area handbook series 

Vietnam 

a country study 




Vietnam 

country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by Ronald J. Cima 
Research Completed 
December 1987 



On the cover: Viet Minh soldier waves the flag of the 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam over General Christian de 
Castries' s bunker following the French defeat at Dien Bien 
Phu, May 7, 1954. 



First Edition, 1989; First Printing, 1989. 

Copyright ®1989 United States Government as represented by 
the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Vietnam: A Country Study 

(Area handbook series) (DA Pam; 550-32) 
Research completed December 1987. 
Bibliography: pp. 335-361. 
Includes index. 

Supt. of Docs, no.: D 101.22:550-32 

1. Vietnam. I. Cima, Ronald J., 1943- 
II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. 
IV. Series: DA Pam; 550-32. 

DS556.3.V54 1989 959.7 88-600482 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-32 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



Acknowledgments 



The authors are indebted to a number of individuals who con- 
tributed their time and specialized knowledge to this volume: 
Dorothy Avery of the Department of State for her insights into the 
Vietnamese political process; William Newcomb of the Department 
of State for his contribution to the discussion on Vietnam's econ- 
omy; Nguyen Phuong Khanh of the Far Eastern Law Division of 
the Library of Congress for sharing her knowledge of Vietnamese 
law; and Bill Herod of the Indochina Project and Douglas Pike 
of the Indochina Archives, Institute of East Asian Studies, Univer- 
sity of California at Berkeley, for making a number of rare photo- 
graphs available for publication. 

The authors also wish to express their appreciation to members 
of the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, whose 
high standards and dedication helped shape this volume. These 
include Sharon Costello, Barbara L. Dash, Marilyn L. Majeska, 
and Ruth Nieland for editing the manuscript; David P. Cabitto, 
Sandra K. Cotugno, and Kimberly A. Lord for their numerous 
contributions to the book's graphics; Susan M. Lender for her 
assistance in preparing maps; Russell G. Swenson for his review 
of textual references to Vietnam's geography; and Arvies J. Staton 
for his contribution to the charts on military ranks and insignia. 
Thanks are also extended to Teresa E. Kamp for her artwork, and 
Harriett R. Blood for preparing the map on Vietnam's topography. 

The following organization and individuals are gratefully 
acknowledged as well: Shirley Kessel for preparing the index; 
Carolyn Hinton for performing the prepublication review; 
Marilyn L. Majeska for managing production; and Diann John- 
son of the Library of Congress Composing Unit for preparing the 
camera- ready copy, under the supervision of Peggy Pixley. 

Finally, the editor wishes to acknowledge Ly H. Burnham and 
Tuyet L. Cosslett for providing an invaluable native Vietnamese 
perspective and language capability; Elizabeth E. Green-Revier 
for her insights into Chinese foreign policy; Elizabeth A. Park and 
Kim E. Colson for their knowledge of telecommunications; Barbara 
Edgerton, Izella Watson, Tracy M. Henry, and Meridel M. 
Jackson for untold hours of word processing; and Russell R. Ross, 
Robert L. Worden, Richard F. Nyrop, and Martha E. Hopkins 
for reviewing all parts of the book. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile xxiii 

Introduction xxxiii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Barbara Leitch LePoer 

EARLY HISTORY 5 

THE CHINESE MILLENNIUM 8 

Chinese Cultural Impact 9 

Political Resistance to the Chinese 11 

NINE CENTURIES OF INDEPENDENCE 14 

The Great Ly Dynasty and the Flowering of 

Buddhism 15 

The Tran Dynasty and the Defeat of the Mongols ... 16 

Renewed Chinese Influence 17 

The Le Dynasty and Southward Expansion 19 

Partition and the Advent of the Europeans 21 

The Tay Son Rebellion 24 

The Nguyen Dynasty and Expanding French 

Influence 26 

UNDER FRENCH RULE 30 

Colonial Administration 32 

Phan Boi Chau and the Rise of Nationalism 35 

Ho Chi Minh and the Communist Movement 40 

The Nghe-Tinh Revolt 43 

WORLD WAR II AND JAPANESE OCCUPATION 45 

Establishment of the Viet Minh 47 

The General Uprising and Independence 50 

FIRST INDOCHINA WAR 54 

Dien Bien Phu 55 

The Aftermath of Geneva 58 

SECOND INDOCHINA WAR 60 

The Fall of Ngo Dinh Diem , 61 



vii 



Escalation of the War 64 

The Tet Offensive 70 

Peace Negotiations 72 

The Final Campaign 76 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment ... 81 

Rinn-Sup Shinn 

GEOGRAPHY 84 

POPULATION 90 

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES 93 

Vietnamese 93 

Minorities 96 

Hoa 101 

THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 102 

Traditional Patterns 102 

Society in the 1954-75 Period 105 

Vietnam after 1975 109 

THE FAMILY 112 

Background 112 

The Family since 1954 116 

RELIGION 120 

Buddhism 120 

Catholicism 123 

Other Faiths 126 

EDUCATION 128 

PUBLIC HEALTH 134 

LIVING CONDITIONS 136 

Chapter 3. The Economy 141 

Tuyet L. Cosslett and William R. Shaw 

ECONOMIC SETTING 144 

Demography 144 

Labor 145 

Natural Resources 146 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 147 

ECONOMIC ROLES OF THE PARTY AND 

THE GOVERNMENT 149 

The Second Five-Year Plan (1976-80) 150 

The Third Five- Year Plan (1981-85) 151 

The Fourth Five- Year Plan (1986-90) 153 

AGRICULTURE 154 

INDUSTRY 158 

INTERNAL COMMERCE 161 



viii 



FOREIGN TRADE AND AID 164 

Foreign Currency Management 167 

Decentralization of Trade 168 

Direction and Composition of Trade 169 

Foreign Investment Policy 170 

Major Trading Partners 170 

External Debt 173 

Foreign Economic Assistance 176 

Overseas Remittances 177 

FINANCE 178 

Budget 178 

Money Supply 179 

Inflation 179 

Prices and Wages 179 

Banking 181 

TRANSPORTATION 181 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS 185 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 187 

Ronald J. Cima 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE 

COMMUNIST PARTY 191 

PARTY ORGANIZATION 195 

The Party Congress and the Central 

Committee 195 

Other Party Organizations 196 

Front Organizations 197 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 199 

POLITICAL CULTURE 200 

THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 204 

Constitutional Evolution 204 

Government Structure 206 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 211 

Laos and Cambodia 213 

China 218 

The Soviet Union 221 

Eastern Europe 224 

The United States 224 

ASEAN . 228 

Thailand 231 

Other Noncommunist Nations 231 

International Organizations 232 

THE MEDIA 232 



ix 



Chapter 5. National Security 237 

Douglas Pike 

OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY 239 

The Tradition of Militancy 240 

Strategic Thinking 242 

Security Concerns 245 

THE ARMED FORCES 248 

History 249 

The Legal-Constitutional Basis of the Military 260 

The Military's Place in Society 261 

Party Control in the Military 267 

Organization 273 

Leadership 282 

Administration 284 

Foreign Military Relations 286 

INTERNAL SECURITY 287 

Problems 289 

Development of the Internal Security System 292 

The Police 293 

Public Security 296 

Law Enforcement 299 

Social Control 303 

Appendix A. Tables 309 

Appendix B. Party Leaders in the 1980s 325 

Bibliography 335 

Glossary 363 

Index 365 

List of Figures 

1. Administrative Divisions of Vietnam, 1985 xxx 

2. Location of Vietnam in Asia, 1987 6 

3. Nam Viet Before Conquest by China in 111 B.C 10 

4. Vietnam (Dai Viet) and Its Neighbors, circa 1350 18 

5. Vietnam's Southern Expansion, A.D. 122-1757 22 

6. French Acquisitions in Indochina in the 

Nineteenth Century 34 

7. Viet Bac, Viet Minh Base Area, 1941-45 46 

8. North Vietnam's Administrative Divisions, 1966 68 

9. South Vietnam's Administrative Divisions, 1966 ........ 69 

10. Topography and Drainage, 1987 88 

11. Population Distribution, 1984 94 



x 



12. Soviet Cooperation Projects, 1985 174 

13. Transportation System, 1987 184 

14. Organization of the Vietnamese Communist 

Party, 1987 . 198 

15. National Government Structure, 1987 212 

16. Rank Insignia of the People's Army of Vietnam 

(PAVN), 1987 256 

17. Military Organization, 1987 264 

18. Organization of the People's Army of Vietnam 

(PAVN), 1987 276 

19. Military Regions, 1986 . 280 



xi 



Preface 



The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, created from the former 
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) and the Democratic Repub- 
lic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), was established as a new nation 
in July 1976. Previous editions in this series discussed the North 
and South separately under the respective titles Area Handbook for 
North Vietnam, published in 1967 and reprinted in 1981 as North 
Vietnam: A Country Study, and Area Handbook for South Vietnam, pub- 
lished in 1967. Written at the height of the Second Indochina War, 
these books described a divided Vietnam that ceased to exist in 
1975 when Saigon fell to communist forces. 

The current study focuses on the years between 1975 and the 
mid-1980s, when a nascent and newly reunified nation struggled 
to develop a postwar identity. It was a period marked by a change 
in leadership, as Vietnam's first generation of communist leaders 
began to retire in favor of younger technocrats; by the introduc- 
tion of significant economic reforms, including the preservation 
of private enterprise in the South; and by major foreign policy devel- 
opments, particularly the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
signed with the Soviet Union, the invasion and occupation of 
Cambodia, and the 1979 border war with China. 

A multidisciplinary team, assisted by a support staff, researched 
and wrote this book. Information came from a variety of sources, 
including scholarly studies, governmental and international organi- 
zation reports, and foreign and domestic newspapers and peri- 
odicals. 

For the reader's reference, a brief commentary on source material 
is provided at the end of each chapter; complete citations appear 
in the Bibliography. Foreign and technical terms are defined when 
they first appear in the text, and other terms that require further 
definition are included in the Glossary. Appendixes provide tabu- 
lar data (see Appendix A) and information on Vietnam's leaders 
in the 1980s (see Appendix B). Use of contemporary place names 
is in accordance with the standards of the United States Board of 
Geographic Names. When place names vary historically, the name 
consistent with the historical period under discussion is used. All 
measurements are metric (see Appendix A, table 1). 



xin 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Date 


Events 




Legendary founding of the Van Lang Kingdom 
by the first Hung Vuong 


2879-258 B.C. 


Hung Dynasty 


257-208 B.C. 


Thuc Dynasty 


207-111 B.C. 


Trieu Dynasty 


1800-1400 B.C. 


Phung Nguyen culture (Early Bronze Age) 




Dong Son culture (Late Bronze Age) 




Kingdom of Au Lac established. 


207 B.C. 


Chinese general Chao Tuo (Trieu Da) founds 
Nan Yueh (Nam Viet). 


Ill B.C. 


Nan Yueh conquered by Han. 


A D. 39 


Trung sisters lead a rebellion against Chinese 
rule. 


43 


Trung sisters' rebellion crushed by Chinese 
general Ma Yuan, and Viet people placed 
under direct Chinese administration lor the 
first time. 


542-544 


Ly Bi leads uprising against China's Liang 
Dynasty and establishes the independent king- 
dom of Van Xuan. 




Early Ly Dynasty 




Ngo Quyen defeats a Chinese invading force at 
the first battle of the Bach Dang River. 


939-968 


Ngo Dynasty 


939-44 


Ngo Quyen rules independent Nam Viet. 


yoo-you 


Dinh Dynasty 


Q70 07^ 

y / u-y / j 


Dinh Bo Linh gains Chinese recognition of 
Nam Viet's independence by establishing a 
tributary relationship with China's Song 
Dynasty. 


980-1009 


Early Le Dynasty 


981 


Le Hoan defeats a Chinese invasion. 


982 


Viet armies invade Champa and destroy its cap- 
ital, Indrapura. 



XV 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



Events 



1009-1225 
1075 



Ly Dynasty 

Minor officials chosen by examination for the 
first time. 



1225-1400 

1257-58 

1284-85 

1287 
1360-90 

1400-1407 

1407-27 

1428 

1428-1527 
1428 

1471 

1483 
1527-92 



Tran Dynasty 

Mongols attack Dai Viet and are defeated. 

Second Mongol invasion and defeat. Resistance 
led by Tran Hung Dao. 

Third Mongol invasion repelled. 

Champa wars. Champa ruled by Che Bong 
Nga. 

Ho Dynasty 

Chinese invasion and occupation 
Le Loi's armies defeat the Chinese. 
Le Dynasty 

Le Loi proclaims himself emperor. The coun- 
try once again named Dai Viet. 

Champa capital of Vijaya falls, ending the 
Champa kingdom. 

Hong Due legal code promulgated. 

Mac Dynasty. Mac rulers control Thang Long 
and the Red River Delta. 



1558-1772 



1627 



Period of opposition between the Trinh and 
Nguyen clans 

Alexandre de Rhodes, Jesuit missionary, arrives 
in Hanoi. 



1771 
1778 



Tay Son Rebellion 

Most of Nguyen clan annihilated by the Tay 
Son. 



1787 



1788 



French missionary Pigneau de Behaine per- 
suades French court to assist in restoration of 
the Nguyen. 

Last Le emperor flees to China. Nguyen Hue 
proclaims himself emperor. 



XVI 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



Events 



1789 
1802 

1802-1945 
1820 

1847 

September 1858 
February 1859 
February 1861 

June 5, 1862 

1863 



Chinese invasion in support of the Le defeated. 

The Nguyen defeat last of Tay Son forces. 
Nguyen Anh accedes to throne as Gia Long 
and establishes his capital at Hue. 

Nguyen Dynasty 

Death of Gia Long. Succeeded by his highly 
sinicized son, Minh Mang. 

French vessels bombard Da Nang. 

French forces seize Da Nang. 

French forces capture Saigon. 

The French defeat the Vietnamese army and 
gain control of Gia Dinh and surrounding 
provinces. 

Treaty of Saigon, which ceded three southern 
provinces — Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, and Dinh 
Tuong — to the French. 

Admiral la Grandiere imposes French protec- 
torate on Cambodia. 



March 1874 



August 1883 



June 1884 



A Franco-Vietnamese treaty confirms French 
sovereignty over Cochinchina and opens the 
Red River to trade. 

Treaty of Protectorate, signed at the Harmond 
Convention, establishes French protectorate 
over Annam and Tonkin. 

Treaty of Hue confirms the Harmond conven- 
tion agreement. 



1885 



Can Vuong movement, calling upon the 
Vietnamese to drive out the French, estab- 
lished. 



1887 

May 19, 1! 
1897-1902 
1904 



Indochinese Union formally established. 

Ho Chi Minh's birth 

Paul Doumer is Governor-General. 

Phan Boi Chau founds Viet Nam Duy Tan Hoi 
(Vietnam Reformation Society). 



October 1911 



Ho Chi Minh departs Vietnam for Europe. 



XVII 



Table A. — Continued 



Date Events 

1912 Phan Boi Chau founds Viet Nam Quang Phuc 

Hoi (Vietnam Restoration Society), replac- 
ing Duy Tan Hoi. 

1919 Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh) attempts to 

meet with President Woodrow Wilson at the 
Versailles Peace Conference to present a pro- 
gram for Vietnamese rights and sovereignty, 
but is turned away. 

1920 Ho Chi Minh participates in founding of the 

French Communist Party. 

1923 Ho Chi Minh's first visit to Moscow 

June-July 1924 Ho Chi Minh attends Fifth Comintern 

Congress. 

1925 Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Menh Dong Chi 

Hoi (Revolutionary Youth League) formed 
in Guangzhou under Ho Chi Minh's 
leadership. 

1926 Ho Chi Minh forms Thanh Nien Cong San 

Doan (Communist Youth League) within the 
larger Thanh Nien organization. 

1927 Nguyen Thai Hoc founds the Vietnam Quoc 

Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnam Nationalist 
Party). 

February 1930 Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, Viet Nam 

Cong San Dang) founded in Hong Kong 
(name changed to Indochinese Communist 
Party, Dong Duong Cong San Dang, in 
October). 

September 1939 World War II begins. 

August 1940 Franco-Japanese treaty, recognizing Japan's 

pre-eminence in Indochina in return for 
nominal recognition of French sovereignty, 
signed. 

February 1941 Ho Chi Minh returns to Vietnam. 

May 1941 ICP Eighth Plenum at Pac Bo establishes the 

Viet Minh (Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh 
Hoi, or League for the Independence of 
Vietnam). 

1942-43 Ho Chi Minh imprisoned in China. 

1944-45 Famine in Tonkin and Annam causes between 

1.5 and 2 million deaths. 



XV111 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



Events 



August 1945 



Japan surrenders and the Viet Minh commences 
the August Revolution, gaining effective con- 
trol over much of Vietnam. 



September 1945 



Ho Chi Minh declares Vietnam's independence 
in Hanoi. 



1946 



Ho Chi Minh visits Paris during negotiations 
with France; hostilities begin following vio- 
lation of agreements. 



1946-54 



1951 



May 7, 1954 
May 8, 1954 
July 21, 1954 

January 1, 1955 
February 12, 1955 
October 26, 1955 
December 20, 1960 



First Indochina War (see Glossary — also known 
as Viet Minh War) 

Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam (Vietnamese Work- 
ers Party — VWP) is founded, succeeding the 
Indochinese Communist Party. 

French surrender at Dien Bien Phu 

Geneva Conference on Indochina opens. 

Geneva Agreements adopted, Vietnam provi- 
sionally divided at the 17th parallel, and Ngo 
Dinh Diem appointed South Vietnam's pre- 
mier by Emperor Bao Dai. 

Direct United States aid to South Vietnam 
begins. 

United States advisers begin training South Viet- 
namese army troops. 

Republic of Vietnam established with Diem its 
first president. 

The National Front for the Liberation of South 
Vietnam (NLF) formed in the South under 
the direction of the Political Bureau. 



December 31, 1961 



United States military personnel in Vietnam 
total about 3,200. 



February 8, 1962 



United States Military Assistance Command- 
Vietnam (MACV) formed under the com- 
mand of General Paul D. Harkins. 



November 1-2, 1963 
August 7, 1964 



Ngo Dinh Diem overthrown and assassinated. 

United States Congress passes the "Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution," authorizing the presi- 
dent of the United States to use force in 
Vietnam to repel attacks on American instal- 
lations. 



XIX 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



Events 



February 7, 1965 
March 9, 1965 
December 31, 1965 
January 30-31, 1968 

January 25, 1969 
May 14, 1969 

June 10, 1969 

September 3, 1969 
April 28, 1970 

March 24, 1971 

March 30, 1972 

January 27, 1973 

March 29, 1973 
March 9, 1975 
April 30, 1975 
July 2, 1976 

December 14-20, 1976 



United States begins bombing military targets 
in North Vietnam. 

First United States ground combat troops land 
in Vietnam at Da Nang. 

United States military personnel in Vietnam to- 
tal 180,000. 

"Tet Offensive," employing coordinated attacks 
on the South' s major cities by North Viet- 
namese and National Liberation Front troops, 
fails to achieve its military objectives but 
erodes American support for the war. 

Four-party peace talks open in Paris. 

United States troop strength in Vietnam peaks 
at 543,000. 

Provisional Revolutionary Government of South 
Vietnam (PRG) formed. 

Ho Chi Minh's death 

Joint United States-Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam force attacks Vietnamese communist 
sanctuaries in Cambodia. 

Operation Lam Son 719. a South Vietnamese 
attack on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, 
ends in defeat. 

People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) .roops 
launch the largest offensive of the war since 
1968. 

Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring 
Peace in Vietnam signed in Paris. 

Last United States troops in Vietnam depart. 

PAVN offensive in the South begins. 

Saigon surrenders. 

The National Assembly proclaims official unifi- 
cation of Vietnam as the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam. 

Fourth National Party Congress. The Viet- 
namese Workers Party renamed the Vietnam 
Communist Party. 



XX 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



Events 



September 20, 1977 
June 29, 1978 

July 3, 1978 

November 3, 1978 

December 21, 1978 
January 7, 1979 

February 17, 1979 
March 5, 1979 
March 1982 
December 1986 



Vietnam admitted to United Nations. 

Vietnam admitted to membership in the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). 

China announces termination of all economic 
assistance to Vietnam. 

Vietnam and the Soviet Union sign a 25-year 
"Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation." 

PAVN forces initiate invasion of Cambodia. 

The Cambodian government of Pol Pot over- 
thrown when Phnom Penh, the capital of 
Cambodia, falls to Vietnamese forces. 

China launches invasion of Vietnam. 

Chinese forces withdrawn from Vietnam 

Fifth National Party Congress 

Sixth National Party Congress 



XXI 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 

Short Form: Vietnam. 

Term for Citizens: Vietnamese. 

Capital: Hanoi. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 331,688 square kilometers. 

Topography: Hills and densely forested mountains, with level land 
covering no more than 20 percent. Mountains account for 40 per- 
cent, hills 40 percent, and forests 75 percent. North consists of 



xxm 



highlands and the Red River Delta; south divided into coastal 
lowlands, Giai Truong Son (central mountains) with high plateaus, 
and Mekong River Delta. 

Climate: Tropical and monsoonal; humidity averages 84 percent 
throughout year. Annual rainfall ranges from 120 to 300 centi- 
meters, and annual temperatures vary between 5°C and 37°C. 

Society 

Population: 64,411,668 (1989 census); 2.1 percent average annual 
population growth rate. Nineteen percent urban; 81 percent rural. 
Population centers Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). 

Languages: Vietnamese official language; also French, various 
Chinese dialects, tribal languages, and English. 

Ethnic Groups: Vietnamese account for 87.5 percent of popula- 
tion (1979 figures). Fifty-three minorities account for remainder, 
including Hoa (Chinese, comprising approximately 1.8 percent), 
Tay, Thai, Khmer, Muong, Nung, Hmong, and numerous moun- 
tain tribes. 

Religion: Mahayana Buddhism, Theravada Buddhism, Cao Dai, 
Hoa Hao, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Hinduism, 
and animism. 

Education and Literacy: Nine years of primary and junior high 
school, three years of secondary school. First nine years compul- 
sory. Manual labor comprises 15 percent of primary curriculum 
and 17 percent of secondary. Ninety-three colleges and universi- 
ties, with close to 130,000 students enrolled, able to admit only 
10 percent of applicants. Education emphasizes training of skilled 
workers, technicians, and managers. Students, nevertheless, tend 
to avoid vocational schools and specialized middle schools because 
they are believed to preclude entry to high-status occupations. Liter- 
acy 78 percent (for all age groups). 

Health: Total of approximately 11,000 hospitals, medical aid sta- 
tions, public health stations, and village maternity clinics, staffed 
by 240,000 medical personnel. Approximately 1 physician per 1,000 
persons. Life expectancy sixty-three years. Malaria, tuberculosis, 
and other communicable diseases prevalent. Government under- 
taken a campaign to improve cleanliness by launching "Three 
Cleans Movement" (clean food, water, and living conditions) and 
"Three Exterminations Movement" (exterminate flies, mosquitos, 
and rats). 



xxiv 



Economy 

Salient Features: In 1984 gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary) stood at US$18.1 billion, US$300 per capita at official ex- 
change rate of 12.1 dong to US$1 (actual per capita income is closer 
to US$200). Produced National Income (PNI — see Glossary) grew 
by 2.1 percent in 1987, down from 3.3 percent in 1986. 

Agriculture: Major agricultural products produced in 1985: grain 
(18.2 million tons), sugar (434,000 tons), tea (26,000 tons), coffee 
(6,000 tons), and rubber (52,000 tons). Agriculture represented 
51 percent of PNI. 

Industry: Thirty-two percent of PNI in 1985; major industries in- 
cluded electricity (5.4 billion kilowatt hours), coal (60 million tons), 
steel (57,000 tons), cement (1.4 million tons), cloth (80 million 
square meters), paper (75,000 tons), fish sauce (174 million liters), 
and processed sea fish (550,000 tons). Mineral resources included 
iron ore, tin, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, manganese, titanium, chro- 
mite, tungsten, bauxite, apatite, graphite, mica, silica sand, and 
limestone. 

Energy Sources: Timber, coal, offshore oil deposits. 

Foreign Trade: Exports totaled US$739.5 million in 1986. Prin- 
cipal exports consisted of coal, rubber, rice, tea, coffee, wood, and 
marine products. Imports totaled US$2.5 billion in 1986. Principal 
imports consisted of petroleum products, fertilizers, rice, and steel. 
In 1986 total debt estimated at nearly US$7.7 billion. According 
to figures given to International Monetary Fund by Hanoi, from 
1981-85 Vietnam's debt to communist bloc countries rose from 
US$3 billion to more than US$6 billion. Trade deficit with the 
Soviet Union grew from US$224 million in 1976 to US$1.5 bil- 
lion in 1986. 

Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: Total of 4,250 kilometers of track. Most important sec- 
tion connects Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. 

Roads: Some 85,000 kilometers of road; of which 9,400 kilometers 
paved, 48,700 kilometers gravel or improved earth, and 26,900 
kilometers unimproved. 

Maritime Shipping: 125 vessels, including 80 coastal freighters, 
12 oil tankers, and 15 ocean-going freighters. Total of thirty-two 
ports, of which nine major ports. Three largest located at Da Nang, 
Haiphong, and Ho Chi Minh City. 



xxv 



Civil Aviation: Controlled by military. Domestic air service con- 
nects Hanoi with Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang, Pleiku, Da Lat, 
Buon Me Thuot, Phu Bai, and Nha Trang. Ho Chi Minh City 
also connected to Rach Gia, Phu Quoc, and Con Son Island. In- 
ternational air service connects Hanoi with Vientiane, Phnom Penh, 
Moscow, and Bangkok. Total of 128 usable airfields, 46 with sur- 
faced runways. 

Telecommunications: Two satellite-ground communications sta- 
tions linking Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Moscow, and integrat- 
ing Vietnam into Soviet Intersputnik Communication Satellite 
Organization. 

Government and Politics 

Party and Government: Democratic Republic of (North) and 
former Republic of (South) Vietnam united to form Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam on July 2, 1976. Constitution adopted in 1980 
stipulates National Assembly as highest governing body. Members 
serve five-year terms and nominally directly elected by electorate. 
Council of State, which serves as collective presidency, and Council 
of Ministers, which manages governmental activities, nominally 
accountable to, and elected by, National Assembly. Political power 
effectively in hands of Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, Viet 
Nam Cong San Dang). Most government positions filled by party 
members, who act at direction of party. Party led by National Party 
Congress, which meets infrequently. Congress elects Central Com- 
mittee, which in turn elects Political Bureau, party's highest policy- 
making body. 

Administrative Divisions: Country divided into thirty-six 
provinces, three autonomous municipalities, and one special zone. 
Provinces divided into districts, towns, and capitals. 

Judicial System: Supreme People's Court; local People's Courts 
at provincial, district, and city levels; military tribunals; and Peo- 
ple's Supreme Organ of Control. National Assembly elects Procu- 
rator General, who heads People's Supreme Organ of Control and 
performs overall administration of justice. 

Foreign Affairs: Vietnam dominated Laos through numerous 
Hanoi-dictated cooperation agreements; most important — Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1977. Occupied Cambo- 
dia as result of military conquest in January 1979 and subsequently 
negotiated Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Relations with 
China marked by China's limited invasion in 1979 and frequent 



xxvi 



border skirmishes. Formally aligned with Soviet Union through 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in November 1978. 
Both countries shared membership in Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon — see Glossary); Soviet Union largest donor 
of economic and military aid. Limited governmental and commer- 
cial ties established with all Association for Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) members but prevented from developing further by 
ASEAN's opposition to Vietnam's Cambodia policy. In 1988 no 
diplomatic relations with United States, which maintained economic 
boycott against Vietnam and stressed Vietnam's cooperation in 
accounting for servicemen missing in action as prerequisite to nor- 
mal relations. Admitted to membership in United Nations in 1977. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Largest military force in Southeast Asia and third 
largest force in the world after China and the Soviet Union. Esti- 
mated in 1987 to total over 5 million: army, 1.2 million; navy, 
15,000; air force, 20,000; Regional Force, 500,000; Militia- Self 
Defense Force, 1.2 million; Armed Youth Assault Force, 1,500,000; 
and Tactical Rear Force, 500,000. 

Combat Units and Major Equipment: Command structure 
divided geographically into military theaters and military regions 
or zones. Tactically divided into corps, divisions, brigades, regi- 
ments, and battalions, companies, platoons, and squads. Army 
comprised eight corps (each numbering 30,000 to 50,000 troops). 
In 1986 total of thirty-eight regular infantry divisions: nineteen in 
Cambodia, ten in northern Vietnam, six in central and southern 
Vietnam, and three in Laos. Thirteen economic construction di- 
visions, which carried burden of 1979 war with China, deployed 
in China border region. Army equipped with 1,600 Soviet-made 
T-34/-54/-55/-62, Type-59 tanks and 450 PT-76 and type 60/63 
light tanks; 2,700 reconnaissance vehicles; some 600 artillery guns 
and howitzers, unspecified number of multiple rocket launchers, 
mortars, and antitank weapons; and 3,000 air defense weapons. 
Navy, with Soviet assistance, largest naval force in Southeast Asia 
in 1986. Five naval regions, headquartered at Da Nang, Haiphong, 
Vinh, Vung Tau, and Rach Gia. Navy equipped with 2 principal 
combat vessels, 192 patrol boats, 51 amphibious warfare ships, 104 
landing ships, and 133 auxiliary craft. Approximately 1,300 
ex-United States, South Vietnamese naval vessels, naval and civilian 
junks and coasters augment this force. Air Force divided into seven- 
teen air regiments, (seven attack fighter plane regiments, four basic 
and advanced training regiments, three cargo transport regiments, 



xxvii 



three helicopter regiments, and one light bomber force), headquar- 
tered at Noi Bai (Hanoi), Da Nang, Tho Xuan, and Tan Son Nhut 
(Ho Chi Minh City). Air Force equipped with some 450 combat 
aircraft (including 225 MiG-21s), 225 trainers, 350 cargo-transport 
planes, 600 helicopters, and 60 light bombers. 

Military Budget: No expenditure estimates available. Military aid 
from Soviet Union estimated about US$1.5 billion annually be- 
ginning in 1986. 

Police Agencies and Paramilitary: Police functions vested in Peo- 
ple's Security Force (PSF), People's Public Security Force (PPSF), 
and People's Armed Security Force (PASF). PSF strictly law en- 
forcement agency operating chiefly in urban rather than rural areas. 
PASF composed of party security cadres and PAVN personnel con- 
cerned with illegal political acts and insurgency movements as well 
as criminal activity. 

Foreign Military Alliances: Friendship and cooperation treaties 
signed with Laos in 1977, Soviet Union in 1978, and Cambodia 
in 1979. 



xxviii 




Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Vietnam, 1985 



xxx 




Figure 1. (continued) 



XXXI 



Introduction 



The victory of communist forces in Vietnam in April 1975 ranks 
as one of the most politically significant occurrences of the post- 
World War II era in Asia. The speed with which the North finally 
seized the South, and the almost simultaneous communist victo- 
ries in Laos and Cambodia, were stunning achievements. The col- 
lapse of the three Indochinese noncommunist governments brought 
under communist control a region that, over the course of four de- 
cades of war, had become the focus of United States policy for the 
containment of communism in Asia. The achievement was even 
more phenomenal for having been accomplished in the face of de- 
termined United States opposition and for having called into ques- 
tion the very policy of containing communism. 

The events of April 1975 prepared the way for the official re- 
unification of North and South in 1976, some three decades after 
Ho Chi Minh first proclaimed Vietnam's independence under one 
government in September 1945 and more than a century after 
France divided Vietnam in order to rule its regions separately. The 
departure of defeated Japanese troops, who had occupied Vietnam 
during World War II, had created the opportunity for Vietnamese 
communists to seize power in August 1945, before French authori- 
ties were able to return to reclaim control of the government. Com- 
munist rule was cut short, however, by Nationalist Chinese and 
British occupation forces whose presence tended to support the 
Communist Party's political opponents. Between 1945 and 1975, 
the generation of communists responsible for victory in the South 
pursued a lengthy war for independence from the French, ac- 
quiesced temporarily to division of the country into a communist 
North and noncommunist South, and engaged in a subsequent war 
for control of the South against a southern regime supported by 
the United States. Reunification and independence, however, were 
goals that predated the communists. They were the long-established 
objectives of Ho Chi Minh's nationalist and anticolonialist predeces- 
sors, who had resisted Chinese rule for 1,000 years and French 
domination for a century. 

Indeed, Vietnam's unrelenting resistance to foreign interven- 
tion remains a dominant Vietnamese historical theme, manifested 
in the repeated waging of dau tranh, or struggle to gain a long-term 
objective through total effort, and motivated by chinh nghia, or just 
cause. Vietnam's communist leaders claim that every Vietnamese 
has been a soldier in this struggle. Paradoxically, Vietnam's fierce 



xxxm 



determination to remain free of foreign domination has often been 
combined with an equally strong willingness to accept foreign in- 
fluence. Historically, the pattern has been to adapt foreign ideas 
to indigenous conditions whenever they applied. 

China was the chief source of Vietnam's foreign ideas and the 
earliest threat to its national sovereignty. Beginning in the first cen- 
tury B.C., China's Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) imposed 
Chinese rule that endured for ten centuries despite repeated Viet- 
namese uprisings and acts of rebellion. Only the collapse of the 
Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907) in the early tenth century enabled 
Vietnamese national hero Ngo Quyen to re-establish Vietnam's 
independence a generation later. The Vietnamese subsequently 
were able to fend off further invasion attempts for 900 years (see 
The Chinese Millennium and Nine Centuries of Independence, 
ch. 1). 

Whether ruled by China or independent, the Vietnamese elite 
consistently modeled Vietnamese cultural institutions on those of 
the Chinese. Foremost among such Chinese institutions was Con- 
fucianism, after which Vietnamese family, bureaucratic, and so- 
cial structures were patterned. The Vietnamese upper classes tended 
also to study Chinese classical literature and to use the Chinese 
system of ideographs in writing. Emperor Gia Long, in a particu- 
larly obvious act of imitation in the early nineteenth century, even 
modeled his new capital at Hue after the Chinese capital at Bei- 
jing. The process of sinicization, however, tended to coexist with, 
rather than to replace, traditional Vietnamese culture and language. 
Imitation of the Chinese was largely confined to the elite classes. 
Traditional Vietnamese society, on the other hand, was sustained 
by the large peasant class, which was less exposed to Chinese in- 
fluence. 

Vietnam's lengthy period of independence ended in 1862, when 
Emperor Tu Due, agreeing to French demands, ceded three 
provinces surrounding Saigon to France. During the colonial 
period, from 1862 to 1954, resistance to French rule was led by 
members of the scholar-official class, whose political activities did 
not involve the peasantry and hence failed. The success of the com- 
munists, on the other hand, was derived from their ability to or- 
ganize and retain the peasantry's support. The Vietnamese 
Communist Party (VCP, Viet Nam Cong San Dang) and its vari- 
ous communist antecedents presented Marxism-Leninism as an ef- 
fective means of recovering the independence that was Vietnam's 
tradition. Belief in this ideal was instrumental in sustaining North- 
ern and Southern peasant-based communist forces during the 
lengthy Second Indochina War, which lasted from 1954 to 1975. 



xxxiv 



In the post- 1975 period, however, it was immediately apparent 
that the popularity and effectiveness of the communist party's war- 
time policies did not necessarily extend to its peacetime nation- 
building plans. Having unified the North and South politically, 
the VCP still had to integrate them socially and economically. In 
this task, VCP policy-makers were confronted with Southern 
resistance to change, as well as traditional animosities arising from 
cultural and historical differences between the North and South. 
The situation was further complicated by a deterioration in eco- 
nomic conditions that ignited an unprecedented level of discon- 
tent among low-level VCP members and open criticism of VCP 
policies. The party appeared to be in a state of transition, waver- 
ing over the pace and manner of the South' s integration with the 
North and debating the place of reform in development strategy. 
The first generation communist leaders, co-founders of the party 
together with Ho Chi Minh, were aging and were beginning to 
step down in favor of younger, often reform-minded technocrats. 
The Sixth National Party Congress held in December 1986 was 
a milestone; it marked the end of the party's revolutionary period, 
when social welfare and modernization were subordinate to secu- 
rity concerns, and the beginning of a time when experimentation 
and reform were encouraged to stimulate development (see Party 
Organization, ch. 4). 

In the 1980s, Vietnam ranked third in population — 60 million — 
and first in population density — an average of 182 persons per 
square kilometer — among the world's communist nations. A 
2-percent annual population growth rate and uneven population 
distribution adversely affected resource allocation, work force com- 
position, and land use. Population projections indicated a popula- 
tion of 80 million by the year 2000, if the growth rate remained 
unchanged. The Fourth National Party Congress in December 1976 
stressed the need to curtail the population growth rate and in- 
troduced a plan to relocate 54 million people to 1 million hectares 
of previously uncultivated land, now organized into "new economic 
zones," by the mid-1990s. As of 1988, however, progress toward 
the plan's fulfillment was considerably behind schedule (see Popu- 
lation, ch. 2). 

A predominantly rural society with more than half of its work 
force committed to agriculture, Vietnam had a standard of living 
that remained one of the poorest in the world. A series of harvest 
shortfalls that reduced food supplies and a scarcity of foreign 
exchange that made it difficult to replenish food reserves contributed 
to this condition. Shortages of raw materials and energy forced 
production facilities to operate at considerably less than full capacity, 



xxxv 



and the party bureaucracy remained incapable of acting quickly 
enough to reduce shortages (see Economic Setting, ch. 3). 

Economic development prospects for the 1980s and 1990s were 
tied to party economic policy in critical ways. Party leaders, in estab- 
lishing economic policy at the Fourth National Party Congress, 
envisioned Vietnam's post-reunification economy to be in a "period 
of transition to socialism." The plan, or series of plans, called for 
the economy to evolve through three phases: The first, outlining 
the objectives of the Second Five-Year Plan (1976-80), set extremely 
high goals for industrial and agricultural production while also giv- 
ing high priority to construction, reconstruction, and the integra- 
tion of the North and the South. The second, entitled "socialist 
industrialization," was divided into two stages — from 1981 to 1990 
and from 1991 to 2005. During these stages, the material and tech- 
nical foundations of communism were to be constructed, and de- 
velopment plans were to focus equally on agriculture and industry. 
The third and final phase, covering the years from 2006 to 2010, 
was to be a time set aside to "perfect the transitional period." 

By 1979, however, it was obvious to Vietnam's leaders that the 
Second Five-Year Plan would fail to meet its goals and that the 
long-range goals established for the transition period were unrealis- 
tic. The economy continued to be dominated by small-scale pro- 
duction, low productivity, high unemployment, material and 
technological shortages, and insufficient food and consumer goods. 

The Fifth National Party Congress, held in March 1982, ap- 
proved the economic goals of the Third Five-Year Plan (1981-85). 
The policies introduced were comparatively liberal and called for 
the temporary retention of private capitalist activities in the South, 
in order to spur economic growth. By sanctioning free enterprise, 
the congress ended the nationalization of small business concerns 
and reversed former policies that sought the immediate transfor- 
mation of the South to communism. The July 1984 Sixth Plenum 
of the Fifth National Party Congress' Central Committee confirmed 
the party's earlier decision, recognizing that the private sector's 
domination over wholesale and retail trade in the South could not 
be eliminated until the state was capable of assuming that respon- 
sibility. Proposals subsequently were made to upgrade the state's 
economic sophistication by decentralizing planning procedures and 
improving the managerial skills of government and party officials. 
To attract foreign currency and expertise, the government approved 
a new foreign investment code in December 1987 (see Economic 
Roles of the Party and the Government, ch. 3). 

Vietnam's security considerations in the 1980s also represented 
a new set of challenges to the party. Until the fall of the South 



xxxvi 



Vietnamese government in 1975, the party had relegated foreign 
policy to a secondary position behind the more immediate concerns 
of national liberation and reunification. Once the Second Indochina 
War had ended, however, the party needed to look outward and 
re-evaluate foreign policy, particularly as it applied to Cambodia, 
China, the Soviet Union, member nations of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United States and other 
Western nations (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). 

By the end of the 1970s, the Vietnamese were threatened on two 
fronts, a condition which Vietnam had not faced previously, even 
at the height of the Second Indochina War. Conflict between Viet- 
namese and Cambodian communists on their common border 
began almost immediately after their respective victories in 1975. 
To neutralize the threat, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in Decem- 
ber 1978 and overran Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, driv- 
ing out the incumbent Khmer Rouge communist regime and 
initiating a prolonged military occupation of the country. Vietnam's 
relations with China, a seemingly staunch ally during the Second 
Indochina War, subsequently reached their nadir, when China 
retaliated against Vietnam's incursion into Cambodia by launch- 
ing a limited invasion of Vietnam in February and March 1979. 
Relations between the two countries had actually been deteriorat- 
ing for some time. Territorial disagreements, which had remained 
dormant during the war against the South, were revived at the war's 
end, and a postwar campaign engineered by Hanoi to limit the 
role of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese (Hoa) community in domestic 
commerce elicited a strong Chinese protest. China was displeased 
with Vietnam primarily, however, because of its rapidly improv- 
ing relationship with the Soviet Union. 

A new era in Vietnamese foreign relations began in 1978, when 
Hanoi joined the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assis- 
tance (Comecon) and signed the Soviet- Vietnamese Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow. The agreement called 
for mutual assistance and consultation in the event either was 
threatened by a third country. A secret protocol accompanying the 
treaty also permitted Soviet use of Vietnamese airport and harbor 
facilities, particularly the former United States military complex 
at Cam Ranh Bay. In return, Vietnam acquired military and eco- 
nomic aid needed to undertake an invasion of Cambodia and was 
able to exploit Soviet influence as a deterrent to Chinese interven- 
tion (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). 

During the 1980s, after China had cut off military assistance to 
Vietnam, such aid — amounting to US$200 to $300 million annually — 
was almost exclusively Soviet in origin. As Vietnam's primary 



xxxvii 



source of economic aid as well, the Soviet Union during this period 
provided close to US$1 billion annually in balance-of-payments 
aid, project assistance, and oil price subsidies. 

Vietnam's growing dependence on the Soviet Union concerned 
Hanoi's Southeast Asian neighbors. As did China, the ASEAN 
nations thought that the relationship provided a springboard for 
Soviet influence in the region and that Soviet support provided a 
critical underpinning for Vietnam's Cambodia policy. The ASEAN 
nations assumed a key role in rallying United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly opposition to Vietnam's interference in Cambodia and 
led the UN in preventing the Vietnamese-supported regime in 
Phnom Penh from assuming Cambodia's General Assembly seat. 
ASEAN members were instrumental in combining — at least on 
paper — the various Cambodian communist and noncommunist fac- 
tions opposing the Vietnamese into a single resistance coalition. 

The decision to intervene militarily in Cambodia further isolated 
Vietnam from the international community. The United States, 
in addition to citing Vietnam's minimal cooperation in account- 
ing for Americans who were missing in action (MIAs) as an ob- 
stacle to normal relations, barred normal ties as long as Vietnamese 
troops occupied Cambodia. In 1987 Washington also continued 
to enforce the trade embargo imposed on Hanoi at the conclusion 
of the war in 1975. 

Normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States, 
however, was not a primary Vietnamese foreign policy objective 
in 1987. The sizable economic benefits it would yield, plus its stra- 
tegic value, remained secondary to other more immediate secur- 
ity concerns, although the potential economic benefits were judged 
sizable. Instead, Vietnam prepared to enter the 1990s with for- 
eign relations priorities that stressed extrication from the military 
stalemate in Cambodia in a manner consistent with security needs, 
repair of ties with China to alleviate Chinese military pressure on 
Vietnam's northern border, and reduction of military and economic 
dependence on the Soviet Union. 

Domestic and foreign policy in 1987 reflected changes initiated 
by the elevation of reformer Nguyen Van Linh to VCP general 
secretary at the Sixth National Party Congress. Policies were charac- 
terized by a program of political and economic experimentation 
that was similar to contemporary reform agendas undertaken in 
China and the Soviet Union. The goal of all three nations was to 
pursue economic development at the cost of some compromise of 
communist ideological orthodoxy. In the case of Vietnam, however, 
the conservative members of the leadership continued to view ortho- 
doxy as an ultimate goal. According to their plan, the stress on 



xxxviii 



economic development was only a momentary emphasis; the real 
goal remained the perfection of Vietnam's communist society. 

* * * 

In 1988 and 1989, the years immediately following completion 
of research and writing of this book, Vietnam's foreign and domestic 
policies were increasingly determined by economic considerations. 
The mood of dramatic economic and political reform, inspired by 
the Sixth National Party Congress and Linh's appointment to party 
leadership, however, appeared to have dissipated, and the mood 
of confidence that had prevailed in 1987 gradually evaporated as 
disagreement among Political Bureau members over the pace of 
change stymied the implementation of many policy innovations. 

A campaign for political and economic renewal (doi moi) was 
launched by Linh immediately following the congress, but the 
progress of change, particularly economic change, failed to meet 
expectations. Linh was strongly opposed within the party's leader- 
ship, and his economic reforms were initially stalled or blocked by 
the resistance efforts of a strong conservative coalition of party lead- 
ers, made up of ideological conservatives, bureaucrats, and mem- 
bers of the military establishment. 

Linh's initiatives for dealing with the country's economic 
problems were bold, but the coalition of conservative party lead- 
ers opposing his policies effectively denied him the consensus he 
needed to implement his plans. Consequently, his powers to effect 
change appeared to wane as the severity of the country's economic 
crisis deepened. 

Despite their opposition to reform policy, reform, per se, was 
viewed as "correct" by most, if not all, members of Vietnam's 
Political Bureau. A member's position on the subject, however, 
was probably determined less by his view of the process in the 
abstract than by his willingness to undertake risk, and in 1988 and 
1989 the non-risk takers appeared to have the upper hand. 

In March 1988 Prime Minister Pham Hung died, and Linh's 
choice of conservative Do Muoi over fellow reformer Vo Van Kiet 
to replace him was viewed as a clear concession to the non-risk 
takers. National Assembly members, however, for the first time 
challenged the central committee's nominee for a key government 
post by demanding that two candidates be permitted to run. Muoi, 
the party's choice, was required to face Vo Van Kiet, the nominee 
of delegates from the south. 

The dissent displayed in the debate leading to Muoi's selection 
was not isolated, but mirrored a dramatic increase in all political 



xxxix 



debate and discussion in 1988. The October 1988 meeting of the 
Congress of National Trade Unions, for example, was extremely 
critical of the government's economic failures. Similarly, the Fourth 
Session of the Eighth National Assembly, held in December 1988, 
heatedly debated the issues. It was conducted without the customary 
Central Committee meeting beforehand and, on the surface, ap- 
peared to be acting without Central Committee guidance. 

Lastly, a campaign against corruption, initiated by Nguyen Van 
Linh in 1987, invited private and official criticism of public policy 
and encouraged the press to take the lead in uncovering corrup- 
tion. By early 1988, the campaign had resulted in the replacement 
of almost all of the country's 40 province secretaries and 80 per- 
cent of the 400 or so district party chiefs. Eleven hundred party 
cadres were tried for corruption in the first six months of the year, 
and the press was credited with the party's removal of Ha Truong 
Hoa, the party Provincial Secretary of Thanh Hoa, whose posi- 
tion had widely been regarded as impregnable despite his well 
publicized abuses of office. The policy of encouraging criticism, 
however, was mysteriously reversed in early 1989 when the press 
was urged to moderate its criticism of the Party. It was speculated 
that the reversal was meant to appease conservatives within the 
Political Bureau who were concerned about the erosion of party 
authority caused by public criticism. 

Party leaders themselves, however, continued to be critical of 
party policy. Nguyen The Phan, the head of the theoretical depart- 
ment of the Marxist-Leninist Institute, for example, told a Janu- 
ary 1989 meeting of high-ranking officials that by following the 
Soviet economic model, Vietnam had developed a centralized and 
subsidized economic system "inferior to capitalism," and "had 
abolished motivation in people and society." He called on party 
leaders to learn about marketplace competition from capitalist 
countries. 

Goals established and reinforced at the December 1988 meet- 
ing of the Eighth National Assembly were consistent with this 
theme. The primary goal was described as development of an econ- 
omy that was less controlled by the government and more subject 
to the rules of the marketplace. This was to be achieved by sub- 
jecting all economic transactions to the standards of basic business 
accountability and by expanding the private sector. Centralized 
bureaucratism was to be abolished, and some state-run economic 
establishments were to be guaranteed autonomy in their business 
practices. Lastly, the system of state subsidies for food, import- 
export operations, or for losses incurred by state-run enterprises 
was scheduled to be eliminated. 



xl 



Beginning in 1988, individual farmers were given more respon- 
sibility for the rice growing process in order to increase their in- 
centive to produce higher yields. Land tenure laws were modified 
to guarantee farmers a ten-year tenure on the land, and the con- 
tract system between peasants and the government was revised to 
permit peasants to keep 45 to 50 percent of their output rather than 
the 25 percent previously allowed. Other reforms removed restric- 
tions on private-production enterprises in Hanoi and introduced 
the concept of developing industry outside the state-run sector. A 
law passed in January 1989 helped free the economy from central 
control by granting entrepreneurs the right to pool their capital 
and set up their own business organizations. Such concessions were 
of particular assistance to entrepreneurs in the South, where the 
economy in 1988 and 1989 was more or less directed by its own 
momentum, and where it had become increasingly evident that 
Vietnam's economic planners had opted to exploit the region's eco- 
nomic potential rather than stifle it by employing rigid controls. 

The sixth plenum of the party Central Committee (Sixth Party 
Congress), held in late March 1989, concluded, however, that 
despite the establishment of goals and the introduction of some new 
policies, little was actually being accomplished because local cadres 
were failing to implement reform plans or institutionalize party reso- 
lutions in a timely manner. The plenum, therefore, resolved to em- 
phasize the implementation and institutionalization of reforms and 
resolutions already introduced in order to accelerate the process. 

Chinese student pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing a few 
months later were watched very closely by Vietnam's leaders. In 
their view, the disaffection demonstrated by Chinese students had 
resulted directly from China's experimentation with political and 
economic reforms. Having undertaken similar changes, they were 
concerned that Vietnam was equally vulnerable to displays of 
unrest. To avoid China's experience, the government reportedly 
dealt with student protesters in Hanoi in May 1989 by acceding 
to their demands for improved conditions. Progress toward greater 
political liberalization, however, was subsequently checked. 

Vietnam's world view noticeably altered in the closing years of 
the 1980s, moving from an ideologically dominated perspective, 
stressing Vietnam's independence and the division of the world 
into communist and noncommunist camps, to a nonideological view 
emphasizing Vietnam's role in a complex world of economic in- 
terdependence. The most significant example of a foreign policy 
initiative motivated by this view was the decision, announced in 
early 1989, to remove all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia by 
the end of September 1989. By disengaging from Cambodia, 



xli 



Vietnam hoped to remove the single largest obstacle to gaining 
admission to the regional and world economic community and to 
convince its noncommunist neighbors, the West, and China, that 
it was ready to end its diplomatic and economic isolation. 

Ending the Cambodian conflict itself, however, was another mat- 
ter, and as events unfolded in 1988 and 1989 it was not clear whether 
Vietnam's withdrawal would expedite or prolong a resolution. In- 
itially, the possibility of ending the stalemate appeared to improve. 
Acting entirely on his own initiative, resistance leader Prince Noro- 
dom Sihanouk, in December 1987, arranged unprecedented direct 
dialogues between himself and Hun Sen, the premier of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of Kampuchea. Although they failed to yield major 
results, the talks nevertheless initiated valuable face-to-face discus- 
sions between representatives of both sides and introduced diplo- 
macy as a means of ending the conflict. 

In May 1988, eleven days after the Soviets began their troop 
withdrawal from Afghanistan and three days before a Moscow sum- 
mit between President Reagan and Soviet Secretary Gorbachev 
was to convene, Vietnam announced plans to withdraw 50,000 
troops by the end of the year. The withdrawal, commencing in 
June and ending in December as promised, involved not only the 
removal of troops, but also the dismantling of Vietnam's military 
high command in Cambodia and the reassignment of remaining 
troops to Cambodian commands. 

In July 1988, Hanoi participated in the first meeting of all par- 
ties in the Cambodia conflict. The "cocktail party" meeting, or 
Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM), convened in Bogor, Indonesia, 
was termed a limited success because, if nothing more, it estab- 
lished a negotiating framework and set the agenda for future dis- 
cussion. However, it also shifted the emphasis of the search for a 
conflict resolution away from Vietnam and to the question of how 
to prevent the Khmer Rouge from seizing power once a political 
agreement was reached. At the meeting, Vietnam linked a total 
withdrawal of its troops to the elimination of the Khmer Rouge 
and won the support of the ASEAN nations and the noncommunist 
factions of the Cambodian resistance coalition, who also feared that 
Pol Pot would return to power in the absence of Vietnamese forces. 

A second "informal" meeting of the four Cambodian factions, 
held in February 1989, ended inconclusively, deadlocked on fun- 
damental issues such as the shape of the international force that 
was to supervise an agreement and the manner in which a quad- 
ripartite authority to rule in Phnom Penh would be established. 
The February meeting was followed by a month-long international 
conference, held in Paris in August 1989 and attended by twenty 



xlii 



nations, which also ended short of a comprehensive agreement. 
Although the conference had been called to help mediate a settle- 
ment between the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh 
and the three-member resistance coalition, it foundered over find- 
ing an appropriate place for the Khmer Rouge once Vietnam's 
troop withdrawal was complete. Thus in September 1989, on the 
eve of the withdrawal, the promise of an impending political set- 
tlement in Cambodia remained unfulfilled. Instead, the inability 
of the four factions to arrive at a compromise renewed prospects 
for an escalation of conflict on the battlefield. 

In 1988 one of Vietnam's top foreign policy priorities was find- 
ing a way to cut China's support for the Khmer Rouge. China, 
Hanoi argued, was the key to a Cambodian resolution because, 
as Pol Pot's chief source of supply, Beijing alone had the power 
to defuse the Khmer Rouge threat. As the year progressed, it be- 
came increasingly evident that Beijing was more interested in a 
settlement than in prolonging the conflict and that its position on 
Cambodia was shifting to facilitate settlement. This fact was evi- 
denced in July 1988 when a Chinese proposal, repeating long- 
standing demands for a complete withdrawal of all Vietnamese 
troops and a quadripartite government led by Sihanouk, surpris- 
ingly ruled out a personal role for Pol Pot in any post-settlement 
government. The proposal was also novel because it intimated that 
Beijing, for the first time, was willing to discuss a provisional coa- 
lition government before the departure of all Vietnamese troops. 
At the International Conference on the conflict held in August 1989, 
the Chinese appeared to be undercutting their support for the 
Khmer Rouge by arguing that civil war was to be avoided at all 
costs and promising to cut off military aid once a settlement was 
reached. China's position on the Khmer Rouge nevertheless re- 
mained ambiguous. 

In a 1988 incident, possibly related to Cambodia because it poten- 
tially strengthened China's position at a future bargaining table, 
the ongoing dispute between China and Vietnam over sovereignty 
to the Spratly Islands erupted into an unprecedented exchange of 
hostilities. The situation was reduced to an exchange of accusa- 
tions following the armed encounter. Vietnam's repeated calls for 
China to settie the dispute diplomatically won rare support for Viet- 
nam from the international community, but elicited littie response 
from Beijing. 

A conciliatory mood developed on both sides of the Sino- 
Vietnamese border in 1989, partly because Vietnam's proposal to 
withdraw completely from Cambodia responded to a basic Chinese 
condition for improved relations. Formal talks at the deputy foreign 



xliii 



minister level were initiated, and a cross-border trade in Chinese 
and Vietnamese goods flourished in the Vietnamese border town 
of Lang Son. The internal turmoil experienced by China in May 
and June 1989 may have actually benefited the relationship from 
Vietnam's point of view. Historically, whenever Beijing had been 
forced to turn its attention inward to quell internal dissension, Viet- 
nam's security situation had correspondingly improved. 

Beijing's interest in improving ties with Moscow in 1988 and 
1989, however, complicated the situation and put Vietnam increas- 
ingly at odds with the Soviet Union. As the reality of an eventual 
Sino-Soviet reconciliation approached, it became increasingly clear 
that Vietnamese and Soviet strategic interests did not always coin- 
cide. The presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, for exam- 
ple, was the leading obstacle to Sino-Soviet reconciliation. 
Accordingly, the most significant development to occur in Soviet- 
Vietnamese relations in 1988 and 1989 was the application of 
increased Soviet pressure on Vietnam to resolve the Cambodian 
situation, a pressure that undoubtedly helped prompt Vietnam's 
policy of withdrawal. 

Hanoi was naturally wary of any talks between the Soviet Union 
and China, fearing that a deal would be made on Cambodia at 
Vietnam's expense. The two powers convened bilateral discussions 
in Beijing in August 1988 and proceeded to normalize relations 
at a summit meeting in Beijing in May 1989. Very little with regard 
to Cambodia was actually accomplished, however, and the sum- 
mit resulted simply in the two sides agreeing to "disagree" on the 
mechanics of a political solution. 

By actively pursuing an end to the Cambodian conflict, Viet- 
nam acted also to further the chances of normalizing its relations 
with the United States. Both sides in 1988 appeared particularly 
receptive to improving relations, and Vietnam's troop withdrawal 
as well as its participation in the JIM were interpreted by the United 
States as positive gestures directed toward Vietnam's disengage- 
ment from Cambodia, a requirement imposed by Washington for 
diplomatic recognition. Hanoi also acted, in the early part of the 
year, to remove other obstacles to recognition by agreeing in prin- 
ciple to resettlement in the United States of thousands of former 
political prisoners and by consenting to cooperate in joint excava- 
tions of United States military aircraft crash sites in an attempt 
to locate the remains of Americans missing in action (MIAs). Some 
remains were returned. In 1989, additional sets of MIA remains 
were returned, and an accord was reached between Vietnam and 
the United States granting re-education camp inmates who had 
worked for the United States permission to emigrate. 



xliv 



Finally, Vietnam sought to improve its regional relations in 1988 
and 1989 by extending a conciliatory gesture to its Asian neigh- 
bors. In response to a rise in the number of Vietnamese refugees, 
Vietnam assured its neighbors that it would ease their burdens as 
countries of first asylum by reversing a policy that forbade refu- 
gees to return home. Hanoi also proposed to open discussions with 
Southeast Asian officials on ending the refugee exodus. In 1989, 
however, Vietnam permitted only those refugees who "voluntarily" 
sought repatriation to return to Vietnam. Because genuine volun- 
teers were few in number, the policy was regarded as inadequate 
by countries with Vietnamese refugee populations. More boat peo- 
ple departed Vietnam in 1989 than in any single year since the 
beginning of the decade, and their numbers were no longer lim- 
ited to southerners fleeing political persecution but included north- 
erners seeking economic opportunity. The willingness of countries 
of first asylum to accept Vietnamese refugees had lessened con- 
siderably since 1979, however, and many were seriously consider- 
ing policies advocating forced repatriation. 

Vietnam's relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), nevertheless, showed dramatic improvement 
during this two-year period, and Thailand, in particular, was sin- 
gled out by Hanoi as critically important to Vietnam's economic 
future. The success of a January 1989 official visit to Hanoi by 
Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila surpassed all expectations 
and led Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan to encourage 
Thai businessmen to expand trade relations with the Indochinese 
countries. According to the Thai Prime Minister, the Thai goal 
was to turn the Southeast Asian peninsula into an economic 
"Golden Land" (Suwannaphume in Thai) with Thailand as its center 
and Indochina, transformed from "a battlefield into a trading 
market," as its cornerstone. Although the plan was controversial, 
it appeared to reflect the shift of regional priorities from security 
to economic concerns. 

Vietnam still lacked an adequate foreign investment structure 
in 1989, although a Foreign Trade Office and a Central Office to 
Supervise Foreign Investment, along with a State Commission for 
Cooperation and Investment, had been established to draft invest- 
ment policies. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations con- 
vened a three-day conference in February 1989, attended by 500 
delegates associated with foreign trade, to discuss modifying Viet- 
nam's existing foreign economic policies and mechanisms in order 
to more effectively attract foreign investors. Ho Chi Minh City 
also authorized the establishment of a "Zone of Fabrication and 
Exportation" where foreign companies would be free to import 



xlv 



commodities, assemble products, use low cost local labor, and re- 
export final products. Ho Chi Minh City, followed by the Vung 
Tau-Con Dao Special Zone, led all other localities in the number 
of foreign investment projects and joint ventures initiated, and a 
large proportion of the investors were identified as overseas Viet- 
namese. 

Although changes introduced in the closing years of the 1980s 
stopped short of systemic reform, they demonstrated a new level 
of commitment on the part of Vietnam's leaders to resolve the coun- 
try's peacetime economic problems. Having known great success 
in warfare, the government appeared to have accepted that yet 
another struggle was underway that would require the kind of fo- 
cused resolve previously displayed in war. The process was marked 
both by the possibility for change and by inertia. Political and for- 
eign policy agendas were opened to redefinition, and strategic goals 
were re-evaluated to emphasize economic rather than military 
strength. The momentum of change, however, was slowed con- 
siderably by party conservatives, who stressed the danger of polit- 
ical liberalization and questioned the pace of economic reform. 
Change, nevertheless, was evident. In foreign policy, Vietnam 
moved to attract foreign investment and to end its international 
isolation by disengaging from Cambodia. Likewise, in the economic 
sphere at home, where the need for change was determined to be 
particularly critical, market forces assumed a larger role in Viet- 
nam's controlled economy than they had previously. In undertak- 
ing such changes, Vietnam seemed on the verge of joining the 
geopolitical trend observed in the late 1980s, in which the behavior 
of socialist and capitalist systems alike appeared to favor economic 
over military development. The Vietnamese leadership, however, 
was not prepared to move quickly. Although it was committed to 
the process of change, the Political Bureau's ability to act was con- 
stricted by internal differences over how to proceed and how much 
to risk. As the country approached the 1990s, the question of 
whether the need to develop economically was worth the political 
risk had yet to be fully resolved. 



September 21, 1989 Ronald J. Cima 



xlvi 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Hanoi temple dedicated to King An Duong Vuong (ruler of Kingdom 
Lac, third century B. C.) 



THE VIETNAMESE TRACE the origins of their culture and 
nation to the fertile plains of the Red River Delta in northern Viet- 
nam. After centuries of developing a civilization and economy based 
on the cultivation of irrigated rice, the Vietnamese began expand- 
ing southward in search of new ricelands. Moving down the nar- 
row coastal plain of the Indochina Peninsula, through conquest 
and pioneering settlement they eventually reached and occupied 
the broad Mekong River Delta. Vietnamese history is the story 
of the struggle to develop a sense of nationhood throughout this 
narrow 1,500-kilometer stretch of land and to maintain it against 
internal and external pressures. 

The first major threat to Vietnam's existence as a separate peo- 
ple and nation was the conquest of the Red River Delta by the 
Chinese, under the mighty Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), in 
the second century B.C. At that time, and in later centuries, the 
expanding Chinese empire assimilated a number of small border- 
ing nations politically and culturally. Although Vietnam spent 1,000 
years under Chinese rule, it succeeded in throwing off the yoke 
of its powerful neighbor in the tenth century. 

The Vietnamese did not, however, emerge unchanged by their 
millennium under Chinese rule. Although they were unsuccessful 
in assimilating the Vietnamese totally, the Chinese did exert a per- 
manent influence on Vietnamese administration, law, education, 
literature, language, and culture. Their greatest impact was on the 
Vietnamese elite, with whom the Chinese administrators had the 
most contact. The effects of this Sinicization (Han-hwa) were much 
less intensive among the common people, who retained a large part 
of their pre-Han culture and language. 

China's cultural influence increased in the centuries following 
the expulsion of its officials, as Vietnamese monarchs and aristocrats 
strove to emulate the cultural ideal established by the Middle King- 
dom. Even for the Vietnamese elite, however, admiration for 
Chinese culture did not include any desire for Chinese political con- 
trol. In the almost uninterrupted 900 years of independence that 
followed China's domination, the Vietnamese thwarted a number 
of Chinese attempts at military reconquest, accepting a tributary 
relationship instead. During this period, learning and literature 
flourished as the Vietnamese expressed themselves both in classi- 
cal Chinese written in Chinese characters and in Vietnamese written 
in chu nom, a script derived from Chinese ideographs. 



3 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

During the Chinese millennium, other cultural influences also 
reached the shores of the Red River Delta. A thriving maritime 
trade among China, India, and Indonesia used the delta as a con- 
venient stopover. Among the array of goods and ideas thus brought 
to Vietnam was Buddhism from India. While the Vietnamese 
aristocracy clung to Chinese Confucianism during most periods, 
the common people embraced Buddhism, adapting it to fit their 
own indigenous religions and world view. 

As the Red River Delta prospered, its population began expand- 
ing southward along the narrow coastal plains. The period from 
the twelfth century to the eighteenth century was marked by warfare 
with both the Cham and Khmer, the peoples of the Indianized king- 
doms of Champa and Cambodia, who controlled lands in the Viet- 
namese line of march to the south. The Cham were finally defeated 
in 1471 , and the Khmer were forced out of the Mekong Delta by 
1749. Vietnamese settlers flooded into the largely untilled lands, 
turning them to rice cultivation. The southward expansion severely 
taxed the ability of the Vietnamese monarchy, ruling from the Red 
River Delta, to maintain control over a people spread over such 
a distance. 

The inability of the ruling Le dynasty to deal with this and other 
problems led to the partition of the country by the nobility in the 
sixteenth century. After two hundred years of warfare between com- 
peting noble families, a peasant rebellion reunified the country in 
the late eighteenth century. The rebels, however, were unable to 
solve the problems of a country ravaged by war, famine, and natural 
disasters and lost control to a surviving member of the Nguyen 
noble family. Nguyen Anh took the reign name Gia Long (a com- 
posite derived from the Vietnamese names for the northern and 
southern capitals of the country during partition) and established 
a new centrally located capital at Hue in 1802. 

Gia Long and his successors also were unable or unwilling to 
solve the persisting problems of the country, particularly the age- 
old dilemma of land alienation, the concentration of large tracts 
of land in the hands of a few and the resulting creation of vast num- 
bers of landless peasants. The monarchy and aristocracy grew more 
and more removed from the people by the mid-nineteenth century. 
This period also climaxed the growth of European expansionism, 
as Western nations sought to carve out colonies in Asia and other 
parts of the non- Western world. Between 1858 and 1873, the French 
conquered Vietnam, dividing it into three parts — Cochinchina, 
Annam, and Tonkin — roughly corresponding to the areas referred 
to by the Vietnamese as Nam Bo (southern Vietnam), Trung 
Bo (central Vietnam), and Bac Bo (northern Vietnam). To the 



4 



Historical Setting 



Vietnamese, however, these were geographical terms, and the use 
of them to imply a political division of their homeland was as odious 
as the loss of their independence. 

French colonial rule was, for the most part, politically repres- 
sive and economically exploitative. Vietnamese resistance in the 
early years was led by members of the scholar-official class, many 
of whom refused to cooperate with the French and left their posi- 
tions in the bureaucracy. The early nationalists involved themselves 
in study groups, demonstrations, production and dissemination of 
anticolonialist literature, and acts of terrorism. Differences in 
approach among the groups were exemplified by Phan Boi Chau, 
who favored using the Vietnamese monarchy as a rallying point 
for driving out the French, and Phan Chu Trinh, who favored 
abolishing the monarchy and using Western democratic ideas as 
a force for gradual reform and independence. The success of these 
early nationalists was limited both by their inability to agree on 
a strategy and their failure to involve the Vietnamese peasantry, 
who made up the vast majority of the population. After World 
War I, another Vietnamese independence leader arose who under- 
stood the need to involve the masses in order to stage a successful 
anticolonial revolt. Ho Chi Minh, schooled in Confucianism, Viet- 
namese nationalism, and Marxism-Leninism, patiently set about 
organizing the Vietnamese peasantry according to communist theo- 
ries, particularly those of Chinese leader Mao Zedong. 

The defeat of the Japanese, who had occupied Vietnam during 
World War II, left a power vacuum, which the communists rushed 
to fill. Their initial success in staging uprisings and in seizing con- 
trol of most of the country by September 1945 was partially undone, 
however, by the return of the French a few months later. Only 
after nine years of armed struggle was France finally persuaded 
to relinquish its colonies in Indochina. The 1954 Geneva Confer- 
ence left Vietnam a divided nation, however, with Ho Chi Minh's 
communist government ruling the northern half from Hanoi and 
Ngo Dinh Diem's regime, supported by the United States, ruling 
the south from Saigon (later Ho Chi Minh City). Another two 
decades of bitter conflict ensued before Vietnam was again reuni- 
fied as one independent nation. 

Early History 

The Vietnamese people represent a fusion of races, languages, 
and cultures, the elements of which are still being sorted out by 
ethnologists, linguists, and archaeologists. As was true for most 
areas of Southeast Asia, the Indochina Peninsula was a crossroads 
for many migrations of peoples, including speakers of Austronesian, 



5 



Vietnam: A Country Study 




Figure 2. Location of Vietnam in Asia, 1987 



6 



Historical Setting 



Mon-Khmer, and Tai languages (see fig. 2). The Vietnamese lan- 
guage provides some clues to the cultural mixture of the Vietnamese 
people. Although a separate and distinct language, Vietnamese bor- 
rows much of its basic vocabulary from Mon-Khmer, tonality from 
the Tai languages, and some grammatical features from both Mon- 
Khmer and Tai. Vietnamese also exhibits some influence from Aus- 
tronesian languages, as well as large infusions of Chinese literary, 
political, and philosophical terminology of a later period. 

The area now known as Vietnam has been inhabited since 
Paleolithic times, with some archaeological sites in Thanh Hoa 
Province reportedly dating back several thousand years. Archaeol- 
ogists link the beginnings of Vietnamese civilization to the late 
Neolithic, early Bronze Age, Phung Nguyen culture, which was 
centered in Vinh Phu Province of contemporary Vietnam from 
about 2000 to 1400 B.C. (see fig. 1). By about 1200 B.C., the devel- 
opment of wet-rice cultivation and bronze casting in the Ma River 
and Red River plains led to the development of the Dong Son cul- 
ture, notable for its elaborate bronze drums. The bronze weapons, 
tools, and drums of Dong Sonian sites show a Southeast Asian influ- 
ence that indicates an indigenous origin for the bronze-casting tech- 
nology. Many small, ancient copper mine sites have been found 
in northern Vietnam. Some of the similarities between the Dong 
Sonian sites and other Southeast Asian sites include the presence 
of boat-shaped coffins and burial jars, stilt dwellings, and evidence 
of the customs of betel-nut-chewing and teeth-blackening. 

According to the earliest Vietnamese traditions, the founder of 
the Vietnamese nation was Hung Vuong, the first ruler of the semi- 
legendary Hung dynasty (2879-258 B.C., mythological dates) of 
the kingdom of Van Lang. Hung Vuong, in Vietnamese mythol- 
ogy, was the oldest son of Lac Long Quan (Lac Dragon Lord), 
who came to the Red River Delta from his home in the sea, and 
Au Co, a Chinese immortal. Lac Long Quan, a Vietnamese cul- 
tural hero, is credited with teaching the people how to cultivate 
rice. The Hung dynasty, which according to tradition ruled Van 
Lang for eighteen generations, is associated by Vietnamese schol- 
ars with Dong Sonian culture. An important aspect of this culture 
by the sixth century B.C. was the tidal irrigation of rice fields 
through an elaborate system of canals and dikes. The fields were 
called Lac fields, and Lac, mentioned in Chinese annals, is the 
earliest recorded name for the Vietnamese people. 

The Hung kings ruled Van Lang in feudal fashion with the aid 
of the Lac lords, who controlled the communal settlements around 
each irrigated area, organized construction and maintenance of the 
dikes, and regulated the supply of water. Besides cultivating rice, 



7 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

the people of Van Lang grew other grains and beans and raised 
stock, mainly buffaloes, chickens, and pigs. Pottery-making and 
bamboo- working were highly developed crafts, as were basketry, 
leather-working, and the weaving of hemp, jute, and silk. Both 
transport and communication were provided by dugout canoes, 
which plied the network of rivers and canals. 

The last Hung king was overthrown in the third century B.C. 
by An Duong Vuong, the ruler of the neighboring upland king- 
dom of Thuc. An Duong Vuong united Van Lang with Thuc to 
form Au Lac, building his capital and citadel at Co Loa, thirty- 
five kilometers north of present-day Hanoi. An Duong's kingdom 
was short-lived, however, being conquered in 208 B.C. by the army 
of the Chinese Qin dynasty (221-207 B.C.) military commander 
Trieu Da (Zhao Tuo in Chinese). Reluctant to accept the rule of 
the Qin dynasty's successor, the new Han dynasty (206 B.C.- 
A.D. 220), Trieu Da combined the territories under his control 
in southern China and northern Vietnam and established the king- 
dom of Nam Viet (Nan Yue in Chinese), meaning Southern Viet. 
Viet (Yue) was the term applied by the Chinese to the various peo- 
ples on the southern fringes of the Han empire, including the peo- 
ple of the Red River Delta. Trieu Da divided his kingdom of Nam 
Viet into nine military districts; the southern three (Giao Chi, Cuu 
Chan, and Nhat Nam) included the northern part of present-day 
Vietnam. The Lac lords continued to rule in the Red River Delta, 
but as vassals of Nam Viet (see fig. 3). 

The Chinese Millennium 

Vietnamese historians regard Trieu Da as a defender of their 
homeland against an expanding Han empire. In 111 B.C., however, 
the Chinese armies of Emperor Wu Di defeated the successors of 
Trieu Da and incorporated Nam Viet into the Han empire. The 
Chinese were anxious to extend their control over the fertile Red 
River Delta, in part to serve as a convenient supply point for Han 
ships engaged in the growing maritime trade with India and Indo- 
nesia. During the first century or so of Chinese rule, Vietnam was 
governed leniently, and the Lac lords maintained their feudal 
offices. In the first century A.D., however, China intensified its 
efforts to assimilate its new territories by raising taxes and instituting 
marriage reforms aimed at turning Vietnam into a patriarchal 
society more amenable to political authority. In response to 
increased Chinese domination, a revolt broke out in Giao Chi, Cuu 
Chan, and Nhat Nam in A.D. 39, led by Trung Trac, the wife 
of a Lac lord who had been put to death by the Chinese, and her 
sister Trung Nhi. The insurrection was put down within two years 



8 



Historical Setting 



by the Han general Ma Yuan, and the Trung sisters drowned them- 
selves to avoid capture by the Chinese. Still celebrated as heroines 
by the Vietnamese, the Trung sisters exemplify the relatively high 
status of women in Vietnamese society as well as the importance 
to Vietnamese of resistance to foreign rule. 

Following the ill-fated revolt, Chinese rule became more direct, 
and the feudal Lac lords faded into history. Ma Yuan established 
a Chinese-style administrative system of three prefectures and fifty- 
six districts ruled by scholar-officials sent by the Han court. 
Although Chinese administrators replaced most former local offi- 
cials, some members of the Vietnamese aristocracy were allowed 
to fill lower positions in the bureaucracy. The Vietnamese elite in 
particular received a thorough indoctrination in Chinese cultural, 
religious, and political traditions. One result of Sinicization, how- 
ever, was the creation of a Confucian bureaucratic, family, and 
social structure that gave the Vietnamese the strength to resist 
Chinese political domination in later centuries, unlike most of the 
other Yue peoples who were sooner or later assimilated into the 
Chinese cultural and political world. Nor was Sinicization so total 
as to erase the memory of pre-Han Vietnamese culture, especially 
among the peasant class, which retained the Vietnamese language 
and many Southeast Asian customs. Chinese rule had the dual effect 
of making the Vietnamese aristocracy more receptive to Chinese 
culture and cultural leadership while at the same time instilling 
resistance and hostility toward Chinese political domination 
throughout Vietnamese society. 

Chinese Cultural Impact 

In order to facilitate administration of their new territories, the 
Chinese built roads, waterways, and harbors, largely with corvee 
labor (unpaid labor exacted by government authorities, particu- 
larly for public works projects). Agriculture was improved with bet- 
ter irrigation methods and the use of ploughs and draft animals, 
innovations which may have already been in use by the Vietnamese 
on a lesser scale. New lands were opened up for agriculture, and 
settlers were brought in from China. After a few generations, most 
of the Chinese settlers probably intermarried with the Vietnamese 
and identified with their new homeland. 

The first and second centuries A.D. saw the rise of a Han- Viet 
ruling class owning large tracts of rice lands. More than 120 brick 
Han tombs have been excavated in northern Vietnam, indicating 
Han families that, rather than returning to China, had become 
members of their adopted society and were no longer, strictly speak- 
ing, Chinese. Although they brought Chinese vocabulary and 



9 



Vietnam: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History, New York, 
1963, 23. 



Figure 3. Nam Viet Before Conquest by China in 111 B.C. 
10 



Historical Setting 



technical terms into their new culture, after a generation or two, 
they probably spoke Vietnamese. 

The second century A.D. was a time of rebellion in Giao Chi, 
Cuu Chan, and Nhat Nam, largely due to the declining quality 
of the Han administrators, who concentrated their energies on mak- 
ing their fortunes and returning north as soon as possible. Revolts 
against corrupt and repressive Chinese officials were often led by 
the Han- Viet families. The fall of the Han dynasty in China in 
220 A.D. further strengthened the allegiance of the Han- Viet rul- 
ing elite to their new society and gave them a sense of their own 
independent political power. Meanwhile, among the peasant class 
there was also a heightened sense of identity fostered by the spread 
of Buddhism by sea from India to Vietnam by the early third cen- 
tury. The new religion was often adapted to blend with indigenous 
religions. Buddhist temples were sometimes dedicated to the mon- 
soon season, for example, or identified with the guardian spirit of 
agricultural fertility. Although ruling-class Vietnamese tended to 
cling to Confucianism, various local rulers patronized the Buddhist 
religion, thus helping to legitimize their own rule in the eyes of 
the common people. 

After the demise of the Han dynasty, the period of the third to 
the sixth century was a time of turbulence in China, with six differ- 
ent dynasties in succession coming to power. The periods between 
dynasties or the periods when dynasties were weak in China were 
usually the most peaceful in Vietnam. When dynasties were strong 
and interfered with local rule, the Vietnamese aristocracy engaged 
in a series of violent revolts that weakened China's control over 
its southern territory. A rebellion led by the noblewoman Trieu 
Au (Lady Trieu) in A.D. 248 was suppressed after about six 
months, but its leader earned a place in the hearts and history of 
the Vietnamese people. Despite pressure to accept Chinese patri- 
archal values, Vietnamese women continued to play an important 
role and to enjoy considerably more freedom than their northern 
counterparts. 

Political Resistance to the Chinese 

The sixth century was an important stage in the Vietnamese 
political evolution toward independence. During this period, the 
Vietnamese aristocracy became increasingly independent of Chinese 
authority, while retaining Chinese political and cultural forms. At 
the same time, indigenous leaders arose who claimed power based 
on Vietnamese traditions of kingship. A series of failed revolts in 
the late sixth and early seventh centuries increased the Vietnamese 
national consciousness. Ly Bi, the leader of a successful revolt in 



11 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

543 against the Liang dynasty (502-556), was himself descended 
from a Chinese family that had fled to the Red River Delta during 
a period of dynastic turbulence in the first century A.D. Ly Bi 
declared himself emperor of Nam Viet in the tradition of Trieu 
Da and organized an imperial court at Long Bien (vicinity of 
Hanoi). Ly Bi was killed in 547, but his followers kept the revolt 
alive for another fifty years, establishing what is sometimes referred 
to in Vietnamese history as the Earlier Ly dynasty. 

While the Ly family retreated to the mountains and attempted 
to rule in the style of their Chinese overlords, a rebel leader who 
based his rule on an indigenous form of kingship arose in the Red 
River Delta. Trieu Quang Phuc made his headquarters on an island 
in a vast swamp. From this refuge, he could strike without warn- 
ing, seizing supplies from the Liang army and then slipping back 
into the labyrinthine channels of the swamp. Despite the initial suc- 
cess of such guerrilla tactics, by which he gained control over the 
Red River Delta, Trieu Quang Phuc was defeated by 570. Accord- 
ing to a much later Vietnamese revolutionary, General Vo Nguyen 
Giap, Vietnamese concepts of protracted warfare were born in the 
surprise offensives, night attacks, and hit-and-run tactics employed 
by Trieu Quang Phuc. 

The Chinese Tang dynasty (618-907) instituted a series of admin- 
istrative reforms culminating in 679 in the reorganization of Viet- 
namese territory as the Protectorate of Annam (or Pacified South), 
a name later used by the French to refer to central Vietnam. The 
Tang dynastic period was a time of heavy Chinese influence, par- 
ticularly in Giao Chau Province (in 203 the district of Giao Chi, 
had been elevated to provincial status and was renamed Giao Chau), 
which included the densely populated Red River plain. The chil- 
dren of ambitious, aristocratic families acquired a classical Con- 
fucian education, as increased emphasis was placed on the Chinese 
examination system for training local administrators. As a result, 
literary terms dating from the Tang dynasty constitute the largest 
category of Chinese loan words in modern Vietnamese. Despite 
the stress placed on Chinese literature and learning, Vietnamese, 
enriched with Chinese literary terms, remained the language of 
the people, while Chinese was used primarily as an administrative 
language by a small elite. During the Tang era, Giao Chau Province 
also became the center of a popular style of Buddhism based on 
spirit cults, which evolved as the dominant religion of Vietnam after 
the tenth century. Buddhism, along with an expanding sea trade, 
linked Vietnam more closely with South and Southeast Asia as 
Buddhist pilgrims traveled to India, Sumatra, and Java aboard mer- 
chant vessels laden with silk, cotton, paper, ivory, pearls, and incense. 



12 



Saigon scholar-official, late nineteenth century 
Courtesy Library of Congress 



13 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

As Tang imperial power became more corrupt and oppressive 
during the latter part of the dynasty, rebellion flared increasingly, 
particularly among the minority peoples in the mountain and border 
regions. Although the Viet culture of Giao Chau Province, as it 
developed under Tang hegemony, depended upon Chinese adminis- 
tration to maintain order, there was growing cultural resistance 
to the Tang in the border regions. A revolt among the Muong peo- 
ple, who are closely related to the central Vietnamese, broke out 
in the early eighth century. The rebels occupied the capital at Tong 
Binh (Hanoi), driving out the Tang governor and garrison, before 
being defeated by reinforcements from China. Some scholars mark 
this as the period of final separation of the Muong peoples from 
the central Vietnamese, which linguistic evidence indicates took 
place near the end of the Tang dynasty. In the mid-ninth century, 
Tai minority rebels in the border regions recruited the assistance 
of Nan-chao, a Tai mountain kingdom in the southern Chinese 
province of Yunnan, which seized control of Annam in 862. 
Although the Tang succeeded in defeating the Nan-chao forces and 
restoring Chinese administration, the dynasty was in decline and 
no longer able to dominate the increasingly autonomous Viet- 
namese. The Tang finally collapsed in 907 and by 939 Ngo Quyen, 
a Vietnamese general, had established himself as king of an inde- 
pendent Vietnam. 

Nine Centuries of Independence 

Having driven out the Chinese, Ngo Quyen defeated a series 
of local rival chiefs and, seeking to identify his rule with traditional 
Vietnamese kingship, established his capital at Co Loa, the third 
century B.C. citadel of An Duong Vuong. The dynasty estab- 
lished by Ngo Quyen lasted fewer than thirty years, however, 
and was overthrown in 968 by a local chieftain, Dinh Bo Linh, 
who reigned under the name Dinh Tien Hoang. He brought 
political unity to the country, which he renamed Dai Co Viet 
(Great Viet). The major accomplishments of Dinh Bo Linh's 
reign were the establishment of a diplomatic basis for Vietnamese 
independence and the institution of universal military mobili- 
zation. He organized a 100,000-man peasant militia called the 
Ten Circuit Army, comprising ten circuits (geographical dis- 
tricts). Each circuit was defended by ten armies, and each army 
was composed of ten brigades. Brigades in turn were made up of 
ten companies with ten ten-member squads apiece. After uniting 
the Vietnamese and establishing his kingdom, Dinh Bo Linh sent 
a tributary mission to the newly established Chinese Northern Song 
dynasty (960-1125). This diplomatic maneuver was a successful 



14 



Historical Setting 



attempt to stave off China's reconquest of its former vassal. The 
Song emperor gave his recognition to Dinh Bo Linh, but only as 
"King of Giao Chi Prefecture," a state within the Chinese empire. 
Not until the rise of the Ly dynasty (1009-1225), however, did the 
Vietnamese monarchy consolidate its control over the country. 

The Great Ly Dynasty and the Flowering of Buddhism 

Following the death of Dinh Bo Linh in 979, the Song rulers 
attempted to reassert Chinese control over Vietnam. Le Hoan, the 
commander in chief of Dinh Bo Linh's army, seized the throne 
and successfully repulsed the Chinese army in 981 . Ly Cong Uan, 
a former temple orphan who had risen to commander of the palace 
guard, succeeded Le Hoan in 1009, thereby founding the great 
Ly dynasty that lasted until 1225. Taking the reign name Ly Thai 
To, he moved his capital to Dai La (modern Hanoi). The early 
Ly kings established a prosperous state with a stable monarchy at 
the head of a centralized administration. The name of the country 
was changed to Dai Viet by Emperor Ly Thanh Tong in 1054. 

The first century of Ly rule was marked by warfare with China 
and the two Indianized kingdoms to the south, Cambodia and 
Champa. After these threats were dealt with successfully, the second 
century of Ly rule was relatively peaceful enabling the Ly kings 
to establish a Buddhist ruling tradition closely related to the other 
Southeast Asian Buddhist kingdoms of that period. Buddhism 
became a kind of state religion as members of the royal family and 
the nobility made pilgrimages, supported the building of pagodas, 
sometimes even entered monastic life, and otherwise took an active 
part in Buddhist practices. Bonzes (see Glossary) became a 
privileged landed class, exempt from taxes and military duty. At 
the same time, Buddhism, in an increasingly Vietnamized form 
associated with magic, spirits, and medicine, grew in popularity 
with the people (see Religion, ch. 2). 

During the Ly dynasty, the Vietnamese began their long march 
to the south {nam tien) at the expense of the Cham and the Khmer. 
Le Hoan had sacked the Cham capital of Indrapura in 982, where- 
upon the Cham established a new capital at Vijaya. This was cap- 
tured twice by the Vietnamese, however, and in 1079 the Cham 
were forced to cede to the Ly rulers their three northern provinces. 
Soon afterwards, Vietnamese peasants began moving into the 
untilled former Cham lands, turning them into rice fields and mov- 
ing relentlessly southward, delta by delta, along the narrow coastal 
plain. The Ly kings supported the improvement of Vietnam's 
agricultural system by constructing and repairing dikes and canals 
and by allowing soldiers to return to their villages to work for six 



15 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

months of each year. As their territory and population expanded, 
the Ly kings looked to China as a model for organizing a strong, 
centrally administered state. Minor officials were chosen by exami- 
nation for the first time in 1075, and a civil service training insti- 
tute and an imperial academy were set up in 1076. In 1089 a fixed 
hierarchy of state officials was established, with nine degrees of civil 
and military scholar-officials. Examinations for public office were 
made compulsory, and literary competitions were held to deter- 
mine the grades of officials. 

The Tran Dynasty and the Defeat of the Mongols 

In 1225 the Tran family, which had effectively controlled the 
Vietnamese throne for many years, replaced the Ly dynasty by 
arranging a marriage between one of its members and the last Ly 
monarch, an eight-year-old princess. Under the Tran dynasty 
(1225-1400), the country prospered and flourished as the Tran rul- 
ers carried out extensive land reform, improved public adminis- 
tration, and encouraged the study of Chinese literature. The Tran, 
however, are best remembered for their defense of the country 
against the Mongols and the Cham. By 1225, the Mongols con- 
trolled most of northern China and Manchuria and were eyeing 
southern China, Vietnam, and Champa. In 1257, 1284, and 1287, 
the Mongol armies of Kublai Khan invaded Vietnam, sacking the 
capital at Thang Long (renamed Hanoi in 1831) on each occasion, 
only to find that the Vietnamese had anticipated their attacks and 
evacuated the city beforehand. Disease, shortage of supplies, the 
climate, and the Vietnamese strategy of harassment and scorched- 
earth tactics foiled the first two invasions. The third Mongol inva- 
sion, of 300,000 men and a vast fleet, was also defeated by the 
Vietnamese under the leadership of General Tran Hung Dao. Bor- 
rowing a tactic used by Ngo Quyen in 938 to defeat an invading 
Chinese fleet, the Vietnamese drove iron-tipped stakes into the bed 
of the Bach Dang River (located in northern Vietnam in present- 
day Ha Bac, Hai Hung, and Quang Ninh provinces), and then, 
with a small Vietnamese flotilla, lured the Mongol fleet into the 
river just as the tide was starting to ebb. Trapped or impaled by 
the iron-tipped stakes, the entire Mongol fleet of 400 craft was sunk, 
captured, or burned by Vietnamese fire arrows. The Mongol army 
retreated to China, harassed enroute by Tran Hung Dao's troops. 

The fourteenth century was marked by wars with Champa, which 
the Tran reduced to a feudatory state by 1312 (see fig. 4). Champa 
freed itself again by 1326 and, under the leadership of Cham hero 
Che Bong Nga, staged a series of attacks on Vietnam between 1360 
and 1390, sacking Thang Long in 1371. The Vietnamese again 



16 



Historical Setting 



gained the upper hand following the death of Che Bong Nga and 
resumed their southward advance at Champa's expense. Despite 
their earlier success, the quality of the Tran rulers had declined 
markedly by the end of the fourteenth century, opening the way 
for exploitation of the peasantry by the feudal landlord class, which 
caused a number of insurrections. In 1400 General Ho Quy Ly 
seized the throne and proclaimed himself founder of the short-lived 
Ho dynasty (1400-07). He instituted a number of reforms that were 
unpopular with the feudal landlords, including a limit on the 
amount of land a family could hold and the rental of excess land 
by the state to landless peasants; proclamations printed in Viet- 
namese, rather than Chinese; and free schools in provincial capi- 
tals. Threatened by the reforms, some of the landowners appealed 
to China's Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) to intervene. Using rein- 
statement of the Tran dynasty as an excuse, the Ming reasserted 
Chinese control in 1407. 

Renewed Chinese Influence 

The Ming administered the country as if it were a province of 
China and ruled it harshly for the next twenty years. The forced 
labor of its people was used to exploit Vietnam's mines and forests 
solely for China's enrichment. Taxes were levied on all products 
including salt, a dietary staple. Under the Ming, Vietnamese cul- 
tural traditions, including the chewing of betel nut, were forbid- 
den, and men were required to wear their hair long and women 
to dress in the Chinese style. Vietnamese Buddhism was replaced 
at court by Ming- sponsored neo-Confucianism, but Ming attempts 
to supplant popular Vietnamese religious traditions with an offi- 
cially sponsored form of Buddhism were less successful. 

The Chinese impact on Vietnamese culture was probably as 
great, or greater, in the centuries following independence as it was 
during the 1,000 years of Chinese political domination. Much of 
China's cultural and governmental influence on Vietnam dates from 
the Ming period. Other aspects of Chinese culture were introduced 
later by Vietnamese kings struggling to bring a Confucian order 
to their unruly kingdom. Chinese administrative reforms and tra- 
ditions, when sponsored by Vietnamese kings and aristocracy, 
tended to be more palatable and hence more readily assimilated 
than those imposed by Chinese officials. Although the Vietnamese 
upper classes during the Ming period studied Chinese classical 
literature and subscribed to the Chinese patriarchal family system, 
the majority of the Vietnamese people recognized these aspects of 
Chinese culture mainly as ideals. Less exposed to Chinese influence, 
the peasantry retained the Vietnamese language and many cultural 



17 



Vietnam: A Country Study 




Figure 4. Vietnam (Dai Viet) and Its Neighbors, circa 1350 



18 



Historical Setting 



traditions that predated Chinese rule. Other factors also encouraged 
the preservation of Vietnamese culture during the periods of 
Chinese rule. Contact with the Indianized Cham and Khmer civili- 
zations, for example, widened the Vietnamese perspective and 
served as a counterweight to Chinese influence. Vietnam's loca- 
tion on the South China Sea and the comings and goings of mer- 
chants and Buddhists encouraged contact with o'her cultures of 
South and Southeast Asia. China, itself, once it developed the port 
of Guangzhou (Canton), had less need to control Vietnam politi- 
cally in order to control the South China Sea. Moreover, the Viet- 
namese who moved southward into lands formerly occupied by the 
Cham and the Khmer became less concerned about the threat from 
China. 

The Le Dynasty and Southward Expansion 

Le Loi, one of Vietnam's most celebrated heroes, is credited with 
rescuing the country from Ming domination in 1428. Born of a 
wealthy landowning family, he served as a senior scholar-official 
until the advent of the Ming, whom he refused to serve. After a 
decade of gathering a resistance movement around him, Le Loi 
and his forces finally defeated the Chinese army in 1428. Rather 
than putting to death the captured Chinese soldiers and adminis- 
trators, he magnanimously provided ships and supplies to send them 
back to China. Le Loi then ascended the Vietnamese throne, tak- 
ing the reign name Le Thai To and establishing the Le dynasty 
(1428-1788). 

The greatest of the Le dynasty rulers was Le Thanh Tong 
(1460-97), who reorganized the administrative divisions of the coun- 
try and upgraded the civil service system. He ordered a census of 
people and landholdings to be taken every six years, revised the 
tax system, and commissioned the writing of a national history. 
During his reign he accomplished the conquest of Champa in 1471 , 
the suppression of Lao-led insurrections in the western border area, 
and the continuation of diplomatic relations with China through 
tribute missions established under Le Thai To. Le Thanh Tong 
also ordered the formulation of the Hong Due legal code, which 
was based on Chinese law but included distinctly Vietnamese fea- 
tures, such as recognition of the higher position of women in Viet- 
namese society than in Chinese society. Under the new code, 
parental consent was not required for marriage, and daughters were 
granted equal inheritance rights with sons. Le Thanh Tong also 
initiated the construction and repair of granaries, dispatched his 
troops to rebuild irrigation works following floods, and provided 
for medical aid during epidemics. A noted writer and poet 



19 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

himself, he encouraged and emphasized employment of the Con- 
fucian examination system. 

A great period of southward expansion also began under Le 
Thanh Tong. The don dien system of land settlement, borrowed 
from the Chinese, was used extensively to occupy and develop ter- 
ritory wrested from Champa. Under this system, military colonies 
were established in which soldiers and landless peasants cleared 
a new area, began rice production on the new land, established 
a village, and served as a militia to defend it. After three years, 
the village was incorporated into the Vietnamese administrative 
system, a communal village meeting house (dinh) was built, and 
the workers were given an opportunity to share in the communal 
lands given by the state to each village. The remainder of the land 
belonged to the state. As each area was cleared and a village estab- 
lished, the soldiers of the don dien would move on to clear more 
land. This method contributed greatly to the success of Vietnam's 
southward expansion (see fig. 5). 

Although the Le rulers had ordered widespread land distribu- 
tion, many peasants remained landless, while the nobility, govern- 
ment officials, and military leaders continued to acquire vast tracts. 
The final conquest of Champa in 1471 eased the situation some- 
what as peasants advanced steadily southward along the coast into 
state-owned communal lands. However, most of the new land was 
set aside for government officials and, although the country grew 
wealthier, the social structure remained the same. Following the 
decline of the Le dynasty, landlessness was a major factor leading 
to a turbulent period during which the peasantry questioned the 
mandate of their rulers. 

In the Confucian world view, emperors were said to have the 
"mandate of heaven" to rule their people, who, in turn, owed the 
emperor total allegiance. Although his power was absolute, an 
emperor was responsible for the prosperity of his people and the 
maintenance of justice and order. An emperor who did not fulfill 
his Confucian responsibilities could, in theory, lose his mandate. 
In practice, the Vietnamese people endured many poor emperors, 
weak and strong. Counterbalancing the power of the emperor was 
the power of the village, illustrated by the Vietnamese proverb, 
' 'The laws of the emperor yield to the customs of the village. ' ' Vil- 
lage institutions served both to restrain the power of the emperor 
and to provide a buffer between central authority and the individual 
villager. Each village had its council of notables, which was respon- 
sible for the obligations of the village to the state. When the cen- 
tral government imposed levies for taxes, for corvee labor for public 
projects, or for soldiers for defense, these levies were based on the 



20 



Historical Setting 



council of notables' report of the resources of the villages, which 
was often underestimated to protect the village. Moreover, there 
was a division between state and local responsibilities. The central 
government assumed responsibility for military, judicial, and reli- 
gious functions, while village authorities oversaw the construction 
of public works projects such as roads, dikes, and bridges, which 
were centrally planned. The autonomy of the villages, however, 
contributed to the weakness of the Vietnamese political system. 
If the ruling dynasty could no longer protect a village, the village 
would often opt for the protection of political movements in opposi- 
tion to the dynasty. These movements, in turn, would have difficulty 
maintaining the allegiance of the villages unless they were able both 
to provide security and to institutionalize their political power. 
Although it insured the preservation of a sense of national and cul- 
tural identity, the strength of the villages was a factor contribut- 
ing to the political instability of the society as it expanded southward. 

Partition and the Advent of the Europeans 

The degenerated Le dynasty, which endured under ten rulers 
between 1497 and 1527, in the end was no longer able to maintain 
control over the northern part of the country, much less the new 
territories to the south. The weakening of the monarchy created 
a vacuum that the various noble families of the aristocracy were 
eager to fill. In 1527 Mac Dang Dung, a scholar-official who had 
effectively controlled the Le for a decade, seized the throne, prompt- 
ing other families of the aristocracy, notably the Nguyen and Trinh, 
to rush to the support of the Le. An attack on the Mac forces led 
by the Le general Nguyen Kim resulted in the partition of Viet- 
nam in 1545, with the Nguyen family seizing control of the southern 
part of the country as far north as what is now Thanh Hoa Province. 
The Nguyen, who took the hereditary title chua (see Glossary), con- 
tinued to profess loyalty to the Le dynasty. By the late sixteenth 
century the Trinh family had ousted the Mac family and had begun 
to rule the northern half of the country also in the name of the Le 
dynasty. The Trinh, who, like the Nyuyen, took the title chua, spent 
most of the seventeenth century attempting to depose the Nguyen. 
In order to repulse invading Trinh forces, the Nguyen in 1631 com- 
pleted the building of two great walls, six meters high and eigh- 
teen kilometers long, on their northern frontier. The Trinh, with 
100,000 troops, 500 elephants, and 500 large junks, were numeri- 
cally far superior to their southern foe. The Nguyen, however, were 
better equipped, having by this time acquired Portuguese weapons 
and gunpowder, and, as the defending force, had the support of 
the local people. In addition, the Nguyen had the advantage of 



21 



Vietnam: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History, New York, 
1968, 50. 



Figure 5. Vietnam's Southern Expansion, A.D. 1000-1757 



22 



Historical Setting 



controlling vast open lands in the Mekong Delta, wrested from the 
Khmer, with which to attract immigrants and refugees from the 
north. Among those who took up residence in the delta were an 
estimated 3,000 Chinese supporters of the defunct Ming dynasty, 
who arrived in 1679 aboard fifty junks and set about becoming 
farmers and traders. The Nguyen, aided by the Chinese settlers, 
succeeded in forcing the Khmer completely out of the Mekong Delta 
by 1749. 

After major offensives by the Trinh in 1661 and 1672 foundered 
on the walls built by the Nguyen, a truce in the fighting ensued 
that lasted nearly 100 years. During that time, the Nguyen con- 
tinued its southward expansion into lands held, or formerly held, 
by the Cham and the Khmer. The Trinh, meanwhile, consolidated 
its authority in the north, instituting administrative reforms and 
supporting scholarship. The nobility and scholar-officials of both 
north and south, however, continued to block the development of 
manufacturing and trade, preferring to retain a feudal, peasant 
society, which they could control. 

The seventeenth century was also a period in which European 
missionaries and merchants became a serious factor in Vietnamese 
court life and politics. Although both had arrived by the early six- 
teenth century, neither foreign merchants nor missionaries had 
much impact on Vietnam before the seventeenth century. The Por- 
tuguese, Dutch, English, and French had all established trading 
posts in Pho Hien by 1680. Fighting among the Europeans and 
opposition by the Vietnamese made the enterprises unprofitable, 
however, and all of the foreign trading posts were closed by 1700. 

European missionaries had occasionally visited Vietnam for short 
periods of time, with little impact, beginning in the early sixteenth 
century. The best known of the early missionaries was Alexandre 
de Rhodes, a French Jesuit who was sent to Hanoi in 1627, where 
he quickly learned the language and began preaching in Viet- 
namese. Initially, Rhodes was well-received by the Trinh court, 
and he reportedly baptized more than 6,000 converts; however, 
his success probably led to his expulsion in 1630. He is credited 
with perfecting a romanized system of writing the Vietnamese lan- 
guage {quoc ngu), which was probably developed as the joint effort 
of several missionaries, including Rhodes. He wrote the first 
catechism in Vietnamese and published a Vietnamese-Latin- 
Portuguese dictionary; these works were the first books printed in 
quoc ngu. Romanized Vietnamese, or quoc ngu, was used initially 
only by missionaries; classical Chinese, or chu nom, continued to 
be used by the court and the bureaucracy. The French later sup- 
ported the use of quoc ngu, which, because of its simplicity, led to 



23 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

a high degree of literacy and a flourishing of Vietnamese litera- 
ture. After being expelled from Vietnam, Rhodes spent the next 
thirty years seeking support for his missionary work from the Vati- 
can and the French Roman Catholic hierarchy as well as making 
several more trips to Vietnam. 

The stalemate between the Trinh and the Nguyen families that 
began at the end of the seventeenth century did not, however, mark 
the beginning of a period of peace and prosperity. Instead, the 
decades of continual warfare between the two families had left the 
peasantry in a weakened state, the victim of taxes levied to sup- 
port the courts and their military adventures. Having to meet their 
tax obligations had forced many peasants off the land and facili- 
tated the acquisition of large tracts by a few wealthy landowners, 
nobles, and scholar-officials. Because scholar-officials were exempted 
from having to pay a land tax, the more land they acquired, the 
greater was the tax burden that fell on those peasants who had been 
able to retain their land. In addition, the peasantry faced new taxes 
on staple items such as charcoal, salt, silk, and cinnamon, and on 
commercial activities such as fishing and mining. The desperate 
condition of the economy led to neglect of the extensive network 
of irrigation systems as well. As they fell into disrepair, disastrous 
flooding and famine resulted, causing great numbers of starving 
and landless people to wander the countryside. The widespread 
suffering in both north and south led to numerous peasant revolts 
between 1730 and 1770. Although the uprisings took place through- 
out the country, they were essentially local phenomena, breaking 
out spontaneously from similar local causes. The occasional coordi- 
nation between and among local movements did not result in any 
national organization or leadership. Moreover, most of the upris- 
ings were conservative, in that the leaders supported the restora- 
tion of the Le dynasty. They did, however, put forward demands 
for land reform, more equitable taxes, and rice for all. Landless 
peasants accounted for most of the initial support for the various 
rebellions, but they were often joined later by craftsmen, fisher- 
men, miners, and traders, who had been taxed out of their occupa- 
tions. Some of these movements enjoyed limited success for a short 
time, but it was not until 1771 that any of the peasant revolts had 
a lasting national impact. 

The Tay Son Rebellion 

The Tay Son Rebellion (1771-1802), which ended the Le and 
Trinh dynasties, was led by three brothers from the village of Tay 
Son in Binh Dinh Province. The brothers, who were of the Ho 
clan (to which Ho Quy Ly had belonged), adopted the name 



24 



Historical Setting 



Nguyen. The eldest brother, Nguyen Nhac, began an attack on 
the ruling Nguyen family by capturing Quang Nam and Binh Dinh 
provinces in 1772. The chief principle and main slogan of the Tay 
Son was "seize the property of the rich and distribute it to the 
poor." In each village the Tay Son controlled, oppressive land- 
lords and scholar-officials were punished and their property redis- 
tributed. The Tay Son also abolished taxes, burned the tax and 
land registers, freed prisoners from local jails, and distributed the 
food from storehouses to the hungry. As the rebellion gathered 
momentum, it gained the support of army deserters, merchants, 
scholars, local officials, and bonzes. 

In 1773 Nguyen Nhac seized Qui Nhon, which became the Tay 
Son capital. By 1778 the Tay Son had effective control over the 
southern part of the country, including Gia Dinh (later Saigon). 
The ruling Nguyen family were all killed by the Tay Son rebels, 
with the exception of Nguyen Anh, the sixteen-year-old nephew 
of the last Nguyen lord, who escaped to the Mekong Delta. There 
he was able to gather a body of supporters and retake Gia Dinh. 
The city changed hands several times until 1783, when the Tay 
Son brothers destroyed Nguyen Anh's fleet and drove him to take 
refuge on Phu Quoc Island. Soon thereafter, he met with French 
missionary bishop Pigneau de Behaine and asked him to be his 
emissary in obtaining French support to defeat the Tay Son. 
Pigneau de Behaine took Nguyen Anh's five-year-old son, Prince 
Canh, and departed for Pondichery in French India to plead for 
support for the restoration of the Nguyen. Finding none there, he 
went to Paris in 1 786 to lobby on Nguyen Anh's behalf. Louis XVI 
ostensibly agreed to provide four ships, 1,650 men, and supplies 
in exchange for Nguyen Anh's promise to cede to France the port 
of Tourane (Da Nang) and the island of Poulo Condore. However, 
the local French authorities in India, under secret orders from the 
king, refused to supply the promised ships and men. Determined 
to see French military intervention in Vietnam, Pigneau de Behaine 
himself raised funds for two ships and supplies from among the 
French merchant community in India, hired deserters from the 
French navy to man them, and sailed back to Vietnam in 1789. 

In the meantime, by 1786 the Tay Son had overcome the crum- 
bling Trinh dynasty and seized all of the north, thus uniting the 
country for the first time in 200 years. The Tay Son made good 
their promise to restore the Le dynasty, at least for ceremonial pur- 
poses. The three Nguyen brothers installed themselves as kings of 
the north, central, and southern sections of the country, respec- 
tively, while continuing to acknowledge the Le emperor in Thang 
Long. In 1788, however, the reigning Le emperor fled north to seek 



25 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Chinese assistance in defeating the Tay Son. Eager to comply, a 
Chinese army of the Qing dynasty (1644-191 1) invaded Vietnam, 
seized Thang Long, and invested the Le ruler as "King of Annam. ' ' 
That same year, the second eldest Tay Son brother, Nguyen Hue, 
proclaimed himself Emperor Quang Trung. Marching north with 
100,000 men and 100 elephants, Quang Trung attacked Thang 
Long at night and routed the Chinese army of 200,000, which 
retreated in disarray. Immediately following his victory, the Tay 
Son leader sought to reestablish friendly relations with China, 
requesting recognition of his rule and sending the usual tributary 
mission. 

Quang Trung stimulated Vietnam's war-ravaged economy by 
encouraging trade and crafts, ordering the recultivation of fallow 
lands, reducing or abolishing taxes on local products, and resettling 
landless peasants on communal lands in their own villages. Quang 
Trung also established a new capital at Phu Xuan (near modern 
Hue), a more central location from which to administer the coun- 
try. He reorganized the government along military lines, giving 
key posts to generals, with the result that military officials for the 
first time outranked civilian officials. Vietnamese was substituted 
for Chinese as the official national language, and candidates for 
the bureaucracy were required to submit prose and verse compo- 
sitions in chu nom rather than in classical Chinese. 

Quang Trung died in 1792, without leaving a successor strong 
enough to assume leadership of the country, and the usual faction- 
alism ensued. By this time, Nguyen Anh and his supporters had 
won back much of the south from Nguyen Lu, the youngest and 
least capable of the Tay Son brothers. When Pigneau de Behaine 
returned to Vietnam in 1789, Nguyen Anh was in control of Gia 
Dinh. In the succeeding years, the bishop brought Nguyen Anh 
a steady flow of ships, arms, and European advisers, who super- 
vised the building of forts, shipyards, cannon foundries and bomb 
factories, and instructed the Vietnamese in the manufacture and 
use of modern armaments. Nguyen's cause was also greatly aided 
by divisions within the Tay Son leadership, following the death 
of Quang Trung, and the inability of the new leaders to deal with 
the problems of famine and natural disasters that wracked the war- 
torn country. After a steady assault on the north, Nguyen Anh's 
forces took Phu Xuan in June 1801 and Thang Long a year later. 

The Nguyen Dynasty and Expanding French Influence 

In June 1802, Nguyen Anh adopted the reign name Gia Long 
to express the unifying of the country — Gia from Gia Dinh (Saigon) 
and Long from Thang Long (Hanoi). As a symbol of this unity, 



26 



A gate to the "Imperial City" 
of Hue, constructed by 
Emperor Gia Long in the 
early nineteenth century 
Courtesy New York Times, 
Paris Collection, 
National Archives 




Gia Long changed the name of the country from Dai Viet to Nam 
Viet. For the Chinese, however, this was too reminiscent of the 
wayward General Trieu Da. In conferring investiture on the new 
government, the Chinese inverted the name to Viet Nam, the first 
use of that name for the country. Acting as a typical counterrevolu- 
tionary government, the Gia Long regime harshly suppressed any 
forces opposing it or the interests of the bureaucracy and the land- 
owners. In his drive for control and order, Gia Long adopted the 
Chinese bureaucratic model to a greater degree than any previous 
Vietnamese ruler. The new capital at Hue, two kilometers north- 
east of Phu Xuan, was patterned after the Chinese model in Bei- 
jing, complete with a Forbidden City, an Imperial City, and a 
Capital City. Vietnamese bureaucrats were required to wear 
Chinese-style gowns and even adopt Chinese-style houses and sedan 
chairs. Vietnamese women, in turn, were compelled to wear 
Chinese-style trousers. Gia Long instituted a law code, which fol- 
lowed very closely the Chinese Qing dynasty (1644-191 1) model. 
Under the Gia Long code, severe punishment was meted out for 
any form of resistance to the absolute power of the government. 
Buddhism, Taoism, and indigenous religions were forbidden under 
the Confucianist administration. Traditional Vietnamese laws and 
customs, such as the provisions of the Hong Due law code pro- 
tecting the rights and status of women, were swept away by the 
new code. Taxes that had been reduced or abolished under the 



27 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Tay Son were levied again under the restored Nguyen dynasty. 
These included taxes on mining, forestry, fisheries, crafts, and on 
various domestic products, such as salt, honey, and incense. 
Another heavy burden on the peasantry was the increased use of 
corvee labor to build not only roads, bridges, ports, and irrigation 
works but also palaces, fortresses, shipyards, and arsenals. All but 
the privileged classes were required to work on such projects at 
least sixty days a year, with no pay but a rice ration. The great 
Mandarin Road, used by couriers and scholar-officials as a link 
between Gia Dinh, Hue, and Thang Long, was started during this 
period in order to strengthen the control of the central government. 
Military service was another burden on the peasantry; in some areas 
one out of every three men was required to serve in the Vietnamese 
Imperial Army. Land reforms instituted under the Tay Son were 
soon lost under the restored Nguyen dynasty, and the proportion 
of communal lands dwindled to less than 20 percent of the total. 
Although chu nom was retained as the national script by Gia Long, 
his son and successor Minh Mang, who gained the throne upon 
his father's death in 1820, ordered a return to the use of Chinese 
ideographs. 

Peasant rebellion flared from time to time throughout the first 
half of the nineteenth century, fueled by government repression 
and such calamities as floods, droughts, epidemics, and famines. 
Minority groups, including the Tay-Nung, Muong, and Cham, 
were also in revolt. Although they were primarily peasant rebel- 
lions, some of these movements found support from, or were led 
by, disaffected scholars or some of the surviving pretenders to the 
Le throne. Vietnam's foreign relations were also a drain on the 
central government during this period. Tributary missions were 
sent biennially to the Qing court in Beijing, bearing the requisite 
600 pieces of silk, 200 pieces of cotton, 1,200 ounces of perfume, 
600 ounces of aloes wood, 90 pounds of betel nuts, 4 elephant tusks, 
and 4 rhinoceros horns. Other missions to pay homage (also bear- 
ing presents) were sent every four years. At the same time, Viet- 
nam endeavored to enforce tributary relations with Cambodia and 
Laos. In 1834, attempts to make Cambodia a Vietnamese province 
led to a Cambodian revolt and to Siamese intervention, with the 
result that a joint Vietnamese-Siamese protectorate was established 
over Cambodia in 1847. Other foreign adventures included Viet- 
namese support for a Laotian rebellion against Siamese overlord- 
ship in 1826-27. 

The most serious foreign policy problem for the Nguyen rulers, 
however, was dealing with France through the French traders, mis- 
sionaries, diplomats, and naval personnel who came in increasing 



28 



Magistrate supervising punishment, late nineteenth century 

Courtesy Library of Congress 



numbers to Vietnam. The influence of missionaries was perceived as 
the most critical issue by the court and scholar-officials. The French 
Societe des Missions Etrangeres reported 450,000 Christian converts 
in Vietnam in 1841. The Vietnamese Christians were for the most 
part organized into villages that included all strata of society, from 
peasants to landowners. The Christian villages, with their own separate 
customs, schools, and hierarchy, as well as their disdain for Confu- 
cianism, were viewed by the government as breeding grounds for 
rebellion— and in fact they often were. The French presence did, 
however, enjoy some support at high levels. Gia Long felt a special 
debt to Pigneau de Behaine and to his two chief French naval ad- 
visers, Jean-Baptiste Chaigneau and Philippe Vannier, both of whom 
remained in the country until 1824. There were also members of the 
Vietnamese court who urged the monarchy to undertake a certain 
degree of westernization and reform in order to strengthen itself in 
the areas of administration, education, and defense. In the southern 
part of the country, Christians enjoyed the protection of Viceroy Le 
Van Duyet until his death in 1832. Soon thereafter the Nguyen govern- 
ment began a serious attempt to rid itself of French missionaries and 
their influence. A series of edicts forbade the practice of Christianity, 
forcing the Christian communities underground. An estimated ninety- 
five priests and members of the laity were executed by the Vietnamese 
during the following quarter of a century. 



29 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

In response, the missionaries stepped up their pressure on the 
French government to intervene militarily and to establish a French 
protectorate over Vietnam. During this period, French traders 
became interested in Vietnam once more, and French diplomats 
in China began to express the view that France was falling behind 
the rest of Europe in gaining a foothold in Asia. Commanders of 
a French naval squadron, permanently deployed in the South China 
Sea after 1841 , also began to agitate for a stronger role in protect- 
ing the lives and interests of the missionaries. Given tacit approval 
by Paris, naval intervention grew steadily. In 1847 two French war- 
ships bombarded Tourane (Da Nang), destroying five Vietnamese 
ships and killing an estimated 10,000 Vietnamese. The purpose 
of the attack was to gain the release of a missionary, who had, in 
fact, already been released. In the following decade, persecution 
of missionaries continued under Emperor Tu Due, who came to 
the throne in 1848. While the missionaries stepped up pressure on 
the government of Louis Napoleon (later Napoleon III), which was 
sympathetic to their cause, a Commission on Cochinchina made 
the convincing argument that France risked becoming a second- 
class power by not intervening. 

Under French Rule 

By 1857 Louis-Napoleon had been persuaded that invasion was 
the best course of action, and French warships were instructed to 
take Tourane without any further efforts to negotiate with the Viet- 
namese. Tourane was captured in late 1858 and Gia Dinh (Saigon 
and later Ho Chi Minh City) in early 1859. In both cases Viet- 
namese Christian support for the French, predicted by the mis- 
sionaries, failed to materialize. Vietnamese resistance and outbreaks 
of cholera and typhoid forced the French to abandon Tourane in 
early 1860. Meanwhile, fear was growing in Paris that if France 
withdrew the British would move in. Also current in Paris at that 
time was the rationalization that France had a civilizing mission — a 
duty to bring the benefits of its superior culture to the less fortunate 
lands of Asia and Africa. (This was a common justification for the 
colonial policies of most of the Western countries.) Meanwhile, 
French business and military interests increased their pressure on 
the government for decisive action. Thus in early 1861, a French 
fleet of 70 ships and 3,500 men reinforced Gia Dinh and, in a series 
of bloody battles, gained control of the surrounding provinces. In 
June 1862, Emperor Tu Due, signed the Treaty of Saigon agree- 
ing to French demands for the cession of three provinces around 
Gia Dinh (which the French had renamed Saigon) and Poulo 
Condore, as well as for the opening of three ports to trade, free 



30 



Historical Setting 



passage of French warships up the Mekong to Cambodia, freedom 
of action for the missionaries, and payment of a large indemnity 
to France for its losses in attacking Vietnam. 

Even the French were surprised by the ease with which the Viet- 
namese agreed to the humiliating treaty. Why, after successfully 
resisting invasions by the Chinese for the previous 900 years, did 
the monarchy give in so readily to French demands? Aside from 
the seriousness of the loss of Saigon and the possible overestima- 
tion of French strength, it appears that the isolation of the monar- 
chy from the people created by decades of repression prevented 
Tu Due and his court from attempting to rally the necessary popular 
support to drive out the French. In fact, by placating the French 
in the south, Tu Due hoped to free his forces to put down a 
widespread Christian-supported rebellion in Bac Bo, which he 
indeed crushed by 1865. French missionaries, who had urged their 
government to support this rebellion, were disillusioned when it 
did not, especially after thousands of Christians were slaughtered 
by Tu Due's forces following the rebellion. The missionaries, how- 
ever, had served only as an initial excuse for French intervention 
in Vietnam; military and economic interests soon became the 
primary reasons for remaining there. 

The French navy was in the forefront of the conquest of Indo- 
china. In 1863 Admiral de la Grandiere, the governor of Cochin- 
china (as the French renamed Nam Bo), forced the Cambodian 
king to accept a French protectorate over that country, claiming 
that the Treaty of Saigon had made France heir to Vietnamese 
claims in Cambodia. In June 1867, the admiral completed the 
annexation of Cochinchina by seizing the remaining three western 
provinces. The following month, the Siamese government agreed 
to recognize a French protectorate over Cambodia in return for 
the cession of two Cambodian provinces, Angkor and Battambang, 
to Siam. With Cochinchina secured, French naval and mercantile 
interests turned to Tonkin (as the French referred to Bac Bo). The 
1873 storming of the citadel of Hanoi, led by French naval officer 
Francis Gamier, had the desired effect of forcing Tu Due to sign 
a treaty with France in March 1874 that recognized France's "full 
and entire sovereignty" over Cochinchina, and opened the Red 
River to commerce. In an attempt to secure Tonkin, Gamier was 
killed and his forces defeated in a battle with Vietnamese regulars 
and Black Flag forces (see Glossary). The latter were Chinese sol- 
diers, who had fled south following the Taiping Rebellion in that 
country and had been hired by the Hue court to keep order in 
Tonkin. 

In April 1882, a French force again stormed the citadel of Hanoi, 



31 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

under the leadership of naval officer Henri Riviere. Riviere and 
part of his forces were wiped out in a battle with a Vietnamese- 
Black Flag army, a reminder of Gamier 's fate a decade earlier. 
While Gamier' s defeat had led to a partial French withdrawal from 
Tonkin, Riviere's loss strengthened the resolve of the French 
government to establish a protectorate by military force. Accord- 
ingly, additional funds were appropriated by the French Parlia- 
ment to support further military operations, and Hue fell to the 
French in August 1883, following the death of Tu Due the previ- 
ous month. A Treaty of Protectorate, signed at the August 1883 
Harmand Convention, established a French protectorate over North 
and Central Vietnam and formally ended Vietnam's independence. 
In June 1884, Vietnamese scholar-officials were forced to sign the 
Treaty of Hue, which confirmed the Harmand Convention agree- 
ment. By the end of 1884, there were 16,500 French troops in Viet- 
nam. Resistance to French control, however, continued. A rebellion 
known as the Can Vuong (Loyalty to the King) movement formed 
in 1885 around the deposed Emperor Ham Nghi and attracted sup- 
port from both scholars and peasants. The rebellion was essentially 
subdued with the capture and exile of Ham Nghi in 1888. Scholar 
and patriot Phan Dinh Phung continued to lead the resistance until 
his death in 1895. Although unsuccessful in driving out the French, 
the Can Vuong movement, with its heroes and patriots, laid impor- 
tant groundwork for future Vietnamese independence movements 
(see fig. 6). 

Colonial Administration 

Not all Vietnamese resisted the French conquest, and some even 
welcomed it. The monarchy, through decades of repression, had 
lost the support of the people; and Tu Due, in the eyes of large 
segments of the peasantry, had lost his mandate to rule. He had 
been able to protect his people neither from foreign aggression nor 
from an unusually high incidence of natural disasters such as floods, 
famines, locusts, droughts, and a cholera epidemic in 1865 that 
killed more than 1 million people. Tu Due's repression of Catho- 
lics also created a large opposition group ready to cooperate with 
the French, and those who did were often rewarded with lands 
vacated during the French invasion. Much of this land, however, 
was given to French colons (colonial settlers), often in sizable hold- 
ings of 4,000 hectares or more. Gradually a French- Vietnamese 
landholding class developed in Cochinchina. Vietnamese, however, 
were appointed only to the lower levels of the bureaucracy estab- 
lished to administer the new colony. Seeking to finance the grow- 
ing bureaucracy, the early admiral-governors of Vietnam viewed 



32 



Historical Setting 



the colony as the source of the necessary revenue. Rice exports, 
forbidden under the monarchy, reached 229,000 tons annually in 
1870. Taxes extracted from Cochinchina increased tenfold in the 
first decade of French control. State monopolies and excise taxes 
on opium, salt, and alcohol eventually came to provide 70 percent 
of the government's operating revenue. 

In 1887 France formally established the Indochinese Union, com- 
prising the colony of Cochinchina and the protectorates of Annam, 
Tonkin, and Cambodia, with Laos being added as a protectorate 
in 1893. There was a rapid turnover among governors- general of 
the Indochinese Union, and few served a full five-year term. One 
who did, Paul Doumer (1897-1902), is considered to have been 
the architect of a colonial system under which Vietnam was politi- 
cally dominated and economically exploited. Following the parti- 
tioning of Vietnam into three parts, the emperor was stripped of 
the last vestiges of his authority. In 1897 the powers of the kinh 
hoc (emperor's viceroy) were transferred to the Resident Superieur 
at Hanoi, who governed in the name of the emperor. That same 
year, the Privy Council or Co Mat Vien (see Glossary) in Annam 
was replaced with a French-controlled Council of Ministers. The 
following year in Annam, the French took over tax collection and 
payment of officials. Most of the Vietnamese scholar-officials had 
refused to cooperate with the French, but those who did were 
restricted to minor or ceremonial positions. Consequently, French- 
men were recruited to staff a new, continually expanding bureau- 
cracy. By 1925 there were 5,000 European administrators ruling 
an Indochinese population of 30 million, roughly the same num- 
ber used to administer British India, which had a population more 
than ten times as large. Under the French laws applicable to indi- 
viduals, Vietnamese were prohibited from traveling outside their 
districts without identity papers; and they were not allowed to pub- 
lish, meet, or organize. They were subject to corvee, and they could 
be imprisoned at the whim of any French magistrate. The coloni- 
al police enforced the law through a network of French and Viet- 
namese agents. 

Land alienation was the cornerstone of economic exploitation 
under the colonial government. By 1930 more than 80 percent of 
the riceland in Cochinchina was owned by 25 percent of the land- 
owners, and 57 percent of the rural population were landless peas- 
ants working on large estates. Although the situation was somewhat 
better in the north, landless peasants in Annam totaled 800,000 
and in Tonkin nearly 1 million. Heavy taxes and usurious interest 
rates on loans were added burdens on the peasants. More than 90 
percent of rubber plantations were French owned. Two- thirds of 



33 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



CHINA 




50 100 MILES 



Figure 6. French Acquisitions in Indochina in the Nineteenth Century 



34 



Historical Setting 



the coal mined in Vietnam (nearly two million tons in 1927) was 
exported. Manufacturing was limited to cement and textiles, partly 
to placate French industrialists who saw Indochina as a market for 
their own goods. Naval shipyards and armament factories built 
under the Nguyen dynasty were dismantled under the French. 
Much of the craft industry survived, however, because it produced 
affordable consumer goods in contrast to imported French goods, 
which only the French colons or wealthy Vietnamese could afford. 

French efforts at education in the early decades of colonial rule 
were negligible. A few government quoc ngu schools were established 
along with an Ecole Normale to train Vietnamese clerks and inter- 
preters. A few Vietnamese from wealthy families, their numbers 
rising to about ninety by 1870, were sent to France to study. Three 
lycees (secondary schools), located in Hanoi, Hue, and Saigon, 
were opened in the early 1900s, using French as the language of 
instruction. The number of quoc ngu elementary schools was grad- 
ually increased, but even by 1925 it was estimated that no more 
than one school-age child in ten was receiving schooling. As a result, 
Vietnam's high degree of literacy declined precipitously during the 
colonial period. The University of Hanoi, founded in 1907 to pro- 
vide an alternative for Vietnamese students beginning to flock to 
Japan, was closed for a decade the following year because of fear 
of student involvement in a 1908 uprising in Hanoi. In Tonkin 
and Annam, traditional education based on Chinese classical litera- 
ture continued to flourish well into the twentieth century despite 
French efforts to discourage it, but the triennial examinations were 
abolished in 1915 in Tonkin and in 1918 in Annam. China, which 
had always served as a source of teaching materials and texts, by 
the turn of the century was beginning to be a source of reformist 
literature and revolutionary ideas. Materials filtering in from China 
included both Chinese texts and translations of Western classics, 
which were copied and spread from province to province. 

Phan Boi Chau and the Rise of Nationalism 

By the turn of the century, a whole generation of Vietnamese 
had grown up under French control. The people continued, as in 
precolonial times, to look to the scholar- gentry class for guidance 
in dealing with French imperialism and the loss of their country's 
independence. A few scholar-officials collaborated with the French, 
but most did not. Among those who refused was a group of several 
hundred scholars who became actively involved in the anticolonial 
movement. The best known among them was Phan Boi Chau, a 
scholar from Nghe An Province, trained in the Confucian tradi- 
tion under his father and other local teachers. In 1885 Phan Boi 



35 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Chau observed at close range the actions of French troops in crush- 
ing scholar- gentry resistance to the colonial overlords. For the next 
decade he devoted himself to his studies and finally passed the 
regional examination with highest honors in 1905. During the fol- 
lowing five years, he traveled about the country making contacts 
with other anticolonial scholars and seeking out in particular the 
survivors of the Can Vuong movement, with whom he hoped to 
launch a rebellion against the French. He also sought to identify 
a member of the Nguyen ruling family sympathetic to the cause, 
who would serve as titular head of the independence movement 
and as a rallying point for both moral and financial support. Chosen 
to fill this role was Cuong De, a direct descendant of Gia Long. 

In 1904 Phan Boi Chau and about twenty others met in Quang 
Nam to form the Duy Tan Hoi (Reformation Society), the first 
of a number of revolutionary societies he organized. The follow- 
ing year, he went to Japan to meet with Japanese and Chinese 
revolutionaries and seek financial support for the Vietnamese cause. 
The Japanese defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima the month 
before his arrival had caused great excitement among the various 
Asian anticolonialist movements. Phan Boi Chau brought Cuong 
De, along with several Vietnamese students, to Japan in 1906. That 
same year he convinced the other great Vietnamese nationalist 
leader of the period, Phan Chu Trinh, to visit him in Tokyo. After 
two weeks of discussions, however, they were unable to resolve their 
basic tactical differences. Whereas Phan Boi Chau favored retain- 
ing the monarchy as a popular ideological symbol and a means 
of attracting financial support, Phan Chu Trinh wanted primarily 
to abolish the monarchy in order to create a base on which to build 
national sovereignty. Furthermore, he was greatly influenced 
by the writings of French political philosophers Rousseau and 
Montesquieu, and he believed that the French colonial adminis- 
tration could serve as a progressive force to establish a Western 
democratic political structure through peaceful reform. Phan Boi 
Chau, conversely, wanted to drive out the French immediately 
through armed resistance and restore Vietnamese independence. 

In 1907 Phan Boi Chau organized the Viet Nam Cong Hien 
Hoi (Vietnam Public Offering Society) to unite the 100 or so Viet- 
namese then studying in Japan. The organization was important 
because of the opportunity it provided for the students to think and 
work together as Vietnamese, rather than as Cochinchinese, Annam- 
ese, or Tonkinese, as the French called them. The following year, 
however, the Japanese, under pressure from the French, expelled 
the students, forcing most of them to return home. In March 1909, 
Phan Boi Chau was also deported by the Japanese. He went first 



36 



Historical Setting 



to Hong Kong, later to Bangkok and Guangzhou. Even during 
his years abroad, his writings served to influence nationalist activi- 
ties in Vietnam. In 1907 the Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc (Free School 
of the Eastern Capital [Hanoi]) was founded to educate nation- 
alist political activists. Phan Boi Chau's writings were studied and 
Phan Chu Trinh gave lectures at the school. Suspecting that Phan 
Boi Chau was associated with the school, however, the French closed 
it in less than a year. The French also blamed Phan Boi Chau for 
instigating antitax demonstrations in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai 
provinces and in Hue in early 1908. As a symbol of the movement, 
the demonstrators forcibly cut off men's traditional long hair. An 
abortive Hanoi uprising and poison plot in June 1908 was also 
blamed on Phan Boi Chau. In response to the uprising, the French 
executed thirteen of the participants and initiated a crackdown on 
Vietnamese political activists, sending hundreds of scholar-officials, 
including Phan Chu Trinh, to prison on Poulo Condore (now Con 
Dao). A major expedition was also launched in 1909 against De 
Tham, a resistance leader who was involved in the Hanoi upris- 
ing. De Tham, who had led a thirty-year campaign against the 
French in the mountains around Yen The in the northeastern part 
of Tonkin, managed to hold out until he was assassinated in 1913 . 

Stimulated by the Chinese Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen in 
1911, Phan Boi Chau and the other Vietnamese nationalists in exile 
in Guangzhou formed a new organization in 1912 to replace the 
moribund Duy Tan Hoi. The main goals of the newly organized 
Viet Nam Quang Phuc Hoi (Vietnam Restoration Society) included 
expulsion of the French, recovery of Vietnamese independence, 
and establishment of a "Vietnamese democratic republic." Phan 
Boi Chau had by this time given up his monarchist position, 
although Cuong De was accorded presidential status within the 
organization's provisional government. In order to gain support 
and financial backing for the new organization, Phan Boi Chau 
organized a number of terrorist bombings and assassinations in 
1913, to which the French responded harshly. By 1914 the counter- 
revolutionary government of Yuan Shi-kai was in charge in China, 
and, by French request, Phan Boi Chau and other Vietnamese 
exiles in that country were imprisoned. 

World War I began shortly thereafter, and some 50,000 Viet- 
namese troops and 50,000 Vietnamese workers were sent to Europe. 
The Vietnamese also endured additional heavy taxes to help pay 
for France's war efforts. Numerous anticolonial revolts occurred 
in Vietnam during the war, all easily suppressed by the French. 
In May 1916, the sixteen-year-old king, Duy Tan, escaped from 
his palace in order to take part in an uprising of Vietnamese troops. 



37 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

The French were informed of the plan and the leaders arrested and 
executed. Duy Tan was deposed and exiled to Reunion in the 
Indian Ocean. One of the most effective uprisings during this period 
was in the northern Vietnamese province of Thai Nguyen. Some 
300 Vietnamese soldiers revolted and released 200 political pris- 
oners, whom, in addition to several hundred local people, they 
armed. The rebels held the town of Thai Nguyen for several days, 
hoping for help from Chinese nationalists. None arrived, however, 
and the French retook the town and hunted down most of the rebels. 

In 1917, Phan Boi Chau was released from prison. He spent 
the next eight years in exile in China, studying and writing but 
exerting little direct influence on the Vietnamese nationalist move- 
ment. In 1925 he was kidnaped by the French in Shanghai and 
returned to Hanoi, where he was tried and sentenced to hard labor 
for life. The sentence was later changed to house arrest until his 
death in 1940. Vietnamese historians view Phan Boi Chau's con- 
tribution to the country's independence as immeasurable. He 
advocated forcibly expelling the French, although he was not able 
to solve the problems involved in actually doing it. He suggested 
learning from other Asian independence movements and leaders, 
while realizing that in the end only the Vietnamese could win their 
own independence. His greatest weakness, according to many his- 
torians, was his failure to involve the Vietnamese peasantry, who 
composed 80 percent of the population, in his drive for indepen- 
dence. Rather than recruiting support at the village level, Phan 
Boi Chau and his followers concentrated on recruiting the elite, 
in the belief that the peasant masses would automatically rally 
around the scholar- gentry. Future Vietnamese independence leaders 
took inspiration from the efforts of the early nationalists and learned 
from their mistakes the importance of winning support at the local 
level. 

An important development in the early part of the twentieth cen- 
tury was the increased use of quoc ngu in the northern part of the 
country through a proliferation of new journals printed in that 
script. There had been quoc ngu publications in Cochinchina since 
1865, but in 1898 a decree of the colonial government prohibited 
publication without permission, in the protectorate areas, of periodi- 
cals in quoc ngu or Chinese that were not published by a French 
citizen. In 1913 Nguyen Van Vinh succeeded in publishing Dong 
Duong Tap Chi (Indochinese Review), a strongly antitraditional but 
pro-French journal. He also founded a publishing house that trans- 
lated such Vietnamese classics as the early nineteenth century poem 
Kim Van Kieu as well as Chinese classics into quoc ngu. Nguyen Van 
Vinh's publications, while largely pro-Western, were the major 



38 



Historical Setting 



impetus for the increasing popularity of quoc ngu in Annam and 
Tonkin. In 1917 the moderate reformist journalist Pham Quynh 
began publishing in Hanoi the quoc ngu journal Nam Phong, which 
addressed the problem of adopting modern Western values without 
destroying the cultural essence of the Vietnamese nation. By World 
War I, quoc ngu had become the vehicle for the dissemination of 
not only Vietnamese, Chinese, and French literary and philosophi- 
cal classics but also a new body of Vietnamese nationalist litera- 
ture emphasizing social comment and criticism. 

In the years immediately following World War I, the scholar- 
led Vietnamese independence movement in Cochinchina began a 
temporary decline as a result, in part, of tighter French control 
and increased activity by the French-educated Vietnamese elite. 
The decrease of both French investments in and imports to Viet- 
nam during the war had opened opportunities to entrepreneurial 
Vietnamese, who began to be active in light industries such as rice 
milling, printing, and textile weaving. The sale of large tracts of 
land in the Mekong Delta by the colonial government to specula- 
tors at cheap prices resulted in the expansion of the Vietnamese 
landed aristocracy. These factors in combination led to the rise of 
a wealthy Vietnamese elite in Cochinchina that was pro-French 
but was frustrated by its own lack of political power and status. 

Prominent among this group was Bui Quang Chieu, a French- 
trained agricultural engineer, who helped organize the Constitu- 
tionalist Party in 1917. Founded with the hope that it would be 
able to exert pressure on the Colonial Council of Cochinchina, the 
governing body of the colony, the party drew its support from Viet- 
namese who were large landowners, wealthy merchants, industri- 
alists, and senior civil servants. The Colonial Council, established 
in 1880, was controlled by French interests, having only ten Viet- 
namese members out of twenty-four by 1922. The demands of the 
party included increased Vietnamese representation on the Colonial 
Council, higher salaries for Vietnamese officials, replacement of 
the scholar-official administration system with a modern bureau- 
cracy, and reform of the naturalization law to make it easier for 
Vietnamese to become French citizens. 

When the party failed to gain acceptance of any of these demands, 
it turned to its most pressing economic grievance, the ethnic Chinese 
domination of the Cochinchinese economy. Although French inves- 
tors exercised almost exclusive control over industry and shared 
control of agriculture with the Vietnamese, the ethnic Chinese were 
sought out by the French to act as middlemen and came to dominate 
rice trade and retail business in both urban and rural areas. A boy- 
cott of Chinese goods organized by the party, however, was largely 



39 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

unsuccessful because it primarily served the interests of the entre- 
preneurial elite. By the mid- 1920s, Constitutionalist Party goals 
were too elitist and too moderate to attract a popular following. 
Although the party grew increasingly critical of the French, it failed 
to advocate anything more than continued Franco-Vietnamese col- 
laboration. Its place in the Vietnamese nationalist movement was 
effectively usurped by more progressive political groups seeking 
Vietnam's independence. 

The mid- 1920s also brought a period of increased activity among 
the growing Vietnamese worker class; and pedicab drivers, dye 
workers, and textile workers launched strikes with some success. 
In August 1925, workers belonging to an underground union struck 
at the Ba Son naval arsenal in Saigon-Cholon, ostensibly for higher 
pay but in actuality to block two French naval ships from being 
sent to Shanghai to pressure striking Chinese workers. The strik- 
ers were successful in their demands and, in November, held mas- 
sive demonstrations in Saigon to protest the arrest of Phan Boi Chau 
in Shanghai. 

Ho Chi Minh and the Communist Movement 

The year 1925 also marked the founding of the Viet Nam Thanh 
Nien Cach Menh Dong Chi Hoi (Revolutionary Youth League) 
in Guangzhou by Ho Chi Minh. Born Nguyen Sinh Cung in Kim 
Lien village, Nghe An Province in May 1890, Ho was the son of 
Nguyen Sinh Sac (or Huy), a scholar from a poor peasant family. 
Following a common custom, Ho's father renamed him Nguyen 
Tat Thanh at about age ten. Ho was trained in the classical Con- 
fucian tradition and was sent to secondary school in Hue. After 
working for a short time as a teacher, he went to Saigon where 
he took a course in navigation and in 1911 joined the crew of a 
French ship. Working as a kitchen hand, Ho traveled to North 
America, Africa, and Europe. While in Paris from 1919-23, he 
took the name Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot). In 1919 he 
attempted to meet with United States President Woodrow Wilson 
at the Versailles Peace Conference in order to present a proposal 
for Vietnam's independence, but he was turned away and the 
proposal was never officially acknowledged. During his stay in Paris, 
Ho was greatly influenced by Marxist-Leninist literature, particu- 
larly Lenin's Theses on the National and Colonial Questions (1920), and 
in 1920 he became a founding member of the French Communist 
Party. He read, wrote, and spoke widely on Indochina's problems 
before moving to Moscow in 1923 and attending the Fifth Con- 
gress of the Communist International (see Glossary), also called 
the Comintern, in 1924. In late 1924, Ho arrived in Guangzhou, 



40 



Historical Setting 



where he spent the next two years training more than 200 Viet- 
namese cadres in revolutionary techniques. His course of instruc- 
tion included study of Marxism-Leninism, Vietnamese and Asian 
revolutionary history, Asian leaders such as Gandhi and Sun 
Yat-sen, and the problem of organizing the masses. As a training 
manual, Ho used his own publication Duong Cach Menh (The 
Revolutionary Path), written in 1926 and considered his primer 
on revolution. Going by the name Ly Thuy, he formed an inner 
communist group, Thanh Nien Cong San Doan (Communist 
Youth League), within the larger Thanh Nien (Youth) organiza- 
tion. The major activity of Thanh Nien was the production of a 
journal, Thanh Nien, distributed clandestinely in Vietnam, Siam, 
and Laos, which introduced communist theory into the Vietnamese 
independence movement. Following Chiang Kai-shek's April 1927 
coup and the subsequent suppression of the communists in southern 
China, Ho fled to Moscow. 

In December of that year, a teacher from a Vietnamese peasant 
family, Nguyen Thai Hoc, founded Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang 
(VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party), in Hanoi. With a mem- 
bership largely of students, low-ranking government employees, 
soldiers, and a few landlords and rich peasants, VNQDD was pat- 
terned after the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), from 
which it received financial support in the 1930s. Another source 
of funds for the VNQDD was the Vietnam Hotel in Hanoi, which 
it opened in 1928 as both a commercial enterprise and the party 
headquarters. The hotel restaurant, however, provided French 
agents with an easy means of penetrating the party and monitor- 
ing its activities. At various times, the VNQDD attempted, without 
success, to form a united front with Thanh Nien and other indepen- 
dence organizations. Thanh Nien, being two years older, however, 
had had a head start over VNQDD in organizing in schools, fac- 
tories, and local government, which it had done with patience and 
planning. The VNQDD therefore concentrated instead on recruit- 
ment of Vietnamese soldiers and the overthrow of French rule 
through putschist-style activities. 

In February 1929, the French official in charge of recruiting coolie 
labor was killed by an assassin connected with the VNQDD. The 
French immediately arrested several hundred VNQDD leaders and 
imprisoned seventy-eight. VNQDD leaders Nguyen Thai Hoc and 
Nguyen Khac Nhu escaped, but most members of the Central Com- 
mittee were captured. The remaining leadership under Nguyen 
Thai Hoc decided to stage a general uprising as soon as possible. 
All dissent to the plan was overridden, and the party began manu- 
facturing and stockpiling weapons. On February 9, 1930, a revolt 



41 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

instigated by the VNQDD broke out at Yen Bai among the Viet- 
namese garrison, but it was quickly suppressed. Simultaneous 
attacks on other key targets, including Son Tay and Lam Thu, 
were also unsuccessful because of poor preparation and communi- 
cation. The Yen Bai uprising was disastrous for the VNQDD. Most 
of the organization's top leaders were executed, and villages that 
had given refuge to the party were shelled and bombed by the 
French. After Yen Bai, the VNQDD ceased to be of importance 
in the anticolonial struggle. Although more modernist and less 
bound by tradition than the scholar-patriots of the Phan Boi Chau 
era, the VNQDD had remained a movement of urban intellectuals 
who were unable to involve the masses in their struggle and too 
often favored reckless exploits over slow and careful planning. 

On June 17, 1929, the founding conference of the first Indo- 
chinese Communist Party (ICP, Dang Cong San Dong Duong) 
was held in Hanoi under the leadership of a breakaway faction of 
Thanh Nien radicals. The party immediately began to publish 
several journals and to send out representatives to all parts of the 
country for the purpose of setting up branches. A series of strikes 
supported by the party broke out at this time, and their success 
led to the convening of the first National Congress of Red Trade 
Unions the following month in Hanoi. Other communist parties 
were founded at this time by both supporting members of Thanh 
Nien and radical members of yet another revolutionary party with 
Marxist leanings but no direct tie with the Comintern, called the 
New Revolutionary Party or Tan Viet Party. At the beginning of 
1930, there were actually three communist parties in French Indo- 
china competing for members. The establishment of the ICP 
prompted remaining Thanh Nien members to transform the Com- 
munist Youth League into a communist party, the Annam Com- 
munist Party (ACP, Annam Cong San Dang), and Tan Viet Party 
members followed suit by renaming their organization the Indo- 
chinese Communist League (Dong Duong Cong San Lien Doan). 
As a result, the Comintern issued a highly critical indictment of 
the factionalism in the Vietnamese revolutionary movement and 
urged the Vietnamese to form a united communist party. Conse- 
quently, the Comintern leadership sent a message to Ho Chi Minh, 
then living in Siam, asking him to come to Hong Kong to unify 
the groups. On February 3, 1930, in Hong Kong, Ho presided 
over a conference of representatives of the two factions derived from 
Thanh Nien (members of the Indochinese Communist League were 
not represented but were to be permitted membership in the newly 
formed party as individuals) at which a unified Vietnamese Com- 
munist Party (VCP) was founded, the Viet Nam Cong San Dang. 



42 



Historical Setting 



At the Comintern's request, the name was changed later that year 
at the first Party Plenum to the Indochinese Communist Party, 
thus reclaiming the original name of the party founded in 1929. 
At the founding meeting, it was agreed that a provisional Central 
Committee of nine members (three from Bac Bo, two from Trung 
Bo, two from Nam Bo, and two from Vietnam's overseas Chinese 
community) should be formed and that recognition should be sought 
from the Comintern. Various mass organizations including unions, 
a peasants' association, a women's association, a relief society, and 
a youth league were to be organized under the new party. Ho drew 
up a program of party objectives, which were approved by the con- 
ference. The main points included overthrow of the French; estab- 
lishment of Vietnamese independence; establishment of a workers', 
peasants', and soldiers' government; organization of a workers' 
militia; cancellation of public debts; confiscation of means of produc- 
tion and their transfer to the proletarian government; distribution 
of French-owned lands to the peasants; suppression of taxes; estab- 
lishment of an eight-hour work day; development of crafts and 
agriculture; institution of freedom of organization; and establish- 
ment of education for all. 

The formation of the ICP came at a time of general unrest in 
the country, caused in part by a global worsening of economic con- 
ditions. Although the size of the Vietnamese urban proletariat had 
increased four times, to about 200,000, since the beginning of the 
century, working conditions and salaries had improved little. The 
number of strikes rose from seven in 1927 to ninety-eight in 1930. 
As the effects of the worldwide depression began to be felt, French 
investors withdrew their money from Vietnam. Salaries dropped 
30 to 50 percent, and employment dropped approximately 33 per- 
cent. Between 1928 and 1932, the price of rice on the world market 
decreased by more than half. Rice exports totaling nearly 2 mil- 
lion tons in 1928 fell to less than 1 million tons in 1931. Although 
both French colons and wealthy Vietnamese landowners were hit 
by the crisis, it was the peasant who bore most of the burden because 
he was forced to sell at least twice as much rice to pay the same 
amount in taxes or other debts. Floods, famine, and food riots 
plagued the countryside. By 1930 rubber prices had plummeted 
to less than one-fourth their 1928 value. Coal production was cut, 
creating more layoffs. Even the colonial government cut its staff 
by one-seventh and salaries by one-quarter. 

The Nghe-Tinh Revolt 

Strikes grew more frequent in Nam Bo in early 1930 and led 
to peasant demonstrations in May and June of that year. The focus 



43 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

of reaction to the worsening economic conditions, however, was 
Nghe An Province, which had a long history of support for peasant 
revolts. Plagued by floods, drought, scarcity of land, and colonial 
exploitation, the people of Nghe An had been supporters of the 
Can Vuong movement and the activities of Phan Boi Chau. By 
late 1929, the ICP had begun organizing party cells, trade unions, 
and peasant associations in the province. By early 1930, it had estab- 
lished a provincial committee in the provincial capital of Vinh and 
had begun to found mass organizations throughout Nghe An. 
French sources reported that by mid-summer 1930 there were about 
300 communist activists in Nghe An and the neighboring province 
of Ha Tinh. This figure rose to 1 ,800 a few months later. The com- 
munists helped to mobilize the workers and peasants of Nghe-Tinh, 
as the two-province area was known, to protest the worsening con- 
ditions. Peasant demonstrators demanded a moratorium on the pay- 
ment of the personal tax and a return of village communal lands 
that were in the hands of wealthy landowners. When the demands 
were ignored, demonstrations turned to riots; government build- 
ings, manor houses, and markets were looted and burned, and tax 
rolls were destroyed. Some village notables joined in the uprisings 
or refused to suppress them. Local officials fled, and government 
authority rapidly disintegrated. In some of the districts, the com- 
munists helped organize the people into local village associations 
called Soviets (using the Bolshevik term). The Soviets, formed by 
calling a meeting of village residents at the local dinh, elected a ruling 
committee to annul taxes, lower rents, distribute excess rice to the 
needy, and organize the seizure of communal land confiscated by 
the wealthy. Village militias were formed, usually armed only with 
sticks, spears, and knives. 

By September the French had realized the seriousness of the 
situation and brought in Foreign Legion troops to suppress the 
rebellion. On September 9, French planes bombed a column of 
thousands of peasants headed toward the provincial capital. Secu- 
rity forces rounded up all those suspected of being communists or 
of being involved in the rebellion, staged executions, and conducted 
punitive raids on rebellious villages. By early 1931 , all of the Soviets 
had been forced to surrender. Of the more than 1,000 arrested, 
400 were given long prison sentences, and 80, including some of 
the party leaders, were executed. With the aid of other Asian colo- 
nial authorities, Vietnamese communists in Singapore, China, and 
Hong Kong were also arrested. 

The early 1930s was a period of recovery and rebuilding for the 
ICP in Vietnam. Reorganization and recruitment were carried on 
even among political prisoners, of whom there were more than 



44 



Historical Setting 



10,000 by 1932. In the prison of Poulo Condore, Marxist litera- 
ture circulated secretly, an underground journal was published, 
and party members (among them future party leaders Pham Van 
Dong and Le Duan) organized a university, teaching courses in 
sciences, literature, languages, geography, and Marxism-Leninism 
(see Development of the Vietnamese Communist Party, ch. 4; 
Appendix B). The party also began to recruit increasingly from 
among Vietnamese minorities, particularly the Tay-Nung ethnic 
groups living in Viet Bac. Located along Vietnam's northern border 
with China, this remote mountainous region includes the modern 
provinces of Lang Son, Cao Bang, Bac Thai, and Ha Tuyen (see 
fig. 7). 

This period also marked the rise of a Trotskyite faction within 
the communist movement, which in 1933 began publishing a widely 
read journal called La Lutte (Struggle). The Comintern's hostility 
toward Trotskvites prevented their formal alliance with the ICP, 
although informal cooperation did exist. In 1935 a combined slate 
of ICP members and Trotskyites managed to elect four candidates 
to the Saigon municipal council. Cooperation between the two 
groups began to break down, however, when a Popular Front 
government led by the French Socialist Party under Leon Blum 
was elected in Paris. The Trotskyites complained that, despite the 
change of leadership in France, nothing had changed in Indochina. 
From the communist viewpoint, the major contribution to Viet- 
namese independence made by the Popular Front government was 
an amnesty declared in 1936 under which 1 ,532 Vietnamese political 
prisoners were freed. 

World War II and Japanese Occupation 

The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Agression pact in August 
1939, caused France immediately to ban the French Communist 
Party and, soon afterwards, to declare illegal all Vietnamese politi- 
cal parties including the ICP. The colonial authorities began a crack- 
down on communists, arresting an estimated 2,000 and closing 
down all communist and radical journals. The party consequently 
was forced to shift its activities to the countryside, where French 
control was weaker — a move that was to benefit the communists 
in the long run. In November the ICP Central Committee held 
its Sixth Plenum with the goal of mapping out a new united front 
strategy, the chief task of which was national liberation. Accord- 
ing to the new strategy, support would now be welcomed from the 
middle class and even the landlord class, although the foundation 
of the party continued to be the proletarian-peasant alliance. 

After the fall of France to the Nazis in June 1940, Japan demanded 



45 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



c 


H 1 N A 




.v\avt" "^7 

r' \ V VIET BAC S 

yDien Bien Phu v — " J^T 


"v — . 


HANOI 

® 

HaiDhona^5~ 

I 1QI|^I lyl i\f 




LAOS 


? / 

/ 


Gulf 


< 




of 
Tonkin 


50 100 KILOMETERS 
6 50 100 MILES 


\ \\ 

f V 





Source: Based on information from Thomas Hodgkin, Vietnam: The Revolutionary Path, New 
York, 1981, Map No. 5. 

Figure 7. Viet Bac, Viet Minh Base Area, 1941-45 

that the French colonial government close the Hanoi-Kunming rail- 
way to shipments of war-related goods to China. In an agreement 
with the Vichy government in France in August, Japan formally 
recognized French sovereignty in Indochina in return for access 
to military facilities, transit rights, and the right to station occu- 
pation troops in Tonkin. On September 22, however, Japanese 
troops invaded from China, seizing the Vietnamese border towns 
of Dong Dang and Lang Son. As the French retreated southward, 
the Japanese encouraged Vietnamese troops to support the inva- 
sion. The communists in the Bac Son district border area moved 
to take advantage of the situation, organizing self-defense units and 
establishing a revolutionary administration. The French protested 



46 



Historical Setting 



to the Japanese, however, and a cease-fire was arranged whereby 
the French forces returned to their posts and promptly put down 
all insurrection. Most of the communist forces in Tonkin were able 
to retreat to the mountains. In similar short-lived uprisings that 
took place in the Plain of Reeds area of Cochinchina, however, 
the communist rebel forces had nowhere to retreat and most were 
destroyed by the French. 

Establishment of the Viet Minn 

In early 1940, Ho Chi Minh returned to southern China, after 
having spent most of the previous seven years studying and teach- 
ing at the Lenin Institute in Moscow. In Kunming he reestablished 
contact with the ICP Central Committee and set up a temporary 
headquarters, which became the focal point for communist policy- 
making and planning. After thirty years absence, Ho returned to 
Vietnam in February 1941 and set up headquarters in a cave at 
Pac Bo, near the Sino- Vietnamese border, where in May the Eighth 
Plenum of the ICP was held. The major outcome of the meeting 
was the reiteration that the struggle for national independence took 
primacy over class war or other concerns of socialist ideology. To 
support this strategy, the League for the Independence of Viet- 
nam (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi, Viet Minh for short — 
see Glossary) was established. In this new front group, which would 
be dominated by the party, all patriotic elements were welcomed 
as potential allies. The party would be forced in the short term to 
modify some of its goals and soften its rhetoric, supporting, for 
example, the reduction of land rents rather than demanding land 
seizures. Social revolution would have to await the defeat of the 
French and the Japanese. The Eighth Plenum also recognized guer- 
rilla warfare as an integral part of the revolutionary strategy and 
established local self-defense militias in all villages under Viet Minh 
control. The cornerstone of the party's strategy, of which Ho 
appears to have been the chief architect, was the melding of the 
forces of urban nationalism and peasant rebellion into a single inde- 
pendence effort. 

In order to implement the new strategy, two tasks were given 
priority: the establishment of a Viet Minh apparatus throughout 
the country and the creation of a secure revolutionary base in the 
Viet Bac border region from which southward expansion could 
begin. This area had the advantages of being remote from colonial 
control but accessible to China, which could serve both as a refuge 
and training ground. Moreover, the Viet Bac population was largely 
sympathetic to the communists. Viet Minh influence began to 
permeate the area, and French forces attempted, but failed, to 



47 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

regain control of the region in 1941 . The liberation zone soon spread 
to include the entire northern frontier area until it reached south 
of Cao Bang, where an ICP Interprovincial Committee established 
its headquarters. A temporary setback for the communists occurred 
in August 1942, when Ho Chi Minh, while on a trip to southern 
China to meet with Chinese Communist Party officials, was arrested 
and imprisoned for two years by the Kuomintang. By August 1944, 
however, he had convinced the regional Chinese commander to 
support his return to Vietnam at the head of a guerrilla force. 
Accordingly, Ho returned to Vietnam in September with eighteen 
men trained and armed by the Chinese. Upon his arrival, he vetoed, 
as too precipitate, a plan laid by the ICP in his absence to launch 
a general uprising in Viet Bac within two months. Ho did, however, 
approve the establishment of armed propaganda detachments with 
both military and political functions. 

As World War II drew to a close, the ICP sought to have the 
Vietnamese independence movement recognized as one of the vic- 
torious Allied forces under the leadership of the United States. With 
this in mind, Ho returned again to southern China in January 1945 
to meet with American and Free French units there. From the 
Americans he solicited financial support, while from the French 
he sought, unsuccessfully, guarantees of Vietnamese independence. 
On March 9, 1945, the Japanese gave the French an ultimatum 
demanding that all French and Indochinese forces be placed under 
Japanese control. Without waiting for the French reply, the Japa- 
nese proceeded to seize administrative buildings, radio stations, 
banks, and industries and to disarm the French forces. Bao Dai, 
the Nguyen ruler under the French, was retained as emperor, and 
a puppet government was established with Tran Trong Kim, a 
teacher and historian, as prime minister. Japan revoked the Franco- 
Vietnamese Treaty of Protectorate of 1883, which had established 
Indochina as a French protectorate, and declared the independence 
of Vietnam under Japanese tutelage. 

The communists concluded that the approaching end of the war 
and the defeat of the Japanese meant that a propitious time for 
a general uprising of the Vietnamese people was close at hand. 
Accordingly, the ICP began planning to take advantage of the 
political vacuum produced by the French loss of control and the 
confinement of Japanese power largely to urban and strategic areas. 
Moreover, famine conditions prevailed in the countryside, and 
unemployment was rampant in the cities. In the Red River Delta 
alone, more than 500,000 people died of starvation between March 
and May 1945. Because Japan was considered the main enemy, 
the communists decided that a United Front should be formed that 



48 



Historical Setting 



included patriotic French resistance groups and moderate urban 
Vietnamese bourgeoisie. The overall ICP strategy called for a two- 
stage revolt, beginning in rural areas and then moving to the cities. 
Accordingly, communist military forces responded to the plan. 
Armed Propaganda units under ICP military strategist Vo Nguyen 
Giap began moving south from Cao Bang into Thai Nguyen 
Province (see the Armed Forces, ch. 5). To the east, the 3,000-man 
National Salvation Army commanded by Chu Van Tan began 
liberating the provinces of Tuyen Quang and Lang Son and estab- 
lishing revolutionary district administrations. At the first major mili- 
tary conference of the ICP, held in April in Bac Giang Province, 
the leaders determined that a liberated zone would be established 
in Viet Bac and that existing ICP military units would be united 
to form the new Vietnam Liberation Army (VLA), later called the 
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN — see Glossary) (see The Armed 
Forces, ch. 5). Giap was named Commander in Chief of the VLA 
and chairman of the Revolution Military Committee, later called 
the Central Military Party Committee (CMPC). Meanwhile, the 
ICP was expanding its influence farther south by forming mass 
organizations known as national salvation associations (cuu quoc hoi) 
for various groups, including workers, peasants, women, youth, 
students, and soldiers. As a result of labor unrest in Hanoi, 2,000 
workers were recruited into salvation associations in early 1945, 
and 100,000 peasants had been enlisted into salvation associations 
in Quang Ngai Province by mid-summer. In Saigon, a youth orga- 
nization, Thanh Nien Tien Phong (Vanguard Youth), established 
by the communists in 1942, had recruited 200,000 by early sum- 
mer. Thanh Nien Tien Phong became the focal point for the com- 
munist effort in the south and soon expanded to more than one 
million members throughout Cochinchina. By June 1945, in the 
provinces of Viet Bac, the Viet Minh had set up people's revolu- 
tionary committees at all levels, distributed communal and French- 
owned lands to the poor, abolished the corvee, established quoc ngu 
classes, set up local self-defense militias in the villages, and declared 
universal suffrage and democratic freedoms. The Viet Minh then 
established a provisional directorate, headed by Ho Chi Minh, as 
the governing body for the liberated zone, comprising an estimated 
one million people. 

Despite its success in the north, the ICP faced a range of serious 
obstacles in Cochinchina, where the Japanese maintained 100,000 
well-armed troops. In addition, the Japanese also supported the 
neo-Buddhist Cao Dai sect (see Glossary) of more than one mil- 
lion members, including a military force of several battalions. 
Another sect, the Hoa Hao (see Glossary), founded and led by the 



49 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

fanatical Huynh Phu So, eschewed temples and hierarchy and 
appealed to the poor and oppressed. Although lacking the mili- 
tary force of the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao was also closely connected 
with the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Japanese had also gained con- 
trol of the Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Dong Minh Hoi (League for the 
Restoration of Vietnam), established in 1939 as an outgrowth of 
Viet Nam Quang Phuc Hoi. Mobilized by the communists to face 
this array of forces in Cochinchina were the Vanguard Youth and 
the Vietnam Trade Union Federation, with 100,000 members in 
300 unions. 

The General Uprising and Independence 

On August 13, 1945, the ICP Central Committee held its Ninth 
Plenum at Tan Trao to prepare an agenda for a National Con- 
gress of the Viet Minh a few days later. At the plenum, convened 
just after the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, an order for a general uprising was issued, and a national 
insurrection committee was established headed by ICP general 
secretary Truong Chinh (see Development of the Vietnamese Com- 
munist Party, ch. 4; Appendix B). On August 16, the Viet Minh 
National Congress convened at Tan Trao and ratified the Central 
Committee decision to launch a general uprising. The Congress 
also elected a National Liberation Committee, headed by Ho Chi 
Minh (who was gravely ill at the time), to serve as a provisional 
government. The following day, the Congress, at a ceremony in 
front of the village dinh, officially adopted the national red flag with 
a gold star, and Ho read an appeal to the Vietnamese people to 
rise in revolution. 

By the end of the first week following the Tan Trao conference, 
most of the provincial and district capitals north of Hanoi had fallen 
to the revolutionary forces. When the news of the Japanese sur- 
render reached Hanoi on August 16, the local Japanese military 
command turned over its powers to the local Vietnamese authori- 
ties. By August 17, Viet Minh units in the Hanoi suburbs had 
deposed the local administrations and seized the government seals 
symbolizing political authority. Self-defense units were set up and 
armed with guns, knives, and sticks. Meanwhile, Viet Minh-led 
demonstrations broke out inside Hanoi. The following morning, 
a member of the Viet Minh Municipal Committee announced to 
a crowd of 200,000 gathered in Ba Dinh Square that the general 
uprising had begun. The crowd broke up immediately after that 
and headed for various key buildings around the city, including 
the palace, city hall, and police headquarters, where they accepted 
the surrender of the Japanese and local Vietnamese government 



50 



Historical Setting 



forces, mostly without resistance. The Viet Minh sent telegrams 
throughout Tonkin announcing its victory, and local Viet Minh 
units were able to take over most of the provincial and district capi- 
tals without a struggle. In Annam and Cochinchina, however, the 
communist victory was less assured because the ICP in those 
regions had neither the advantage of long, careful preparation nor 
an established liberated base area and army. Hue fell in a manner 
similar to Hanoi, with the takeover first of the surrounding area. 
Saigon fell on August 25 to the Viet Minh, who organized a nine- 
member, multiparty Committee of the South, including six mem- 
bers of the Viet Minh, to govern the city. The provinces south and 
west of Saigon, however, remained in the hands of the Hoa Hao. 
Although the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai were anti-French, both were 
more interested in regional autonomy than in communist-led 
national independence. As a result, clashes between the Hoa Hao 
and the Viet Minh broke out in the Mekong Delta in September. 

Ho Chi Minh moved his headquarters to Hanoi shortly after 
the Viet Minh takeover of the city. On August 28, the Viet Minh 
announced the formation of the provisional government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) with Ho as president and 
minister of foreign affairs. Vo Nguyen Giap was named minister 
of interior and Pham Van Dong minister of finance. In order to 
broaden support for the new government, several noncommunists 
were also included. Emperor Bao Dai, whom the communists had 
forced to abdicate on August 25, was given the position of high 
counselor to the new government. On September 2, half a million 
people gathered in Ba Dinh Square to hear Ho read the Vietnamese 
Declaration of Independence, based on the American Declaration 
of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen. After indicting the French colonial record in Viet- 
nam, he closed with an appeal to the victorious Allies to recognize 
the independence of Vietnam. 

Despite the heady days of August, major problems lay ahead 
for the ICP. Noncommunist political parties, which had been too 
weak and disorganized to take advantage of the political vacuum 
left by the fall of the Japanese, began to express opposition to com- 
munist control of the new provisional government. Among these 
parties, the nationalist VNQDD and Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Dong 
Minh Hoi parties had the benefit of friendship with the Chinese 
expeditionary forces of Chiang Kai-shek, which began arriving in 
northern Vietnam in early September. At the Potsdam Conference 
in July 1945, the Allies had agreed that the Chinese would accept 
the surrender of the Japanese in Indochina north of the 16°N 
parallel and the British, south of that line. The Vietnamese 



51 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

nationalists, with the help of Chinese troops, seized some areas north 
of Hanoi, and the VNQDD subsequently set up an opposition 
newspaper in Hanoi to denounce "red terror." The communists 
gave high priority to avoiding clashes with Chinese troops, which 
soon numbered 180,000. To prevent such encounters, Ho ordered 
VLA troops to avoid provoking any incidents with the Chinese and 
agreed to the Chinese demand that the communists negotiate with 
the Vietnamese nationalist parties. Accordingly, in November 1945, 
the provisional government began negotiations with the VNQDD 
and the Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Dong Minh Hoi, both of which ini- 
tially took a hard line in their demands. The communists resisted, 
however, and the final agreement called for a provisional coali- 
tion government with Ho as president and nationalist leader 
Nguyen Hai Than as vice president. In the general elections sched- 
uled for early January, 50 of the 350 National Assembly seats were 
to be reserved for the VNQDD and 20 for Viet Nam Phuc Quoc 
Dong Minh Hoi regardless of the results of the balloting. 

At the same time, the communists were in a far weaker political 
position in Cochinchina because they faced competition from the 
well-organized, economically influential, moderate parties based 
in Saigon and from the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai in the countryside. 
Moreover, the commander of the British expeditionary forces, 
which arrived in early September, was unsympathetic to Viet- 
namese desires for independence. French troops, released from 
Japanese prisons and rearmed by the British, provoked incidents 
and seized control of the city. A general strike called by the Viet- 
namese led to clashes with the French troops and mob violence in 
the French sections of the city. Negotiations between the French 
and the Committee of the South broke down in early October, as 
French troops began to occupy towns in the Mekong Delta. Plagued 
by clashes with the religious sects, lack of weapons, and a high deser- 
tion rate, the troops of the Viet Minh were driven deep into the 
delta, forests, and other inaccessible areas of the region. 

Meanwhile, in Hanoi candidates supported by the Viet Minh 
won 300 seats in the National Assembly in the January 1946 elec- 
tions. In early March, however, the threat of the imminent arrival 
of French troops in the north forced Ho to negotiate a compromise 
with France. Under the terms of the agreement, the French govern- 
ment recognized the DRV as a free state with its own army, legis- 
lative body, and financial powers, in return for Hanoi's acceptance 
of a small French military presence in northern Vietnam and mem- 
bership in the French Union. Both sides agreed to a plebiscite in 
Cochinchina. The terms of the accord were generally unpopular 
with the Vietnamese and were widely viewed as a sell-out of the 



52 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

revolution. Ho, however, foresaw grave danger in refusing to com- 
promise while the country was still in a weakened position. Soon 
after the agreement was signed, some 15,000 French troops arrived 
in Tonkin, and both the Vietnamese and the French began to ques- 
tion the terms of the accord. Negotiations to implement the agree- 
ment began in late spring at Fontainbleau, near Paris, and dragged 
on throughout the summer. Ho signed a modus vivendi (temporary 
agreement), which gave the Vietnamese little more than the promise 
of negotiation of a final treaty the following January, and returned 
to Vietnam. 

First Indochina War 

Ho's efforts during this period were directed primarily at con- 
ciliating both the French themselves and the militantly anti-French 
members of the ICP leadership. The growing frequency of clashes 
between French and Vietnamese forces in Haiphong led to a French 
naval bombardment of that port city in November 1946. Estimates 
of Vietnamese casualties from the action range from 6,000 to 
20,000. This incident and the arrival of 1 ,000 troops of the French 
Foreign Legion in central and northern Vietnam in early Decem- 
ber convinced the communists, including Ho, that they should pre- 
pare for war. On December 19, the French demanded that the 
Vietnamese forces in the Hanoi area disarm and transfer respon- 
sibility for law and order to French authority. That evening, the 
Viet Minh responded by attacking the city's electric plant and other 
French installations around the area. Forewarned, the French seized 
Gia Lam airfield and took control of the central part of Hanoi, 
as full-scale war broke out. By late January, the French had retaken 
most of the provincial capitals in northern and central Vietnam. 
Hue fell in early February, after a six- week siege. The Viet Minh, 
which avoided using its main force units against the French at that 
time, continued to control most of the countryside, where it con- 
centrated on building up its military strength and setting up guer- 
rilla training programs in liberated areas. Seizing the initiative, 
however, the French marched north to the Chinese border in the 
autumn of 1947, inflicting heavy casualties on the Viet Minh and 
retaking much of the Viet Bac region. 

Meanwhile, in April 1947 the Viet Minh in Cochinchina had 
destroyed all chance for alliance with the religious sects by execut- 
ing Huynh Phu So, leader of the Hoa Hao. Both the Hoa Hao 
and the Cao Dai formed alliances soon afterward with the French. 
The Committee for the South, which had seriously damaged the 
communist image in Cochinchina by its hard-line approach, was 
replaced in 1951 by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN, 



54 



Historical Setting 



Trung Uong Cue Mien Nam), headed by Le Duan. In the north, 
however, the political and military situation had begun to improve 
for the communists by late 1948. The Viet Minh had increased 
the number of its troops to more than 250,000 and, through guer- 
rilla activities, the communists had managed to retake part of Viet 
Bac as well as a number of small liberated base areas in the south. 
ICP political power was also growing, although lack of a land reform 
program and the continued moderate policy toward the patriotic 
landed gentry discouraged peasant support for the communists. 
In 1948, the French responded to the growing strength of the Viet 
Minh by granting nominal independence to all of Vietnam in the 
guise of "associated statehood" within the French Union. The terms 
of the agreement made it clear, however, that Vietnam's indepen- 
dence was, in reality, devoid of any practical significance. The new 
government, established with Bao Dai as chief of state, was viewed 
critically by nationalists as well as communists. Most prominent 
nationalists, including Ngo Dinh Diem (president, Republic of Viet- 
nam, South Vietnam, 1955-63), refused positions in the govern- 
ment, and many left the country. 

The United States recognized the Associated State of Vietnam 
in early 1950, but this action was counterbalanced a few days later 
with the recognition of the DRV by the new People's Republic 
of China. In March, Ho Chi Minh signed an agreement with Bei- 
jing that called for limited assistance to Hanoi. Shortly thereafter, 
Moscow also formally recognized the DRV, and the Viet Minh 
became more openly affiliated with the communist camp. Mao 
Zedong's model of revolution was openly praised in the Vietnamese 
press; and the ICP, which, on paper, had been temporarily dis- 
solved in 1945 to obscure the Viet Minh's communist roots, sur- 
faced under a new name in 1951 that removed all doubt of its 
communist nature. More than 200 delegates, representing some 
500,000 party members, gathered at the Second National Party 
Congress of the ICP, held in February 1951 in Tuyen Quang 
Province. Renaming the ICP the Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP, 
Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam), the delegates elected Ho as party chair- 
man and Truong Chinh as general secretary. 

Dien Bien Phu 

With Beijing's promise of limited assistance to Hanoi, the com- 
munist military strategy concentrated on the liberation of Tonkin 
and consigned Cochinchina to a lower priority. The top military 
priority, as set by Giap, was to free the northern border areas in 
order to protect the movement of supplies and personnel from 
China. By autumn of 1950, the Viet Minh had again liberated 



55 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Viet Bac in decisive battles that forced the French to evacuate the 
entire border region, leaving behind a large quantity of ammuni- 
tion. From their liberated zone in the northern border area, the 
Viet Minh were free to make raids into the Red River Delta. The 
French military in Vietnam found it increasingly difficult to con- 
vince Paris and the French electorate to give them the manpower 
and materiel needed to defeat the Viet Minh. For the next two years, 
the Viet Minh, well aware of the growing disillusionment of the 
French people with Indochina, concentrated its efforts on wearing 
down the French military by attacking its weakest outposts and 
by maximizing the physical distance between engagements to dis- 
perse French forces. Being able to choose the time and place for 
such engagements gave the guerrillas a decided advantage. Mean- 
while, political activity was increased until, by late 1952, more than 
half the villages of the Red River Delta were under Viet Minh 
control. 

The newly appointed commander of French forces in Vietnam, 
General Henri Navarre, decided soon after his arrival in Vietnam 
that it was essential to halt a Viet Minh offensive underway in neigh- 
boring Laos. To do so, Navarre believed it was necessary for the 
French to capture and hold the town of Dien Bien Phu, sixteen 
kilometers from the Laotian border. For the Viet Minh, control 
of Dien Bien Phu was an important link in the supply route from 
China. In November 1953, the French occupied the town with 
paratroop battalions and began reinforcing it with units from the 
French military post at nearby Lai Chau. 

During that same month, Ho indicated that the DRV was will- 
ing to examine French proposals for a diplomatic settlement 
announced the month before. In February 1954, a peace confer- 
ence to settle the Korean and Indochinese conflicts was set for April 
in Geneva, and negotiations in Indochina were scheduled to begin 
on May 8. Viet Minh strategists, led by Giap, concluded that a 
successful attack on a French fortified camp, timed to coincide with 
the peace talks, would give Hanoi the necessary leverage for a suc- 
cessful conclusion of the negotiations. 

Accordingly, the siege of Dien Bien Phu began on March 13, 
by which time the Viet Minh had concentrated nearly 50,000 regu- 
lar troops, 55,000 support troops, and almost 100,000 transport 
workers in the area. Chinese aid, consisting mainly of ammuni- 
tion, petroleum, and some large artillery pieces carried a distance 
of 350 kilometers from the Chinese border, reached 1,500 tons per 
month by early 1954. The French garrison of 15,000, which 
depended on supply by air, was cut off by March 27, when the 
Viet Minh artillery succeeded in making the airfield unusable. An 



56 




57 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



elaborate system of tunnels dug in the mountainsides enabled the 
Viet Minh to protect its artillery pieces by continually moving them 
to prevent discovery. Several hundred kilometers of trenches per- 
mitted the attackers to move progressively closer to the French 
encampment. In the final battle, human wave assaults were used 
to take the perimeter defenses, which yielded defensive guns that 
were then turned on the main encampment. The French garrison 
surrendered on May 7, ending the siege that had cost the lives of 
about 25,000 Vietnamese and more than 1,500 French troops. 

The following day, peace talks on Indochina began in Geneva, 
attended by the DRV, the Associated State of Vietnam, Cambo- 
dia, Laos, France, Britain, China, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States. In July a compromise agreement was reached consisting 
of two documents: a cease-fire and a final declaration. The cease- 
fire agreement, which was signed only by France and the DRV, 
established a provisional military demarcation line at about the 
17°N parallel and required the regrouping of all French military 
forces south of that line and of all Viet Minh military forces north 
of the line. A demilitarized zone (DMZ), no more than five kilo- 
meters wide, was established on either side of the demarcation line. 
The cease-fire agreement also provided for a 300-day period, dur- 
ing which all civilians were free to move from one zone to the other, 
and an International Control Commission, consisting of Canada, 
India, and Poland, to supervise the cease-fire. The final declara- 
tion was endorsed through recorded oral assent by the DRV, 
France, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. It provided for the 
holding of national elections in July 1956, under the supervision 
of the International Control Commission, and stated that the mili- 
tary demarcation line was provisional and "should not in any way 
be interpreted as constituting a political territorial boundary." Both 
the United States and the Associated State of Vietnam, which 
France had recognized on June 4 as a "fully independent and sover- 
eign state," refused to approve the final declaration and submitted 
separate declarations stating their reservations. 

The Aftermath of Geneva 

The Geneva Agreements were viewed with doubt and dissatis- 
faction on all sides. Concern over possible United States interven- 
tion, should the Geneva talks fail, was probably a major factor in 
Hanoi's decision to accept the compromise agreement. The United 
States had dissociated itself from the final declaration, although 
it had stated that it would refrain from the threat or use of force 
to disturb the agreements. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote 
to the new Prime Minister of the Bao Dai government, Ngo Dinh 



58 



Charles DeGaulle and 
Ho Chi Minh are hanged in 
effigy during the National 
Shame Day celebration in 
Saigon, July 1964, observing 
the tenth anniversary 
of the July 1954 
Geneva Agreements. 
Courtesy United States Army 



Northern Roman Catholic 
peasant refugee, 1954 
Courtesy Indochina Archives 




59 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Diem, in September 1954 promising United States support for a 
noncommunist Vietnam. Direct United States aid to South Viet- 
nam began in January 1955, and American advisors began arriv- 
ing the following month to train South Vietnamese army troops. 
By early 1955, Diem had consolidated his control by moving against 
lawless elements in the Saigon area and by suppressing the reli- 
gious sects in the Mekong Delta. He also launched a "denounce 
the communists" campaign, in which, according to communist 
accounts, 25,000 communist sympathizers were arrested and more 
than 1,000 killed. In August 1955, Diem issued a statement for- 
mally refusing to participate in consultations with the DRV, which 
had been called for by the Geneva Agreement to prepare for national 
elections. In October, he easily defeated Bao Dai in a seriously 
tainted referendum and became president of the new Republic of 
Vietnam. 

Despite the growing likelihood that national elections would not 
be held, the communist leadership in Hanoi decided for the time 
being to continue to concentrate its efforts on the political struggle. 
Several factors led to this decision, including the weakness of the 
party apparatus in the South, the need to concentrate on strength- 
ening the war-weakened North, and pressure from the communist 
leadership of the Soviet Union, which, under General Secretary 
Nikita Khrushchev, had inaugurated its policy of peaceful coexis- 
tence with the West. By 1957, however, a shift to a more militant 
approach to the reunification of the country was apparent. Partly 
in response to Diem's anticommunist campaign, the Party stepped 
up terrorist activities in the South, assassinating several hundred 
officials of the Diem government. This led to the arrest of another 
65,000 suspected communists and the killing of more than 2,000 
by the Saigon government in 1957. Repression by the Diem regime 
led to the rise of armed rebel self-defense units in various parts 
of the South, with the units often operating on their own without 
any party direction. Observing that a potential revolutionary situa- 
tion had been created by popular resentment of the Diem govern- 
ment and fearing that the government's anticommunist policy 
would destroy or weaken party organization in the South, the VWP 
leadership determined that the time had come to resort to violent 
struggle. 

Second Indochina War 

By 1959 some of the 90,000 Viet Minh troops that had returned 
to the North following the Geneva Agreements had begun filtering 
back into the South to take up leadership positions in the insurgency 
apparatus. Mass demonstrations, punctuated by an occasional 



60 



Historical Setting 



raid on an isolated post, were the major activities in the initial stage 
of this insurgency. Communist-led uprisings launched in 1959 in 
the lower Mekong Delta and Central Highlands resulted in the 
establishment of liberated zones, including an area of nearly fifty 
villages in Quang Ngai Province. In areas under communist con- 
trol in 1959, the guerrillas established their own government, levied 
taxes, trained troops, built defense works, and provided education 
and medical care. In order to direct and coordinate the new poli- 
cies in the South, it was necessary to revamp the party leadership 
apparatus and form a new united front group. Accordingly, 
COSVN, which had been abolished in 1954, was reestablished with 
General Nguyen Chi Thanh, a northerner, as chairman and Pham 
Hung, a southerner, as deputy chairman. On December 20, 1960, 
the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, informally 
called the National Liberation Front (NLF, Mat Tran Dan Toe 
Giai Phong Mien Nam), was founded, with representatives on its 
Central Committee from all social classes, political parties, women's 
organizations, and religious groups, including Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, 
the Buddhists, and the Catholics. In order to keep the NLF from 
being obviously linked with the VWP and the DRV, its executive 
leadership consisted of individuals not publicly identified with the 
communists, and the number of party members in leadership 
positions at all levels was strictly limited. Furthermore, in order 
not to alienate patriotic noncommunist elements, the new front was 
oriented more toward the defeat of the United States-backed Sai- 
gon government than toward social revolution. 

The Fall of Ngo Dinh Diem 

In 1961 the rapid increase of insurgency in the South Vietnamese 
countryside led President John F. Kennedy's administration to 
decide to increase United States support for the Diem regime. Some 
$US65 million in military equipment and $US136 million in eco- 
nomic aid were delivered that year, and by December 3,200 United 
States military personnel were in Vietnam. The United States Mili- 
tary Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was formed under 
the command of General Paul D. Harkins in February 1962. The 
cornerstone of the counterinsurgency effort was the strategic hamlet 
program, which called for the consolidation of 14,000 villages of 
South Vietnam into 11,000 secure hamlets, each with its own 
houses, schools, wells, and watchtowers. The hamlets were intended 
to isolate guerrillas from the villages, their source of supplies and 
information, or, in Maoist terminology, to separate the fish from 
the sea in which they swim. The program had its problems, how- 
ever, aside from the frequent attacks on the hamlets by guerrilla 



61 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

units. The self-defense units for the hamlets were often poorly 
trained, and support from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN — see Glossary) was inadequate. Corruption, favoritism, 
and the resentment of a growing number of peasants who were 
forcibly resettled plagued the program. It was estimated that of 
the 8,000 hamlets established, only 1,500 were viable. 

In response to increased United States involvement, all com- 
munist armed units in the South were unified into a single Peo- 
ple's Liberation Armed Force (PLAF) in 1961. These troops 
expanded in number from fewer than 3,000 in 1959 to more than 
15,000 by 1961, most of whom were assigned to guerrilla units. 
Southerners trained in the North who infiltrated back into the South 
composed an important element of this force. Although they 
accounted numerically for only about 20 percent of the PLAF, they 
provided a well-trained nucleus for the movement and often served 
as officers or political cadres. By late 1962, the PLAF had achieved 
the capability to attack fixed positions with battalion-sized forces. 
The NLF was also expanded to include 300,000 members and 
perhaps 1 million sympathizers by 1962. Land reform programs 
were begun in liberated areas, and by 1964 approximately 1.52 
million hectares had been distributed to needy peasants, accord- 
ing to communist records. In the early stages, only communal 
lands, uncultivated lands, or lands of absentee landlords were dis- 
tributed. Despite local pressure for more aggressive land reform, 
the peasantry generally approved of the program, and it was an 
important factor in gaining support for the liberation movement 
in the countryside. In the cities, the Workers' Liberation Associa- 
tion of Vietnam (Hoi Lao Dong Giai Phong Mien Nam), a labor 
organization affiliated with the NLF, was established in 1961. 

Diem grew steadily more unpopular as his regime became more 
repressive. His brother and chief adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was iden- 
tified by regime opponents as the source of many of the govern- 
ment's repressive measures. Harassment of Buddhist groups by 
ARVN forces in early 1963 led to a crisis situation in Saigon. On 
May 8, 1963, ARVN troops fired into a crowd of demonstrators 
protesting the Diem government's discriminatory policies toward 
Buddhists, killing nine persons. Hundreds of Buddhist bonzes 
responded by staging peaceful protest demonstrations and by fast- 
ing. In June a bonze set himself on fire in Saigon as a protest, and, 
by the end of the year, six more bonzes had committed self- 
immolation. On August 21, special forces under the command of 
Ngo Dinh Nhu raided the pagodas of the major cities, killing many 
bonzes and arresting thousands of others. Following demonstra- 
tions at Saigon University on August 24, an estimated 4,000 



62 




Peasants suspected of being communists, 1966 
Courtesy United States Army 



63 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

students were rounded up and jailed, and the universities of Sai- 
gon and Hue were closed. Outraged by the Diem regime's repres- 
sive policies, the Kennedy administration indicated to South 
Vietnamese military leaders that Washington would be willing to 
support a new military government. Diem and Nhu were assassi- 
nated in a military coup in early November, and General Duong 
Van Minh took over the government. 

Escalation of the War 

Hanoi's response to the fall of the Diem regime was a subject 
of intense debate at the Ninth Plenum of the VWP Central Com- 
mittee held in December 1963. It appeared that the new adminis- 
tration of President Lyndon B. Johnson (who assumed office 
following the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22) 
was not planning to withdraw from Vietnam but, rather, to increase 
its support for the new Saigon government. The VWP leadership 
concluded that only armed struggle would lead to success and called 
for an escalation of the war. The critical issues then became the 
reactions of the United States and the Soviet Union. Hanoi clearly 
hoped that the United States would opt for a compromise solu- 
tion, as it had in Korea and Laos, and the party leaders believed 
that a quick and forceful escalation of the war would induce it to 
do so. Hanoi's decision to escalate the struggle was made in spite 
of the risk of damage to its relations with Moscow, which opposed 
the decision. The new policy also became an issue in the develop- 
ing rift between Beijing and Moscow because China expressed its 
full support for the Vietnamese war of national liberation. As a 
result, Moscow's aid began to decrease as Beijing's grew. 

Escalation of the war resulted in some immediate success for the 
struggle in the South. By 1964 a liberated zone had been estab- 
lished from the Central Highlands to the edge of the Mekong Delta, 
giving the communists control over more than half the total land 
area and about half the population of the South. PLAF forces totaled 
between 30 and 40 battalions, including 35,000 guerrillas and 
80,000 irregulars. Moreover, with the completion of the so-called 
Ho Chi Minh Trail (see Glossary) through Laos, the number of 
PAVN troops infiltrated into the South began to increase. ARVN 
control was limited mainly to the cities and surrounding areas, and 
in 1964 and 1965 Saigon governments fell repeatedly in a series 
of military and civilian coups. 

The Johnson administration remained hesitant to raise the 
American commitment to Vietnam. However, in August 1964, fol- 
lowing the reputed shelling of United States warships in the Gulf 
of Tonkin off the North Vietnamese coast, Johnson approved air 



64 



iir<n if the. 

Hill 




Citizens of Toy Ninh welcome the United States Army's 
25th Infantry Division, August 1966. 

Courtesy United States Army 



strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases. At President John- 
son's urgent request, the United States Congress passed the Gulf 
of Tonkin Resolution, which gave the president the power "to take 
all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces 
of the United States and to prevent further aggression." This 
tougher United States stance was matched in Moscow in October 
when Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksey Kosygin took over control of 
the government following the fall from power of Nikita Khrushchev. 
The new Soviet government pledged increased military support 
for Hanoi, and the NLF set up a permanent mission in Moscow. 

United States support for South Vietnam, which had begun as 
an effort to defend Southeast Asia from the communist threat, 
developed into a matter of preserving United States prestige. The 
Johnson administration, nevertheless, was reluctant to commit com- 
bat troops to Vietnam, although the number of United States mili- 
tary advisers including their support and defense units had reached 
16,000 by July 1964. Instead, in February 1965 the United States 
began a program of air strikes known as Operation Rolling Thun- 
der against military targets in North Vietnam. Despite the bomb- 
ing of the North, ARVN losses grew steadily, and the political 
situation in Saigon became precarious as one unstable government 
succeeded another. General William C. Westmoreland, commander 



65 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

of MAC V from June 1964 to March 1968, urged the use of United 
States combat troops to stop the communist advance, which he 
predicted could take over the country within a year. The first two 
battalions of United States Marines (3,500 men) arrived in Viet- 
nam in March 1965 to protect the United States airbase at Da Nang. 
The following month, Westmoreland convinced the administra- 
tion to commit sufficient combat troops to secure base areas and 
mount a series of search and destroy missions (see Glossary). By 
late 1965, the United States expeditionary force in South Vietnam 
numbered 180,000, and the military situation had stabilized some- 
what. Infiltration from the north, however, had also increased, 
although still chiefly by southerners who had gone north in 1954 
and received military training. PLAF strength was estimated to 
be about 220,000, divided almost equally between guerrillas and 
main force troops, the latter including units of PAVN regulars total- 
ling about 13,000 troops. 

The United States decision to escalate the war was a surprise 
and a blow to party strategists in Hanoi. At the Twelfth Plenum 
of the Central Committee in December 1965, the decision was made 
to continue the struggle for liberation of the South despite the 
escalated American commitment. The party leadership concluded 
that a period of protracted struggle lay ahead in which it would 
be necessary to exert constant military pressure on the Saigon 
government and its ally in order to make the war sufficiently 
unpopular in Washington. Efforts were to be concentrated on the 
ARVN troops, which had suffered 113,000 desertions in 1965 and 
were thought to be on the verge of disintegration. In early 1965, 
Hanoi had been encouraged by Moscow's decision to increase its 
economic and military assistance substantially. The resulting several 
hundred million dollars in Soviet aid, including surface-to-air mis- 
siles, had probably been tied to a promise by Hanoi to attend an 
international conference on Indochina that had been proposed by 
Soviet premier Kosygin in February. As preconditions for these 
negotiations, Hanoi and Washington, however, had each presented 
demands that were unacceptable to the other side. The DRV had 
called for an immediate and unconditional halt to the bombing of 
the north, and the United States had demanded the removal of 
PAVN troops from the South. Although both Hanoi and Washing- 
ton had been interested in a negotiated settlement, each had pre- 
ferred to postpone negotiations until it had achieved a position of 
strength on the battlefield. 

By mid- 1966 United States forces, now numbering 350,000, had 
gained the initiative in several key areas, pushing the communists 
out of the heavily populated zones of the south into the more 



66 



Historical Setting 



remote mountainous regions and into areas along the Cambodian 
border. Revolutionary forces in the South, under the command 
of General Nguyen Chi Thanh, responded by launching an aggres- 
sive campaign of harassment operations and full-scale attacks by 
regiment-sized units. This approach proved costly, however, in 
terms of manpower and resources, and by late 1966 about 5,000 
troops, including main force PAVN units, were being infiltrated 
from the North each month to help implement this strategy. At 
the same time, North Vietnam placed its economy on a war foot- 
ing, temporarily shelving non-war-related construction efforts. As 
a consequence of the heavy United States bombing of the North, 
industries were dismantled and moved to remote areas. Young men 
were conscripted into the army and their places in fields and fac- 
tories were filled by women, who also served in home defense and 
antiaircraft units. Such measures were very effective in counter- 
ing the impact of the bombing on the North's war effort. The John- 
son administration, however, showed no sign of willingness to 
change its bombing strategy or to lessen its war effort (see fig. 8; 
fig. 9). 

During this difficult period, the communists returned to pro- 
tracted guerrilla warfare and political struggle. The party leader- 
ship called for increased efforts to infiltrate moderate political parties 
and religious organizations. The underground communist leader- 
ship in Saigon was instructed to prepare for a general uprising by 
recruiting youths into guerrilla units and training women to agi- 
tate against the city's poor living conditions and the injustices of 
the Saigon government. Total victory, according to the party leader- 
ship, would probably occur when military victories in rural areas 
were combined with general uprisings in the cities. 

In mid- 1967, with United States troop levels close to the half mil- 
lion mark, Westmoreland requested 80,000 additional troops for 
immediate needs and indicated that further requests were being con- 
templated. United States forces in Tay Ninh, Binh Dinh, Quang 
Ngai, and Dinh Tuong provinces had initiated major offensives in 
late 1966 and in early 1967, and more troops were needed to sup- 
port these and other planned operations. As a result of these deploy- 
ments, United States forces were scattered from the DMZ to the 
Mekong Delta by mid- 1967. Opposition to the war, meanwhile, was 
mounting in the United States; and among the Vietnamese facing 
one another in the South, the rising cost of men and resources was 
beginning to take its toll on both sides. The level of PLAF volun- 
teers declined to less than 50 percent in 1967 and desertions rose, 
resulting in an even greater increase in northern troop participa- 
tion. Morale declined among communist sympathizers and Saigon 



67 



Vietnam: A Country Study 




Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 8. North Vietnam's Administrative Divisions, 1966 



68 



Historical Setting 



A. 



INDEX TO REGIONS 
AND PROVINCES 

Central Vietnam Lowlands 

Quang Tri 1 Ouang Nam 

Thua Thien 2 Quang Tin 
Quang Ngai 5 

Central Vietnam Highlands 

6 Khanh Hoa 



NORTH 
VIETNAM 

Vv 



Kontum 
Binh Dinh 
Pleiku 
Phu Bon 
Phu Yen 
Darlac 



Quang Due 
Tuyen Due 
Ninh Thuan 
Lam Dong 
Binh Thuan 



South Vietnam— East 

Tay Ninh 18 Long Khanh 

Binh Long 19 Binh Tuy 
Phuoc Long 20 Gia Dinh 
Binh Duong 21 Bien Hoa 
Phuoc Tuy 26 



South Vietnam— West 



Chau Doc 
Kien Phong 
Kien Tuong 
Hau Nghia 
Kien Giang 
An Giang 
Vinh Long 
Ding Tuong 



27 Long An 

28 Chuong Thie 

29 Phong Dinh 

30 Vinh Binh 

31 Kien Hoa 

32 Go Cong 

33 An Xuyen 
Bac Lieu 



r SXDemarcation Line 
>Sanh .J 

%2 



i 2 AS 



LAOS \ K <' 



)a Nang 



3 A 



V 6 



Kontum f" 
) 

, .4 




South 
China 
Sea 



Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 



International boundary 
Region boundary 
Province boundary 
National capital 
City 

Ho Chi Minh Trail 

50 100 KILOM ETERS 
100 MILES 



Figure 9. South Vietnam's Administrative Divisions, 1966 



69 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

government supporters alike. In elections held in South Vietnam 
in September 1967, former generals Nguyen Van Thieu and 
Nguyen Cao Ky were elected president and vice president, respec- 
tively. A number of popular candidates, including Buddhists and 
peace candidates, were barred from running, and newspapers were 
largely suppressed during the campaign. Even so, the military can- 
didates received less than 35 percent of the vote, although the elec- 
tion took place only in areas under the Saigon government's control. 
When proof of widespread election fraud was produced by the 
defeated candidates, students and Buddhists demonstrated and 
demanded that the elections be annulled. 

The Tet Offensive 

In mid- 1967 the costs of the war mounted daily with no mili- 
tary victory in sight for either side. Against this background, the 
party leadership in Hanoi decided that the time was ripe for a gen- 
eral offensive in the rural areas combined with a popular uprising 
in the cities. The primary goals of this combined major offensive 
and uprising were to destabilize the Saigon regime and to force 
the United States to opt for a negotiated settlement. In October 
1967, the first stage of the offensive began with a series of small 
attacks in remote and border areas designed to draw the ARVN 
and United States forces away from the cities. The rate of infiltra- 
tion of troops from the North rose to 20,000 per month by late 
1967, and the United States command in Saigon predicted a major 
communist offensive early the following year. The DMZ area was 
expected to bear the brunt of the attack. Accordingly, United States 
troops were sent to strengthen northern border posts, and the secu- 
rity of the Saigon area was transferred to ARVN forces. Despite 
warnings of the impending offensive, in late January more than 
one-half of the ARVN forces were on leave because of the approach- 
ing Tet (Lunar New Year) holiday. 

On January 31, 1968, the full-scale offensive began, with simul- 
taneous attacks by the communists on five major cities, thirty-six 
provincial capitals, sixty-four district capitals, and numerous vil- 
lages. In Saigon, suicide squads attacked the Independence Palace 
(the residence of the president), the radio station, the ARVN's joint 
General Staff Compound, Tan Son Nhut airfield, and the United 
States embassy, causing considerable damage and throwing the city 
into turmoil. Most of the attack forces throughout the country col- 
lapsed within a few days, often under the pressure of United States 
bombing and artillery attacks, which extensively damaged the urban 
areas. Hue, which had been seized by an estimated 12,000 com- 
munist troops who had previously infiltrated the city, remained 



70 



5JF 







Newly arrived United States troops board 
buses at the Bien Hoa Air Terminal, February 1970. 

Courtesy United States Army 



in communist hands until late February. A reported 2,000 to 3,000 
officials, police, and others were executed in Hue during that time 
as counterrevolutionaries. 

The Tet offensive is widely viewed as a turning point in the war 
despite the high cost to the communists (approximately 32,000 killed 
and about 5,800 captured) for what appeared at the time to be small 
gains. Although they managed to retain control of some of the rural 
areas, the communists were forced out of all of the towns and cities, 
except Hue, within a few weeks. Nevertheless, the offensive empha- 
sized to the Johnson administration that victory in Vietnam would 
require a greater commitment of men and resources than the Ameri- 
can people were willing to invest. On March 31, 1968, Johnson 
announced that he would not seek his party's nomination for 
another term of office, declared a halt to the bombing of North 
Vietnam (except for a narrow strip above the DMZ), and urged 
Hanoi to agree to peace talks. In the meantime, with United States 
troop strength at 525,000, a request by Westmoreland for an 
additional 200,000 troops was refused by a presidential commis- 
sion headed by the new United States secretary of defense, Clark 
Clifford. 

Following the Tet Offensive, the communists attempted to main- 
tain their momentum through a series of attacks directed mainly 



71 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

at cities in the delta. Near the DMZ, some 15,000 PAVN and PLAF 
troops were also thrown into a three-month attack on the United 
States base at Khe Sanh. A second assault on Saigon, complete 
with rocket attacks, was launched in May. Through these and other 
attacks in the spring and summer of 1968, the communists kept 
up pressure on the battlefield in order to strengthen their position 
in a projected series of four-party peace talks scheduled to begin 
in January 1969 that called for representatives of the United States, 
South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front 
to meet in Paris. In June 1969, the NLF and its allied organiza- 
tions formed the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the 
Republic of South Vietnam (PRG), recognized by Hanoi as the 
legal government of South Vietnam. At that time, communist losses 
dating from the Tet Offensive numbered 75,000, and morale was 
faltering, even among the party leadership. 

Peace Negotiations 

With negotiations making little progress, the United States mili- 
tary commander in Saigon, General Creighton W. Abrams, who 
had held that post since mid- 1968, requested and was given per- 
mission by President Richard M. Nixon to launch secret bomb- 
ing attacks, beginning March 18, 1970, on what were described 
as Vietnamese communist sanctuaries and supply routes inside 
Cambodia. In late March, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambo- 
dia was ousted as chief of state in a military coup led by Premier 
and Defense Minister, General Lon Nol. Shortly thereafter, the 
Lon Nol government cancelled an agreement that had allowed 
North Vietnam to use the port at Sihanoukville. Hanoi reacted by 
increasing support to the Khmer (Kampuchean) Communist Party, 
by then under the leadership of the radical Pol Pot. In April, Nixon 
authorized the invasion of Cambodia by a joint United States- 
ARVN force of 30,000 troops for the purpose of destroying com- 
munist bases across the border. Little more than short-term gains 
were accomplished by the invasion, which resulted in massive pro- 
tests in the United States, leading to the passage of legislation by 
Congress requiring the removal of United States troops from Cam- 
bodia by the end of June. 

In 1971 and 1972, the communists faced some serious problems 
unrelated to United States offensive operations. The Saigon govern- 
ment began to gain some support in the Mekong Delta because 
of the implementation of a "land-to-the-tiller" reform program 
pressed on the Thieu government by Washington in 1970. Almost 
400,000 farmers received a total of 600,000 hectares, and by 1972 
tenancy reportedly had declined from about 60 percent to 34 percent 



72 



Historical Setting 



in some rural areas. In addition, a People's Self-Defense Force Pro- 
gram begun about this time had some success in freeing ARVN 
troops for combat duty, as United States forces were gradually with- 
drawn. Although it wasn't clear at the time whether the withdrawal 
of United States troops would cause the ARVN to crumble 
instantly, as predicted by the communists, the decisive defeat of 
an ARVN operation mounted against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 
Laos in March 1971 was an early indication. At the time of the 
ARVN defeat, however, the communists were coping with deterio- 
rating morale and with dwindling numbers of troops; a rising deser- 
tion rate and falling recruitment levels had reduced PLAF strength 
from 250,000 in 1968 to less than 200,000 in 1971. 

Both on the battlefield and at the conference table, a stalemate 
of sorts was reached by mid- 1971 . In negotiations there was some 
flexibility, as Washington offered a unilateral withdrawal of United 
States forces provided Hanoi stopped its infiltration of the South; 
and Hanoi countered by agreeing to a coalition government in Sai- 
gon along with a United States troop withdrawal and to a cease- 
fire following the formation of a new government. The main point 
of debate was the retention of President Thieu as head of the South 
Vietnamese government, which Washington demanded and Hanoi 
rejected. To break the deadlock, the party leadership in Hanoi 
turned again to the strategy of a general offensive and uprising. 
Accordingly, the so-called Easter offensive was launched beginning 
on March 30, 1972, with a three-pronged attack across the DMZ 
through the A Shau Valley. The following day the communists 
attacked the city of Kontum and the provinces of Binh Dinh and 
Phuoc Tuy, threatening to cut South Vietnam in two. A few days 
later, three PAVN divisions attacked Binh Long Province along 
the Cambodian border, placing the capital, An Loc, under siege. 
In May the communists captured Quang Tri Province, including 
the capital, which was not recaptured by the ARVN until Septem- 
ber. By that time, Quang Tri city had been virtually leveled by 
United States air strikes. Although the Easter offensive did not result 
in the fall of the Saigon government, as the communists had hoped, 
it did further destabilize the government and reveal the ARVN's 
weaknesses. The costs were great on both sides, however, and by 
October both Hanoi and Washington were more inclined to negoti- 
ate. By then Hanoi had agreed to accept Thieu as president of a 
future Saigon government in exchange for the removal of United 
States forces without a corresponding removal of PAVN troops. 
Thieu 's objections to the failure to require the removal of North 
Vietnamese forces was in the end ignored, and the Agreement on 



73 




74 





Interment for 300 unidentified victims 
of communist occupation of Hue in 1968 
Courtesy United States Army 



75 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was signed in 
Paris on January 27, 1973. 

The Final Campaign 

Although the terms of the peace agreement were less than the 
communists had hoped for, the accords did permit them to partici- 
pate in the new government legally and recognized their right to 
control certain areas. Most important, the removal of United States 
forces gave the communists a welcome breathing space, allowing 
them to concentrate on political efforts. In the initial period after 
the signing of the agreement, the party leadership viewed armed 
struggle as a last resort only because it was feared that the United 
States might reintroduce its forces. PLAF troops were instructed 
to limit their use of force to self-defense. Meanwhile, the Thieu 
government embarked on pacification efforts along the central coast 
and in the Mekong Delta, which resulted in a reduction of the area 
under official communist control to about 20 percent of the South. 
The Saigon government, however, faced serious difficulties, 
including the negative effect on the economy of the withdrawal of 
United States forces and a critical refugee problem. During the 
course of the war, several million Vietnamese had been evacuated 
or had fled from their villages to find safety and jobs in urban areas. 
Most of these remained unemployed and, together with militant 
Buddhist groups, the Cao Dai, and the Hoa Hao, represented a 
sizable wellspring of discontent with the Thieu government. 

In early 1974, the communists launched a campaign to regain 
the territory they had lost since the cease-fire. Raids were conducted 
on roads, airfields, and economic installations; the flow of supplies 
and equipment from the North was stepped up; and a 19,000- 
kilometer network of roads leading from the DMZ in Quang Tri 
Province to Loc Ninh, northwest of Saigon, was completed. By 
summer the communists were moving cautiously forward, seizing 
vulnerable areas in the Central Highlands and in the provinces 
around Saigon. There was no direct response from the United 
States, and the resignation of Nixon in August convinced the party 
leadership that further United States intervention was unlikely. 
ARVN forces continued to deteriorate, suffering high casualties 
and facing a lack of ammunition and spare parts. The party leader- 
ship met in October to plan a 1975 military offensive concentrat- 
ing on the Cambodian border area and the Central Highlands. The 
taking of the Phuoc Long province capital, Phuoc Binh (now Ba 
Ra in Song Be Province), in early January was followed by a sur- 
prise attack in March on Ban Me Thuot, the largest city in the 
Central Highlands. President Thieu ordered ARVN units at Pleiku 



76 




77 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

and Kontum to leave the highlands and withdraw to the coast to 
regroup for a counterattack on Ban Me Thuot. The ARVN stra- 
tegic withdrawal became a rout, however, because PAVN units 
had already cut the main roads to the coast and fleeing civilians 
clogged the secondary roads as panic ensued. By the end of March, 
eight northern provinces had fallen to the communist forces, 
including the cities of Hue and Da Nang. Buoyed by this stun- 
ning victory, the party leadership directed the commander of revolu- 
tionary forces in the South, General Van Tien Dung to prepare 
for an offensive against Saigon. In early April, PAVN and PLAF 
troops moved south and began an encirclement of the capital. On 
April 20, after ten days of stiff resistance, the ARVN Eighteenth 
Division, stationed thirty kilometers north of Saigon, finally crum- 
bled under the attack of three PAVN divisions. With Saigon in 
a state of panic, President Thieu resigned the following day and 
was replaced by Vice President Tran Van Huong. Duong Van 
Minh, thought to be more acceptable to the communists, took over 
the presidency on April 28. The communists refused to negotiate, 
however, and fifteen PAVN battalions began to move toward 
Saigon. On April 30, communist forces entered the capital, and 
Duong Van Minh ordered ARVN troops to lay down their arms. 

Nearly thirty years had passed since Ho Chi Minh first declared 
Vietnam's independence as a unified nation in September 1945. 
In the interim, an entire generation of Vietnamese had endured 
a divided Vietnam, knowing only continuous warfare. The events 
of April 1975 not only abruptly concluded the war but also pre- 
pared the way for the official reunification of the country the fol- 
lowing year, when the Vietnamese people were brought together 
under one independent government for the first time in more than 
a century. 

* * * 

The body of literature in English on the history of Vietnam has 
increased dramatically since the mid-1960s. Most of the writing, 
however, has focused on the three decades of war in that country 
following World War II. The increased interest in Vietnam, 
nevertheless, has prompted a number of historians to take the longer 
view — the Vietnamese view — of history and to examine earlier time 
periods. 

Based on Vietnamese and Chinese sources, and particularly use- 
ful for Vietnamese history from the earliest traditions up to the 
end of the Chinese millennium, is Keith Weller Taylor's Birth of 
Vietnam. Also treating this period, as well as the period up through 



78 



Historical Setting 



World War II, is Thomas Hodgkin's, Vietnam. The Revolutionary 
Path. Hodgkin gives detailed coverage of the 900-year period of 
Vietnamese independence, while D.G.E. Hall's classic History of 
South-East Asia provides a description and analysis of that period 
within the larger Southeast Asian context. Another useful single- 
volume history of Vietnam up to 1968 is Joseph Buttinger's Viet- 
nam: A Political History. Finally, Alexander Woodside in Vietnam 
and the Chinese Model presents an interesting analysis, based on Viet- 
namese and Chinese sources, of Chinese influence on Vietnamese 
education, administration, literature, and law during the nineteenth 
century. 

J. F. Cady treats in detail the French conquest and early colonial 
period in The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia. David Marr 
uses Vietnamese source materials to examine the roots of Viet- 
namese nationalism in Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925, and 
William Duiker in The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1 900-1 941 
carries the examination of the nationalist movement up to the early 
period of Japanese occupation. Duiker also traces the communist 
movement from its origins to the reunification of the country in 
The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. 

Although their focus is somewhat peripheral to an overview his- 
tory of Vietnam, there are a number of accounts of the United States 
involvement in Vietnam that bear mentioning, including: William 
Turley's The Second Indochina War; Ronald Spector's Advice and Sup- 
port: The Early Years, 1941-1960; R.B. Smith' 's An International His- 
tory of the Vietnam War; Stanley Karnow's Vietnam. A History; and 
George McT. Kahin's, Intervention. How America Became Involved in 
Vietnam. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



79 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Village official, late French colonial period 



SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE his death in 1969, Ho Chi Minh 
declared that Vietnam would "certainly be reunified under the same 
roof "no matter what difficulties and hardships might lie ahead. 
In 1976 the country was territorially reunited — under Hanoi's 
roof — after more than twenty years of separation. This historic event 
proved, however, to be only the first step toward the ultimate test 
of reunification — the development of sociocultural, economic, and 
political processes that could best serve the aspirations and needs 
of the Vietnamese people. In 1987 Vietnam was, in some respects, 
still a divided nation and still at war — not for liberation from the 
bondage of neo-colonialism but for the triumph of socialism in what 
was officially called the struggle between the socialist and the 
capitalist paths. 

The struggle between socialism and capitalism unfolded in an 
environment of social and religious patterns molded by centuries 
of cultural influences from Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, 
indigenous animism, and, more recently, Roman Catholicism. The 
communist government disparaged some of these influences as 
feudal, backward, superstitious, reactionary, or bourgeois and tar- 
geted them for reform. Others, including Buddhism, Catholicism, 
and minor faiths, were tolerated. 

The Vietnamese people were continually urged to discard ves- 
tiges of the old society and to adopt instead new values associated 
with love of labor, collective ownership, patriotism, socialism, and 
the proletarian dictatorship under the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(VCP, Viet Nam Cong San Dang). In 1987 these values were at 
best an abstraction to most Vietnamese, except perhaps for a frac- 
tion of the party's fewer than 2 million members. Despite the 
increasing dependence of families, simply for subsistence, on orga- 
nizations sponsored by collectives and the state, the strongest bond 
in the society by far was that of family loyalty. Such loyalty was 
particularly evident after the mid-1970s, when living conditions 
deteriorated amid indications of growing government corruption. 

Much of Vietnam's contemporary history has been a grim strug- 
gle, not on behalf of patriotism or socialism but for survival. With 
a per capita income estimated at less than US$200 per year, the 
Vietnamese people in the 1980s remained among the poorest in 
the world. In 1987 the society was predominantly rural; more than 
80 percent of the population resided in villages and engaged 
primarily in farming. Among the urban population, party and 



83 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

government officials supplanted the former elite, whose privileged 
status had been derived mainly from wealth and higher education. 
In theory, Vietnam had eliminated all exploiting classes by develop- 
ing a class structure composed of workers, peasants, and socialist 
intellectuals. In practice, a small-scale bourgeoisie continued to 
operate in the South' s industrial sector with the permission of the 
state, and, according to an official source, some cadres in the south 
were exploiting peasants in the tradition of former landowners. 

Theoretically the society is multiracial, but actually it is domi- 
nated by an ethnic Vietnamese elite. Vietnamese, who outnum- 
ber other ethnic groups, are overwhelmingly lowlanders; minority 
peoples, who are divided into nearly sixty groups of various sizes 
and backgrounds, are mostly highlanders. With the exception of 
the Chinese, or Hoa (see Glossary), who are mostly lowlanders, 
the minority peoples traditionally lived apart from one another and 
from the Vietnamese. In the 1980s, however, the distance between 
the highland and lowland communities gradually narrowed as a 
result of the government policy of population redistribution and 
political integration. 

Under this policy, lowlanders were sent to remote, uninhabited 
areas of the highlands both to relieve overcrowding in the cities 
and in the congested Red River Delta and to increase food produc- 
tion. Both aims were part of the government's effort to raise the 
standard of living, which in turn was linked to another urgent 
national priority — family planning. In 1987 the rate of population 
growth continued to outstrip food production. Given the people's 
traditional belief in large families, the government faced a major 
challenge in its attempt to reduce the annual rate of population 
growth to 1.7 percent or less by 1990. 

Geography 

Vietnam is located in the southeastern extremity of the Indo- 
chinese peninsula and occupies about 331,688 square kilometers, 
of which about 25 percent was under cultivation in 1987. The 
S-shaped country has a north-to-south distance of 1,650 kilometers 
and is about 50 kilometers wide at the narrowest point. With a 
coastline of 3,260 kilometers, excluding islands, Vietnam claims 
12 nautical miles as the limit of its territorial waters, an additional 
12 nautical miles as a contiguous customs and security zone, and 
200 nautical miles as an exclusive economic zone. 

The boundary with Laos, settled, on an ethnic basis, between 
the rulers of Vietnam and Laos in the mid-seventeenth century, 
was formally defined by a delimitation treaty signed in 1977 and 
ratified in 1986. The frontier with Cambodia, defined at the time 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



of French annexation of the western part of the Mekong River Delta 
in 1867, remained essentially unchanged, according to Hanoi, until 
some unresolved border issues were finally settled in the 1982-85 
period. The land and sea boundary with China, delineated under 
the France-China treaties of 1887 and 1895, is "the frontier line" 
accepted by Hanoi that China agreed in 1957-58 to respect. 
However, in February 1979, following China's limited invasion 
of Vietnam, Hanoi complained that from 1957 onward China had 
provoked numerous border incidents as part of its anti- Vietnam 
policy and expansionist designs in Southeast Asia. Among the ter- 
ritorial infringements cited was the Chinese occupation in Janu- 
ary 1974 of the Paracel Islands, claimed by both countries in a 
dispute left unresolved in the 1980s (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). 

Vietnam is a country of tropical lowlands, hills, and densely 
forested highlands, with level land covering no more than 20 per- 
cent of the area. The country is divided into the highlands and the 
Red River Delta in the north; and the Giai Truong Son (Central 
mountains, or the Chaine Annamitique, sometimes referred to sim- 
ply as the Chaine), the coastal lowlands, and the Mekong River 
Delta in the south. 

The Red River Delta, a flat, triangular region of 3,000 square 
kilometers, is smaller but more intensely developed and more 
densely populated than the Mekong River Delta. Once an inlet 
of the Gulf of Tonkin, it has been filled in by the enormous alluvial 
deposits of the rivers, over a period of millennia, and it advances 
one hundred meters into the gulf annually. The ancestral home 
of the ethnic Vietnamese, the delta accounted for almost 70 per- 
cent of the agriculture and 80 percent of the industry of North Viet- 
nam before 1975. 

The Red River (Song Hong in Vietnamese), rising in China's 
Yunnan Province, is about 1,200 kilometers long. Its two main 
tributaries, the Song Lo (also called the Lo River, the Riviere 
Claire, or the Clear River) and the Song Da (also called the Black 
River or Riviere Noire), contribute to its high water volume, which 
averages 500 million cubic meters per second, but may increase 
by more than 60 times at the peak of the rainy season. The entire 
delta region, backed by the steep rises of the forested highlands, 
is no more than three meters above sea level, and much of it is 
one meter or less. The area is subject to frequent flooding; at some 
places the high-water mark of floods is fourteen meters above the 
surrounding countryside. For centuries flood control has been an 
integral part of the delta's culture and economy. An extensive sys- 
tem of dikes and canals has been built to contain the Red River 
and to irrigate the rich rice-growing delta. Modeled on that of 



85 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

China, this ancient system has sustained a highly concentrated 
population and has made double-cropping wet-rice cultivation pos- 
sible throughout about half the region (see Agriculture, ch. 3; 
fig. 10). 

The highlands and mountain plateaus in the north and north- 
west are inhabited mainly by tribal minority groups. The Giai 
Truong Son originates in the Xizang (Tibet) and Yunnan regions 
of southwest China and forms Vietnam's border with Laos and 
Cambodia. It terminates in the Mekong River Delta north of Ho 
Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). 

These central mountains, which have several high plateaus, are 
irregular in elevation and form. The northern section is narrow 
and very rugged; the country's highest peak, Fan Si Pan, rises to 
3,142 meters in the extreme northwest. The southern portion has 
numerous spurs that divide the narrow coastal strip into a series 
of compartments. For centuries these topographical features not 
only rendered north-south communication difficult but also formed 
an effective natural barrier for the containment of the people liv- 
ing in the Mekong basin. 

Within the southern portion of Vietnam is a plateau known as 
the Central Highlands (Tay Nguyen), approximately 51,800 square 
kilometers of rugged mountain peaks, extensive forests, and rich 
soil. Comprising 5 relatively flat plateaus of basalt soil spread over 
the provinces of Dac Lac and Gia Lai-Kon Turn, the highlands 
account for 16 percent of the country's arable land and 22 percent 
of its total forested land (see fig. 1). Before 1975 North Vietnam 
had maintained that the Central Highlands and the Giai Truong 
Son were strategic areas of paramount importance, essential to the 
domination not only of South Vietnam but also of the southern 
part of Indochina. Since 1975 the highlands have provided an area 
in which to relocate people from the densely populated lowlands. 
The narrow, flat coastal lowlands extend from south of the Red 
River Delta to the Mekong River basin. On the landward side, 
the Giai Truong Son rises precipitously above the coast, its spurs 
jutting into the sea at several places. Generally the coastal strip 
is fertile and rice is cultivated intensively. 

The Mekong, which is 4,220 kilometers long, is one of the 12 
great rivers of the world. From its source in the Xizang plateau, 
it flows through the Xizang and Yunnan regions of China, forms 
the boundary between Laos and Burma as well as between Laos 
and Thailand, divides into two branches — the Song Han Giang 
and Song Tien Giang — below Phnom Penh, and continues through 
Cambodia and the Mekong basin before draining into the South 
China Sea through nine mouths or cuu long (nine dragons). The 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



river is heavily silted and is navigable by seagoing craft of shallow 
draft as far as Kompong Cham in Cambodia. A tributary enter- 
ing the river at Phnom Penh drains the Tonle Sap, a shallow fresh- 
water lake that acts as a natural reservoir to stabilize the flow of 
water through the lower Mekong. When the river is in flood stage, 
its silted delta outlets are unable to carry off the high volume of 
water. Floodwaters back up into the Tonle Sap, causing the lake 
to inundate as much as 10,000 square kilometers. As the flood sub- 
sides, the flow of water reverses and proceeds from the lake to the 
sea. The effect is to reduce significantly the danger of devastating 
floods in the Mekong delta, where the river floods the surround- 
ing fields each year to a level of one to two meters. 

The Mekong delta, covering about 40,000 square kilometers, 
is a low-level plain not more than three meters above sea level at 
any point and criss-crossed by a maze of canals and rivers. So much 
sediment is carried by the Mekong's various branches and tribu- 
taries that the delta advances sixty to eighty meters into the sea 
every year. An official Vietnamese source estimates the amount 
of sediment deposited annually to be about 1 billion cubic meters, 
or nearly 13 times the amount deposited by the Red River. About 
10,000 square kilometers of the delta are under rice cultivation, 
making the area one of the major rice-growing regions of the world. 
The southern tip, known as the Ca Mau Peninsula, is covered by 
dense jungle and mangrove swamps. 

Vietnam has a tropical monsoon climate, with humidity aver- 
aging 84 percent throughout the year. However, because of differ- 
ences in latitude and the marked variety of topographical relief, 
the climate tends to vary considerably from place to place. During 
the winter or dry season, extending roughly from November to 
April, the monsoon winds usually blow from the northeast along 
the China coast and across the Gulf of Tonkin, picking up con- 
siderable moisture; consequently the winter season in most parts 
of the country is dry only by comparison with the rainy or sum- 
mer season. During the southwesterly summer monsoon, occur- 
ring from May to October, the heated air of the Gobi Desert rises, 
far to the north, inducing moist air to flow inland from the sea 
and deposit heavy rainfall. 

Annual rainfall is substantial in all regions and torrential in some, 
ranging from 120 centimeters to 300 centimeters. Nearly 90 per- 
cent of the precipitation occurs during the summer. The average 
annual temperature is generally higher in the plains than in the 
mountains and plateaus. Temperatures range from a low of 5°C 
in December and January, the coolest months, to more than 37°C 
in April, the hottest month. Seasonal divisions are more clearly 



89 




Figure 10. Topography and Drainage, 1987 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

marked in the northern half than in the southern half of the coun- 
try, where, except in some of the highlands, seasonal temperatures 
vary only a few degrees, usually in the 21°C-28°C range. 

Population 

According to Hanoi, the population of Vietnam was almost 60 
million at the end of 1985 (Western sources estimated about a half 
million more than that in mid- 1985). Vietnamese officials estimated 
that the population would be at least 66 million by 1990 and 80 
million by the year 2000, unless the growth rate of 2 percent per 
year used for these estimates was lowered to 1 .7 percent by 1990. 
With declining mortality rates achieved through improved health 
conditions, the population increased by 1.2 million or more per 
year between 1981 and 1986 (1.5 million in 1985 alone), worsen- 
ing the country's chronic food shortage. In the 1980s, Vietnam 
needed to produce an additional 400,000 tons of food each year 
just to keep pace with its rapidly increasing population. 

Census results of October 1979 showed the total population of 
reunified Vietnam to be 52.7 million of which 52 percent lived in 
the North and 48 percent in the South. About 19 percent of the 
population was classified as urban and 81 percent as rural. Females 
outnumbered males by 3 percent, and the average life expectancy 
at birth was 66 for females and 63 for males. With 52 percent of 
the total under 20 years of age, the population was young. Ethni- 
cally, 87 percent were Vietnamese-speaking lowlanders known as 
Viet or Kinh, and the remainder were Hoa or members of high- 
land minority groups (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, this ch.). 
In December 1986, Hanoi estimated that more than 1 million Viet- 
namese lived overseas, 50 percent of them in the United States. 
A Vietnamese source in Paris claimed that about half of Ho Chi 
Minh City's population lived completely or partially on family aid 
packages sent by Vietnamese emigres abroad. 

Beginning in the early 1960s, the socioeconomic implications of 
rapid population growth became an increasing concern of the 
government in Hanoi. A family planning drive, instituted in 1963, 
was claimed by the government to have accounted for a decline 
in the annual growth rate in the North from 3.4 percent in 1960 
to 2.7 percent in 1975. In the South, however, family planning 
was actively encouraged only after 1976, and the results were mixed, 
consistently falling short of announced goals. In 1981 Hanoi set 
a national goal of 1.7 percent growth rate to be achieved by the 
end of 1985: a growth rate of 1.3 to 1.5 percent was established 
for the North, 1.5 to 1.7 percent for the South, and 1.7 to 2.0 per- 
cent for the sparsely settled highland provinces. In 1987, the growth 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



rate, according to Vietnamese sources, was about 2.0 percent (see 
table 2, Appendix A). 

Family planning was described as voluntary and dependent upon 
persuasion. The program's guidelines called for two children per 
couple, births spaced five years apart, and a minimum age of 
twenty-two for first-time mothers — a major challenge in a society 
where the customary age for women to marry, especially in the 
rural areas, was sixteen to twenty. Campaign workers were 
instructed to refrain tactfully from mentioning abortion and to focus 
instead on pregnancy prevention when dealing with people of strong 
religious conviction. Enlisting the support of Catholic priests for 
the campaign was strongly encouraged. In 1987 it was evident that 
the government was serious about family planning; a new law on 
marriage and the family adopted in December 1986 made family 
planning obligatory, and punitive measures, such as pay cuts and 
denial of bonuses and promotions, were introduced for non- 
compliance (see The Family since 1954, this ch.). 

A substantial portion of the population had mixed feelings about 
birth control and sex education, and the number of women marry- 
ing before age twenty remained high. Typically, a woman of child- 
bearing age had four or more children. The 1986 family law that 
raised the legal marriage age for women to twenty-two met with 
strenuous opposition. Critics argued that raising the legal age offered 
no solution to the widespread practice among Vietnamese youth 
of "falling in love early, having sexual relations early, and getting 
married early." Some critics even advanced the view that the popu- 
lation should be increased to further economic development; others 
insisted that those who could grow enough food for themselves need 
not practice birth control. A significant proportion of the popula- 
tion retained traditional attitudes which favored large families with 
many sons as a means of insuring the survival of a family's line- 
age and providing for its security. Although problems associated 
with urban living, such as inadequate housing and unemployment, 
created a need for change in traditional family-size standards, old 
ways nevertheless persisted. They were perpetuated in proverbs 
like "If Heaven procreates elephants, it will provide enough grass 
to feed them" or "To have one son is to have; to have ten daugh- 
ters is not to have." 

Government authorities were concerned over the lack of coordi- 
nation among agencies involved in family planning and the lack 
of necessary clinics and funding to provide convenient, safe, and 
efficient family planning services in rural areas. Even more dis- 
turbing was the knowledge that many local party committees and 
government agencies were only going through the motions of 



91 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

supporting the family planning drive. To remedy the situation, the 
government in 1984 created the National Committee on Family 
Planning (also known as the National Commission on Demogra- 
phy and Family Planning, or the National Population and Parent- 
hood Commission). The commission was directed to increase the 
rate of contraceptive use among married couples from about 23 per- 
cent in 1983 to 70 percent by 1990 and to limit the population to 
between 75 and 80 million by the year 2000. The latter goal was 
to be based on an annual growth rate of 1 .7 percent or less, a figure 
that in 1987 seemed unrealistically low. According to a National 
Committee on Family Planning report released in February 1987, 
the population grew by 2.2 percent in 1986 (Western analysts 
estimate the increase to have been between 2.5 and 2.8 percent). 
In light of the 1986 growth rate, the committee's target for 1987 
was revised at the beginning of the year to 1.9 percent. Even if 
such a goal were met, Vietnam's population at the end of 1987 
would stand in excess of 63 million inhabitants. 

The average population density in 1985 was 179 persons per 
square kilometer. Population density varied widely, however, and 
was generally lower in the southern provinces than in the north- 
ern ones; in both North and South it was also lower in the high- 
lands and mountainous regions than in the lowlands. The most 
densely settled region was the Red River Delta, accounting for 
roughly 75 percent of the population of the North. Also heavily 
settled was the Mekong River Delta, with nearly half of the southern 
population. 

After 1976, population redistribution became a pressing issue 
because of food shortages and unemployment in the urban areas. 
A plan unveiled at the Fourth National Party Congress in Decem- 
ber 1976 called for the relocation of 44 million people by 1980 and 
an additional 10 million by the mid-1990s. The plan also called 
for opening up 1 million hectares of virgin land to cultivation and 
introduced a measure designed to divert some armed forces per- 
sonnel to the building of new economic zones (see Glossary). The 
relocation was to involve an interregional transfer of northerners 
to the South as well as an intraregional movement of lowlanders 
to upland areas in both the North and the South. Between 1976 
and 1980, most of the 4 million people who were relocated to rural 
areas and the new economic zones were from Ho Chi Minh City 
and other southern cities. In the 1981-85 period, a total of about 
0.6 million workers and 1 .3 million dependents were relocated, caus- 
ing the country's urban population to decline from 19.3 percent 
of the total in 1979 to 18 percent in 1985. The country's long-range 
goal, established in 1976, called for the population to be distributed 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



more or less evenly throughout Vietnam's 443 districts with an aver- 
age for each district of 200,000 persons living on 20,000 hectares 
(see fig. 11). 

Ethnic Groups and Languages 

The ethnic Vietnamese are concentrated largely in the alluvial 
deltas and in the coastal plains, having little in common with the 
minority peoples of the highlands, whom they historically have 
regarded as hostile and barbaric. A homogenous social group, the 
Vietnamese exert influence on national life through their control 
of political and economic affairs and their role as purveyors of the 
dominant culture. By contrast, the ethnic minorities, except for 
the Hoa, are found mostly in the highlands that cover two-thirds 
of the national territory. The Hoa, the largest minority, are mainly 
lowlanders. Officially, the ethnic minorities are referred to as 
national minorities. 

Vietnamese 

The origins of the Vietnamese are generally traced to the inhabit- 
ants of the Red River Delta between 500 and 200 B.C., people 
who were a mixture of Australoid, Austronesian, and Mongoloid 
stock. Like their contemporary descendants, they were largely vil- 
lagers, skilled in rice cultivation and fishing (see Early History, 
ch. 1). 

Contemporary ethnic Vietnamese live in urban as well as rural 
areas, are engaged in a variety of occupations, and are represented 
at all levels on the socioeconomic scale. The power elite (senior 
officials in the party, government, and military establishments), 
in particular, is dominated by ethnic Vietnamese. Although pre- 
dominantly Buddhist, the Vietnamese people's religious beliefs and 
practices nevertheless include remnants of an earlier animistic faith. 
A sizable minority is Roman Catholic. Despite some regional and 
local differences in customs and speech, the people retain a strong 
sense of ethnic identity that rests on a common language and a 
shared cultural heritage. 

Vietnamese, the official language, is the mother tongue of the 
vast majority of the people and is understood by many national 
minority members. According to a widely accepted theory, Viet- 
namese is believed to be related to the Austroasiatic family of lan- 
guages, which includes various languages, dialects, and subdialects 
spoken in mainland Southeast Asia from Burma to Vietnam. 
Scholarship nonetheless is tentative on whether Vietnamese, which 
was spoken in the Red River Delta long before the Christian era, 
was influenced by Mon-Khmer or Tai, both Austroasiatic subsets. 



93 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



CHINA 



LAOS 



Gulf 
of 
Tonkin 



(in thousands by administrative divisions) 




(Dac Lac, Gia Lai-Kon Turn, Lai Chau, 
Lam Dong, Son La) 


[77] 50-99 


(Cao Bang, Ha Tuyen, Hoang Lien 
Son, Lang Son, Song Be, Thuan Hai) 


ggj| 100-199 


(Bac Thai. Binh Tri Thien, Dong Nai, 
Kien Giang, Nghia Binh, Nghe Tin, 
Phu Khanh, Quang Nam-Da Nang, 
Quang Ninh, Tay Ninh) 


[•• ';] 200-399 


(Dong Thap. Ha Son Binh, Minh Hai, 
Long An, Thanh Hoa, Vinh Phu, Vung 
Tau-Con Dao) 


Effl 400 - 599 


(Tien Giang, Hau Giang, Ha Bac, Cuu 
Long, Ben Tre, An Giang) 


ggj 600-899 


(Ha Nam Ninh, Hai Hung) 


nmujn ^ 900 


(Hanoi, Haiphong, Ho Chi Minh City, 
Thai Binh) 




50 100 KIL OMETERS 
6" u lo 100 MILES 



Source: Based on information from Tong Cue Thong Ke, So Lieu Thong Ke, 
1930-1984, Hanoi, 1985, 7-8. 



Figure 11. Population Distribution, 1984 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



Actually, the Vietnamese language was influenced more by clas- 
sical Chinese than by any other language. During more than 1 ,000 
years of Chinese rule and for centuries afterwards, Chinese was 
the language of officialdom, scholarship, and literature. The Chinese 
language had special status because of its identification with the 
ruling class of scholar-officials. Nevertheless, Vietnamese continued 
to be the popular language, even though knowledge of Chinese was 
a prerequisite to government employment and social advancement. 

Beginning in the eighth or ninth century, the Vietnamese devised 
a popular script based on Chinese characters to express written ideas 
and to standardize the phonetics of their own language. Well devel- 
oped by the thirteenth century, this system, which combined ideo- 
graphs and phonetics, became the medium for a growing popular 
literature. The system is known as chu nom, literally "southern 
character" or "southern writing," or simply nom. Although dis- 
dained by orthodox Confucian scholars, chu nom had a distinct place 
in the evolution of Vietnam's vernacular literature through the end 
of the nineteenth century. 

In the seventeenth century, the Vietnamese language evolved 
further when Portuguese and French missionaries developed a new 
transcription that used roman letters instead of Chinese charac- 
ters. The new system, called quoc ngu, was devised as a tool for their 
missionary activities, including the translation of prayer books and 
catechisms. By the end of the nineteenth century, it had become 
the common method of writing, gradually replacing classical 
Chinese and chu nom. Quoc ngu uses diacritical marks above or below 
letters to indicate variations in the pronunciation of vowels and 
of consonants, and differentiations in tones. Since most single sylla- 
bles function as meaningful words identified only by tone, and each 
of these phonetic syllables can have numerous meanings, the dia- 
critical marks are an essential part of the new writing system (see 
Nine Centuries of Independence, ch. 1). 

Under French rule, the French language was widely used in the 
cities, and it was read and spoken by all secondary-school gradu- 
ates. Many less educated people, including merchants, low-ranking 
civil servants, army veterans, and domestics working for French 
households, also had some familiarity with the language, although 
their knowledge might be limited to a form of pidgin French. In 
the rural areas the language generally was less well-known, but 
a number of minority peoples learned its rudiments in school or 
during service with the French army. Use of the French language 
resulted in minor changes in the grammatical structure of Viet- 
namese and in the addition of some new technical, scientific, and 
popular terms. 



95 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Minorities 

Living somewhat separately from the dominant ethnic Viet- 
namese are the numerous minorities. The 1979 census listed fifty- 
three minorities accounting for 12.5 percent (6.6 million persons) 
of the national population. This figure included the Hoa (Han 
Chinese), the single largest bloc — representing approximately 1.8 
percent of the total population, or about 935,000 people — in the 
lowland urban centers of both the North and the South. Of the 
other minority groups, thirty, comprising 68 percent of the minority 
population (4.5 million persons), resided in the North, while the 
remaining twenty-two groups, comprising 32 percent of the minor- 
ity population (2.1 million persons) lived in the South. The size 
of each community ranged from fewer than 1,000 to as many as 
0.9 million persons, and 10 major groups comprised about 85 per- 
cent of the minority population (see table 3, Appendix A). 

Minorities that live in the mountainous regions are known by 
their generic name, Montagnards. The Vietnamese also disparag- 
ingly call them "moi," meaning savage. The government attrib- 
utes the backwardness of the Montagnards to the overwhelming 
influence of their history as exploited and oppressed peoples. They 
are darker skinned than their lowland neighbors. 

The origins of the non-Vietnamese minorities are far from clear, 
but scholars generally believe that some, like the Hmong (Meo), 
Zao, Nung, San Chay, Cao Lan, Giay, and Lolo, are descendants 
of the ancient migrants from southern China who settled in the 
northern border regions. Others, like the Tay, Muong, and Thai, 
are believed to be related to the lowland natives of Malay stock 
who were forced into the highlands by successive invasions of 
Mongoloid peoples from China. Among these indigenous minori- 
ties are the Cham of central Vietnam, remnants of a kingdom that 
ruled the central coast of the country until overrun by the Viet- 
namese in the fifteenth century, and the Khmer, whose Cambodian 
forebears controlled the Mekong delta region until displaced in the 
late eighteenth century by the Vietnamese (see Nine Centuries of 
Independence, ch. 1). The Khmer and the Cham are lowlanders 
of the south and are considered, along with the Tay, Muong, and 
Thai of the north, to be culturally more developed than other 
minority ethnic groups but less so than the Vietnamese. 

The non-Chinese minority peoples, however, are for the most 
part highlanders who live in relative independence and follow their 
own traditional customs and culture. They are classified as either 
sedentary or nomadic. The sedentary groups, the more numerous 
of the two kinds, are engaged mainly in the cultivation of wet rice 



96 




Tonkinese woman, late nineteenth century 
Courtesy New York Times, Paris Collection, National Archives 



97 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

and industrial crops; the nomadic groups, in slash-and-burn farming 
where forested land is cleared for a brief period of cultivation and 
then abandoned. Both groups inhabit the same four major areas: 
the northern border region and the uplands adjacent to the Red 
River Delta, the northwestern border region adjoining Laos and 
China, the Central Highlands and the area along the Giai Truong 
Son, and parts of the Mekong River Delta and the central coastal 
strip. These groups are notable for their diverse cultural character- 
istics. They are distinguished from one another not only by language 
but also by such other cultural features as architectural styles, colors 
and shapes of dress and personal ornaments, shapes of agricultural 
implements, religious practices, and systems of social organization. 

The number and variety of languages used by Vietnam's minori- 
ties reflect the country's ethnic complexity. Minority groups are 
distinguished by more than a dozen distinct languages and numer- 
ous dialects; the origins and distribution of many of these languages 
have not yet been conclusively established. They can, however, 
be classified loosely into three major language families, which in 
turn can be divided into several subgroups. Eleven of the minority 
groups — Tay, Thai, Nung, Hmong, Muong, Cham, Khmer, 
Kohor, Ede, Bahnar, and Jarai — have their own writing systems. 

Religious practices among highland minorities tend to be rooted 
in animistic beliefs. Most worship a pantheon of spirits, but a large 
number are Catholics or Protestants. In contrast to the Mahayana 
Buddhist beliefs of the majority of Vietnamese, the Khmer prac- 
tice Theravada (or Hinayana) Buddhism, and the Cham subscribe 
to both Islam and Hindu beliefs (see Religion, this ch.). 

Before the arrival of the French in the nineteenth century, the 
highland minorities lived in isolation from the lowland population. 
Upon the consolidation of French rule, however, contacts between 
the two groups increased. The French, interested in the uplands 
for plantation agriculture, permitted the highlanders their linguis- 
tic and cultural autonomy, and administered their areas separately 
from the rest of Vietnam. Conferring this special status gave the 
French a free hand in cultivating the largely unexploited highlands, 
where their administrators and Christian missionaries also set up 
schools, hospitals, and leprosariums. 

Often, however, conflicts arose between the upland communi- 
ties and the French, who were distrusted as exploitative, unwel- 
come interlopers. The French, however, eventually overcame the 
unrest and successfully developed some of the highland areas, 
especially those of the Ede and Jarai, where they established large 
rubber, coffee, and tea plantations. 



98 



Montagnard tribesman 
Courtesy 
United States Army 




After the mid-1950s, North and South Vietnam dealt with the 
minorities differently. The Hanoi regime in the North, recogniz- 
ing the traditional separatist attitudes of the tribal minorities, 
initiated a policy of accommodation by setting up two autonomous 
zones for the highlanders in return for their acceptance of Hanoi's 
political control. By offering limited self-government, Hanoi's lead- 
ers hoped that integration of the minorities into Vietnamese society 
could eventually be achieved. By contrast, the noncommunist Sai- 
gon administration in the South, under Ngo Dinh Diem, opted 
for direct, centralized control of the tribal minorities and incurred 
their enduring wrath by seizing ancestral tribal lands for the reset- 
tlement of displaced Catholic refugees from the North. 

After Diem's death in 1963, successive Saigon administrations 
granted a modicum of autonomy, but the strategic hamlet program, 
introduced in the South in the 1960s, caused further disruption 
by forcing highlanders to relocate to fortified enclaves. The pro- 
gram was proposed to improve the physical security of Montagnards 
as well as to deny food and services to Viet Cong (see Glossary) 
guerrillas, but it largely embittered its minority participants, who 
wanted to be left alone to continue living on their ancestral lands 
in the traditional manner. In an act of resistance, some tribal lead- 
ers gathered in 1964 to announce the formation of the Unified 
Front for the Struggle of Oppressed Races (Front Unifie pour la 
Lutte des Races Opprimees — FULRO), representing the Bahnar, 



99 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Cham, Ede, Hre, Jarai, Mnong, Raglai, Sadang, Stieng, and other 
groups. 

After 1975 a number of northern minority cadres were sent to 
the Central Highlands to lay the groundwork for socio-economic 
development. In 1977 a university was set up at Buon Me Thuot, 
capital of Dac Lac Province, to train a corps of minority cadres. 
These tactics were designed to narrow the socioeconomic gap not 
only between the highlanders and the lowlanders but also among 
the minorities themselves. 

In the mid-1980s, the party and media expressed satisfaction with 
the cadres' training and commended certain highland provinces 
for progress in agricultural cooperativization, noting that a grow- 
ing number of slash-and-burn farmers had turned to sedentary 
farming and that further improvements in cultural and health 
facilities were planned. By 1986 about 43 percent of the estimated 
2.2 million nomadic minority members were reported to have 
adopted a more sedentary life. There were also glowing claims that 
minorities were now full-fledged participants in national affairs, 
as was evidenced by their representation in the National Assem- 
bly (see Glossary) and in other government and party organizations. 

A cursory examination reveals, however, that progress was 
spotty. The living conditions of highlanders continued to lag behind 
those of lowlanders. In remote areas, "backward customs and prac- 
tices" remained unchanged, minority groups were insufficiently 
represented among cadres, and sorely needed resources for material 
improvements were lacking. Official claims that closer unity and 
greater harmony were being achieved in a multinational Vietnam 
were belied by the government's frequent admonishments against 
"narrow nationalism" (the parochialism of the minority groups) 
and against "big nationality prejudices" (the ingrained Vietnamese 
biases against minorities). To be sure, the number of minority 
cadres with either general or college-level education was growing, 
but in 1987 these cadres represented only a small portion of the 
functionaries serving in the highland provinces, districts, towns, 
and villages. In Dac Lac Province, 91 percent of the district-level 
cadres and 63 percent of the key village and lower level cadres had 
been transferred from other places, presumably from the North 
or the lowlands of the South. 

Under the government program of population redistribution, 
lowlanders continued to emigrate to the Central Highlands. In 1980 
about 52 percent of the Central Highlands population consisted 
of ethnic Vietnamese. In 1985, as pressure mounted on the Viet- 
namese government to produce grain and industrial crops, a greater 
influx of ethnic Vietnamese was anticipated. By 1987 it seemed 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



clear that minority groups were likely to remain unequal partners 
in the management of their local affairs, despite official protesta- 
tions to the contrary, as increasing numbers of Vietnamese settled 
in the Central Highlands. 

The minority question remained an issue because of its impli- 
cations not only for integration but also for internal security. In 
the mid-1980s, there were occasional official allusions to counter- 
revolutionary activities attributed to FULRO. Hanoi was quick 
to assert, however, that these rebel activities were blown out of 
proportion by the Western media (see Internal Security, ch. 5). 
Nonetheless, the authorities were concerned about the northern 
border areas, where renegades of such groups as the Hmong, Zao, 
and Giay were said to have participated in China's anti- Vietnamese 
activities after 1979 as "special gangs of bandits." Official litera- 
ture supported the construction of "a border cultural defense line 
to counter the multifaceted war of sabotage waged by the Chinese 
expansionists." 

Hoa 

The Hoa, or ethnic Chinese, are predominantly urban dwellers. 
A few Hoa live in small settlements in the northern highlands near 
the Chinese frontier, where they are also known as Ngai. Tradi- 
tionally, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Chinese have retained 
a distinctive cultural identity, but in 1955 North Vietnam and China 
agreed that the Hoa should be integrated gradually into Vietnamese 
society and should have Vietnamese citizenship conferred on them 
(see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). 

Before 1975 the northern Hoa were mainly rice farmers, fisher- 
men, and coal miners, except for those residing in cities and provin- 
cial towns. In the South they were dominant in commerce and 
manufacturing. According to an official source, at the end of 1974 
the Hoa controlled more than 80 percent of the food, textile, chemi- 
cal, metallurgy, engineering, and electrical industries, 100 percent 
of wholesale trade, more than 50 percent of retail trade, and 90 per- 
cent of export-import trade. Dominance over the economy enabled 
the Hoa to "manipulate prices" of rice and other scarce goods. 
This particular source further observed that the Hoa community 
constituted "a state within a state," inasmuch as they had built 
"a closed world based on blood relations, strict internal discipline, 
and a network of sects, each with its own chief, to avoid the indige- 
nous administration's direct interference." It was noted by Hanoi 
in 1983 that as many as 60 percent of "the former bourgeoisie" 
of the south were of Chinese origin. 



101 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

In mid- 1975 the combined Hoa communities of the North and 
South numbered approximately 1.3 million, and all but 200,000 
resided in the South, most of them in the Saigon metropolitan area. 
Beginning in 1975, the Hoa bore the brunt of socialist transfor- 
mation in the South, especially after the communist government 
decided in early 1978 to abolish private trade (see Economic Roles 
of the Party and the Government, ch. 3). This, combined with 
external tensions stemming from Vietnam's dispute with Cambodia 
and China in 1978 and 1979 caused an exodus of about 250,000 
Hoa, of whom 170,000 fled overland into China from the North 
and the remainder fled by boat from the South (see Foreign Rela- 
tions, ch. 4; The Armed Forces, ch. 5). 

The Social System 

Traditional Patterns 

For centuries Vietnamese society was knit together by Confu- 
cian norms based on five relationships: the subordination of sub- 
ject to ruler, son to father, wife to husband, and younger brother 
to elder brother, and the mutual respect between friends. These 
norms influenced the evolution of Vietnam as a hierarchic, 
authoritarian society in which Confucian scholarship, monarchi- 
cal absolutism, filial piety, the subordinate role of women, and the 
family system were regarded as integral to the natural order of the 
universe. 

The traditional society was stratified on the basis of education 
and occupation into four groups: scholar-officials or mandarins, 
farmers, artisans, and merchants. At the pinnacle was the emperor, 
who ruled with the "mandate of heaven." Next were the scholar- 
officials, recruited through rigorous civil service examinations in 
Chinese classical literature and philosophy. Once a person passed 
the triennial examinations, he became an accredited scholar or 
degree holder and was eligible for appointment to the imperial civil 
service, the most prestigious route to power, status, and wealth. 
Together, the emperor, his family, and the scholar-officials con- 
stituted the ruling class. 

In theory, the mandarinate was not a closed social group. Com- 
moners were permitted to apply for the examinations, and the status 
of scholar- official could not be inherited. In practice, however, these 
officials became a self-perpetuating class of generalist- 
administrators, partly because their sons could afford years of aca- 
demic preparation for the examinations whereas most commoners 
could not. Education, the key to upward mobility, was neither free 
nor compulsory and tended to be the preserve of the mandarins. 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



Although social eminence and political power were thus concen- 
trated in the hands of the mandarins, economic power was based 
on landholdings and was more widely diffused as a result of progres- 
sive dismantling of the hereditary feudal nobility after the fifteenth 
century. This process was accomplished by breaking up the nobil- 
ity's vast holdings and redistributing smaller parcels to others, such 
as families of royal blood, prominent scholar-officials, and influential 
local notables. The wealthier of these notables formed a kind of 
landed gentry that wielded influence in the rural towns and villages. 

The society was further transformed in the nineteenth century 
by the imposition of French rule, the introduction of Western edu- 
cation, the beginnings of industrialization and urbanization, and 
the growth of commercial agriculture. The establishment of a new, 
French-dominated governing class led to a rapid decline in the 
power and prestige of the emperor and the mandarins, whose func- 
tions were substantially reduced. When the triennial examinations 
were held in 1876 and 1879, an average of 6,000 candidates took 
them; in 1913, only 1,330 did. 

In place of the old imperial bureaucracy, in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries a new intellectual elite emerged that 
emphasized achievement in science, geography, and other modern 
subjects instead of the Confucian classics. The new Vietnamese 
intelligentsia was impressed by the power of the French and by 
the 1905 naval victory at Tsushima of a modernized Japan over 
tsarist Russia. Having viewed some of the achievements of Western 
culture in Europe during World War I, when nearly 150,000 Viet- 
namese were recruited for work in French factories, the new elite 
proclaimed their country's need for a modern, Western educational 
focus. By 1920, even in the conservative city of Hue, the last Con- 
fucian outpost, wealthy families refused to marry their daughters 
to the sons of distinguished scholar-official families unless the young 
men had acquired a modern, Western-style education. The tradi- 
tional civil service examinations were held for the last time in 1919. 

Traditional Confucian village schools, accustomed to teaching 
in Chinese, introduced instruction in Vietnamese and French into 
the existing curriculum. Vietnamese who had successfully acquired 
a higher education at home or abroad entered government service 
as administrators or were absorbed as doctors, engineers, and 
teachers as the government expanded its role in the fields of health, 
public works, and education. Others took up professions outside 
government, such as law, medicine, pharmacology, and journalism. 
The new elite was composed mainly of Vietnamese from Tonkin 
and Annam rather than from Cochinchina, a regional bias perhaps 



103 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

attributable to the location in Hanoi of the country's only institu- 
tion of Western higher education (see fig. 6). 

The French period also produced a new group of Vietnamese 
absentee landowners who possessed riches far in excess of the wealth 
anyone in the older society had enjoyed. This new group came into 
existence as a result of the French development of vast new tracts 
of land in Cochinchina. A few of these large holdings were retained 
by French companies or citizens, but most were held by enterpris- 
ing, Western-oriented, urban Vietnamese from Annam and Tonkin 
who lived mainly in Hanoi and Hue. By investing in light indus- 
try and medium-sized trading concerns, they became Vietnam's 
first modern industrialists and entrepreneurs. 

In urban centers the demand of both the expanding French 
government bureaucracy and the private sector for secretaries, 
clerks, cashiers, interpreters, minor officials, and labor foremen 
created a new Vietnamese white-collar group. The development 
of mining and industry between 1890 and 1919 also introduced 
a new class of workers. Because most of the natural resources as 
well as a large labor pool were located in the North, industrial devel- 
opment was concentrated there, and Hanoi and Haiphong became 
the country's leading industrial centers. At the same time, condi- 
tions of overcrowding and intensive farming in the North provided 
little room for agriculture on a commercial scale. In order to expand 
agriculture, the French turned their attention to the underdevel- 
oped, warmer South, where French cultivation of such crops as 
rubber, coffee, tea, and, in Cochinchina, rice gave rise to a group 
of agricultural and plantation wage earners. 

The colonial period also led to a substantial increase in the Hoa 
population. The country's limited foreign and domestic trade were 
already in the hands of Chinese when the French arrived. The 
French chose to promote the Chinese role in commerce and to 
import Chinese labor to develop road and railroad systems, min- 
ing, and industry. French colonial policy that lifted the traditional 
ban on rice exports at the end of the nineteenth century also 
attracted new waves of Chinese merchants and shopkeepers seek- 
ing to take advantage of the new export market. Vietnam's grow- 
ing economy attracted even more Chinese thereafter, especially to 
the South. Already deeply involved in the rice trade, the Chinese 
expanded their interests to include rice-milling and established a 
virtual monopoly. 

They also were a significant presence in sugar refining, coconut 
and peanut oil production, lumber, and shipbuilding. Many who 
began their careers as laborers on the French rubber plantations 
of Cochinchina eventually started their own tea, pepper, or rice 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



plantations to supply local market needs. Chinese gardeners in the 
suburbs of Saigon monopolized the supply of fresh vegetables con- 
sumed in that city, and Chinese restaurants and hotels proliferated 
in virtually every urban center. 

Society in the 1954-75 Period 

North Vietnam 

At the time of the 1954 partition, Vietnam was overwhelmingly 
a rural society; peasants accounted for nearly 90 percent of the total 
population. During the ensuing 20 years of political separation, 
however, the North and the South developed into two very differ- 
ent societies. In the North the communists had embarked on a pro- 
gram intended to revolutionize the socioeconomic structure. The 
focus of change was ostensibly economic, but its underlying moti- 
vation was both political and social as well. Based on the Marxist 
principle of class struggle, it involved no less than the creation of 
a totally new social structure. Propertied classes were eliminated, 
and a proletarian dictatorship was established in which workers 
and peasants emerged as the nominal new masters of a socialist 
and ultimately classless state. 

As a prelude to the socialist revolution, a land reform campaign 
and a harsh, systematic campaign to liquidate "feudal landlords" 
from rural society were launched concurrently in 1955. Reminis- 
cent of the campaign undertaken by communists in China in earlier 
years, the liquidation of landlords cost the lives of an estimated 
50,000 people and prompted the party to acknowledge and redress 
"a number of serious errors" committed by its zealous cadres. 

In urban sectors the party's intervention was less direct, initially 
at least, because large numbers of the bourgeoisie had fled the North 
in anticipation of the communists' coming to power. Many had 
fled to the South before the party gained full control. Those who 
remained were verbally assailed as exploiters of the people, but 
because the regime needed their administrative and technical skills 
and experience, they were otherwise treated tolerantly and allowed 
to retain private property. 

In 1958 the regime stepped up the pace of "socialist transfor- 
mation," mindful that even though the foundations of a socialist 
society were basically in place, the economy remained for the most 
part still in the hands of the private, capitalist sector. By 1960 all 
but a small number of peasants, artisans, handicraft workers, indus- 
trialists, traders, and merchants had been forced to join coopera- 
tives of various kinds. 



105 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Intellectuals, many of whom had earlier been supporters of the 
Viet Minh (see Glossary), were first conciliated by the government, 
then stifled. Opposition to the government, expressed openly dur- 
ing and after the peasant uprisings of 1956, prompted the imposi- 
tion of controls that graduated to complete suppression by 1958. 
Writers and artists who had established their reputations in the pre- 
communist era were excluded from taking any effective role in 
national affairs. Many were sent to the countryside to perform 
manual labor and to help educate a new corps of socialist intellec- 
tuals among the peasants. 

The dominant group in the new social order were the high-level 
party officials, who constituted a new ruling class. They owed their 
standing more to demonstrations of political acumen and devotion 
to nationalism or Marxism-Leninism than to educational or profes- 
sional achievements. Years of resistance against the French in the 
rural areas had inured them to hardship and at the same time given 
them valuable experience in organization and guerrilla warfare. 
Resistance work had also brought them into close touch with many 
different segments of the population. 

At the apex of the new ruling class were select members of 
the Political Bureau of the communist Vietnam Workers Party 
(VWP, Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam), and a somewhat larger body 
of Central Committee members holding key posts in the party, the 
government, the military, and various party-supported organiza- 
tions. Below the top echelon were the rank and file party members 
(500,000 by 1960), including a number of women and members 
of ethnic minorities. Party cadres who possessed special knowledge 
and experience in technical, financial, administrative, or managerial 
matters were posted in all social institutions to supervise the imple- 
mentation of party decisions. 

Occupying an intermediate position between the party and the 
citizenry were those persons who did not belong to the party but 
who, nevertheless, had professional skills or other talents needed 
by the regime. Noncommunists were found in various technical 
posts, in the school system, and in the mass organizations to which 
most citizens were required to belong. A few even occupied high, 
though politically marginal, posts in the government. The bulk of 
the population remained farmers, workers, soldiers, miners, por- 
ters, stevedores, clerks, tradespeople, teachers, and artisans. 

Social reorganization did little to evoke mass enthusiasm for 
socialism, and socialist transformation of the private sector into 
cooperative- and state-run operations did not result in the kind of 
economic improvement the government needed to win over the 
peasants and merchants. The regime managed to provide better 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



educational and health care services than had existed in the pre- 1954 
years, but poverty was still endemic. The party attributed the 
"numerous difficulties" it faced to "natural calamities, enemy 
actions, and the utterly poor and backward state of the economy," 
but also acknowledged its own failings. These included cadre incom- 
petence in ideological and organizational matters as well as in finan- 
cial, technical, and managerial affairs. 

South Vietnam 

South of the demarcation line after partition in 1954, the social 
system remained unchanged except that power reverted to a Viet- 
namese elite. The South' s urban-rural network of roles, heavily 
dependent on the peasant economy, remained intact despite the 
influx of nearly a million refugees from the North; and land reform, 
initiated unenthusiastically in 1956, had little socioeconomic impact 
in the face of obstruction by the landowning class. In contrast to 
the North, there was no doctrinaire, organized attempt to reor- 
ganize the society fundamentally or to implant new cultural values 
and social sanctions. The regime of Ngo Dinh Diem was more con- 
cerned with its own immediate survival than with revolutionary 
social change, and if it had a vision of sociopolitical reform at all, 
that vision was diffusive. Furthermore, it lacked a political organi- 
zation comparable in zeal to the party apparatus of Hanoi in order 
to achieve its goals. 

In the 1960s, prolonged political instability placed social struc- 
tures in the South under increasing stress. The communist insur- 
gency, which prevented the government from extending its 
authority to some areas of the countryside, was partially responsi- 
ble, but even more disruptive were the policies of the government 
itself. Isolated in Saigon, the Diem regime alienated large parts 
of the population by acting to suppress Buddhists and other minori- 
ties, by forcing the relocation of peasants to areas nominally con- 
trolled by the government, and by systematically crushing political 
opposition. Such policies fueled a growing dissatisfaction with the 
regime that led to Diem's assassination in November 1963 and his 
replacement by a series of military strongmen. 

As the war in the South intensified, it created unprecedented 
social disruption in both urban and rural life. Countless civilians 
were forced to abandon their ancestral lands and sever their net- 
work of family and communal ties to flee areas controlled by the 
Viet Cong or exposed to government operations against the com- 
munists. By the early 1970s, as many as 12 million persons, or 
63 percent of the entire southern population, were estimated to have 
been displaced; some were relocated to government-protected rural 



107 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

hamlets while others crowded into already congested urban centers. 
Few villages, however remote, were left untouched by the war. The 
urban-rural boundary, once sharply defined, seemed to disappear 
as throngs of uprooted refugees moved to the cities. Traditional 
social structures broke down, leaving the society listless and bereft 
of a cohesive force other than the common instinct for survival. 

The disruption imposed by the war, however, did not alter con- 
ventional socioeconomic class identifiers. In the urban areas, the 
small upper class elite continued to be limited to high-ranking mili- 
tary officers, government officials, people in the professions, 
absentee landlords, intellectuals, and Catholic and Buddhist reli- 
gious leaders. The elite retained a strong personal interest in France 
and French culture; many had been educated in France and many 
had sons or daughters residing there. In addition to wealth, Western 
education — particularly French education — was valued highly, and 
French and English were widely spoken. 

The urban middle class included civil servants, lower and middle- 
ranking officers in the armed forces, commercial employees, school 
teachers, shop owners and managers, small merchants, and farm 
and factory managers. A few were college graduates, although the 
majority had only a secondary-school education. Very few had been 
able to study abroad. 

At the bottom of the urban society were unskilled, largely 
uneducated wageworkers and petty tradespeople. While semiliterate 
themselves, they nevertheless were able to send their children to 
primary school. Secondary education was less common, however, 
particularly for girls. These children tended not to proceed far 
enough in school to acquire an elementary knowledge of French 
or English, and most adults of the lower class knew only Vietnamese 
unless they had worked as domestics for foreigners. 

Village society, which embraced 80 percent of the population, 
was composed mostly of farmers, who were ranked in three socioeco- 
nomic groups. The elite were the wealthiest landowners. If they 
farmed, the work was done by hired laborers who planted, irrigated, 
and harvested under the owner's supervision. In the off-season, 
landowners engaged in moneylending, rice trading, or rice mill- 
ing. Usually the well-to-do owners were active in village affairs as 
members of the village councils. After the mid-1960s, however, 
interest in seeking such positions waned as village leaders increas- 
ingly were targeted by Viet Cong insurgents. 

The less prosperous, middle-level villagers owned or rented 
enough land to live at a level well above subsistence, but they tended 
not to acquire a surplus large enough to invest in other ventures. 
They worked their own fields and hired farm hands only when 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



needed during planting or harvesting. A few supplemented their 
income as artisans, but never as laborers. Because of their more 
modest economic circumstances, members of this group tended not 
to assume as many communal responsibilities as did the wealthier 
villagers. 

At the bottom of village life were owners of small farming plots 
and tenant farmers. Forced to spend nearly all of their time eking 
out a living, they could not afford to engage in village affairs. 
Because they could not cultivate enough land to support their fami- 
lies, most of them worked also as part-time laborers, and their wives 
and children assisted with the field work. Their children frequently 
went to school only long enough to learn the rudiments of reading 
and writing. This group also included workers in a wide range of 
other service occupations, such as artisans, practitioners of orien- 
tal medicine, and small tradespeople. 

Vietnam after 1975 

The sudden collapse of Saigon in April 1975 set the stage for a 
new and uncertain chapter in the evolution of Vietnamese society. 
The Hanoi government had to confront directly what communists 
have long called the struggle between the two paths of socialism and 
capitalism. At issue was Hanoi's ability to translate its wartime suc- 
cess and socialist revolutionary experience into postwar rehabilita- 
tion and reconstruction now that it controlled the South territorially. 

Foremost among the regime's imperatives was that of restoring 
order and stability to the war-torn South. The critical question, 
however, was whether or not the northern conquerors could inspire 
the southern population to embrace communism. Initially, Hanoi 
appeared sanguine; the two zones had more similarities than dis- 
similarities, and the dissimilarities were expected to be eliminated 
as the South caught up with the North in socialist organization. 

The December 1975 Vietnam Courier, an official government pub- 
lication, portrayed Vietnam as two distinct, incongruent societies. 
The South was reported to continue to suffer from what communists 
consider the neo-colonialist influences and feudal ideology of the 
United States, while the North was considered to serve as a progres- 
sive environment for growing numbers of a new kind of socialist 
human being, imbued with patriotism, proletarian internationalism, 
and socialist virtues. The class of social exploiter had been elimi- 
nated in the North, leaving the classes of worker, collectivized 
peasant, and socialist intellectual, the last consisting of various 
groups. In contrast, the South was divided into a working class, 
peasantry, petit bourgeois, capitalist — or comprador (see Glos- 
sary) — class, and the remnant of a feudal landlord class. 



109 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



In September 1976, Premier Pham Van Dong declared that his 
compatriots, North and South, were "translating the revolution- 
ary heroism they [had] displayed in fighting into creative labor in 
the acquisition of wealth and strength. " In the South particularly, 
the old society was undergoing active changes as the result of "stir- 
ring revolutionary movements" by the workers, peasants, youth, 
women, intellectuals, and other groups. In agriculture alone, "mil- 
lions of people" participated in bringing hundreds of thousands 
more hectares under cultivation and in building or dredging thou- 
sands of kilometers of canals and ditches. 

From all indications, however, these changes occurred more 
through coercion than volition. In Dong's own words, the party 
had initiated "various policies aimed at eliminating the comprador 
capitalists as a class and doing away with all vestiges of feudal 
exploitation." These policies radically realigned the power elite so 
that the ruling machine was controlled collectively by the putative 
vanguard of the working class — the party — and by the senior cadres 
of the party who were mostly from the North. 

In its quest for a new socialist order in the South, Hanoi relied 
on other techniques apart from socialist economic transformation 
and socialist education. These included thought reform, popula- 
tion resettlement, and internal exile, as well as surveillance and 
mass mobilization. Party-sponsored "study sessions" were obliga- 
tory for all adults. For the former elite of the Saigon regime, a more 
rigorous form of indoctrination was used; hundreds of thousands 
of former military officers, bureaucrats, politicians, religious and 
labor leaders, scholars, intellectuals, and lawyers, as well as critics 
of the new regime were ordered to "reeducation camps" for vary- 
ing periods. In mid- 1985, the Hanoi government conceded that 
it still held about 10,000 inmates in the reeducation camps, but 
the actual number was believed to be at least 40,000. In 1982 there 
were about 120,000 Vietnamese in these camps. According to a 
knowledgeable American observer, the inmates faced hard labor, 
but only rarely torture or execution. 

Population resettlement or redistribution, although heralded on 
economic grounds, turned out to be another instrument of social 
control in disguise. It was a means of defusing tensions in congested 
cities, which were burdened with unemployed and socially dislocated 
people even after most of the rural refugees had been repatriated 
to their native villages. These refugees had swelled the urban popu- 
lation to 45 percent of the southern total in 1975 (up from 33 per- 
cent in 1970). The authorities sought to address the problem of 
urban congestion by relocating many of the metropolitan jobless 
in the new economic zones hastily set up in virgin lands, often 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



malaria-infested jungles, as part of a broader effort to boost agricul- 
tural output. In 1975 and 1976 alone, more than 600,000 people 
were moved from Ho Chi Minh City to these zones, in most 
instances, reportedly, against their will. Because of the barely toler- 
able living conditions in the new settlements, a considerable num- 
ber of people escaped or bribed their way back to the city. The 
new economic zones came to be widely perceived as places of inter- 
nal exile. In fact, the authorities were said to have used the threat 
of exile to such places against those who refused to obey party 
instructions or to participate in the activities of the mass organi- 
zations. 

Surveillance was a familiar tool of the regime, which was bent 
on purging all class enemies. Counterrevolutionaries, real and sus- 
pected, were summarily interned in reform camps or forced labor 
camps that were set up separately from the new economic zones 
in several border areas and other undeveloped regions. 

The Hanoi government has claimed that not a single political 
execution took place in the South after 1975, even in cases of grave 
war crimes. Generally, the foreign press corroborated this claim 
by reporting in 1975 that there seemed to be no overt indication 
of the blood bath that many Western observers had predicted would 
occur in the wake of the communist takeover. Some Western 
observers, however, have estimated that as many as 65,000 South 
Vietnamese may have been executed. 

In March 1982, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) con- 
vened its Fifth National Party Congress to assess its achievements 
since 1976 and to outline its major tasks for the 1980s. The con- 
gress was revealing if only because of its somber admission that 
revolutionary optimism was no substitute for common sense. 
Despite rigid social controls and mass mobilization, the party fell 
far short of its original expectations for socialist transition. According 
to the party's assessment, from 1976 through 1980 shortcomings 
and errors occurred in establishing transition goals and in imple- 
menting the party line. 

The congress, however, reaffirmed the correctness of the party 
line concerning socialist transition, and directed that it be imple- 
mented with due allowances for different regional circumstances. 
The task was admittedly formidable. In a realistic appraisal of the 
regime's difficulties, Nhan Dan, the party's daily organ, warned 
in June 1982 that the crux of the problem lay in the regime itself, 
the shortcomings of which included lack of party discipline and cor- 
ruption of party and state functionaries. 

In 1987 the goal of establishing a new society remained elusive, 
and Vietnam languished in the first stage of the party's planned 



111 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

period of transition to socialism. Mai Chi Tho, mayor of Ho Chi 
Minh City and deputy head of its party branch, had told visiting 
Western reporters as early as April 1985 that socialist transition, 
as officially envisioned, would probably continue until the year 
2000. 

In the estimation of the party, Vietnamese society had succumbed 
to a new form of sociopolitical elitism that was just as undesirable 
as the much-condemned elitism of the old society. Landlords and 
comprador capitalists may have disappeared but in their places were 
party cadres and state functionaries who were no less status- 
conscious and self-seeking. The Sixth National Party Congress in 
December 1986 found it necessary to issue a stern warning against 
opportunism, individualism, personal gain, corruption, and a desire 
for special prerogatives and privileges. A report to the congress 
urged the party to intensify class struggle in order to combat the 
corrupt practices engaged in by those who had "lost their class con- 
sciousness." Official efforts to purify the ranks of the working class, 
peasantry, and socialist intellectuals, however, failed to strike a 
responsive chord. In fact, the proceedings of the Sixth Congress 
left the inescapable impression that the regime was barely surviv- 
ing the struggle between socialism and capitalism and that an early 
emergence of a communist class structure was unlikely. 

As ideally envisioned, the socialist sector was expected to pro- 
vide 70 percent of household income, and the "household 
economy," or the privately controlled resources of the home, was 
to make up the balance. In September 1986, cadres and workers 
were earning their living mainly through moonlighting and, 
according to a Vietnamese source, remained on "the state rolls 
only to preserve their political prestige and to receive some ration 
stamps and coupons." The source further disclosed that the society's 
lack of class consciousness was reflected in the party's member- 
ship, among whom only about 10 percent were identified as from 
the working class. 

The Family 

Background 

Using the patriarchal family as the basic social institution, the 
Confucianists framed their societal norm in terms of the duties and 
obligations of a family to a father, a child to a parent, a wife to 
a husband, and a younger brother to an older brother; they held 
that the welfare and continuity of the family group were more 
important than the interests of any individual member. Indeed, 
the individual was less an independent being than a member of 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



a family group that included not only living members but also a 
long line of ancestors and of those yet to be born. A family mem- 
ber's life was caught up in the activities of a multitude of relatives. 
Members of the same household lived together, worked together, 
and gathered together for marriages, funerals, Tet (lunar New Year) 
celebrations, and rituals marking the anniversary of an ancestor's 
death. Family members looked first to other family members for 
help and counsel in times of personal crisis and guarded the inter- 
ests of the family in making personal or household decisions. 

Special reverence was accorded a family's ancestors. This prac- 
tice, known as the family cult or cult of the ancestors, derived from 
the belief that after death the spirits of the departed continued to 
influence the world of the living. The soul was believed to become 
restless and likely to exert an unfavorable influence on the living, 
unless it was venerated in the expected manner. 

Veneration of ancestors was also regarded as a means through 
which an individual could assure his or her own immortality. Chil- 
dren were valued because they could provide for the spirits of their 
parents after death. Family members who remained together and 
venerated their forebears with strict adherence to prescribed ritual 
found comfort in the belief that the souls of their ancestors were 
receiving proper spiritual nourishment and that they were insur- 
ing their own soul's nourishment after death. 

The cult required an ancestral home or patrimony, a piece of 
land legally designated as a place devoted to the support of vener- 
ated ancestors. Ownership of land that could be dedicated to the 
support of the cult was, however, only a dream for most landless 
farmers. The cult also required a senior male of direct descent to 
oversee preparations for obligatory celebrations and offerings. 

On the anniversary of an ancestor's death, rites were performed 
before the family altar to the god of the house, and sacrificial offer- 
ings were made to both the god and the ancestor. The lavishness 
of the offering depended on the income of the family and on the 
rank of the deceased within the family. A representative of each 
family in the lineage was expected to be present, even if this meant 
traveling great distances. Whenever there was an occasion of family 
joy or sorrow, such as a wedding, an anniversary, success in an 
examination, a promotion, or a funeral, the ancestors were con- 
sulted or informed of the event through sacrificial offerings. 

In the traditional kinship system, the paternal line of descent 
was emphasized. Individuals were identified primarily by their con- 
nections through the father's male bloodline, and kin groups larger 
than the family — clans and lineages — were formed by kinspeople 
who traced their relationship to each other in this manner. It was 



113 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



through these patrilineal descent groups that both men and women 
inherited property and that men assumed their primary obligation 
for maintaining the ancestor observances. 

The patrilineal group maintained an extremely strong kin rela- 
tionship. Members' ties to one another were reinforced by their 
shared heritage, derived from residence in the same village over 
many generations. Family land and tombs, located in or near the 
village, acted as a focus for feelings of kin loyalty, solidarity, and 
continuity. 

The extended family rather than the nuclear one was the 
dominant family structure, often including three or even four gener- 
ations, and typically consisting of grandparents, father and mother, 
children, and grandchildren, all living under the same roof. Some- 
times parents had more than one married son living with them, 
but this often led to such tension that it was generally held prefer- 
able for a second son to live separately. All members of the house- 
hold lived under the authority of the oldest male, and all contributed 
to the income of the family. 

Despite the cultural emphasis on their obedience, women were 
not regarded as the weaker sex but as resilient and strong-willed. 
In the village, women assumed a great deal of responsibility for 
cultivation of paddy fields, often working harder than men, and 
sometimes engaged in retail trade of all kinds. A few women owned 
agricultural estates, factories, and other businesses, and both urban 
and rural women typically managed the family income. A wom- 
an's influence in family affairs could be increased by giving birth 
to a first male child. In general, though, a woman was expected 
to be dutiful and respectful toward her husband and his parents, 
to care for him and his children, and to perform household duties. 
There were few women in public life. 

Besides the so-called wife of the first rank, a household some- 
times included a second and third wife and their children. The con- 
sent of the first wife was required before this arrangement could 
be made, but, more often than not, additional wives either were 
established by the husband in separate households or were permitted 
to continue living as they had before marriage, in their own homes 
or with parents. Polygyny was widespread in both northern and 
central Vietnam, as was the taking of concubines. 

Marriage was regarded primarily as a social contract and was 
arranged by the parents through intermediaries. The parents' choice 
was influenced more by considerations affecting the welfare of the 
lineage than by the preferences of the participants. 

Interest in having children was strongly reinforced by Confu- 
cian culture, which made it imperative to produce a male heir to 



114 



Tonkinese family of Son Toy, early twentieth century 
Courtesy New York Times, Paris Collection, National Archives 

continue the family line. A couple with numerous offspring was 
envied. If there were sons, it was assured that the lineage would 
be perpetuated and the cult of the ancestors maintained; if there 
was no male heir, a couple was regarded as unfortunate, and a 
barren wife could be divorced or supplanted by another wife. 

Fostering filial piety was of overriding importance in child- 
rearing. Children were expected to be polite to their parents and 
older persons, to be solicitous of their welfare, to show them respect 
through proper manner and forms of address, and to carry out 
prescribed tradition with respect to funeral practices and the obser- 
vance of mourning. After the deaths of their parents, it was incum- 
bent upon surviving children (and their children in turn) to 
honor their parents' memory through maintenance of the ances- 
tors' cult. 

All important family occasions such as births, betrothals, mar- 
riages, funerals, and anniversaries of the deaths of ancestors were 
observed by appropriate ceremonies in which members of the kin 
group participated. The ceremonies had both religious and social 
meaning, and many were very elaborate, in keeping with the wealth 
and social status of the family. Whenever such a celebration took 
place, the family was always careful to make an offering to the god 
of the hearth. Prayers and sacrifices were also made when misfor- 
tune fell upon the household. 



115 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

The Family since 1954 

In the first decade after World War II, the vast majority of North 
and South Vietnamese clung tenaciously to traditional customs and 
practices. After the 1950s, however, some traditions were ques- 
tioned, especially in the North. The timeless notion that the family 
was the primary focus of individual loyalty was disparaged as feu- 
dal by the communists, who also criticized the traditional concept 
of the family as a self-contained socioeconomic unit. Major family 
reform was initiated under a new law enacted in 1959 and put into 
effect in 1960. The law's intent was to protect the rights of women 
and children by prohibiting polygyny, forced marriage, concubi- 
nage, and abuse. It was designed to equalize the rights and obli- 
gations of women and men within the family and to enable women 
to enjoy equal status with men in social and work-related activi- 
ties. Young women were encouraged to join the party as well as 
the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth League and the Vietnam 
Women's Union, and they were trained as cadres and assigned 
as leaders to production teams. 

In conjunction with the law, a mass campaign was launched to 
discourage as wasteful the dowries and lavish wedding feasts of an 
earlier era. Large families were also discouraged. Parents who felt 
themselves blessed by heaven and secure in their old age because 
they had many children were labeled bourgeois and reactionary. 
Young people were advised not to marry before the age of twenty 
for males and eighteen for females and to have no more than two 
children per household. Lectures on birth control were common- 
place in the public meeting rooms of cooperatives and factories. 

According to Ha Thi Que, president of the Vietnam Women's 
Union in the early 1980s, popularizing family reform was extremely 
difficult, even in 1980, because women lacked a feminist con- 
sciousness and men resisted passively. To promote equality of the 
sexes, members of the women's union took an active part in a 
consciousness-raising campaign under the slogan, "As good in run- 
ning society as running the home, women must be the equals of 
men." Such campaigns resulted in a fairer division of labor between 
husbands and wives and in the decline of customs and practices 
based on belief in women's inferiority. 

In 1980 some old habits remained. Change reportedly was slower 
in the mountain areas and in the countryside than in the towns. 
According to Ha Thi Que, in areas where state control and super- 
vision were lax, old-fashioned habits reemerged not only among 
the working people but also among state employees. She also pointed 
out that many young people misinterpreted the notion of free 



116 



Female lathe operator 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



marriage, or the right of individuals to select their own marriage 
partners, and were engaging in love affairs without seriously 
intending to marry. Marriages were also being concluded for money 
or for status, and in the cities the divorce rate was rising. 

In the North, family life was affected by the demands of the war 
for the liberation of the South, or the Second Indochina War (see 
Glossary), on the society and by the policies of a regime doctrinally 
committed to a major overhaul of its socioeconomic organization. 
Sources of stress on the family in the North in the 1960s and the 
1970s included the trend toward nuclear families, rural collectivi- 
zation, population redistribution from the Red River Delta region 
to the highlands, prolonged mobilization of a large part of the male 
work force for the war effort, and the consequent movement of 
women into the economic sector. By 1975 women accounted for 
more than 60 percent of the total labor force. 

In the South, despite the hardships brought on by the First Indo- 
china War (see Glossary) and Second Indochina War, the tradi- 
tional family system endured. Family lineage remained the source 
of an individual's identity, and nearly all southerners believed that 
the family had first claim on their loyalties, before that of extra- 
familial individuals or institutions, including the state. 

The first attempt to reform the family system in the South 
occurred in 1959, when the Catholic Diem regime passed a family 



117 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



code to outlaw polygyny and concubinage. The code also made 
legal separation extremely difficult and divorce almost impossible. 
Under provisions equalizing the rights and obligations of spouses, 
a system of community property was established so that all property 
and incomes of husband and wife would be jointly owned and 
administered. The code reinforced the role of parents, grandparents, 
and the head of the lineage as the formal validators of marriage, 
divorce, or adoption, and supported the tradition of ancestor cults. 
The consent of parents or grandparents was required in the mar- 
riage or the adoption of a minor, and they or the head of the line- 
age had the right to oppose the marriage of a descendant. 

In 1964 after the Diem regime had been toppled in a coup, a 
revised family law was promulgated. It was similar to the previ- 
ous one except that separation and divorce were permitted after 
two years of marriage on grounds of adultery, cruelty, abandon- 
ment, or a criminal act on the part of a spouse. Concubinage, which 
had been expressly forbidden previously, was not mentioned, and 
adultery was no longer punishable by fines or imprisonment. 

During the war years, family life was seriously disrupted as family 
members were separated and often resettled in different areas. If 
the distance from one another was too great, they could not assemble 
for the rites and celebrations that traditionally reinforced kinship 
solidarity. Family ties were further torn by deaths and separations 
caused by the war and by political loyalties, which in some instances 
set one kinsperson against another. 

In those areas where hostilities occurred, the war was a family 
affair, extending to the children. Few Vietnamese children had the 
opportunity simply to be children. From birth they were participants 
in the war as well as its victims. They matured in an environment 
where death and suffering inflicted by war were commonplace and 
seemingly unavoidable. 

The years of military conflicts and refugee movements tended 
in many parts of the South to break up the extended family units 
and to reinforce the bonds uniting the nuclear family. The major 
preoccupation of the ordinary villager and urbanite alike was to 
earn a livelihood and to protect his immediate family, holding his 
household together at any cost. 

After the mid-1970s, the North and South faced the task of social 
reconstruction. For the South, the communist conquest and ensu- 
ing relocation and collectivization policies created an uncertain social 
milieu. While the return of peace reunited families, communist poli- 
cies forced fathers or sons into reeducation camps or entire fami- 
lies into new economic zones for resettlement. For those who saw 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



no future in a socialist Vietnam, the only alternatives were to escape 
by boat or escape by land. 

As the pace of rural collectivization accelerated in 1987, and as 
the people became more receptive to family planning, it seemed 
likely that families in the South would gradually take on the charac- 
teristics of those in the North. This conjecture was reinforced by 
Hanoi's decision in 1977 to apply its own 1959 family law to the 
South. 

According to an official 1979 survey of rural families in the Red 
River Delta commune of An Binh near Hanoi, a typical family 
was nuclear, averaging four persons (parents and two children). 
The An Binh study, confirmed by other studies, also showed the 
family to be heavily dependent on outsiders for the satisfaction of 
its essential needs and confirmed that the family planning drive 
had had some success in changing traditional desires for a large 
family. Seventy-five percent of those interviewed nonetheless con- 
tinued to believe three or four children per family to be the most 
desirable number and to prefer a son to a daughter. 

The An Binh study revealed in addition that almost all the par- 
ents interviewed preferred their children not to be farmers, a prefer- 
ence that reflected the popular conviction that farming was not the 
promising route to high-status occupations. Such thinking, however, 
was alarming to officials who considered the promotion of agricul- 
ture as essential to the regime's scheme for successful transition 
to a socialist economy (see Agriculture, ch. 3). 

In December 1986, the government enacted a new family law 
that incorporated the 1959 law and added some new provisions. 
The goal of the new legislation was "to develop and consolidate 
the socialist marriage and family system, shape a new type of man, 
and promote a new socialist way of life eliminating the vestiges of 
feudalism, backward customs, and bad or bourgeois thoughts about 
marriage and family." The law explicitly defined the "socialist 
family" as one in which "the wife and husband are equals who 
love each other, who help each other to make progress, who actively 
participate in building socialism and defending the fatherland and 
work together to raise their children to be productive citizens for 
society." 

Reflecting the government's sense of urgency about population 
control, the 1986 law stipulated a new parental "obligation" to 
practice family planning, a provision that was absent from the 1959 
text. The new law was notable also for its stronger wording regard- 
ing the recommended marriage age: it specified that "only males 
twenty years of age or older and females eighteen years of age or 



119 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



older may marry." The 1959 text had stated only that such per- 
sons were "eligible for marriage." 

Other noteworthy provisions concerned adoption, guardianship, 
and marriage between Vietnamese and foreigners. Foreigners mar- 
ried to Vietnamese were to comply with the provisions of the 1986 
law except in matters relating to separation, divorce, adoption, and 
guardianship, which were to be regulated separately. The new code 
also called on various mass organizations to play an active role in 
"teaching and campaigning among the people for the strict imple- 
mentation" of the law. 

Religion 

The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, adopted 
in 1980, proclaims that "citizens enjoy freedom of worship, and 
may practice or not practice a religion" but that "no one may mis- 
use religions to violate state laws or policies." Despite the Consti- 
tution's ostensible protection of the practice of religion, the status 
of such was precarious in Vietnam in late 1987. 

Buddhism 

Historically, most Vietnamese have identified themselves with 
Buddhism, which originated in what is now southern Nepal around 
530 B.C. as an offshoot of Hinduism. Its founder was Gautama, 
a prince who bridled at the formalism of Hinduism as it was being 
interpreted by the priestly caste of Brahmans. Gautama spent years 
meditating and wandering as an ascetic until he discovered the path 
of enlightenment to nirvana, the world of endless serenity in which 
one is freed from the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. According 
to Buddhist thought, human salvation lies in discovering the "four 
noble truths" — that man is born to suffer in successive lives, that 
the cause of this suffering is man's craving for earthly pleasures 
and possessions, that the suffering ceases upon his deliverance from 
this craving, and that he achieves this deliverance by following "the 
noble eightfold path." The foundation of the Buddhist concept of 
morality and right behavior, the eightfold path, consists of right 
views, or sincerity in leading a religious life; right intention, or 
honesty in judgment; right speech, or sincerity in speech; right con- 
duct, or sincerity in work; right livelihood, or sincerity in making 
a living; right effort, or sincerity in aspiration; right mindfulness, 
or sincerity in memory; and right concentration, or sincerity in 
meditation. 

Buddhism spread first from China to Vietnam's Red River Delta 
region in approximately the second century A.D., and then from 
India to the southern Mekong Delta area at some time between 



120 



Children riding in a cyclo, 
Ho Chi Minh City 
Courtesy Bill Herod 




the third and the sixth centuries. The Chinese version, Mahayana 
Buddhism, became the faith of most Vietnamese, whereas the 
Indian version, Theravada (or Hinayana) Buddhism, was confined 
mostly to the southern delta region. The doctrinal distinction 
between the two consists of their differing views of Gautama Bud- 
dha: the Mahayana school teaches that Gautama was only one of 
many "enlightened ones" manifesting the fundamental divine 
power of the universe; the Theravada school teaches that Gautama 
was the one-and-only enlightened one and the great teacher, but 
that he was not divine. The Mahayana sect holds further that lay- 
persons can attain nirvana, whereas the Theravada school believes 
that only ordained monks and nuns can do so. 

Few Vietnamese outside the clergy, however, are acquainted with 
Buddhism's elaborate cosmology. What appealed to them at the 
time it was introduced was Mahayana ritual and imagery. Maha- 
yana ceremony easily conformed to indigenous Vietnamese beliefs, 
which combined folklore with Confucian and Taoist teachings, and 
Mahayana' s "enlightened ones" were often venerated alongside 
various animist spirits. 

Before the country was unified under communism, Buddhism 
enjoyed an autonomy from the state that was increasingly threat- 
ened once the communists gained power. For pragmatic reasons, 
however, the regime initially avoided overt hostility toward Bud- 
dhism or any other organized religion. Instead, it sought to separate 



121 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

real and potential collaborators from opponents by co-optation and 
control. For example, within months after winning the South, the 
communist regime set up a front called the Patriotic Buddhist Liai- 
son Committee. The committee's purpose was to promote the idea 
that all patriotic Buddhists had a duty to participate in building 
a new society liberated for the first time from the shackles of feu- 
dal and neo-colonialist influences. The committee also tried to show 
that most Buddhists, leaders and followers alike, were indeed rally- 
ing behind the new regime and the liaison committee. This strategy 
attempted to thwart the power of the influential, independent groups 
of Buddhist clergy, particularly the Unified Buddhist Church of 
Vietnam, which had been a major pre- 1975 critic of the Saigon 
government and, of the roughly twenty Buddhist sects in Vietnam, 
the most vocal in opposing the war. 

Communists also pressured monks and nuns to lead a secular 
life, encouraging them to take part in productive agricultural labor 
or to become actively involved in the work of the Patriotic Bud- 
dhist Liaison Committee. For their refusal to collaborate, some 
prominent clerical leaders in the South were placed under house 
arrest or imprisoned, their pagodas were converted to public use, 
and their holdings were confiscated. Such activity closely paralleled 
communist actions against Buddhists in the North in the 1950s. 
In addition, the party prevented Buddhist organizations from train- 
ing monks and nuns in schools that previously had been autono- 
mous. In April 1980, a national committee of Buddhist groups 
throughout the country was formed by the government. The 
government-controlled Vietnam Buddhist Church was established 
in November 1981, and it emerged as the only officially sanctioned 
organization authorized to represent all Buddhist groups both at 
home and abroad. 

As a result of communist policy, the observance of Buddhist ritual 
and practice was drastically reduced. A 1979 study of a Red River 
Delta commune, reported to be "overwhelmingly Catholic," dis- 
closed that the commune's two pagodas were "maintained and fre- 
quented regularly by the faithful (the majority of whom were old 
women), especially on the Buddhist feast days." No monks or nuns 
had been observed, however, and the study went on to note that 
pagodas had been eliminated entirely in nearby Hanoi. In 1987 
occasional reports suggested that the observance of Buddhist ritual 
continued in some remote areas. 

The communist government's attitude toward Buddhism and 
other faiths being practiced remained one of tolerance as long as 
the clergy and faithful adhered strictly to official guidelines. These 
guidelines inhibited the growth of religious institutions, however, 



122 



Chinese Buddhist temple, Cholon 
Courtesy United States Army 



by restricting the number of institutions approved to train clergy 
and by preempting the time of potential candidates among the youth 
whose daily routine might require study, work, and participation 
in the activities of communist youth organizations. In an appar- 
ent effort to train a new generation of monks and nuns, the Viet- 
nam Buddhist Church reportedly set up one Buddhist academy in 
Hanoi in November 1981 and another in Ho Chi Minh City in 
December 1984 . These academies, however, served as an arm of 
the state. 

Catholicism 

Despite the Roman Catholic Church's rejection of ancestor wor- 
ship, a cornerstone of the Confucian cultural tradition, Roman 
Catholicism established a solid position in Vietnamese society under 
French rule. The French encouraged its propagation to balance 
Buddhism and to serve as a vehicle for the further dissemination 
of Western culture. After the mid-1950s, Catholicism declined in 
the North, where the communists regarded it as a reactionary force 
opposed to national liberation and social progress. In the South, 
by contrast, Catholicism expanded under the presidency of Ngo 
Dinh Diem, who promoted it as an important bulwark against 
North Vietnam. Under Diem, himself a devout Catholic, Roman 
Catholics enjoyed an advantage over non-Catholics in commerce, 



123 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

the professions, education, and the government. This caused grow- 
ing Buddhist discontent that contributed to the eventual collapse 
of the Diem regime and the ultimate rise to power of the military. 
Roman Catholics in reunified Vietnam numbered about 3.0 mil- 
lion in 1984, of whom nearly 1 million resided in the North and 
the remainder in the South. 

In 1955 approximately 600,000 Catholics remained in the North 
after an estimated 650,000 had fled to the South. That year the 
Liaison Committee of Patriotic and Peace-Loving Catholics was 
set up in the North by the communist regime in an attempt to win 
over those Catholics who had chosen to remain (but were slower 
than non-Catholics to embrace the regime) and to "reintegrate" 
them into northern society. The church was allowed to retain its 
link with the Vatican, although all foreign priests had either fled 
south or been expelled, and normal church activities were permit- 
ted to continue, albeit in the shadow of a campaign of harassment. 
The appearance of normalcy was misleading, however. The church 
was stripped of its traditional autonomy in running schools, hospi- 
tals, and orphanages. Its traditional right to own property was 
abolished, and priests and nuns were required to devote part of 
their time to productive labor in agriculture. Nevertheless, offi- 
cials claimed that Catholics had complete freedom of worship as 
long as they did not question the principle of collective socialism, 
spurn manual labor, or jeopardize the internal and external secu- 
rity of the state. 

In November 1977, the Vietnam Courier reported that the church 
in the North had changed from "opposition to acceptance and par- 
ticipation," but that the transformation had been difficult for 
Catholics. In the same month, the government unveiled a decree 
on religion that reaffirmed the constitution's position on religious 
freedom, but made it unequivocally clear that such freedom was 
conditional and depended on the compatibility of church activities 
with such higher imperatives as patriotism and socialism. The new 
decree not only prescribed the duties and obligations required of 
the clergy by the state but also imposed state control over the con- 
duct of religious services, education, training, investitures, appoint- 
ments, travels, and transfers. 

Applicable to all religious communities in the North and South, 
the new law clearly introduced a period of more active state inter- 
vention in church affairs. The regime apparently acted out of con- 
cern that the church in the North, despite having coexisted with 
socialism for twenty- three years, was not progressive enough to lead 
in the socialist transformation of the Catholic community in the 
South. The Vietnam Courier suggested this link between the northern 



124 



Buddhist shrine with 
portrait of Ho Chi Minh 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



and southern situations in November 1977, after noting that the 
northern Catholic church would have to shoulder the additional 
task of helping to reintegrate Vietnam's entire Catholic popula- 
tion into the national community. 

Catholics in the South in 1975 officially numbered about 1.9 mil- 
lion, including 15 bishops, 3,000 regular and diocesan priests, 1,200 
brothers, and 6,000 nuns. Four-hundred priests and lay brothers 
and 56,000 lay Catholics were estimated already to have fled the 
country in anticipation of the communist victory. At the time of 
the imposition of communist rule, the South had 870 parishes in 
15 dioceses; Ho Chi Minh City alone had a half million Catho- 
lics, who were served by 600 priests and 4,000 lay brothers and 
nuns. The North's less than 1 million Catholics were served by 
about 3,500 churches attended by nearly 400 priests, 10 bishops, 
and 2 archbishops. 

The government claimed that after April 1975 the religious 
activities of Roman Catholics were quickly stabilized, major ser- 
vices were held, and many cathedrals and churches that had been 
damaged or destroyed in the war were rebuilt. The regime claimed 
further that there was no religious persecution, or if there was perse- 
cution, that it was directed at the activities of "reactionary forces" 
bent on taking advantage of "the backwardness of a number of 
the faithful . . . ." Nevertheless, the authorities acted to isolate and 
to neutralize hard-core opposition to party policy and to persuade 



125 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

less strongly opposed factions to join a party-controlled "renova- 
tion and reconciliation" movement. A considerable number of 
Northern and Southern Roman Catholics, however, remained 
opposed to communist authority. 

In 1980 the Unified Bishops' Council of Vietnam was established 
to enlist the aid of "patriotic" bishops in persuading recalcitrant 
elements of the Catholic community to cooperate with the regime. 
Three years later, in November 1983, a Committee for Solidarity 
of Patriotic Catholics was created to unite all Catholics and channel 
their energy into the building of socialism. This committee, which 
replaced the Liaison Committee of Patriotic and Peace-Loving 
Catholics, was formed at a time when the regime's surveillance 
of the Catholic community had been stepped up, reportedly due 
to the suspicion that some Catholics were involved in antistate 
activities. The regime's growing concern was further reflected in 
the establishment in March 1985 of a Religious Affairs Commit- 
tee to coordinate and supervise religious organizations more effec- 
tively. Hanoi's increasing involvement in church affairs reportedly 
produced new strains in its relations with the Vatican. In 1987 it 
nevertheless appeared critical to Vietnam's leaders to convey to 
the public the impression that the Roman Catholic Church was 
active in the affairs of the nation and that church members were 
significant contributors to the socialist cause. 

Other Faiths 

Religions with less of a following than Buddhism or Catholicism 
were treated similarly by the regime, with the exception of those 
the regime considered merely superstitious, which incurred its out- 
right hostility. Two religious movements that enjoyed consider- 
able followings before 1975 were the Cao Dai (see Glossary) and 
the Hoa Hao (see Glossary). Both were founded in this century 
in the Mekong River Delta. The Cao Dai, the older of the two 
and a self-styled reformed Buddhist sect, flourished in the rural 
areas of the southern delta region. An amalgam of different beliefs 
derived from Confucianism, Taoism, and Christianity, among other 
sources, it claimed 1 million to 2 million adherents. The Hoa Hao, 
with more than 1 million followers, identified itself as a reformed 
Theravada Buddhist sect, but, unlike the Cao Dai, it preserved 
a distinctive Buddhist coloration. Based mostly in the southern- 
most areas of the delta, it stressed individual prayer, simplicity, 
and social justice over icon veneration or elaborate ceremonies. 
Before 1975 both faiths sought, with some success, to remain neu- 
tral in the war between Hanoi and Saigon. After 1975, however, 



126 




A painting at the Cao Dai Temple, Tay Ninh Province, depicting 
three of the Cao Dai movement's spiritual "fathers": founder of the 
Chinese Republic Sun Yat-sen, French poet and novelist Victor Hugo, 

and Vietnamese prophet Trang Thinh 
Courtesy United States Army 



127 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

like Buddhists and Roman Catholics, they were under heavy pres- 
sure from the communist regime to join its ranks. 

Protestants, numbered between 100,000 and 200,000 in the early 
1980s, and were found mostly among the Montagnard communi- 
ties inhabiting the South 's central highlands. Because of their alleged 
close association with American missionaries of the Christian and 
Missionary Alliance, Protestants were reported to have suffered 
more than Catholics after 1975. 

In addition to organized religions, there existed a melange of 
beliefs without institutional structure that nevertheless had an 
enduring impact on Vietnamese life well into the 1980s. These 
beliefs, which were derived partly from Confucianism, stressed the 
virtues of filial piety, loyalty, family solidarity, and ancestor venera- 
tion — all central to the family system of the old society. Taoism, 
another important system of belief introduced from China, empha- 
sized the importance of an individual's relationship to nature and 
to the universe. Beliefs rooted in Taoism were condemned by the 
regime as superstitious. 

Despite official disapproval of superstitious practices, most Viet- 
namese, regardless of their professed religion, level of education, 
or ideology, were influenced at one time or another by such prac- 
tices as astrology, geomancy and sorcery. Diviners and other 
specialists in the occult remained in popular demand because they 
were believed to be able to diagnose supernatural causes of illness, 
establish lucky dates for personal undertakings, or predict the future. 
Moreover, many Vietnamese believed that individual destiny was 
guided by astrological phenomena. By consulting one's horoscope, 
one could make the most of auspicious times and avoid disaster. 
It was not unusual, for example, for a couple to consult an astrologer 
before marrying. He would determine if the betrothed were suit- 
ably matched and even fix the date of the ceremony. 

The belief in good and evil spirits, or animism, antedated all 
organized faiths in Vietnam and permeated the society, especially 
in the rural areas and in the highlands. These beliefs held that all 
phenomena and forces in the universe were controlled by spirits 
and that the souls of the dead were instrumental in determining 
an individual's fate. If propitiated, they provided the living with 
protection; if ignored, they induced misfortune. Although officially 
condemned as "superstitious practices," these beliefs continued 
to proliferate in the rural and in the highland areas as well as in 
the cities in the 1980s. 

Education 

The Vietnamese inherited a high respect for learning. Under 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



Confucianism, education was essential for admission to the ruling 
class of scholar-officials, the mandarinate. Under French rule, even 
though Vietnamese were excluded from the higher echelons of the 
colonial power elite, education was a requisite for employment in 
the colonial civil service and for other white-collar, high-status jobs. 
In divided Vietnam, education continued to be a channel for social 
mobility in both the North and the South. 

Before the 1950s, poverty was a major impediment to learning, 
and secondary and higher education were beyond the reach of all 
but a small number of upper class people. Subsequently, however, 
rival regimes in Hanoi and Saigon broadened educational oppor- 
tunities. Both governments accomplished this despite the shortage 
of teachers, textbooks, equipment, and classrooms and despite the 
disruptions of war in the 1960s and early 1970s. The school sys- 
tem was originally patterned after the French model, but the cur- 
riculum was revised to give more emphasis to Vietnamese history, 
language, and literature and, in Hanoi, to the teaching of revolu- 
tionary ethics and Marxism-Leninism. 

In the years after 1975, all public and private schools in the South 
were taken over by the state as a first step toward integration into 
a unified socialist school system. Thousands of teachers were sent 
from the North to direct and supervise the process of transition, 
and former teachers under the Saigon regime were allowed to con- 
tinue their work only after they had completed "special courses" 
designed to expose "the ideological and cultural poisoning of which 
they had been victims for twenty years." 

The educational system in 1987 was based on reforms announced 
in January 1979 that were designed to make education more rele- 
vant to the nation's economic and social needs. These reforms com- 
bined theory with practical application and emphasized the training 
of skilled workers, technicians, and managers. The reforms also 
stressed the need to develop the country's scientific and techno- 
logical levels of achievement until they were comparable to inter- 
national levels in order to assist Vietnam in expanding its technical 
cooperation with foreign countries in general and socialist coun- 
tries in particular. 

The 1979 reforms were implemented in stages beginning in the 
1981-82 school year (September to August). By 1985 the north- 
ern and southern schools had been integrated into one system, new 
textbooks had been distributed throughout the country, and the 
curriculum had been made uniform for the first time. The govern- 
ment also tried to make the first nine years of general education 
compulsory, despite the continuing shortage of teachers, school 
buildings, and equipment, particularly modern equipment for 



129 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

teaching applied sciences. The low morale of underpaid teachers 
with low job status complicated these attempts. 

The perennial shortage of money presented another stumbling 
block in education. In order to address the problem, the 1979 
reforms called on agricultural cooperatives and even "private 
citizens" to make contributions to local schools and to participate 
in "a movement for self-supply of teaching aids." In an apparent 
effort to utilize local resources for educational development, the 
government assigned "people's educational councils," set up at 
the grass-roots level, to undertake the task. Composed of represen- 
tatives of the school, parents, local administration, and various mass 
organizations, these councils were designed to promote more 
productive relations between the school and the local community. 

Education continued to be structured in a traditional manner, 
including preschool, vocational and professional schools, sup- 
plementary courses, and higher education. "General" education, 
however, was extended from ten to twelve years. The first nine 
years of general education formed the compulsory level, correspond- 
ing to primary and junior high schools; the last three years con- 
stituted the secondary level. Graduates of secondary schools were 
considered to have completed training in "general culture" and 
to be ready for employment requiring skilled labor. They were also 
eligible to apply to colleges or advanced vocational and professional 
schools. The general education category also covered the school- 
ing of gifted and handicapped children. As part of the effort to foster 
"love and respect" for manual labor, students spent 15 percent 
of school time at the primary level and 1 7 percent at the secondary 
level in manual work. 

Vocational schools at the secondary and college levels served to 
train technicians and skilled workers. Graduates of professional 
specialized schools at the college level primarily filled mid-level cadre 
positions in the technical, economic, educational, cultural, and 
medical fields. Senior cadres in these fields as well as members of 
the upper bureaucracy usually had graduated from regular univer- 
sities. The 1979 educational reforms gave high priority to voca- 
tional and professional training in order to absorb a large number 
of general education students who were unable to proceed to col- 
leges and secondary-level vocational schools. In 1980, for exam- 
ple, 70 percent of primary school students and 85 percent of 
secondary school students failed to matriculate either because of 
bleak prospects for employment after graduation or because the 
country's ninety-three institutions of higher learning could admit 
only 10 percent of all applicants. 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



Vocational schools continued to struggle to attract students. In 
a study of mass education in Vietnam, a Western scholar observed 
that "Vietnamese students aggressively avoided vocational schools 
and the specialized middle schools favored by the government." 
He also noted: 

The reason for the imbalance between the technical 
schools and the general middle schools was only too clear. 
The former were thought to foreclose entry to high- status 
occupations. The latter were thought to be an indispens- 
able part of the ideal educational odyssey through univer- 
sity and into the upper bureaucracy — the modern 
equivalent of the old Vietnamese Confucian quest to 
become a metropolitan examination graduate ... or 
imperial tribute student ... as Vo Nguyen Giap bit- 
terly acknowledged in January 1982. 

Supplementary, or complementary, education served adults who 
had not completed a basic and secondary general education and 
who needed additional training in their specialties. Open to those 
under forty-five, supplementary courses were offered through cor- 
respondence, at worksites, or at special schools. Officials expected 
that participants in these courses could raise their "cultural level" 
to the equivalent of students who had completed ninth or twelfth 
grade. 

The number of students in institutions of higher learning 
increased rapidly from about 50,000 (29,000 in the North and 
20,834 in the South) in 1964 to 150,000 in 1980. Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City served as the two major centers for universities and 
colleges; major provincial capitals were the sites of regional col- 
leges; and the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of 
Interior sponsored an unspecified number of colleges. Of the 
150,000 college students in 1980, approximately 23 percent were 
female. 

In the mid-1980s, some Vietnamese observers believed that the 
college system needed reform to make it more diverse and flexi- 
ble. They promoted change in order to accommodate more secon- 
dary school applicants and to improve the quality of college 
education. Students were perceived as spending too much time try- 
ing to earn diplomas and not enough time "in practical, creative 
activities." 

Vietnam took part in international student exchange and coopera- 
tion programs in the fields of education and technical training, prin- 
cipally with the Soviet Union and with other communist countries 
(excluding China). Nhan Dan reported in 1983 that Vietnamese and 



131 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Soviet linguists had compiled textbooks for Vietnamese secondary 
general education schools and that they had also begun a similar 
project in Russian for use in Vietnamese colleges. The Soviets also 
assisted the Vietnamese in publishing scientific and technical dic- 
tionaries. In 1984 a Soviet source reported that, under the Soviet 
program of educational assistance that had begun in 1959, about 
60,000 Vietnamese specialists and skilled workers had been trained 
in addition to 18,000 vocational students at the college and second- 
ary school levels. As of mid- 1986, Vietnam had "cooperative ties" 
with 15 Soviet universities. 

In 1986 the reforms initiated in 1979 remained in the trial and 
error stage, but the educational system was considerably improved. 
Illiteracy was declining, and about 2.5 million children were being 
admitted to school annually. The Vietnamese report that in 1986 
there were 3 million children enrolled in child-care centers and kin- 
dergartens, close to 12 million students in general education schools, 
and more than 300,000 students in vocational and professional 
schools and colleges. Scientific and technical cadres numbered more 
than 1 million. Nhan Dan reported in September 1986 that schools 
were shifting from literary education to literary, ethical, and voca- 
tional education, in accordance with the goals established by the 
1979 reforms. The quality of education, however, remained low. 
Material and technical support for education were far from ade- 
quate, student absenteeism and the dropout rate were high, teachers 
continued to face difficult personal economic circumstances, and 
students and teachers in general failed to embrace the socialist ideals 
and practices the regime encouraged. 

In April 1986, Reform Commission head Hoang Xuan Tuy 
related that two-thirds of preschool aged children had not yet 
enrolled in school, that elementary and junior-high-school educa- 
tion in the highlands and in the Mekong River Delta was inade- 
quate, and that instruction in general was still oriented toward 
purely academic subjects and theory divorced from practical appli- 
cation. The majority of general education students, he added, were 
preoccupied with college entrance; and vocational schools, profes- 
sional schools, and colleges had yet to restructure their curricula 
and training programs or to formulate plans for scientific research 
and experimentation. In Hoang' s assessment, such shortcomings 
were symptomatic of a very low level of financial and human 
resource investment in education that was derived from the party 
and the government's failure to recognize the importance of "the 
human factor" and the fundamental role of education in socioeco- 
nomic development. 



132 



Top photo: Village medical clinic 
Courtesy United Nations 
Bottom photo: Agronomy students in a college near Can Tho 

Courtesy United Nations 



133 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Public Health 

In 1945 Vietnam had forty-seven hospitals with a total of 3,000 
beds, and it had one physician for every 180,000 persons. The life 
expectancy of its citizens averaged thirty-four years. By 1979 there 
were 713 hospitals with 205,700 beds, in addition to more than 
10,000 maternity clinics and rural health stations; the ratio of phy- 
sicians to potential patients had increased to one per 1,000 per- 
sons, and the average life expectancy was sixty-three years. 

Information concerning the health sector in the mid-1980s, 
although fragmentary, suggested that the country's unified health 
care system had expanded and improved in both preventive and 
curative medicine. Medical personnel totaled about 240,000, includ- 
ing physicians, nurses, midwives, and other paramedics. The qual- 
ity of public health care and the level of medical technology 
remained inadequate, however, and authorities were increasingly 
concerned about such problems as nutritional deficiency, mental 
health, and old-age illnesses. Cardiovascular diseases and cancers 
were reportedly not widespread but had increased "in recent 
years." Information on AIDS was unavailable. 

The most common diseases were malaria, tuberculosis, trachoma, 
intestinal infections, leprosy, diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, 
measles, poliomyelitis, chicken pox, typhoid fever, acute encepha- 
litis, and acute meningitis. Hanoi claimed in 1970 that alcoholic 
cirrhosis and venereal diseases were "seldom found in North Viet- 
nam because of the wholesome and temperate life of the popula- 
tion and the cadres." In November 1984, however, the government 
admitted that the incidence of these diseases had increased "sig- 
nificantly" since 1976, "especially in the major cities." 

Vietnam claimed to have eliminated cholera, smallpox, and 
typhoid in the North as early as 1959 and poliomyelitis by 1961. 
Malaria, once endemic, was said to have been eradicated in many 
provinces of the North by 1965. Much progress was reported also 
in the containment of trachoma, tuberculosis, and other diseases, 
but an official assessment made public in November 1984 acknowl- 
edged that, except for smallpox, contagious and infectious diseases 
had yet to be brought under control and that the mortality rate 
associated with these diseases remained high. The high mortality 
rate associated with malaria was a matter of particular concern, 
especially in the provinces along the Vietnam-Laos border, the Cen- 
tral Highlands, the central region, and the northern border 
provinces. Tuberculosis, responsible for the death of about 1 per- 
cent of the national population, or nearly 600,000 persons annu- 
ally, remained a major problem although the rate fell from the 



134 



The Society and Its Environment 



1.7 percent reported in 1976. In 1984 as many as 92 percent of 
the people examined in many different localities were found to be 
afflicted with one or more diseases. Authorities judged from these 
results that as few as 48 to 60 percent of the people in the localities 
sampled were in good health. Gastroenteritis and such childhood 
diseases as diphtheria, and whooping cough accounted for the 
extremely high 35 percent mortality rate among children, but the 
annual death rate for the population as a whole in 1983 was 7.4 
per 1000 persons, a decline from 26 per 1000 in 1945. 

The prevalence of epidemics of bacterial, viral, and parasitic dis- 
eases was attributed to the unsanitary environment. For this rea- 
son the government introduced programs to improve hygiene 
habits. Sanitary stations emphasizing water and environmental 
purification were established in every district, and campaigns such 
as the Three Cleans movement (clean food, water, and living con- 
ditions) and the Three Exterminations movement (extermination 
of flies, mosquitoes, and rats) were instituted. In addition, offi- 
cials encouraged district residents to dig wells and construct septic 
tanks. They recommended regular vaccinations and inoculations 
against diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, poliomyelitis, tuber- 
culosis, and measles. 

Although access to health care had improved by the mid-1980s, 
the shortages of funds, of qualified physicians, and of medicines 
prevented the Hanoi government from providing quality health 
care for more than a few. Minister of Public Health Dan Hoi Xuan 
acknowledged in November 1984 that the inadequacy of the pub- 
lic health system was responsible for the proliferation of private 
health services, the black market in medicines, and the consequent 
corruption of a number of doctors and pharmacists. 

In 1987 the practice of traditional medicine remained an impor- 
tant part of the health care system. The Institute of Folk Medicine 
in Hanoi, a leading center devoted to the study of ancient theories 
and practices, utilized acupuncture and massage as an integral part 
of its treatment programs. Official sources maintained that tradi- 
tional Vietnamese medicine had given rise to new therapeutic 
methods that called for the wider application of herbal medicine 
and acupuncture. The cultivation of medicinal plants and manufac- 
ture of drugs derived from these plants reportedly helped to over- 
come the shortage of Western medicines, which had to be imported 
in large quantities every year. Some of these traditional drugs were 
described as "most effective" in curing dysentery, arthritis, gastritis, 
stomach ulcers, heart diseases, influenza, blood clotting, and high 
blood pressure. In 1985 the Vietnamese press reported that many 
cooperatives were using folk medicines to satisfy 50 to 70 percent 



135 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



of their own needs for common drugs. Earlier in 1985, however, 
an official source had disclosed that efforts to develop Vietnamese 
medical science by integrating traditional and modern methods had 
not been systematic and had achieved minimal success. 

In the mid-1980s, there were six medical and pharmacological 
colleges, one college-level institute for the training of managerial 
cadres in the health services, and more than forty secondary-level 
schools for mid-level paramedics and pharmacists. Physicians at 
"modern scientific and technical installations," according to the 
Vietnamese press, performed "sophisticated" heart, lung, kidney, 
and neurological surgery as well as microscopic eye surgery. Viet- 
namese doctors also were reported to be abreast of procedures in 
a number of other disciplines such as nuclear medicine and hema- 
tology. 

Living Conditions 

The improvement of living conditions has consistently been one 
of Hanoi's most important but most elusive goals. In the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, food, housing, medicines, and consumer goods 
were chronically scarce as agriculture and industry slowly recovered 
from the effects of prolonged wartime disruptions, corrupt and inept 
management, and the cost of the military occupation of Cambo- 
dia. Consequently, the Hanoi government was under tremendous 
pressure to address social problems such as urban unemployment, 
vocational training, homelessness, the care of orphans, war veter- 
ans, and the disabled, the control of epidemics, and the rehabili- 
tation of drug addicts and prostitutes. These problems were 
complicated by rapid population growth, which tested the limits 
of the food supply and increased the need to import grains. 

In December 1985, Vo Van Kiet, chairman of the State Plan- 
ning Commission, nevertheless reported that farmers' lives had 
generally improved and that people employed in other economic 
sectors were adequately supplied with the basic necessities. The 
standard of living remained low, however, because of acute eco- 
nomic problems that arose between 1981 and 1985, including unem- 
ployment. During the 1981-85 period, a total of about 7 million 
young people reached working age (age 18), but up to 85 percent 
remained jobless. Among the unemployed of all ages nationwide, 
80 percent were unskilled, while in Ho Chi Minh City, the figure 
rose to 95 percent. 

For most Vietnamese having to face soaring inflation and a rapid 
drop in purchasing power, austerity was an inescapable fact of life. 
In the mid-1980s no one was starving, but the average diet was 
highly deficient in protein and amounted to only 1.940 calories 



136 



The Society and Its Environment 



per day, 23 percent below the level required for manual labor. 
Moreover, as much as an estimated 80 percent of a worker's 
monthly wage was spent on food. A reader complained to a Ho 
Chi Minh City newspaper in 1986 that the monthly salary and price 
subsidies paid to an ordinary worker or civil servant were barely 
enough to support his family for part of the month. The writer also 
noted that an increasing number of workers and public officials 
had succumbed to the lure of "outside temptations" and were mis- 
using their functions and power to get rich illegally. "Because life 
is so difficult," a 1986 article in the military daily, Quan Doi Nhan 
Dan lamented, "even the most honest people must come up with 
schemes to earn a living and support the family." 

In 1986 the standard of living was unstable, and cadres, manual 
workers, civil servants, armed forces personnel, and laborers experi- 
enced serious economic difficulties in their everyday lives. In March 
1986, evidently as a stop-gap measure, the government reinstated 
rationing (discontinued since August 1985) in many parts of the 
country for such essential goods as rice, meat, sugar, and kero- 
sene. In addition, the government granted more autonomy to com- 
mercial enterprises and even encouraged the development of 
small-scale private industry. 

Although the state controlled the economy and most essential 
consumer goods, it lacked control of the free market, which 
accounted for more than 50 percent of retail trade volume (see Inter- 
nal Commerce, ch. 3). In mid-1987 the free market flourished, 
although Vo Van Kiet had reported to the National Assembly in 
December 1986 that the government planned to "create conditions 
for stabilizing the market and prices step by step." 

Meanwhile, Vo Van Kiet revealed that the new wage and allow- 
ance system put into effect in 1985 for state employees and mem- 
bers of the armed forces had failed to improve living conditions. 
Indexed to cost-of-living increases, the 1985 system had replaced 
the no-incentive egalitarianism of the past with a system that linked 
wages to productivity, quality, and efficiency of work performed. 

Through the mid-1980s, the Vietnamese bureaucracy failed to 
act quickly enough to remedy the shortage of consumer goods in 
state shops. Shortages of raw materials and energy also continued, 
forcing manufacturing enterprises to operate at 50 percent of their 
production capacity. In 1987 it was hoped that the reform-minded 
leaders selected at the Sixth National Party Congress in Decem- 
ber 1986 might begin to turn the economy around. 

* * * 



137 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Reliable and current information on Vietnamese society remains 
relatively scarce. Among the most useful sources of information 
are Indochina Chronology, a quarterly of the Institute of East Asian 
Studies, of the University of California at Berkeley, which gives 
an informative summary of events, literature, and personalities 
relating to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; and the Southeast Asia 
Report, of the Joint Publications Research Service, which contains 
translations of Vietnamese newspapers and periodicals. For a gen- 
eral understanding of the political and economic contexts in which 
Vietnamese society evolves, readers are advised to consult the 
annual summary articles on Vietnam contained in Asian Survey, Far 
Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook, and Southeast Asian Affairs. For 
official perceptions relating to various aspects of Vietnamese soci- 
ety, see Vietnam Courier, an English-language monthly of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam. 

William J. Duiker's Vietnam: Nation in Revolution offers useful, 
well-balanced overviews on various aspects of contemporary Viet- 
nam, with a brief annotated bibliography. Also useful is Nguyen 
Van Canh's Vietnam Under Communism, 1975-1982, which depicts 
life in post- 1975 Vietnam as perceived and experienced by a num- 
ber of Vietnamese expatriates. Hai Van: Life in a Vietnamese Com- 
mune by Francois Houtart and Genevieve Lemercinier provides a 
rare glimpse into the life of a Red River Delta commune in 1979; 
life in South Vietnamese rural communities in the early 1960s is 
given an excellent discussion in Gerald C. Hickey's Village in Viet- 
nam. We the Vietnamese: Voices from Viet Nam, edited by Francois Sully, 
is useful for perspectives on various social aspects of South Viet- 
nam in the 1960s. How Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City appeared 
to visiting Western journalists in 1985 is presented in Vietnam Ten 
Years After, edited by Robert Emmet Long. 

Graeme Jackson's "An Assessment of Church Life in Vietnam" 
is a balanced account of religious life; Alexander Woodside offers 
an informative analysis on education in his "The Triumphs and 
Failures of Mass Education in Vietnam." In "Vietnam 1975-1982: 
The Cruel Peace," Jacqueline Desbarats and Karl D. Jackson 
present their findings on the question of whether there were politi- 
cal executions in the years after the communist takeover in 1975. 
Ethnic minorities are the subject of scholarly treatment in Hickey's 
Sons of the Mountains and Free in the Forest; in Southeast Asian Tribes, 
Minorities, and Nations, edited by Peter Kunstadter; and in Ronald 
Provencher's Mainland Southeast Asia: An Anthropological Perspective. 
John DeFrancis's Colonialism and Language Policy in Vietnam is a schol- 
arly analysis of the evolution of the national writing system, quoc 



138 



The Society and Its Environment 

ngu; also informative is Language in Vietnamese Society: Some Articles 
by Nguyen Dinh-Hoa, edited by Patricia Nguyen Thi My-Huong. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



139 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Farmers transporting goods to market 



SINCE REUNIFICATION IN 1975, the economy of Vietnam 
has been plagued by enormous difficulties in production, imbalances 
in supply and demand, inefficiencies in distribution and circula- 
tion, soaring inflation rates, and rising debt problems. Vietnam 
is one of the few countries in modern history to experience a sharp 
economic deterioration in a postwar reconstruction period. Its 
peacetime economy is one of the poorest in the world and has shown 
a negative to very slow growth in total national output as well as 
in agricultural and industrial production. Vietnam's gross domestic 
product (GDP— see Glossary) in 1984 was valued at US$18.1 billion 
with a per capita income estimated to be between US$200 and 
US$300 per year. Reasons for this mediocre economic performance 
have included severe climatic conditions that afflicted agricultural 
crops, bureaucratic mismanagement, elimination of private owner- 
ship, extinction of entrepreneurial classes in the South, and mili- 
tary occupation of Cambodia (which resulted in a cutoff of 
much-needed international aid for reconstruction). 

In the 1980s, the country was at a crossroads between economic 
liberalization and complete government economic control. It is pos- 
sible that the leadership changes undertaken at the Sixth National 
Party Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, Viet 
Nam Cong San Dang) in December 1986 marked the beginning 
of the end of an era dominated by revolutionaries who emphasized 
security at the expense of social welfare and modernization. In 1987 
Vietnam took practical steps to resolve chronic economic problems 
such as rapid inflation, slow and erratic economic growth, deterio- 
rating living conditions, and severe trade imbalances. The new eco- 
nomic policy laid out at the Sixth National Party Congress addressed 
these issues while avoiding others such as high unemployment and 
substantial arrearage on foreign debt payments. 

At the party's Second Plenum in April 1987, a new, reform- 
oriented leadership proposed measures that would give greater scope 
to the private sector, reduce the budget deficit, and boost the out- 
put of agricultural and consumer goods in order to raise market 
supplies and exports. Specifically, the government sought to make 
prices more responsive to market forces and to allow farmers and 
industrial producers to make profits. Barriers to trade were lowered; 
the checkpoint inspection system that required goods in transit to 
be frequently inspected was abolished; and regulations on private 
inflow of money, goods, and tourists from overseas were relaxed. 



143 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



In the state-controlled industrial sector, wage raises were sched- 
uled, and overstaffmg in state administrative and service organi- 
zations was slated for reduction. Government leaders also planned 
to restructure the tax system to boost revenue and improve 
incentives. 

Earlier efforts to reform the economy had employed methods 
similar to those proposed in 1987. These previous recovery policies, 
while achieving short-term gains toward economic recovery, even- 
tually faltered because of poor implementation, lack of commit- 
ment, and decisions to industrialize and socialize the country 
regardless of cost. The 1987 effort to cure Vietnam's economic ills 
held more promise of being sustained, however. The power of the 
new reform-minded general secretary of the party, Nguyen Van 
Linh, appeared to strengthen as other reformers assumed key party 
Political Bureau positions. Moreover, Soviet pressure to improve 
economic performance increased markedly during 1987. A high 
Soviet official attending Vietnam's Sixth National Party Congress 
pointed out Vietnam's urgent need to reform and offered the Soviet 
Union's own reform efforts as a model for Vietnamese programs. 

Economic Setting 

In the 1980s, Vietnam was the world's third-largest communist 
country — ranking below China and the Soviet Union and above 
Poland — and the most densely populated. According to Vietnamese 
figures, the country's population in 1985 totaled more than 60 mil- 
lion, with an average density of 179 persons per square kilometer. 
In comparison, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), 
ranking second in population density, averaged 154 persons per 
square kilometer. Vietnam's average annual population growth rate 
was reported to be 2.5 percent (see Population, ch. 2). 

Demography 

The 1979 census showed that more than 42 percent of the popula- 
tion at that time was younger than 1 5 years of age and nearly 5 per- 
cent was 65 or older. Furthermore, 71 percent of the Vietnamese 
population was 30 years of age or younger. 

A population boom in the 1980s put pressure on food supplies 
and severely taxed the government's ability to create jobs. Har- 
vest shortfalls were frequent, grain reserves remained low, and for- 
eign exchange was extremely scarce. As a result, overcoming even 
a short-term food deficit was difficult for the government and costly 
for the people. 

In 1984 a United Nations (UN) nutrition specialist calculated 
the daily average food consumption among Vietnamese to be only 



144 



The Economy 



1,850 calories per day, nearly 20 percent less than the generally 
accepted minimum daily standard of 2,300 calories. In 1985, the 
Vietnam Institute of Nutrition reported average daily intake at 
1,940 calories. The institute also estimated that roughly 25 per- 
cent of the children suffered from malnutrition. 

Labor 

The Vietnamese labor force in mid- 1985 was estimated at 31.2 
million, having increased at the rate of 3.5 to 4 percent annually 
between 1981 and mid- 1985. A 1987 Vietnamese estimate put 
unemployment at more than 20 percent. More than half of the work 
force was committed to agriculture; however, observers estimated 
that the unemployment level in the agricultural sector was very 
low because agricultural workers were more likely to be underem- 
ployed than unemployed. In contrast, the unemployment rate in 
the nonagricultural sector may have exceeded 40 percent, mean- 
ing that more than 2 out of every 5 Vietnamese workers were job- 
less. A similar calculation for the nonagricultural sector in 1981 
yielded an estimate of 20 percent, or 1 out of 5. 

Unemployment was particularly concentrated among younger 
workers living in urban areas. According to Vietnamese govern- 
ment statistics, of the 7 million persons who entered the work force 
between 1981 and 1985, about 33 percent lived in urban areas, 
and only 15 to 20 percent reportedly had found jobs. The actual 
ratio of jobs to unemployed people may not have been as grim as 
statistics indicate, however. According to some observers, the high 
rate of inflation during the period forced many people, especially 
state workers, to take a second job in order to make ends meet. 

Vietnam's economic prospects for the late 1980s and early 1990s 
depended on resolving population and labor problems. Govern- 
ment population projections in 1987 showed that the gender 
imbalance, with females more numerous, probably would persist 
through the end of the century. National security concerns were 
unlikely to diminish, and the armed forces were expected to con- 
tinue their high demand for males of service age. A similar demand 
also was expected to continue in the sectors and occupations in which 
males were employed during the 1980s: agriculture, fishing, mining, 
metallurgy, machine building, construction, and transportation. 
Female workers probably would remain concentrated in subsistence 
agriculture, light industry, and, perhaps, forestry. Education, train- 
ing programs, and the wage structure were expected to continue 
to favor males and male-dominated occupations, while the absence 
of these incentives would cause productivity gains in female- 
intensive industries to remain low. 



145 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Economic recovery policies that emphasized austerity and post- 
poned industrialization were unlikely to create sufficient new 
employment opportunities. In the short run, the government's dis- 
charge of surplus state employees during the mid-1980s in order 
to curb expenditures would tend to increase unemployment. The 
stress on boosting production in light industry was expected even- 
tually to reduce unemployment, but only if expansion were sup- 
ported with state investment and bank credit. The coincident 
removal of restraints on the labor-intensive informal economy, 
which was uncontrolled by the state, and the likely influx of labor 
into this sector could then be expected to expand the informal econ- 
omy relative to the official economy. 

Natural Resources 

Although Vietnam is relatively rich in natural resources, the 
country's protracted state of war has precluded their proper exploi- 
tation. Coal reserves, located mainly in the North, have been esti- 
mated at 20 billion tons. With Soviet assistance, coal mining has 
been expanded somewhat. Commercially exploitable metals and 
minerals include iron ore, tin, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, manga- 
nese, titanium, chromite, tungsten, bauxite, apatite, graphite, mica, 
silica sand, and limestone. Vietnam is deficient, however, in coking 
coal, which, prior to the outbreak of hostilities with China in 1979, 
it traditionally imported from the Chinese. Gold deposits are small. 

Vietnam's production of crude oil and natural gas was in very 
preliminary stages in the late 1980s and the amounts of commer- 
cially recoverable reserves were not available to Western analysts. 
With the cooperation of the Soviet Union, Vietnam began exploi- 
tation of a reported 1 -billion-ton offshore oil find southeast of the 
Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone (see fig. 1). By early 1987, the 
Vietnamese were exporting crude oil for the first time in shipments 
to Japan. Production remained low, estimated at about 5,000 barrels 
per day, although Vietnam's minimum domestic oil requirements 
totaled 30,000 barrels per day. Despite optimistic plans for develop- 
ing offshore fields, Vietnam was likely to remain dependent on 
Soviet-supplied petroleum products through the 1990s. 

Vietnam's ability to exploit its resources diminished in the early 
1980s, as production fell from the levels attained between 1976 and 
1980. In the 1980s, the need to regulate investment and focus spend- 
ing on projects with a short-term payoff pointed to continued slow 
development of the country's resource base, with the exception of 
areas targeted by the Soviet Union for economic assistance, such 
as oil, gas, coal, tin, and apatite. 



146 



The Economy 



Vietnam's fisheries are modest, even though the country's 
lengthy coast provides it with a disproportionately large offshore 
economic zone for its size. In the 1980s, Vietnam claimed a 
1 -million-square- kilometer offshore economic zone and an annual 
catch of 1.3 to 1.4 million tons. More than half the fish caught, 
however, were classified as being of low-quality. Schools of fish 
reportedly were small and widely dispersed. 

As the 1990s approached, it seemed increasingly likely that Viet- 
nam's economy would remain predominantly agricultural. This 
trend, however, did not necessarily limit attainable economic growth 
since Vietnam processed a significant amount of unused land with 
agricultural potential. According to Vietnamese statistics of the mid 
1980s, agricultural land then in use theoretically could be expanded 
by more than 50 percent to occupy nearly one-third of the nation. 
Funds and equipment for expensive land-reclamation projects were 
scarce, however, and foreign economists believed that a projected 
increase in agricultural land use of about 20 to 25 percent was more 
realistic. Even if the reclaimed land were only minimally produc- 
tive, an increase in land use would increase agricultural output 
substantially. 

Both the availability of land and the density of settlement in tradi- 
tional agricultural areas — about 463 persons per square kilometer 
in the Red River Delta and 366 persons per square kilometer in 
the Mekong Delta — explained much of the government's commit- 
ment to the building of new economic zones (see Glossary) in less- 
settled areas. During the period from 1976 to 1980, only 1.5 mil- 
lion out of the 4 million persons targeted for relocation actually 
were moved to new economic zones. The government's Third Five- 
Year Plan (1981-85) called for the relocation of 2 million people 
by 1985, and subsequent plans projected the resettlement of as many 
as 10 million by 1999. By the end of 1986, however, the Vietnamese 
reported that fewer than 3 million people had been resettled since 
the program began. Slow progress in bringing new land into produc- 
tion, low yields on reclaimed land, and hardships endured by reset- 
tled workers — particularly former city dwellers, many of whom 
chose to return home — testified to the problems inherent in the reset- 
tlement program. 

Historical Background 

Post- 1975 developments, including the establishment of new eco- 
nomic zones, did not eradicate distinctions between North and 
South. North, South, and Central Vietnam historically were divided 
by ethnolinguistic differences, but until the mid-nineteenth century 
and the beginning of the French colonial period, they were all 



147 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

agrarian, subsistence, and village-oriented societies (see Early His- 
tory, ch. 1). The French, who needed raw materials and a market 
for French manufactured goods, altered these commonalities by 
undertaking a plan to develop the northern and southern regions 
separately. The South, better suited for agriculture and relatively 
poor in industrial resources, was designated to be developed agricul- 
turally; the North, naturally wealthy in mineral resources, was 
selected as the region in which industrial development was to be 
concentrated. 

The separation distorted the basic Vietnamese economy by overly 
stressing regional economic differences. In the North, while irrigated 
rice remained the principal subsistence crop, the French introduced 
plantation agriculture with products such as coffee, tea, cotton, and 
tobacco. The colonial government also developed some extractive 
industries, such as the mining of coal, iron, and nonferrous metals. 
A shipbuilding industry was begun in Hanoi; and railroads, roads, 
power stations, and hydraulics works were constructed. In the 
South, agricultural development concentrated on rice cultivation, 
and, nationally, rice and rubber were the main items of export. 
Domestic and foreign trade were centered around the Saigon- 
Cholon area. Industry in the South consisted mostly of food- 
processing plants and factories producing consumer goods. 

The development of exports — coal from the North, rice from the 
South — and the importation of French manufactured goods, 
however, stimulated internal commerce. A pattern of trade devel- 
oped whereby rice from the South was exchanged for coal and 
manufactured goods from the North. When the North and South 
were divided politically in 1954, they also adopted different eco- 
nomic ideologies, one communist and one capitalist. In the North, 
the communist regime's First Five-Year Plan (1961-65) gave 
priority to heavy industry, but priority subsequently shifted to 
agriculture and light industry. 

During the 1954-75 Second Indochina War (see Glossary), 
United States air strikes in the North, beginning in early 1965, 
slowed large-scale construction considerably as laborers were 
diverted to repairing bomb damage. By the end of 1966, serious 
strains developed in the North's economy as a result of war condi- 
tions. Interruptions in electric power, the destruction of petroleum 
storage facilities, and labor shortages led to a slowdown in indus- 
trial and agricultural activity. The disruption of transportation 
routes by U.S. bombing further slowed distribution of raw materials 
and consumer goods. In the North, all 6 industrial cities, 28 out 
of 30 provincial towns, 96 out of 1 16 district towns, and 4,000 out 
of 5,788 communes were either severely damaged or destroyed. 



148 



The Economy 



All power stations, 1,600 hydraulics works, 6 railway lines, all roads, 
bridges, and sea and inland ports were seriously damaged or 
destroyed. In addition, 400,000 cattle were killed, and several 
hundred thousand hectares of farmland were damaged. 

The economy in the South between 1954 and 1975 became 
increasingly dependent on foreign aid. The United States, the fore- 
most donor, financed the development of the military and the con- 
struction of roads, bridges, airfields and ports; supported the 
currency; and met the large deficit in the balance of payments. 
Destruction attributed to the Second Indochina War was consider- 
able. Hanoi claimed that in the South, 9,000 out of 15,000 hamlets 
were damaged or destroyed, 10 million hectares of farmland and 
5 million hectares of forest lands were devastated, and 1.5 million 
cattle were killed. 

For Vietnam as a whole, the war resulted in some 1.5 million 
military and civilian deaths, 362,000 invalids, 1 million widows, 
and 800,000 orphans. The country sustained a further loss in human 
capital through the exodus of refugees from Vietnam after the com- 
munist victory in the South. According to the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees, as of October 1982 approximately 1 mil- 
lion people had fled Vietnam. Among them were tens of thousands 
of professionals, intellectuals, technicians, and skilled workers. 

Economic Roles of the Party and the Government 

The Vietnamese economy is shaped primarily by the VCP 
through the plenary sessions of the Central Committee and national 
congresses. The party plays a leading role in establishing the foun- 
dations and principles of communism, mapping strategies for eco- 
nomic development, setting growth targets, and launching reforms. 

Planning is a key characteristic of centralized, communist econo- 
mies, and one plan established for the entire country normally con- 
tains detailed economic development guidelines for all its regions. 
According to Vietnamese economist Vo Nhan Tri, Vietnam's post- 
reunification economy was in a "period of transition to socialism." 
The process was described as consisting of three phases. The first 
phase, from 1976 through 1980, incorporated the Second Five-Year 
Plan (1976-80)— the First Five-Year Plan (1960-65) applied to 
North Vietnam only. The second phase, called "socialist indus- 
trialization," was divided into two stages: from 1981 through 1990 
and from 1991 through 2005. The third phase, covering the years 
2006 through 2010, was to be time allotted to "perfect" the tran- 
sition. 

The party's goal was to unify the economic system of the entire 
country under communism. Steps were taken to implement this 



149 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



goal at the long-delayed Fourth National Party Congress, convened 
in December 1976, when the party adopted the Second Five- Year 
Plan and defined both its "line of socialist revolution" and its "line 
of building a socialist economy." The next two congresses, held 
in March 1982 and December 1986, respectively, reiterated this 
long-term communist objective and approved the five-year plans 
designed to guide the development of the Vietnamese economy at 
each specific stage of the communist revolution. 

The Second Five-Year Plan (1976-80) 

The optimism and impatience of Vietnam's leaders were evi- 
dent in the Second Five-Year Plan. The plan set extraordinarily 
high goals for the average annual growth rates for industry (16 to 
18 percent), agriculture (8 to 10 percent), and national income 
(13 to 14 percent). It also gave priority to reconstruction and new 
construction while attempting to develop agricultural resources, 
to integrate the North and the South, and to proceed with com- 
munization. 

Twenty years were allowed to construct the material and tech- 
nical bases of communism. In the South, material construction and 
systemic transformation were to be combined in order to hasten 
economic integration with the North. It was considered critical for 
the VCP to improve and extend its involvement in economic affairs 
so that it could guide this process. Development plans were to focus 
equally on agriculture and industry, while initial investment was 
to favor projects that developed both sectors of the economy. Thus, 
for example, heavy industry was intended to serve agriculture on 
the premise that a rapid increase in agricultural production would 
in turn fund further industrial growth. With this strategy, Viet- 
namese leaders claimed that the country could bypass the capitalist 
industrialization stage necessary to prepare for communism (see 
table 4, Appendix A). 

Vietnam was incapable, however, of undertaking such an ambi- 
tious program on its own and solicited financial support for its 
Second Five-Year Plan from Western nations, international organi- 
zations, and communist allies. Although the amount of economic 
aid requested is not known, some idea of the assistance level 
envisioned by Hanoi can be obtained from available financial data. 
The Vietnamese government budget for 1976 amounted to US$2.5 
billion, while investments amounting to US$7.5 billion were 
planned for the period between 1976 and 1980. 

The economic aid tendered to Hanoi was substantial, but it still 
fell short of requirements. The Soviet Union, China, and Eastern 
Europe offered assistance that was probably worth US$3 billion 



150 



The Economy 



to US$4 billion, and countries of the Western economic commu- 
nity pledged roughly US$1 billion to US$1.5 billion. 

The Third Five-Year Plan (1981-85) 

By 1979 it was clear that the Second Five-Year Plan had failed 
to reduce the serious problems facing the newly unified economy. 
Vietnam's economy remained dominated by small-scale produc- 
tion, low labor productivity, unemployment, material and tech- 
nological shortfalls, and insufficient food and consumer goods. 

To address these problems, at its Fifth National Party Congress 
held in March 1982, the VCP approved resolutions on "orienta- 
tions, tasks and objectives of economic and social development for 
1981-85 and the 1980s." The resolutions established economic goals 
and in effect constituted Vietnam's Third Five-Year Plan (1981-85). 
Because of the failure of the Second Five-Year Plan, however, the 
Vietnamese leadership proceeded cautiously, presenting the plan 
one year at a time. The plan as a whole was neither drawn up in 
final form nor presented to the National Assembly (see Glossary) 
for adoption. 

The economic policies set forth in 1982 resulted from a com- 
promise between ideological and pragmatic elements within the 
party leadership. The question of whether or not to preserve private 
capitalist activities in the South was addressed, as was the issue 
of the pace of the South 's communist transformation. The policies 
arrived at called for the temporary retention of private capitalist 
activities in order to spur economic growth and the completion, 
more or less, of a communist transformation in the South by the 
mid-1980s. 

The plan's highest priority, however, was to develop agricul- 
ture by integrating the collective and individual sectors into an over- 
all system emphasizing intensive cultivation and crop specialization 
and by employing science and technology. Economic policy encour- 
aged the development of the "family economy"; that is, the peas- 
ants' personal use of economic resources, including land, not being 
used by the cooperative. Through use of an end-product contract 
system introduced by the plan, peasant households were permitted 
to sign contracts with the collective to farm land owned by the col- 
lective. The households then assumed responsibility for produc- 
tion on the plots. If production fell short of assigned quotas, the 
households were to be required to make up the deficit the follow- 
ing year. If a surplus was produced, the households were to be 
allowed to keep it, sell it on the free market, or sell it to the state 
for a "negotiated price." In 1983 the family economy reportedly 



151 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

supplied 50 to 60 percent of the peasants' total income and 30 to 
50 percent of their foodstuffs. 

Free enterprise was sanctioned, thus bringing to an end the 
nationalization of small enterprises and reversing former policies 
that had sought the complete and immediate communization of 
the South. The new policy especially benefited peasants (includ- 
ing the overwhelming majority of peasants in the South) who had 
refused to join cooperatives, small producers, small traders, and 
family businesses. 

The effort to reduce the capitalist sector in the South neverthe- 
less continued. Late in 1983, a number of import-export firms that 
had been created in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) to spur 
the development of the export market were integrated into a single 
enterprise regulated by the state. At the same time, the pace of 
collectivization in the countryside was accelerated under the plan. 
By the end of 1985, Hanoi reported that 72 percent of the total 
number of peasant households in the South were enrolled in some 
form of cooperative organization. 

Despite the plan's emphasis on agricultural development, the 
industrial sector received a larger share of state investment during 
the first two years. In 1982, for example, the approximate propor- 
tion was 53 percent for industry compared with 18 percent for 
agriculture. Limiting state investment in agriculture, however, did 
not appear to affect total food production, which increased 19.5 per- 
cent from 1980 to 1984. 

The plan also stressed the development of small-scale industry 
to meet Vietnam's material needs, create goods for export, and 
lay the foundation for the development of heavy industry. In the 
South, this entailed transforming some private enterprises into 
"state-private joint enterprises" and reorganizing some small-scale 
industries into cooperatives. In other cases, however, individual 
ownership was maintained. Investment in light industry actually 
decreased by 48 percent while investment in heavy industry 
increased by 17 percent during the first two years of the plan. 
Nonetheless, the increase in light-industry production outpaced that 
of heavy industry by 33 percent to 28 percent during the same two- 
year period. 

The July 1984 Sixth Plenum (Fifth Congress) of the VCP Cen- 
tral Committee recognized that private sector domination of whole- 
sale and retail trade in the South could not be eliminated until the 
state was capable of assuming responsibility for trade. Proposals 
therefore were made to decentralize planning procedures and 
improve the managerial skills of government and party officials. 



152 



The Economy 



These plans were subsequently advanced at the Central Com- 
mittee's Eighth Plenum (Fifth Congress) in June 1985. Acting to 
disperse economic decision making, the plenum resolved to grant 
production autonomy at the factory and individual farm levels. The 
plenum also sought to reduce government expenditures by ending 
state subsidies on food and certain consumer goods for state 
employees. It further determined that all relevant costs to the 
national government needed to be accounted for in determining 
production costs and that the state should cease compensating for 
losses incurred by state enterprises. To implement these resolu- 
tions, monetary organizations were required to shift to modern eco- 
nomic accounting. The government created a new dong (D — for 
the value of the dong, see Glossary) in September 1985, and set 
maximum quotas for the amount permitted to be exchanged in bank 
notes. The dong also was officially devalued. 

The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1986-90) 

The central economic objectives of the Fourth Five- Year Plan 
were to increase production of food, consumer goods, and export 
goods. Increasing food production was of primary importance. 
Grain production was targeted to reach 22 to 23 million tons 
annually by 1990, and rice production was planned to total 19 to 
20 million tons annually. Combined output for subsidiary crops 
was established at about 3 million tons annually. Planned annual 
per capita food production was set at 333 to 348 kilograms, and 
an effort was initiated to bring subsidiary food crops (corn, sweet 
potatoes, manioc, and white potatoes) into the people's diet. 

Grain-production policy was accompanied by measures dealing 
with land use, water conservation, Mekong Delta irrigation works, 
Red River Delta dike consolidation, fertilizer imports, pest con- 
trol, animal husbandry, tractor use, and seed production. The plan 
also stressed the cultivation and harvesting of marine products and 
the development of short-term industrial crops (crops that can be 
planted and harvested in a single growing season and that require 
some form of processing before being marketed, such as beans, 
peanuts, and oil-bearing crops) and long-term industrial crops 
(crops that also include a processing stage but that require a lengthy 
period of cultivation, such as coffee, tea, pepper, and coconuts). 
The government also identified forestry as an important sector of 
the economy to be developed. 

Production of consumer goods was improved in order to meet 
the basic needs of the people, to balance goods and money, to create 
jobs, and to develop an important source of capital accumulation 
and export commodities. The volume of consumer goods produced 



153 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

was expected to increase by an average annual rate of 13 to 15 per- 
cent, compared with the 11.3 percent average annual increase 
recorded during the Third Five-Year Plan. 

Adequate incentive policies for raw materials production were 
deemed critical to the development of high-quality consumer goods 
for internal consumption and export. Priority in using foreign 
exchange was to be given to importers of needed raw materials. 
The plan also sought to protect domestic production of consumer 
goods and to emphasize local production of goods over imports. 

In order to obtain the foreign exchange needed to fulfill import 
requirements and to carry out trade agreements with other coun- 
tries, the government scheduled a major increase — 70 percent above 
the previous plan's target — in the volume of exports. Under the 
Fourth Five-Year Plan, particular emphasis was to be given prin- 
cipal products such as processed agricultural goods, light indus- 
try, handicraft goods, and fish products (see table 5 and table 6, 
Appendix A). 

Agriculture 

Agricultural production, the backbone of Vietnam's development 
strategy, varied considerably from year to year following national 
reunification in 1975. A particularly strong performance in agricul- 
ture was recorded in 1976 — up more than 10 percent from 
1975 — but production dropped back to approximately 95 percent 
of the 1976 level in 1977 and 1978 and recovered to a level higher 
than that of 1976 only in 1979 (see table 6 and table 7, Appendix A). 

Vietnamese crop and livestock production offset agricultural per- 
formance during this period. For example, an 8-percent increase 
in the value of livestock production in 1977 balanced an 8-percent 
decrease in the value of crop production (mainly the result of a 
1 -million-ton decline in the rice harvest). In 1978 the reverse 
occurred: a steep decline in livestock output countered a significant 
increase in grain production. The value of crop production, 
however, averaged four times the value of livestock output at this 
time. 

Foremost among Vietnam's agricultural troubles was exception- 
ally adverse weather, including a drought in 1977 and major 
typhoons and widespread flooding in 1978. The drought overtaxed 
Vietnam's modest irrigation systems, and the floods damaged them. 
In addition, the floods reportedly reduced cattle herds by 20 per- 
cent. The size of this loss was indirectly confirmed in Vietnamese 
statistics that showed a leveling off of growth in livestock invento- 
ries (particularly of cattle) between 1978 and 1980. Throughout 
the Second Five-Year Plan, and especially in the late 1970s, 



154 



The Economy 



chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and spare parts for mechanical equip- 
ment were in short supply. 

Despite their having occurred, for the most part, fairly early in 
the plan period, the severe reversals in the agricultural sector greatly 
diminished hopes of achieving self-sufficiency in food production 
by 1980. The 1980 grain target eventually was lowered from 21 mil- 
lion tons to 15 million tons, but even that amount proved unat- 
tainable. 

The agricultural policies promulgated from 1976 through 1980 
had mixed results. Pragmatic measures that encouraged the planting 
of more subsidiary food crops (such as sweet potatoes, manioc, 
beans, and corn) led to an increase of these crops from a level of 
less than 10 percent that of grain production in 1975 to a level that 
was more than 20 percent of grain output by the late 1970s. 
Improved incentives for farmers in 1978 and 1979 included efforts 
to boost availability of consumer goods in the countryside and to 
raise state procurement prices. They were reinforced by adoption 
of a contract system that sought to guarantee producers access to 
agricultural inputs in exchange for farm products. Even so, 
bureaucratic inefficiencies and shortages of agricultural supplies 
prevented complete success. 

The program undertaken in mid- 197 7 to expedite unification 
of North and South by collectivizing Southern agriculture met with 
strong resistance. The reportedly voluntary program was designed 
to be implemented by local leaders, but Southern peasants were 
mainly freeholders — not tenants — and, aside from forming produc- 
tion teams for mutual assistance (an idea that won immediate 
acceptance), they resisted participation in any collective program 
that attenuated property rights. 

Failure to collectivize agriculture by voluntary means led briefly 
to the adoption of coercive measures to increase peasant partici- 
pation. It soon became apparent, however, that such harsh methods 
were counterproductive. Increased food shortages and heightened 
security concerns in late 1978 and 1979 caused the leadership once 
again to relax its grip on Southern agriculture. 

In the North, formation of cooperatives had begun in 1959 and 
1960, and by 1965 about 90 percent of peasant households were 
organized into collectives. By 1975 more than 96 percent of peasant 
households belonging to cooperatives were classified as members 
of "high-level cooperatives," which meant that farmers had con- 
tributed land, tools, animals, and labor in exchange for income. 

Between 1976 and 1980, agricultural policy in the North was 
implemented by newly established government district offices in 
an effort to improve central control over planting decisions and 



155 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

farm work. The lax enforcement of state agricultural policies 
adopted during the war years gave way to a greater rigidity that 
diminished cooperative members' flexibility to undertake differ- 
ent tasks. Labor productivity fell as a result. A study by an over- 
seas Vietnamese who surveyed ten rice-growing cooperatives found 
that, despite an increase in labor and area cultivated in 1975, 1976, 
and 1977, production decreased while costs increased when com- 
pared with production and costs for 1972 through 1974. Although 
the study failed to take weather and other variables into account, 
the findings were consistent with conclusions reached by investi- 
gators who have studied the effects of collectivization in other coun- 
tries. Moreover, the study drew attention to the North's poor 
agricultural performance as a reason for Vietnam's persistent food 
problem. 

State investment in agriculture under the Third Five-Year Plan 
remained low, and the sector was severely troubled throughout the 
plan period and into 1986 and 1987 as well. Only modest food- 
grain increases of 5 percent were generated annually. Although 
this was enough to outpace the 2.3 percent annual rate of popula- 
tion growth during the 1980s, it remained insufficient to raise aver- 
age annual per capita food consumption much above the official 
subsistence level of 300 kilograms. One official Vietnamese source 
estimated in 1986 that farm families devoted up to 80 percent of 
their income to their own food needs. 

At the conclusion of the Third Five-Year Plan, agricultural yields 
remained less than required to permit diverting resources to the 
support of industrial development. In 1986 agriculture still 
accounted for about 44 percent of national income (the figure for 
developed nations is closer to 10 percent). The agricultural sector 
also occupied some 66 percent of the work force — a higher percent- 
age than in 1976 and 1980. Worse still, the output per agricultural 
worker had slipped during the plan period, falling even further 
behind the increasing output per worker in industry. In 1980 more 
than three agricultural workers were needed to produce as much 
national income as a single industrial or construction worker. By 
1985 an industrial worker produced more than six times as much 
as an agricultural worker. 

In December 1986, Vo Van Kiet, vice chairman of the Council 
of Ministers and member of the Political Bureau, highlighted most 
of the major problems of Vietnamese agriculture in his speech to 
the Twelfth Session of the Seventh National Assembly. While men- 
tioning gains in fisheries and forestry, he noted that nearly all farm- 
ing subsectors — constituting 80 percent of the agricultural sector — 
had failed to achieve plan targets for 1986. Kiet blamed state 



156 



Rice paddy dike construction 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



agencies, such as the Council of Ministers, the State Planning Com- 
mission, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, for their failure to 
ensure appropriate ''material conditions" (chiefly sufficient quan- 
tities of chemical fertilizers and pesticides) for the growth of agricul- 
tural production. Kiet also blamed the state price system for 
underproduction of key "industrial crops" that Vietnam exported, 
including jute, sugar, groundnut, coffee, tea, and rubber. Produc- 
tion levels of subsidiary food crops, such as sweet potatoes, corn, 
and manioc, had been declining for several years, both in relation 
to plan targets and in actual output as well. By contrast, livestock- 
output, including that of cattle, poultry, buffalo, and hogs, was 
reported by the government to have continued its growth and to 
have met or exceeded targets, despite unstable prices and short- 
ages of state-provided animal feed. 

Outside observers agreed that the problems noted in Kiet's speech 
had been exacerbated by the complexity of the pricing system, which 
included multiple tiers of fixed prices for quota and above-quota 
state purchases as well as generally higher free market prices. The 
removal of more orthodox leaders, the rise of moderate reformists 
such as Kiet to high party and government positions during the 
Sixth National Party Congress, and the cabinet changes in early 
1987 seemed to indicate that the pricing system would be modi- 
fied, although no change was evident in the fundamental structure 



157 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

of state-controlled markets or in the tension within the multiple- 
market system (see Internal Commerce, this ch.). 

Industry 

The pattern of Vietnamese industrial growth after reunification 
was initially the reverse of the record in agriculture; it showed recov- 
ery from a depressed base in the early postwar years. Recovery 
stopped in the late 1970s, however, when the war in Cambodia 
and the threat from China caused the government to redirect food, 
finance, and other resources to the military, a move that worsened 
shortages and intensified old bottlenecks. At the same time, the 
invasion of Cambodia cost Vietnam badly needed foreign economic 
support. China's attack on Vietnam in 1979 compounded indus- 
trial problems by badly damaging important industrial facilities 
in the North, particularly a major steel plant and an apatite mine 
(see The Armed Forces, ch. 5). 

National leadership objectives during the immediate postwar 
period included consolidating factories and workshops in the North 
that had been scattered and hidden during the war to improve their 
chances of survival and nationalizing banks and major factories 
in the South to bring the financial and industrial sectors under state 
control. The government's continued use of wartime planning 
mechanisms that emphasized output targets and paid little heed 
to production or long term costs caused profits to erode, however, 
and increased the government's financial burdens. Economic 
reforms undertaken in 1977 gave factory management some inde- 
pendence in formulating production plans, arranging production 
resources, and containing production expenses. Such additional 
pragmatic steps as the adoption of incentive-structured wages and 
the realignment of prices better to reflect costs were also considered. 

This first experiment with reform was relatively short-lived, partly 
because it ran counter to the overriding policy of socializing the 
South and integrating it with the North by reducing the central- 
ized administrative control obviously needed to do the job. Some 
reform measures stayed on the books, however, and were revived 
in the 1980s. 

Vietnamese statistics indicate that the gross value of industrial 
output in 1980 was not much higher than in 1976 and that the value 
of output per capita declined more than 8 percent. For example, 
cement production was relatively stagnant; it averaged 1.7 million 
tons annually during the Second Five-Year Plan, but only 1 .4 mil- 
lion tons in 1985. 

In general, fuel production increased at more than 10 percent 
annually. Coal output grew from 5.2 million tons in 1975 to 



158 



United States armored cars 
converted into bulldozers, 1977 
Production of small tractors 



159 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

6 million tons in 1978 and fell to 5.3 million tons in 1980. According 
to official figures, 1985 coal production remained at, or somewhat 
below, the 1981 level of 6 million tons (see table 8, Appendix A). 
Coal accounted for about two-thirds of energy consumption in the 
1980s. Coal mining remained handicapped by coordination and 
management problems at mining sites, incomplete rail connections 
to mines, equipment and materials shortages, and inadequate food 
and consumer goods for miners. 

Some light industry and handicrafts sectors mirrored the difficul- 
ties experienced in agriculture because they used agricultural raw 
materials. By 1980 the Vietnamese press was reporting that many 
grain, food-product, and consumer-goods processing enterprises 
had reduced production or ceased operations entirely. Although 
detailed statistics on sector performance were insufficient to show 
annual results, the total value of light industry output peaked in 
1978; by 1980 it was nearly 3 percent lower than it had been in 
1976. Increasingly severe shortages of food (particularly grain and 
fish) and industrial consumer goods lessened workers' incentives. 

Total industrial production during the Third Five-Year Plan 
reflected high levels of investment, averaging some 40 percent of 
total annual investment during the plan period. In 1985 the 
industrial sector accounted for some 32 percent of national income, 
up from approximately 20 percent in 1980. 

From 1981 through 1985, industrial growth was unevenly dis- 
tributed and in many instances simply restored production levels 
to their 1976 levels. The highest production growth rates were 
recorded in the manufacture of paper products (32 percent per year), 
and food processing (42 percent per year). Both sectors had declined 
in production during the Second Five-Year Plan. Production of 
processed sugar increased from 271,000 tons in 1981 to 434,000 
tons in 1985, almost ten times the 1975 production level. The pro- 
cessing of ocean fish increased from 385,000 tons in 1980 to 550,000 
tons in 1985, not quite reaching 1976 and 1977 levels, but clearly 
reversing the steady decline this sector had experienced in the late 
1970s. (The decline had been generated in part by the use of fish- 
ing boats in the South as escape craft to flee the communist regime.) 
Other light industries grew at annual rates of 10 percent or more 
during the early 1980s, which essentially restored production to 
1975 or 1976 levels. Brick production increased steadily to 3.7 bil- 
lion bricks in 1985, after regular declines during the previous plan. 
Production of glass reached 41,000 tons in 1985, exceeding 1975 
levels for the first time. Paper production in 1985 again reached 
the 1976 level of 75,000 tons, up from 42,000 tons at the begin- 
ning of the plan in 1981; and the textile subsector exhibited an 



160 



The Economy 



8 percent average annual growth rate during the plan period as 
cloth production more than doubled to 380 million square meters 
in 1985. 

Among heavy industries, machine-building and chemical indus- 
tries (including rubber) registered annual average production gains 
of approximately 25 percent. Chemical fertilizer production con- 
tinued to exceed the 1975 level and, in 1985, reached 516,000 tons 
despite relatively underdeveloped mining and enrichment processes 
for apatite and pyrite ore and underutilization of the Lam Thao 
Superphosphate of Lime plant (Vinh Phu Province). Pesticide 
production also maintained a decade-long growth trend to reach 
11.74 billion tons in 1985. 

Fragmentary figures for iron and chromium ore production were 
discouraging and suggested a continuation of the decline from 1975 
levels. Ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgical production actually 
declined overall, reflecting exhausted and obsolescent plants, low 
investment rates, and probably dwindling supplies of scrap left from 
the end of the Second Indochina War. Modest gains were reported 
annually in steel production, which reached 57,000 tons in 1985. 

Electric power production, although handicapped by uncom- 
pleted projects and shortages of oil and spare parts, grew at an aver- 
age of 8 percent per year. Vietnamese statistics on the annual output 
of primary products showed that production of electricity increased 
by almost 60 percent to nearly 3.8 billion kilowatt hours from 1976 
through 1978, then declined to around 3.7 billion kilowatt hours 
in 1980. By 1985, however, production of electricity had increased 
to 5.4 billion kilowatt hours. Energy-producing industries gener- 
ally remained stagnant, however, which caused tremendous difficul- 
ties for the other sectors of the economy. Power output grew very 
slowly, and power shortages forced many factories to operate at 
only 45 to 50 percent of capacity. The government planned that 
in the 1980s energy production would be tripled by the comple- 
tion of three big Soviet-assisted projects: the 500-megawatt thermal 
plant at Pha Lai, Hai Hung Province; the 300-megawatt hydro- 
electric plant at Tri An, Dong Nai Province, and the giant, 
1 ,900-megawatt hydroelectric plant at Hoa Binh, Ha Son Binh 
Province, which has been called the "Asian Aswan Dam." 

Internal Commerce 

The control and regulation of markets was one of the most sen- 
sitive and persistent problems faced by the government following 
the beginning of North-South integration in 1975. The government, 
in its doctrinaire efforts to communize the commercial, market- 
oriented Southern economy, faced several paradoxes. The first was 



161 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

the need both to cultivate and to control commercial activity by 
ethnic Chinese in the South, especially in Ho Chi Minh City. 
Chinese businesses controlled much of the commerce in Ho Chi 
Minh City and the South generally. Following the break with China 
in 1978, some Vietnamese leaders evidently feared the potential 
for espionage activities within the Chinese commercial community. 
On the one hand, Chinese-owned concerns controlled trade in a 
number of commodities and services, such as pharmaceuticals, fer- 
tilizer distribution, grain milling, and foreign-currency exchange, 
that were supposed to be state monopolies. On the other hand, 
Chinese merchants provided excellent access to markets for Viet- 
namese exports through Hong Kong and Singapore. This access 
became increasingly important in the 1980s as a way of circum- 
venting the boycott on trade with Vietnam imposed by a number 
of Asian and Western Nations. 

The second paradox lay in the role markets played in economic 
planning. State plans depended upon complex and interrelated flows 
of industrial and agricultural commodities, mediated by state mar- 
kets at fixed prices. For example, predetermined amounts of food 
had to be produced and made available to coal miners, who were 
required to increase production of fuel for thermal power plants, 
which would in turn supply energy to fertilizer factories and machine 
shops. Production of fertilizer and small machines — for example, 
irrigation pumps and insecticide sprayers — would close the circle 
by providing planned levels of inputs necessary to increase agricul- 
tural production. Production campaigns under the guise of encour- 
aging volunteerism — heroic efforts for the development of the 
fatherland — were to be used to keep production at quota levels at 
every part of the cycle. By the late 1970s, however, this plan had 
failed conspicuously. Although inhibited by controls and the exodus 
of numerous Chinese in the late 1970s, the private market remained 
active (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). Enterprises work- 
ing under the Second Five-Year Plan found themselves compet- 
ing for needed inputs in the private sector. Prices in the free market 
were usually well above those set by the plan, but private markets 
often were the only source for needed goods. Bottlenecks and short- 
ages persisted, aggravated by the tendency of low-level managers 
to stockpile above-quota production against future levies or simply 
to sell production on the private market. Repeated failures to 
improve harvests caused food shortages to approach crisis propor- 
tions and forced the government to back away from its attempt 
to mold the South into the North's economic image. After 1978 
the government moderated its crackdown on private commerce in 
the South to allow some commercial activity, including reinvestment 



162 



The Economy 



of private profits. By 1979 the share of state-owned commerce in 
Ho Chi Minh City had declined to 27 percent, compared with 
54 percent for the country as a whole. 

A major problem for the leadership was the structure of the econ- 
omy in the South. Nationalization had little effect on the small- 
scale manufacturing that characterized much of production. 
Moreover, commerce was a principal occupation in the major cities. 
While state stores were established as part of a new government- 
controlled distribution network, private vendors were able to com- 
pete effectively with them by offering to pay more to suppliers and 
by providing customers with better and otherwise unobtainable 
goods in exchange for higher prices. Hanoi's orthodox communist 
leaders viewed this activity in a time of shortage as speculation, 
hoarding, and monopolization of the market. 

At roughly the same time that the government intensified the 
collectivization drive, it launched a campaign in the South to trans- 
form commerce into a largely public-sector activity. Private shops 
were closed, merchandise was redirected to state channels, and mer- 
chants were shifted to production work. At the peak of the trans- 
formation drive in 1978, state-sponsored commerce in Ho Chi Minh 
City reportedly accounted for 40 percent of retail sales. The govern- 
ment's crackdown on private traders initiated an unprecedented 
exodus of ethnic Chinese, who made up many of their number. 
The market dislocation also increased hardship in the South, which, 
along with unpopular resettlement policies, convinced many South- 
erners to flee. Not only did the government's program deprive the 
South of the services of some of the more capable members of the 
middle class, but the escape of many Southerners by sea provoked 
a shortage of fishing boats and a decline in the fish catch, a prin- 
cipal source of foreign-exchange income. 

Through 1986 and 1987, official policy toward unofficial mar- 
kets continued to alternate between restrictive and liberal 
approaches. Restrictions included licensing and tax regulations and 
proscriptions against reinvestment of profits. In periods of relaxa- 
tion, these restrictions were eased; local organizations were given 
greater autonomy in setting prices for locally produced goods; and 
unofficial markets were permitted to flourish. 

Lenient policies reflected official awareness that both produc- 
tion and distribution remained to some degree dependent on the 
unofficial market. In agriculture, for example, the "family econ- 
omy" continued to account for an important share of peasant 
agricultural production. The state plan for industrial production 
recognized the existence and importance of the unofficial market 
in the "dual quota planning" system. Under this program, 



163 



Black market American goods, Ho Chi Minh City 

Courtesy Bill Herod 

introduced in 1985, enterprises that met plan quotas were allowed 
independently to plan, finance, produce, and privately market sur- 
plus goods on the unofficial market. In 1986 state enterprises in 
Hanoi reportedly were unable to meet their budget contribution 
quotas because of the high cost of purchasing goods on the unoffi- 
cial market. Many organizations not authorized to trade continued 
to do so, however, and the available goods on the official, "orga- 
nized" market remained well below quotas. 

Foreign Trade and Aid 

In the 1980s, the Vietnamese government, acting under party 
supervision, continued to regulate and control all foreign trade. 
The Ministry of Foreign Trade managed trade and was responsi- 
ble for issuing of import and export licenses and approving any 
departures from the formal economic plan on an ad hoc basis. There 
was considerable division of responsibility, however, among high 
level agencies, financial institutions, state trading corporations, local 
export companies, and provincial and regional government bodies. 

The role of planning in foreign trade became increasingly sig- 
nificant after June 1978, when the country formally joined the 
Soviet-sponsored Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Come- 
con — see Glossary) and began to coordinate its five-year develop- 
ment and trade plans more closely with those of the Soviet Union 



164 



Scrambling to buy plastic water containers in Hanoi 

Courtesy Bill Herod 
Hanoi pen merchant uses hypodermic needle 
to insert ink into used ballpoint pens 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



165 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

and other Comecon members. Planning officials set trade goals on 
the basis of the overall planning targets and quotas required by 
bilateral trade agreements with various Comecon countries. The 
1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet 
Union and Vietnam, the most important of numerous such agree- 
ments with Comecon members, established the basis for the two 
countries' "long-term coordination of their national economic 
plans" and for long-term Soviet development assistance in tech- 
nology and other crucial sectors of the Vietnamese economy. A 
1981 Soviet- Vietnamese protocol on coordination of state plans dur- 
ing the Third Five-Year Plan set specific targets for bilateral trade 
and for coordination of Soviet machinery and equipment exports 
with plans for development of Vietnam's fuel and energy sectors. 

After approval by the Council of Ministers, major trade pro- 
grams were announced at national party congresses (see Develop- 
ment of the Vietnamese Communist Party, ch. 4). The trade 
program announced in 1986 at the Sixth National Party Congress 
called for export growth of 70 percent during the Fourth Five-Year 
Plan (see table 9, Appendix A). 

Closer linkages between trade and general economic planning 
in the 1980s had mixed effects. Fluctuating commodities prices at 
home and market-oriented trade with, and investment from, West- 
ern countries were too uncertain to plan. Consequently, the Second 
Five-Year Plan was crippled when hoped-for Western investment 
failed to materialize. The joint planning approach was designed 
to enable Vietnam to minimize risk because it could count on stable 
supplies of important resources and equipment at concessionary 
prices, especially from the Soviet Union. Any delays or bottlenecks 
in the plans or aid commitments of Comecon countries, however, 
could delay or disrupt Vietnam's planning effort. In the early 1980s, 
for example, announcement of the Third Five-Year Plan was 
delayed until the Fifth National Party Congress of March 1982 while 
Vietnam waited for the Soviet Union to confirm its aid commit- 
ment. Similarly, Vietnam in the mid-1980s endured first reduc- 
tion, then elimination of Soviet price subsidies for purchases of 
Soviet oil. The reductions were in accordance with the then general 
Soviet practice of avoiding oil price subsidies in order to keep Come- 
con oil prices close to those of the world market. The volume of 
Vietnamese trade suffered increasingly from some of the recurring 
problems that troubled planners in other Comecon countries dur- 
ing this period, including overly optimistic targets, problems of 
regionalism, priorities often driven by ideology, and chronic short- 
ages of domestically produced raw materials and industrial com- 
modities. By 1987 observers had concluded that, despite Vietnam's 



166 



The Economy 



financial ties with Comecon, increased investment and trade from 
Western countries and other non-Comecon sources would be 
required for a general Vietnamese economic recovery (following 
Vietnam's incursion into Cambodia in late 1978, numerous 
Western and regional aid donors had withdrawn their support and 
imposed a trade boycott). 

Foreign Currency Management 

In the 1980s, the Foreign Trade Bank, under the authorization of 
the State Bank of Vietnam (formerly the National Bank of Vietnam), 
made payments for imports. Headquartered in Hanoi, with a branch 
in Ho Chi Minh City, the Foreign Trade Bank managed Vietnam's 
foreign currency holdings and related matters, such as the resolu- 
tion of debts owed foreign countries. The Foreign Trade Bank also 
conducted Vietnam's relationship with the World Bank (see Glos- 
sary), following Hanoi's assumption of the memberships held in the 
Asian Development Bank (see Glossary) and the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) by the government of the Repub- 
lic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) until 1975 (see Banking, this ch.). 

Vietnam was, in addition, a member of the Comecon-affiliated 
International Investment Bank and the International Bank for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation in Moscow. Under the terms of Vietnam's 
Comecon membership, the International Bank for Economic 
Cooperation extended limited credit in transferable rubles (for value 
of ruble, see Glossary) for transactions not cleared through bilateral 
Soviet- Vietnamese trade agreements; the bank also maintained a 
convertible foreign exchange account for Vietnam. 

In order to increase exports, the government used incentives. 
Bonuses for export production were introduced in 1980, and 
extended in 1985, to reward cooperatives and other collective entities 
that met their export production quotas. Incentives to increase 
exports also were applied through the government's manipulation 
of foreign exchange disbursement. In general, foreign exchange 
for import companies either was carefully allocated in the state plan 
or was determined by the relevant ministries on an ad hoc basis 
when the companies requested convertible currencies for their 
operations. The amount of foreign exchange allocated to a com- 
pany for import operations, however, was determined by the 
amount of foreign exchange earned by the company's exports. 
Tying foreign exchange allocations to export earnings was intended 
to act as an incentive to boost export production. The government 
also required that most export companies turn in between 10 and 
30 percent of their foreign exchange earnings. Beyond this general 
guideline, however, many enterprises were permitted to retain all 



167 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

or a portion of their hard currency earnings in the form of special 
credits against State Bank accounts. Companies operating in a 
developing region such as the highlands, for example, were granted 
a five-year holiday during which they could retain all foreign 
exchange earnings. Those exporting major commodities such as 
coal, rubber, and marine products were allowed to retain between 
80 and 100 percent of their hard-currency earnings for use in neces- 
sary import purchases. Centrally controlled enterprises in the field 
of tourism were completely exempted from turn-in requirements, 
and companies that borrowed hard currencies from abroad received 
preferential status. 

Under a system of procurement subsidies, export companies 
applied for funds to cover gaps between procurement costs and their 
export revenues. The Ministry of Finance, through its Export Sup- 
port Fund, disbursed these subsidy payments to the centrally admin- 
istered trading corporations. Local corporations could receive a 
subsidy mix based on profits from imports and payments made 
by local governments. All such subsidies were limited, and com- 
panies exceeding the limit could lose their export permits. 

Decentralization of Trade 

During the 1980s, there were variations in the level of decen- 
tralization of foreign trade that the government was willing to per- 
mit. A policy of giving local governments and export companies 
greater autonomy in making contractual and credit arrangements 
with foreign businesses and government organizations was 
attempted in 1981 without much success but was endorsed by the 
Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986. Decentraliza- 
tion was blocked initially by Hanoi's desire to bring the economi- 
cally livelier southern region of the country, with its latent 
market-economy orientation, under fuller economic and political 
control. Such control — exemplified by a 1983 crackdown on the 
ethnic Chinese commercial community in Ho Chi Minh City — 
sometimes took precedence over trade promotion. In early 1987, 
however, city officials reportedly were again encouraging local com- 
panies to engage freely in foreign trade, joint ventures, acquisi- 
tion of technology, and foreign currency borrowing. Provinces, as 
early as 1986, were permitted to set their own trade regulations 
and develop export strategies in order to draw sufficient revenue 
to pay for imports needed to fulfill provincial plan targets. 

Some twenty-seven state trading corporations and twenty-two 
local trading companies conducted business directly or indirectly 
with companies abroad during the 1980s, either producing export 
goods or purchasing them from suppliers. Imexco, the central 



168 



The Economy 



umbrella organization, handled general administrative matters, 
leaving detailed operations to specialized corporations such as 
Agrexport and Vegetexco (foodstuffs and animal products); Marani- 
mex (marine products); Naforimex (forest products); and Machine- 
import and Technoimport (machinery, plants, and equipment). 
Two specialized corporations, the Vietnam Foreign Trade Cor- 
poration and the Vietnam Ocean Shipping Agency, administered 
all sea transport and cargo handling, respectively. The Soviet- 
Vietnamese joint venture Vietsovpetro conducted offshore petro- 
leum exploration. 

In their day-to-day operations, the specialized trading corpora- 
tions independently arranged contracts with producers, coordinated 
in-country transportation, and even designed packaging (for 
example, of fresh fruit or marine products) to improve freshness 
and quality control. The Number One Frozen Seafood Export 
Company, a highly profitable corporation, regularly sent its offi- 
cials abroad to negotiate trade contracts for its popular frozen 
prawns and other seafood. In 1986 the company reportedly earned 
a profit of around US$17 million, chiefly in trade with Japan and 
Hong Kong (see table 10, Appendix A). 

Direction and Composition of Trade 

Trading patterns from 1978 through 1986 reflected the growing 
importance of Vietnam's relationship with Comecon and its 
weakening ties with major Western economies and noncommunist 
regional trading partners. Total trade with non-Comecon coun- 
tries peaked at a little more than US$1 billion in 1978, dropped 
to less than US$700 million in 1982 ancf 1983, then averaged some 
US$850 million per year through 1986 (all dollar figures are given 
in terms of 1987 conversion rates). Two-way trade with the Soviet 
Union, that totaled about US$550 million in 1977, reached US$1.2 
billion in 1981 . This trade, which averaged some 43 percent of total 
trade from 1977 through 1980, accounted for about 64 percent of 
the total during the period of the Third Five- Year Plan. Accord- 
ing to export plans announced by the Sixth National Party Con- 
gress in December 1986, two-way trade with the Soviet Union 
would continue to account for the major share of the country's for- 
eign trade under the Fourth Five-Year Plan (see table 11, 
Appendix A). 

In the 1980s, Vietnam's trade deficits with non-Comecon coun- 
tries declined as the country's deficit with the Soviet Union grew. 
In 1977 and for several years thereafter, Vietnamese exports to 
its non-communist trade partners averaged less than 20 percent 
of the value of its imports from them. Exports to these countries 



169 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

increased slowly throughout the mid-1980s as imports declined. 
Most of the improvement resulted from substantive reductions in 
imports from eight major trading partners: Canada, Australia, 
France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), 
Sweden, Britain, and India. The reduction in imports resulted as 
much from Vietnamese self restraint and loss of trade credit as from 
politically motivated boycotts on trade with Vietnam, such as that 
observed by a number of Western and Asian Nations including 
the United States and the member nations of ASEAN. Vietnam's 
exports to several Western countries, including West Germany and 
Britain, increased, however, and the Vietnamese occasionally 
showed small positive trade balances with Australia and Canada 
in the mid-1980s. By 1986 Vietnam had reduced its balance-of- 
payments deficit with non-Comecon countries to less than US$300 
million (compared with more than US$700 million annually in the 
late 1970s) and was exporting products worth half the value of its 
import bill. Trade with the Soviet Union, however, followed the 
opposite pattern. Vietnamese exports were valued at an average 
of 49 percent of imports from the Soviet Union in 1977 and 1978, 
but at less than 25 percent of imports from 1981 through 1986. 

Foreign Investment Policy 

In December 1987, the National Assembly approved a new for- 
eign investment code in an apparent effort to bypass boycott restric- 
tions and deal directly with Western and regional businesses. The 
legislation, which was much more liberal than foreign investment 
laws in use in other communist states, gave more concessions to 
foreign investors than similar Vietnamese laws that had been 
enacted in 1977. The new code used low taxes — 20 to 30 percent 
of profits — to encourage joint ventures and permitted wholly owned 
foreign enterprises in Vietnam. The code, which was designed to 
emphasize the development of export industries and services, also 
granted full repatriation of profits after taxes and guaranteed for- 
eign enterprises against government expropriation. The new law 
also encouraged oil exploration and production contracts. 

Major Trading Partners 

By 1982 Vietnam's most important noncommunist trading part- 
ners were Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. In 1985 these three 
partners together accounted for US$576 million in trade, approxi- 
mately 65 percent of Vietnam's trade with non-Comecon coun- 
tries. In 1986 Japan and Hong Kong together conducted more than 
50 percent of Vietnam's non-Comecon trade. Much of the trade 
with Hong Kong and Singapore, however, was in goods either 



170 



The Economy 



originating in, or destined for, other countries, making it difficult 
to assess the effectiveness of the trade boycott of Vietnam subscribed 
to by a number of Western and Asian nations, including Singapore. 

Japan 

Japanese trade with Vietnam — US$285 million in 1986 — was 
conducted through Japanese trading companies and the Japan- 
Vietnam Trade Association, which was made up of some eighty- 
three Japanese firms. Japanese government officials also visited 
Hanoi in support of trade, but Vietnam's failure to repay outstand- 
ing public and private debts inhibited further trade growth. 
Japanese exports to Vietnam emphasized chemicals, textiles, 
machinery, and transportation equipment. In return, Vietnamese 
exports to Japan comprised mostly marine products and coal. 

Hong Kong 

Vietnam was Hong Kong's second-largest supplier of prawns 
and plants used for perfume, and held a strong position in sales 
of other specialized animal products, such as feathers. Vietnamese 
imports from Hong Kong, often paid for through complicated barter 
arrangements, comprised chemicals, machinery and equipment, 
and industrial textiles. Hong Kong also provided a conduit for an 
undetermined amount of covert trade by ASEAN countries such 
as Thailand. 

Singapore 

Despite Singapore's ASEAN membership and its official sanc- 
tion of the organization's participation in a boycott on trade with 
Vietnam, unofficial trade between the two countries grew dramati- 
cally during the 1980s. By 1985 trade had reached a total two-way 
figure of almost US$200 million (Singapore stopped publishing 
figures for its trade with Vietnam in 1986). In 1985 Singapore 
exported almost as much to Vietnam as Japan did, and imported 
twice as much as Hong Kong did. Singapore also provided Hanoi 
with important services, including cable and telex links. By 1985, 
the year in which for the first time ASEAN trade with Vietnam 
equalled that of Japan, the boycott seemed to have lost force. 

Soviet Union 

Vietnamese trade with the Soviet Union was strongly influenced 
by aid, trade, and joint planning agreements associated with Viet- 
nam's Third Five- Year Plan. Imports of oil and petroleum products, 
for example, which had averaged less than 9 percent of total imports 
from the Soviet Union from 1975 through 1980, increased to an 



171 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

annual average of 33 percent of imports between 1981 and 1985. 
This change followed a pattern in which the Soviet Union provided 
oil-exploration equipment and technical assistance against future 
recoveries while providing for Vietnamese fuel consumption in the 
meantime (see fig. 12). 

Machinery and equipment deliveries, averaging 45 percent of 
Vietnamese imports from the Soviet Union between 1975 and 1980, 
were important because they were intended for Soviet assisted 
hydropower, coal mining, and oil exploration projects. Other major, 
regularly repeated Vietnamese purchases from 1975 through 1986 
included rolled steel and cotton fiber. 

Wheat and wheat flour imports from the Soviet Union, neces- 
sary because of repeated crop failures in the late 1970s, dropped 
to negligible amounts in the 1980s. Soviet shipments of chemical 
fertilizers (principally granular urea) beginning in 1981 appeared 
to be synchronized with the Third Five- Year Plan's stress on 
improving agricultural production. 

Soviet deliveries for some projects occasionally spanned two plan- 
ning periods; deliveries for other projects were completed within 
short intervals. Shipments of agricultural and forestry equipment, 
for example, peaked for a short period in 1979 and 1980, while 
deliveries of materials for two Intersputnik Lotus telecommunica- 
tions ground stations began in 1979 and continued at substantial 
levels through 1984 before tapering off once installation work was 
completed in 1985. 

According to the joint Soviet- Vietnamese trade agreement of 
1981, bilateral trade was to more than double over the period of 
the Third Five- Year Plan. The Soviet Union planned to import 
more Vietnamese agricultural products in exchange for increased 
Vietnamese imports of Soviet oil, vehicles, metals, construction 
equipment, and fertilizers. Although Vietnam's exports failed to 
keep pace with projections, gains were reported in such categories 
as clothing, household goods, handicrafts, fruits and vegetables, 
pharmaceuticals, and raw rubber. Vietnamese production and 
export shortfalls, coupled with a persistent deficit that required sub- 
stantial subsidies, did not preclude the Soviet Union's deriving some 
benefit from the two-way trade. For example, shipments of fresh 
and frozen fruits and vegetables, chiefly to the Soviet Far East, 
ranked fourth in recorded imports from Vietnam and were favorably 
reported in Soviet publications. The Soviet Union also saved valu- 
able foreign exchange by purchasing some products, such as rub- 
ber, from Vietnam instead of from other countries. Rubber sent 
to the Soviet Union remained an important part — some 6.5 percent 
annually — of Vietnam's total exports. Soviet assistance provided 



172 



The Economy 



during the Second Five-Year Plan to a 2,000 hectare plantation 
managed by the Phu Rieng Rubber Company in Song Be Province 
suggested that preserving the long-term development of this impor- 
tant rubber source may have been a critical Soviet concern. Finally, 
Vietnamese vodka shipments to the Soviet Union enabled the Soviet 
Union to increase exports of its own higher quality product to the 
hard-currency markets of the West. 

The Soviet- Vietnamese trade plan additionally included Viet- 
namese exports of nonferrous metals, although according to its prac- 
tice of some years the Soviet Union did not report transactions in 
this category. In 1983 the Soviet Union claimed that Soviet-assisted 
projects, such as the Tinh Tuc Tin Mine in Cao Bang Province, 
accounted for 100 percent of Vietnam's tin production. 

External Debt 

Vietnam is one of only two communist countries — the Demo- 
cratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) is the other — to 
default on its international debts. Vietnam's scheduled 1982 pay- 
ments to Western creditors were estimated at US$260 million, well 
over the US$182 million value of Vietnam's exports that year to 
noncommunist countries with hard, or convertible, currencies. The 
Soviets cancelled some US$450 million of Vietnam's debts in 1975 
and began a program of grant aid. As Vietnam-Comecon trade 
expanded in the 1980s, however, so did Vietnamese debts to Come- 
con countries. Comecon funds for project assistance and related 
equipment often were wasted because of mismanagement or 
remained frozen for years in projects not scheduled to become 
productive until the middle or late 1980s. Projected exports fre- 
quently fell short of expectations, widening trade deficits and 
requiring additional balance-of-payments aid. Taking the long view, 
the Soviet Union shifted its assistance during the Third Five-Year 
Plan to concessionary loans, repayable at 2 percent interest over 
a period of 20 to 30 years. 

As Vietnam's international debt grew steadily through the 1980s, 
the debt owed to the Soviet Union and other Comecon countries 
accounted for larger portions of the total foreign debt. In 1982, 
according to estimates by the Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development (OECD), Vietnam's total foreign debt was 
US$2.8 billion. Of this debt, US$1.7 billion, or 60 percent, was 
owed to OECD member countries (advanced industrial Western 
countries) and their capital markets or to multilateral lenders. A 
large portion of Vietnam's international debt covered the balance 
of payments deficit with Comecon countries (see Foreign Economic 
Assistance, this ch.). In 1987 Le Hoang, deputy director of the 



173 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



CHINA 



i 



THAILAND 



Gulf of Thailand 




— International 
boundary 

— Province boundary 
s> National capital 

50 100 KILOMETERS 



Boundary representation not necessarily autnoritatrve 



50 100 MILES 



Source: Based on information from Soren To Betonamu Tono Kyoryokukankei, 
translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Southeast Asia 
Report, March 19, 1985, 66-136. 



Figure 12. Soviet Cooperation Projects, 1985 



174 



The Economy 



KEY TO SOVIET COOPERATION PROJECTS, 1985 

1 . Tinh Tuc Tin Mine and Plant 

2. Lam Thao Superphosphate of Lime Plant 
Battery factory 

3. Lao Cai Apatite Mine 

Thac Ba Hydroelectric Power Plant 

4. Ha Tu Coal Mine 
Cao Son Coal Mine 
Mong Duong Coal Mine 
Vang Danh Coal Mine 
Quang Ninh Coal Mine 
Vang Dinh Coal Mine 

Uong Bi Hydroelectric Power Plant 
Uong Bi Vietnam-USSR Miners School 
Cam Pha Central Machine Plant 
Flour mill 

5. Pha Lai Thermal Power Plant 

6. Moc Chau Tea-Manufacturing Plant 

7. Vietnam-USSR Farm Machinery Technicians School 
Truck repair workshop 

Haiphong port expansion 

8. Dong Anh Electric Equipment Repair Workshop 
Giap Bac Automobile Servicing Plant 

Xuan Mai Prefab Housing Concrete Slab Factory 
Thang Long Bridge 

Branch of the Pushkin Russian Language School 
Meterological station 
Computer center 

USSR-Vietnam joint tropical weather research facility 

Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum 

Labor Cultural Center 

Ky An Scientific Research Center 

9. Natural gas development 
Gas turbine power plant 

Hoa Binh Hydroelectric Power Plant 
Song Cong Diesel Engine Factory 

10. Lotus One Inter-Sputnik Satellite Communications Ground Station 

1 1 . Bim Son Cement Factory 
Kien Chau Cement Factory 

12. Vinh-Vientiane, Loas 500-kilometer oil pipeline 

13. Dong Hoi diesel-powered electric generating plant 

14. Farm machinery repair workshop 

15. Phu Rieng Rubber Company 

16. Bao Loc Tractor Servicing Plant 
Da Lat Nuclear Reactor 

17. Tri An Hydroelectric Power Plant 

18. Automobile servicing plant 

Trang Bang Tractor Repair Workshop 

19. Vung Tau offshore: continental shelf oil and natural gas development 

20. Automobile and tractor repair workshop 

Cu Chi Farm Machinery and Maintenance Workshop 
Meteorological radar observation post 

Lotus Two Inter-Sputnik Satellite Communcations Ground Station 

21 . Phung Hiep Farm Machinery Repair Plant 



175 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

State Bank of Vietnam, told a Western correspondent that the coun- 
try owed between US$5.5 and US$6 billion to Comecon member 
countries. Hoang stated that Vietnam's debts (both official and 
private) to hard-currency countries were about US$1 billion. 

Creditors in convertible-currency areas included international 
organizations such as the IMF and the Asian Development Bank; 
national creditors such as Belgium, Denmark, France, India, Japan, 
and the Netherlands; and private creditors in numerous Western 
countries. In January 1985, the IMF suspended further credit when 
Vietnam failed to meet a repayment schedule on the amount owed 
to the fund. Talks to reschedule the obligation failed in 1987, making 
Vietnam ineligible for fresh funding. In 1987 Vietnam owed the 
fund some US$90 million. Its foreign exchange reserves in 1985 
had been estimated at less than US$20 million. 

Foreign Economic Assistance 

In the late 1970s, Vietnam relied heavily on economic assistance 
from both Western and Soviet-bloc donors to finance major devel- 
opment projects, to underwrite its fledgling export industries, and 
to meet balance of payments deficits. Following Vietnam's accep- 
tance of closer ties with the Soviet Union, its incursion into Cam- 
bodia in December 1978, and its border fighting with China in 
early 1979, aid from China and from Western countries and multi- 
lateral organizations dropped, slowing development. 

Offshore oil exploration with the assistance of West German, 
Italian, and Canadian companies ended in 1981 , but resumed sub- 
sequently with Soviet technical assistance. Aid from China, report- 
edly close to US$300 million in 1977 and 1978, dropped to zero 
in 1979, and Vietnamese recovery in coal production was pro- 
foundly affected by the accompanying loss of ethnic Chinese work- 
ers. In 1979 Japan suspended its Official Development Assistance 
funds (a mixture of grants and low-interest loans amounting to 
US$135 million) and made renewal contingent upon Vietnamese 
withdrawal from Cambodia. Loss of other Western aid in hard cur- 
rencies crippled Vietnam's ability to continue importing needed 
modern machinery and technology from its West European trad- 
ing partners. Following Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, only 
Sweden continued to provide any significant amount of economic 
help. Some multilateral assistance, such as that for development 
of the Mekong River, was made available by the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, however. 
Western and multilateral assistance, therefore, did not stop entirely, 
although the yearly average of about US$100 million through 1986 
provided only a fraction of the country's hard-currency needs. 



176 



The Economy 



In 1986 Vietnam's current account deficit with major industrial 
countries was some US$221 million. The conflicts with Cambo- 
dia and China in 1978 and 1979 proved particularly costly in terms 
of continuing economic ties with Western and neighboring Asian 
countries. As a result, Hanoi was forced to rely even more heavily 
on Soviet-bloc assistance. 

The Soviet Union and other members of Comecon increased their 
aid commitments as their own planning became more closely coor- 
dinated with Vietnam's following Hanoi's entry into Comecon in 
June 1978. Soviet economic aid in 1978, estimated at between 
US$0.7 and 1 .0 billion, was already higher than Western assistance. 
By 1982 it had increased to more than US$1 billion annually, close 
to US$3 million per day, and it remained at this level through the 
mid-1980s. The Soviet Union and other Comecon countries pro- 
vided aid in all categories — project assistance, technical training, 
price subsidies, loans, and trade credits. Soviet publications empha- 
sized the importance of project assistance to Vietnam's economic 
recovery, but about 75 percent of the value of aid disbursed dur- 
ing the Third Five- Year Plan was used to finance Vietnam's bilat- 
eral trade deficit with the Soviet Union, which averaged about 
US$896 million a year. Trade subsidies in the form of reduced prices 
for Soviet oil also declined sharply in the early 1980s as the Soviet 
Union brought Vietnam into the Comecon oil-pricing system based 
on world market values. 

Although the details of Comecon assistance to Vietnam since 
the 1970s had not been made public as of late 1987, Soviet sources 
gave some indications of the type of project assistance provided 
and were quick to claim credit for production increases attribut- 
able to Soviet technical and plant assistance. Soviet-aid goals from 
1978 to 1981 included helping with balance-of-payments problems, 
assisting with key projects, introducing industrial cooperation, 
accelerating scientific and technical cooperation, and assisting with 
the improvement of Vietnamese professional skills. During this 
period, the Soviet Union also signed numerous agreements call- 
ing for financial and technical assistance in matters ranging from 
traffic-improvement programs for the railroad from Hanoi to Ho 
Chi Minh City to completing construction of the Thang Long 
Bridge over the Red River (see Transportation, this ch.). 

Overseas Remittances 

During the 1980s, informal aid in the form of packages and remit- 
tances from overseas Vietnamese played an important role in 
improving the living standards of many families, maintaining the 
domestic economy, and boosting the country's holdings of hard 



177 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

currency. Vietnamese customs officials in 1983 told a Western jour- 
nalist that packages from overseas relatives — valued at some US$70 
million annually in Western products — generated between US$10 
million and US$20 million annually in customs revenues alone. 
Remittances from overseas Vietnamese were believed to provide 
an additional US$100 million or more in annual foreign exchange 
earnings. 

Finance 
Budget 

The government allocated resources through its annual plan, 
which in the 1980s included the annual budget and credit plan. 
The Ministry of Finance, in consultation with the State Planning 
Commission, prepared the budget for approval by the Standing 
Committee of the National Assembly. Both the fiscal year (FY — 
see Glossary) and the annual plan year corresponded to the Western 
calendar year. 

The state budget included the revenues and expenditures of the 
central government, 38 provincial governments, and more than 
500 local governments. The state economic enterprises forwarded 
the bulk of their profits to the state treasury. Tax revenue accounted 
for about one-third of total budgetary revenue. 

Tax measures introduced in 1983 included the imposition of new 
agricultural levies based on the potential output of collectives rather 
than actual per capita output and the actual output from private 
plots (previously exempted from the agricultural tax). In addition, 
more enterprises were made subject to taxation. Subsequently, total 
tax revenue from agricultural as well as nonagricultural coopera- 
tives and the private sector increased, reflecting higher official and 
free-market prices, more efficient tax collection, and the continued 
expansion of economic activity. 

In the 1980s, Vietnamese authorities did not release budget 
figures. Data prepared for the 1984 visit of IMF officials, however, 
revealed a 1 983 budget deficit of D20 billion (approximately US$2 . 2 
billion), largely financed by increases in the money supply, the sale 
of taxes paid in kind, the sale of government-enterprise products, 
aid in kind, and the various taxes levied on the free market. These 
revenues were offset by large outlays on employment in the state 
sector and purchases (primarily of agricultural products) from 
peasants and cooperatives. The payment of bonuses to production 
workers, the attempt to match free-market prices, and the high level 
of food subsidies to the urban population also constituted major 
budget expenditures. 



178 



The Economy 



Money Supply 

The increase in prices and wages, as well as a mismanaged 
devaluation of the dong in the early 1980s, contributed to increases 
in the demand for credit and in the actual amount of currency in 
circulation. Domestic credit subsequently increased to reflect the 
large price adjustments that were made, the increase in invento- 
ries, and the emergence of bank-financed budget deficits. Credit 
to the commercial sector accounted for nearly half the total out- 
standing capital-credit. The expansion of domestic credit was 
reflected in a proportional expansion in liquidity. Total deposits 
rose significantly, and the volume of cash in circulation increased. 
Interest rates were adjusted accordingly in order to restrain growth 
in credit and the amount of cash in circulation. The rate on sav- 
ings deposits was raised, and lending rates were lowered to reflect 
higher deposit rates. 

Inflation 

The ill-conceived monetary-reform plan introduced in late 1985 
set in motion unprecedented inflation. Hanoi replaced the old D10 
note with a new Dl note and devalued the dong's foreign exchange 
rate from Dl .20 to US$1 to D15 to US$1 . A leak about the planned 
currency change and the unavailability of new notes of small 
denominations, however, defeated the goal of contracting the money 
supply by eliminating illegal cash holdings. As a result, inflation 
increased from about 50 percent in late 1985 to 700 percent by Sep- 
tember 1986. 

In implementing the reform, the government deprived both pri- 
vate and state-run enterprises of large amounts of cash they held 
for operating expenses. A Vietnamese economist estimated that 
half the cash in circulation was held by public enterprises for the 
purpose of expanding production. Most enterprises held their earn- 
ings in cash because the banking system encouraged only deposits 
and not withdrawals. 

To curb inflation, the government directed its efforts at lower- 
ing prices by imposing state regulations. Price subsidies were rein- 
troduced, and, in the face of widespread shortages and hoarding, 
the rationing of essential goods also was reinstituted. 

Prices and Wages 

During the early 1980s, the trend was toward greater price flexi- 
bility, but prices of both intermediate and consumer goods con- 
tinued to be determined largely by the central government. Prices 
of agricultural and non-agricultural cooperative products were 



179 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

closely related to the government's procurement policy and the two- 
way contract system. Under this system, the government assigned 
production quotas. Production achieved in excess of the quota could 
then be sold either to the government at negotiated prices or to 
buyers in the free market. Negotiated prices normally were higher 
than quota prices but lower than free-market prices. 

Prices of the products of state-owned enterprises were established 
on the basis of average cost norms, applicable taxes, and a fixed 
profit margin. Production in excess of quotas or from inputs not 
supplied by the state could be sold at higher prices, enabling 
producers to recoup input cost while providing an incentive for 
above-quota production. 

Consumer prices for commodities distributed by the state were 
different from those for products distributed in the free market. 
Official consumer prices fell into three categories depending on the 
type of goods as well as on the type of consumer. The first two 
categories consisted of essential commodities, such as rice, pork, 
textiles, and soap, which were distributed under rations at two 
different price levels. Civil servants, workers in state enterprises, 
and selected groups of consumers, such as students, pensioners and 
welfare recipients, were permitted to purchase these goods at sub- 
stantial subsidies. A third price category for the same commodi- 
ties was based on cost and was reserved for members of cooperatives 
and for individuals associated with contract work for the govern- 
ment. The subsidized prices remained unchanged for twenty years, 
but the cost-based prices continued to rise. 

Party leaders at the Central Committee's Eighth Plenum (Fifth 
Congress) in 1985 experimented with eliminating fixed prices and 
removing subsidies on staples, thus causing a price increase for basic 
items. At the Second Plenum (Sixth Congress) held in April 1987, 
a policy of rational pricing based on cost and projected consumer 
demand was implemented for industries. 

Wage increases of between 90 and 110 percent were granted in 
mid- 1981 to civil servants and employees of state enterprises. Before 
the wage increase, state employees had benefited from access to 
state-supplied commodities at subsidized prices. Afterwards, pur- 
chases of state-supplied commodities, as part of the total expendi- 
tures of civil servants and manual laborers, fell, a development that 
contributed to a decline in the real incomes of these workers. 

Reform measures introduced in 1985 instituted major changes 
in wage policy. Beginning at that time, wages were determined 
on the basis of performance and paid in cash. Previously wages 
had been paid partly or entirely in kind. Government employees 
(including the military) received a further increase in salary but 



180 



The Economy 



lost the supplements to their income that had previously included 
food subsidies. Wages for workers in state-run factories were 
increased at the April 1987 party plenum but any wage increases 
were directly translated into, and offset by, higher prices. 

Banking 

Following its reorganization in 1976, the State Bank of Vietnam 
(formerly the National Bank of Vietnam) became the central bank 
of the country. In addition to its national financial responsibili- 
ties, the State Bank also assumed some of the duties of a commer- 
cial bank. It maintained a head office in Hanoi, a division in Ho 
Chi Minh City, and numerous provincial branches. Other impor- 
tant banks operating in Vietnam in 1988 included the Foreign Trade 
Bank, which was charged with overseeing all aspects of foreign pay- 
ments, and the Bank for Agricultural Development, which provided 
loans to agriculture and fishing. 

The first solely commercial bank opened in Ho Chi Minh City 
in July 1987 to handle personal savings and to extend loans to enter- 
prises and individuals. The bank was capitalized with D500 mil- 
lion (US$1.4 million) provided by the government and through 
stock issues. One objective in establishing Vietnam's first commer- 
cial bank was to limit inflation through the bank's ability to coordi- 
nate the extension of credit. 

To attract more foreign exchange, the Foreign Trade Bank 
opened an account in 1987 for overseas Vietnamese remittances 
of foreign currencies to their relatives at home. The currencies dealt 
with were United States dollars, French francs, Swiss francs, Hong 
Kong dollars, Canadian dollars, British pounds, Japanese yen, Aus- 
tralian dollars, and West German marks. In 1987 the bank also 
agreed to establish a finance company in Tokyo in partnership with 
a Japanese bank. As the first joint venture between the two coun- 
tries, the proposed company was intended to help settle bilateral 
trade accounts, but it was also expected to assist in technology 
transfers. 

Transportation 

As described by the Vietnamese government, the economy in 
the 1980s suffered from the "backwardness" of the transport sys- 
tem. The system's inadequate development constituted a major 
impediment to industrial development, created bottlenecks in the 
circulation of goods and supplies, and constrained domestic trade. 
The importance of transportation development was emphasized at 
the Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986, and con- 
firmed at the Central Committee's Second Plenum in April 1987. 



181 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

The plenum urged state cooperatives, private enterprises, and 
individuals to invest in expanding the transportation sector and 
to engage in transportation services that would benefit business (see 
fig. 13). 

Damage to the transportation structure was extensive during the 
latter half of the Second Indochina War, particularly in the North, 
and the 1979 Chinese invasion severely interdicted rail transport 
near the Chinese border, but Vietnamese transportation statistics 
also indicated a lack of development from 1975 through 1980. In 
1980 total cargo transported amounted to 42.3 million tons, an 
increase of only 4.2 percent over the 40.6 million tons transported 
in 1970. Cargo carried by rail totaled only 3.5 million tons in 1980, 
compared with 4.5 million tons in 1965. In terms of volume hauled 
over distance traveled, 758 million tons per kilometer were trans- 
ported by rail in 1980, a figure not significantly greater than that 
measured in 1965 (749 million tons per kilometer). A 30-percent 
increase in the average rail distance traveled per shipment in 1980 
(from 1 66 kilometers to 2 1 6 kilometers) was attributed to expanded 
shipments from the South to the North. 

In 1987 Vietnamese road and railroad construction figures for 
the period of the Second Five- Year Plan were contradictory. Con- 
struction figures indicated that 1 ,500 kilometers of new roads were 
built and 137 kilometers of new railroad track were laid during 
this time, but the plan's fulfillment report cited 3,800 kilometers 
of road constructed and 2,000 kilometers of main and auxiliary 
track laid for the North-South railroad. Vietnamese reports to 
Comecon showed that total track increased by 837 kilometers to 
reach a total of 2,900 kilometers in 1980. Repair of war damage 
to the rail system and construction of new sidings, however, took 
up much of the effort that might otherwise have been directed 
toward expanding the rail system. 

The profitability and efficiency of the railroad transportation sys- 
tem had declined even before the system was damaged by the 
Chinese invasion in 1979. According to a Vietnamese transporta- 
tion economist, profit per dong of fixed-capital investment decreased 
from DO. 17 in 1964 to DO. 04 in 1978. The same source calculated 
that the productivity per railcar declined from 1 ,999 tons per kilo- 
meter per day in 1960 to 784 tons per kilometer per day in 1978. 
Comparable estimates for road transportation were not available; 
however, the aging truck stock and the severe parts shortages 
experienced in the late 1970s, which left trucks inoperable or can- 
nibalized, suggested that road transportation was at least as 
problematic as rail transportation. 



182 



The Economy 



In 1985 Vietnam had approximately 85,000 kilometers of roads 
and 4,250 kilometers of railroad. According to Vietnamese offi- 
cials, 238 kilometers of railroad and nearly 3,500 kilometers of road 
had been built in the ten years since reunification. The principal 
road and rail routes linked Hanoi to Ho Chi Minh City (1,730 
kilometers), Hanoi to Haiphong (102 kilometers), Hanoi to Muc 
Quan (176 kilometers), Hanoi to Thanh Hoa (160 kilometers), and 
Hanoi to Lao Cai (295 kilometers). Railroads were in working order 
but needed substantial repair and restoration. Track running from 
Nha Trang, Phu Khanh Province, to Qui Nhon, Nghia Binh 
Province was completed between 1983 and 1984 by a French 
development-aid team. 

Dozens of kilometers of bridges were constructed between 1975 
and 1985. With Soviet assistance, Vietnam rebuilt the Thang Long 
bridge over the Red River, north of Hanoi. The country's longest 
bridge, extending 1,688 meters, it had been destroyed during the 
Second Indochina War. Other bridges were built on the national 
highway in central Vietnam and in the Mekong River Delta. The 
road system in the 1980s included 9,400 kilometers with a 
bituminous surface, 48,700 kilometers with a gravel or improved 
earth surface, and 26,900 kilometers with an unimproved earth 
roadbed. 

Haiphong, Ho Chi Minh City, and Da Nang were the largest 
of nine major and twenty-three minor ports. Port capacity in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s increased greatly. Haiphong's wharves 
reportedly grew to 1,700 meters and were served by 3,600 meters 
of railroad track and 2,000 meters of crane track. Covered and open 
storage were increased to 90,000 square meters. Despite efforts to 
enlarge and equip the ports, however, they remained the weakest 
link in Vietnam's transportation system. 

In early 1985, the Vietnamese portion of a 500-kilometer oil pipe- 
line linking the seaport of Vinh in Nghe Tinh Province to Vien- 
tiane, Laos, was completed with Soviet assistance. The project was 
expected to provide Laos with an annual supply of 300,000 tons 
of petroleum and gas, some of which was to be used by Vietnamese 
army units stationed there. 

The Vietnamese merchant fleet was upgraded with Soviet assis- 
tance. The Soviets installed and ran a sophisticated coastal freighter 
and barge system between Haiphong and Soviet Pacific Ocean 
ports. The system apparently was designed to transport military 
hardware in a secure manner. Vietnam also cooperated with 
Thailand and Laos in improving the navigability of the Mekong 
River under the auspices of the UN Mekong Committee. Naviga- 
ble inland waterways totaled about 17,702 kilometers, of which more 



183 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



CHINA 



'? 



1, 



Son Lai 



Met Tn?QU>**Bac 

iQt®» t _Jija_ 



/ 



LAOS 



S. 



ong Gai 
Haiphong 



tanh Hoa 



Vinh 



Gulf 
of 
Tonkin 




V 



THAILAND 



>a Nang 




CAMBODIA 



vPleiku 



Gulf 
of 
Thailand 



International 

Boundary 
® National Capital 
h — ' — •■ Railroad 
— — — Road 
i Airport 
Port 

50 100 Ki lometers 
50 100 Miles 



"Canjjho 



Da Lat 



T BjenJ Hoa, 
vHo Chi Minh C 

X- Vung Tau 



Qui Nhon 
ty Hoa 

r Nha Trang 
I Cam Ranh 



South 



China 



Sea 



Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 13. Transportation System, 1987 



184 



The Economy 



than 5,149 kilometers were navigable at all times by vessels of up 
to 1.8 meters in draft. According to Vietnamese statistics for the 
years 1984 and 1985, marine transport had increased by 2.2 times 
the level in 1976. 

Civil aviation in the 1980s was controlled by the military and 
based primarily at two international airports, Noi Bai in Hanoi 
and Tan Son Nhut in Ho Chi Minh City. Domestically, Hanoi 
was linked by regular service to Phu Bai, Nha Trang, Da Nang, 
Pleiku, Da Lat, Buon Me Thuot, and Ho Chi Minh City. Ho Chi 
Minh City also was connected by regularly scheduled flights to Rach 
Gia, Phu Quoc, and Con Son Island. The aircraft used were 
Soviet-made. 

In March 1983, commercial air service between Hanoi and 
Moscow was opened by Aeroflot. Air Vietnam, in the late 1980s, 
connected Hanoi with Vientiane, Phnom Penh and Bangkok, and 
Air France provided regular flights to Ho Chi Minh City from 
Bangkok. The number of airfields totaled 217, of which 128 were 
usable and 46 had permanently surfaced runways. Twelve had run- 
ways from 2,440 to 3,659 meters in length, and 28 maintained run- 
ways of 1,220 to 2,439 meters. 

Telecommunications 

By 1985 Vietnam possessed two satellite-ground stations con- 
structed with the assistance of the Soviet Union. The Lotus One 
satellite communication station was located in Ha Nam Ninh 
Province, 100 kilometers south of Hanoi, and served to integrate 
Vietnam into the Soviet Intersputnik Communication Satellite 
Organization. Construction began in January 1979 and was com- 
pleted in July 1980 in time for the Moscow Olympics. Lotus Two 
was inaugurated near Ho Chi Minh City in April 1985 to broad- 
cast the ceremonies celebrating the tenth anniversary of the end 
of the Second Indochina War. The system linked Moscow, Hanoi, 
and Ho Chi Minh City, and the two stations were reportedly 
manned entirely by Soviet personnel. A French telecommunica- 
tions company was installing a modern nationwide telephone sys- 
tem in 1987. 

The installation of a national telephone system symbolized 
Hanoi's acknowledgement of the country's critical need to formulate 
an integrated development plan that would tap the country's eco- 
nomic potential on a national scale. It also demonstrated the prag- 
matic character of a new generation of leaders who had risen to 
power in the mid-1980s and appeared more willing than the nation's 
past leadership to risk economic and political reform for the sake 
of modernization. Reforms undertaken during this time were 



185 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

greeted by outside observers as a promising sign that the nation's 
economy might be moving at last out of its prolonged stagnation. 

* * * 

Information on Vietnam's economy can be found in Vietnamese 
newspaper and journal articles translated and published by the For- 
eign Broadcast Information Service and the Joint Publications 
Research Service of the United States government. Additional 
material is published by some of Vietnam's trading partners; 
especially useful is the Statistical Yearbook of the Comecon Countries, 
published annually by the Soviet government. 

Another valuable source that combines data with some analysis 
is the Quarterly Economic Review of Indochina published by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Analytical articles are most 
readily found in the Far Eastern Economic Review and in the yearly 
summary issues published by Asian Survey. (For further informa- 
tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



186 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap plan Dien Bien Phu campaign, 
March 1954. 



The socialist republic of Vietnam (srv) is gov- 
erned through a highly centralized system dominated by the Viet- 
namese Communist Party (VCP, Viet Nam Cong San Dang). As 
the force controlling the system, the party exercises leadership in 
all matters. The government manages state affairs through a struc- 
ture that parallels the party's apparatus, but it is incapable of act- 
ing without party direction. All key government positions are filled 
by party members. 

Society is ruled by the party's ubiquitous presence, which is 
manifested in a network of party cadres at almost every level of 
social activity. All citizens are expected to be members of one or 
another of the mass organizations led by party cadres, and all man- 
agers and military officials are ultimately answerable to party 
representatives. 

The VCP in the mid-1980s was in a state of transition and experi- 
mentation. It was a time when a number of party leaders, who 
had been contemporaries of Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969), were step- 
ping down in favor of a younger generation of pragmatists and tech- 
nocrats, and a time when the prolonged poor condition of the 
economy sparked discontent among grass-roots party organizations 
as well as open criticism of the party's domestic policy. The party's 
political ethos, which had once seemed to embody the traditional 
Vietnamese spirit of resistance to foreigners and which had known 
great success when the country was overwhelmingly dominated by 
war and the issues of national liberation and reunification, appeared 
to have changed after the fall of the Republic of Vietnam (South 
Vietnam) in the spring of 1975 and the reunification of Vietnam 
in 1976. This ethos had been at the core of the VCP's rise to power 
during the struggles for independence and unification. To a large 
degree, the popularity of the communist movement remained tied 
to these causes; when victory over the South was achieved in 1975, 
it became apparent that some of the party's governing principles 
did not easily translate to peacetime conditions. In the absence of 
war, the ethos changed and the difference between what was com- 
munist and what was popular became increasingly noticeable. 

Hanoi was apparently unprepared for the scale of its victory in 
the South, having anticipated that the path to complete power would 
require at the very least a transition period of shared power with 
the Southern communist infrastructure (the Provisional Revolu- 
tionary Government) and even elements of the incumbent order. 



189 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Two separate governments in North and South Vietnam were 
planned until the surprisingly swift disintegration of the South Viet- 
namese government eliminated the need for a lengthy transition. 
Following the establishment of communist control in the South, 
the government immediately was placed under a Military Manage- 
ment Commission, directed by Senior Lieutenant General Tran 
Van Tra with the assistance of local People's Revolutionary Com- 
mittees. At a reunification conference in November 1975, the 
Party's plans for uniting North and South were announced, and 
elections for a single National Assembly — the highest state organ — 
(see Glossary) were held on April 26, 1976, the first anniversary 
of the Southern victory. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam was 
formally named at the first session of the Sixth National Assembly 
(the "Unification Assembly"), which met from June 24 to July 2, 
1976. 

After reunification, the focus of policy became more diffuse. 
Policy makers, absorbed with incorporating the South into the com- 
munist order as quickly as possible, were confronted with both 
dissension within the North's leadership and southern resistance 
to the proposed pace of change. The drive undertaken by party 
ideologues to eliminate all vestiges of capitalism and to collectivize 
the economy in the South was outlined in the Second Five-Year 
Plan (1976-80) and announced at the Fourth National Party Con- 
gress in December 1976. The plan, the first after reunification, 
stressed the development of agriculture and light industry, but it 
set unattainably high goals. The government expected that all 
industry and agriculture in the South would be state-controlled by 
the end of 1979. According to Vietnamese sources, however, only 
66 percent of cultivated land and 72 percent of peasant households 
in the South had been organized into collectivized production by 
early 1985, and socialist transformation in private industry had led 
to decreased production, increased production costs, and decreased 
product quality. Meanwhile, the country's leaders were finding it 
necessary to divert their attention to a number of other equally press- 
ing issues. Besides addressing the many problems of the country's 
newly unified economy, they also had to work out postwar relations 
with Cambodia, China, and the Soviet Union. The Sixth National 
Party Congress held in December 1986 was a watershed for party 
policy in the 1980s. The party's political mood was accurately 
reflected in the congress' candid acknowledgment of existing eco- 
nomic problems and in its seeming willingness to change in order 
to solve them. A new atmosphere of experimentation and reform, 
apparently reinforced by reforms initiated by the Soviet Union's 
new leadership, was introduced, setting the stage for a period of 



190 



Government and Politics 



self-examination, the elimination of corrupt party officials, and new 
economic policies. 

Development of the Vietnamese Communist Party 

The state Constitution adopted in 1980 describes the party as 
"the only force leading the state and society and the main factor 
determining all successes of the Vietnamese revolution." The 
party's role is primary in all state activities, overriding that of the 
government, which functions merely to implement party policies. 
The party maintains control by filling key positions in all govern- 
ment agencies with party leaders or the most trusted party cadres 
and by controlling all mass organizations. Citizens belong to mass 
organizations appropriate to their status, such as the quasi- 
governmental Vietnam Fatherland Front, the Vietnam General 
Confederation of Trade Unions, or the Ho Chi Minh Communist 
Youth League (see Party Organization, this ch.). Party cadres lead- 
ing such organizations educate and mobilize the masses through 
regular study sessions to implement party policies. 

Although party congresses are rare events in Vietnam, they pro- 
vide a record of the party's history and direction and tend to reflect 
accurately the important issues of their time. In February 1930 in 
Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh presided over the founding congress 
of the VCP. At the direction of the Communist International 
(Comintern — see Glossary), the party's name was changed shortly 
afterwards to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). The desig- 
nated First National Party Congress following the party's found- 
ing was held secretly in Macao in 1935, coincidentally with the 
convocation in Moscow of the Seventh Congress of the Comin- 
tern. At the Seventh Congress, the Comintern modified its "united 
front" strategy for world revolution chiefly to protect the Soviet 
Union from the rise of fascism. Member parties were instructed 
to join in popular fronts with noncommunist parties to preserve 
world socialism in the face of fascism's new threat. Although the 
Vietnamese party subsequently adopted the strategy, the timing 
of the two meetings dictated that the Vietnamese in Macao wait 
until after their meeting for directions from Moscow. Consequently, 
the resolutions enunciated at the ICP's first congress turned out 
to be only provisional because they stressed the older and narrower 
concept of the united front that divided the world into imperialist 
and socialist camps but failed to account for fascism. Under the 
new strategy, the ICP considered all nationalist parties in Indochina 
as potential allies. The Second National Party Congress was 
held in 1951 in Tuyen Quang, a former province in Viet Bac, a 
remote region of the North Vietnamese highlands controlled by 



191 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

the Viet Minh (see Glossary) during the First Indochina War (see 
Glossary — also known as the Viet Minh War). It reestablished the 
ICP, which had been officially dissolved in 1945 to obscure the 
party's communist affiliation, and renamed it the Vietnam Work- 
ers' Party (VWP, Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam). Nine years later 
in Hanoi, the Third National Party Congress formalized the tasks 
required to construct a socialist society in the North and to carry 
out a revolution in the South. 

The Fourth National Party Congress, which convened in Decem- 
ber 1976, was the first such congress held after the country's 
reunification. Reflecting the party's sense of rebirth, the congress 
changed the party's name from the Vietnam Workers' Party to 
the Vietnam Communist Party. This congress was significant for 
disclosing the party's plans for a unified Vietnam and for initiat- 
ing the party's most widespread leadership changes up to that time. 
The delegates adopted a new party Statute, replacing one that had 
been ratified in 1960 when the country was divided. The new Stat- 
ute was directed at the country as a whole but focused on the 
application of Marxist-Leninist principles in the South, stating that 
the party's goal was to "realize socialism and communism in Viet- 
nam." It further described the VCP as the "vanguard, organized 
combat staff, and highest organization" of the Vietnamese work- 
ing class, and a "united bloc of will and action" structured on the 
principle of democratic centralism (see Glossary). Democratic cen- 
tralism is a fundamental organizational principle of the party, and, 
according to the 1976 Statute, it mandates not only the "activity 
and creativity" of all party organizations but also "guarantees the 
party's unity of will and action." As a result of unification, the 
Central Committee expanded from 77 to 133 members, the 
1 1 -member Political Bureau of the Central Committee grew to 17, 
including 3 alternate or candidate members, and the Secretariat 
of the Central Committee increased from 7 to 9. More than half 
of the members of the Central Committee were first-time appoin- 
tees, many of whom came from the southern provinces. 

Membership in the party doubled from 760,000 in 1966 to 
1,553,500 in 1976, representing 3.1 percent of the total popula- 
tion. Comparable figures for China (4.2 percent) and the Soviet 
Union (6.9 percent) in 1986 suggest that the 1976 proportion of 
party membership to total population in Vietnam was small. 
Nevertheless, the doubling of the party's size in the space of a decade 
was cause for concern to Vietnam's leaders, who feared that a 
decline in the party's selection standards had resulted in increased 
inefficiency and corruption. They believed that quantity had been 



192 




Ho Chi Minh 's tomb in Hanoi 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



substituted for quality and resolved to stress quality in the future. 
In an effort to purify the party, growth over the next decade was 
deliberately checked. Membership in 1986 was close to 2 million, 
only about 3.3 percent of the population. According to Hanoi's 
estimates, nearly 10 percent, or 200,000 party members, were 
expelled for alleged inefficiency, corruption, or other failures 
between 1976 and 1986. 

Turning to the economy, the Fourth National Party Congress 
transferred the party's emphasis on heavy industry, initiated at the 
Third National Party Congress, to light industry, fishing, forestry, 
and agriculture. It directed attention to the Second Five- Year Plan, 
which was already a year old (see Economic Roles of the Party and 
the Government, ch.3). The Fourth National Party Congress also 
introduced a number of economic objectives, including establish- 
ment on a national scale of a new system of economic manage- 
ment, better use of prices to regulate supply and demand, budgets 
to implement economic development programs, tax policy to con- 
trol sources of income, and banks to supply capital for production. 
Finally, differences over the role of the military surfaced at the con- 
gress, dividing party pragmatists, who saw the army as a supple- 
ment to the labor force, from the more doctrinaire theoreticians, 
who saw the military as a fighting force, the primary mission of 
which would be obstructed by economic tasks. 



193 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

The Fifth National Party Congress, held in March 1982, con- 
firmed Vietnam's alignment with the Soviet Union but revealed 
a breach in party unity and indecision on economic policy. An 
unprecedented six members of the Political Bureau were retired, 
including Vo Nguyen Giap, defense minister and former chief mili- 
tary strategist in the wars against France and the United States, 
and Nguyen Van Linh, future party general secretary who later 
returned to the Political Bureau in June 1985. The six who departed, 
however, were from the middle ranks of the Political Bureau. The 
topmost leaders — from General Secretary Le Duan to fifth-ranked 
member Le Due Tho — remained in their posts. Thirty-four full 
members and twelve alternate members of the Central Commit- 
tee also were dropped. The new Central Committee was increased 
from 133 members and 32 alternate members to 152 members and 
36 alternate members. Party strength had grown to 1.7 million. 

The Sixth National Party Congress, held in December 1986, was 
characterized by candid evaluations of the party and more leader- 
ship changes. There was an extraordinary outpouring of self- 
criticism over the party's failure to improve the economy. A new 
commitment was made to revive the economy but in a more moder- 
ate manner. The policy of the Sixth National Party Congress thus 
attempted to balance the positions of radicals, who urged a quicker 
transition to socialism through collectivization, and moderates, who 
urged increased reliance on free-market forces. Three of the coun- 
try's top leaders voluntarily retired from their party positions: VCP 
General Secretary and President Truong Chinh, aged seventy-nine; 
second-ranked Political Bureau member and Premier Pham Van 
Dong, aged seventy-nine; and party theoretician and fourth-ranked 
Political Bureau member (without government portfolio) Le Due 
Tho, aged seventy-five (see Appendix B). Afterwards, they took 
up positions as advisers, with unspecified powers, to the Central 
Committee. Chinh and Dong retained their government posts until 
the new National Assembly met in June 1987. Their simultaneous 
retirement was unusual in that leaders of Communist nations tend 
either to die in office or to be purged, but it paved the way for 
younger, better educated leaders to rise to the top. 

Nguyen Van Linh, an economic pragmatist, was named party 
general secretary. The new Political Bureau had 14 members, and 
the new Central Committee was expanded to 173, including 124 
full members and 49 alternate members. In continuing the trend 
to purify party ranks by replacing old members, the Sixth Party 
Congress replaced approximately one-third of the Central Com- 
mittee members with thirty-eight new full members and forty-three 



194 



Ho Chi Minh addresses the Third National Party Congress 
(September 1960), flanked by Le Duan and Truong Chinh. 

Courtesy Indochina Archives 

new alternate members. It expanded the Secretariat from ten mem- 
bers to thirteen, only three of whom had previously served. 

Party Organization 

The Party Congress and the Central Committee 

As stipulated in the party Statute, the National Party Congress 
(or National Congress of Party Delegates) is the party's highest 
organ. Because of its unwieldy size (the Sixth National Party Con- 
gress held in December 1986 was attended by 1,129 delegates), 
the infrequency with which it meets (once every 5 years or when 
a special situation arises), and its de facto subordinate position to 
the party's Central Committee, which it elects, the National Party 
Congress lacks real power. In theory, the congress establishes party 
policy, but in actuality it functions as a rubber stamp for the policies 
of the Political Bureau, the Central Committee's decision-making 
body. The primary role of the National Party Congress is to pro- 
vide a forum for reports on party programs since the last congress, 
to ratify party directives for the future, and to elect a Central Com- 
mittee. Once these duties are performed, the congress adjourns, 
leaving the Central Committee, which has a term of five years, 
to implement the policies of the congress. 



195 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

The Central Committee — the party organization in which politi- 
cal power is formally vested — meets more frequently than the 
National Party Congress — at least twice annually in forums called 
plenums — and is much smaller in size (the Central Committee 
elected at the Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986 
numbered 124 full members and 49 alternate members). Like the 
National Party Congress, however, it usually acts to confirm rather 
than establish policy. In reality, the creation of policy is the preroga- 
tive of the Political Bureau, which the Central Committee elects 
and to which it delegates all decision-making authority. 

The Political Bureau, composed of the party's highest ranking 
members, is the party's supreme policy-making body; it possesses 
unlimited decision- and policy-making powers. At the Sixth 
National Party Congress, the Central Committee elected thirteen 
full members and one alternate member to the Political Bureau. 

Acting in administrative capacities under the direction of the 
Political Bureau are a party Secretariat, a Central Control Com- 
mission, and a Central Military Party Committee. The Secretariat 
is the most important of these three bodies, overseeing the party 
and day-to-day implementation of policies set by the Political 
Bureau. In 1986 the Secretariat, headed by the party general secre- 
tary, was expanded from ten to thirteen members. Five of the 
Secretariat's members held concurrent positions on the Political 
Bureau: Nguyen Van Linh, Nguyen Due Tarn, Tran Xuan Bach, 
Dao Duy Tung, and Do Muoi. Among its roles are the supervi- 
sion of Central Committee departments concerned with party 
organization, propaganda and training, foreign affairs, finance, 
science and education, and industry and agriculture. In 1986 there 
existed a seven-member Central Control Commission, appointed 
by the Central Committee and charged with investigating reports 
of party irregularities. A Central Military Party Committee with 
an undisclosed number of members, also appointed by the Cen- 
tral Committee, controlled the party's military affairs. In 1987, 
party committees throughout the armed forces were under the 
supervision of the People's Army of Vietnam's (PAVN — see Glos- 
sary) Directorate General for Political Affairs, which, in turn, was 
responsible to the Central Military Party Committee. These com- 
mittees maintained close relationships with local civilian party com- 
mittees (see fig. 14). 

Other Party Organizations 

Party caucuses operate throughout the government and mass 
organizations. Using assorted methods of persuasion and prose- 
lytization, they implement party lines, policies, and resolutions; 



196 



Government and Politics 



increase party influence and unity; and develop and propose guide- 
lines and programs for mass organizations and party committees 
at various administrative levels. Party caucuses are responsible for 
appointing political cadres to serve as delegates or to hold key posi- 
tions in such government organizations as the National Assembly 
and the people's councils, or in such party organizations as the 
party congresses and the mass organizations (see The System of 
Government, this ch.). In state agencies where the "manager sys- 
tem" is practiced — those in which party cadres have been appointed 
officially to management positions — the functions of party caucuses 
are assumed by coordination and operations committees. 

The chapter is the basic party unit. It numbers from three to 
thirty members depending upon whether it represents a produc- 
tion, work, or military unit. Larger groups, such as factories or 
cooperatives, may have more than one party chapter. A chapter's 
chief responsibilities are to indoctrinate party members and to pro- 
vide political leadership for production units and the armed forces. 

Cadres are party members in leadership positions. They func- 
tion at all levels of party organization but are most numerous at 
lower levels. The strength of the cadre system is its ability to mobi- 
lize the people quickly. Its weaknesses include abuse of power, which 
is facilitated by the absence of enforced standards of conduct, and 
over-reliance by the higher echelons on the lower. The higher party 
leaders tolerate the excesses of lower echelon cadres because the 
lower-level representatives tend to be well entrenched in local society 
and in the best position to influence the people. Higher officials 
simply lack the clout to motivate the people as well. 

Front Organizations 

The purpose of front organizations is to mobilize and recruit for 
the party and to monitor the activities of their members in coopera- 
tion with local security agents. Organizations may be segregated 
by sex, age, national origin, profession, or other traits designated 
by the party. From members of front organizations, such as the Red- 
Scarf Teenagers' Organization and the Ho Chi Minh Communist 
Youth League, the party is able to select potential party members. 

The Vietnam Fatherland Front, because it unites a number of 
subordinate front organizations, is the most important. Its first uni- 
fied national congress took place in January 1977 when all national 
front organizations, including the National Front for the libera- 
tion of South Vietnam, informally called the National Liberation 
Front (NLF, Mat Tran Dan Toe Giai Phong Mien Nam Viet 
Nam), operating in the south, were merged under its banner. In 
the late 1980s, the Vietnam General Confederation of Trade 



197 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS 



CENTRAL COMMITTEE 



ADVISERS 



POLITICAL BUREAU 



! CENTRAL CONTROL 








CENTRAL MILITARY 1 


COMMISSION 










PARTY COMMITTEE [ 



PEOPLE'S ARMY OF 
VIETNAM DIRECTORATE 
GENERAL FOR 
: I POLITICAL AFFAIRS 



DEPARTMENTS 



AGRICULTURE 


FOREIGN AFFAIRS 


PROPAGANDA 
AND TRAINING 


CULTURE 


INDUSTRY 


PROSELYTIZING 


DISTRIBUTION AND 


INTERNAL AFFAIRS 


AND FRONT 


CIRCULATION 








LEGISLATION 


RESEARCH ON 


ECONOMICS AND 




PARTY HISTORY 


PLANNING 


NATIONALITIES 


RESEARCH ON 


EMULATION 


ORGANIZATION 


PARTY THEORY 


FINANCE AND 


OVERSEAS 


SCIENCE AND 


ADMINISTRATION 


VIETNAMESE 


EDUCATION 



Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directory 
of Officials of Vietnam, Washington, July 1985, 1-6; Nguyen Van Canh, Vietnam 
under Communism 1975-1982, Stanford, California, 1983, 57. 



Figure 14. Organization of the Vietnamese Communist Party, 1987 

Unions, described by the party as the "broadest mass organiza- 
tion of the working class," was also significant because its mem- 
bers, along with party members, state employees, and members 
of the Youth League, were included among the elite granted mate- 
rial privileges by the state. Finally, the Ho Chi Minn Communist 
Youth League was important because it acted to screen, train, and 
recruit party members. 



198 



Government and Politics 



In the mid-and late 1980s, the party increasingly viewed the front 
organizations as moribund and criticized them for being no longer 
representative of party policy. Party General Secretary Nguyen Van 
Linh, however, sought to revive and develop them as important 
avenues for controlled criticism of party abuses. 

Political Dynamics 

The VCP has been characterized by the stability of its leader- 
ship. According to Vietnam observer Douglas Pike, Hanoi's leader- 
ship was "forged of a constant forty-year association" in which 
individuals shared "the same common experience, the same devel- 
opment, the same social trauma." Because of their small number, 
Political Bureau members were able to arrive at agreement more 
easily than larger forums and hence were able to deal more effec- 
tively with day-to-day decisions. As individuals, they tended to take 
on a large number of diverse party and government functions, thus 
keeping the administrative apparatus small and highly personalized. 

Decisions tended to be made in a collegial fashion with alliances 
changing on different issues. Where factions existed, they were 
differentiated along lines separating those favoring Moscow from 
those preferring Beijing or along lines distinguishing ideological 
hardliners and purists from reformists and economic pragmatists. 
The accounts of Hoang Van Hoan, a former Political Bureau mem- 
ber who fled to Beijing in 1978, and of Truong Nhu Tang, former 
justice minister of the NLF, verified the existence in the early 1970s 
of factions identified by their loyalty to either Moscow or Beijing. 
They asserted that the pro-Soviet direction taken following Ho Chi 
Minh's death in 1969, and particularly after the Fourth National 
Party Congress in 1976, was the result of the party's having progres- 
sively come under the influence of a small pro-Soviet clique led 
by Party Secretary Le Duan and high-ranking Political Bureau 
member Le Due Tho, and including Truong Chinh, Pham Van 
Dong, and Pham Hung. Until Le Duan's death, these five repre- 
sented a core policy-making element within the Political Bureau. 
Whether or not a similar core of decision makers existed in the 
Political Bureau of the mid-1980s, under Party Secretary Nguyen 
Van Linh, was not clear. 

Differences within the Political Bureau in the mid-1980s, 
however, appeared focused on the country's economic problems. 
The line was drawn between reformists, who were willing to insti- 
tute changes that included a free market system in order to stimu- 
late Vietnam's ailing economy, and ideologues, who feared the effect 
such reforms would have on party control and the ideological purity 
of the society. The leadership changes that occurred in late 1986 



199 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

and early 1987 as a result of the Sixth National Party Congress 
suggested that the reformers might have won concessions in favor 
of moderate economic reform. The scale of the infighting report- 
edly was small, however, and the changes that were made proba- 
bly were undertaken on the basis of a consensus reached between 
the hardliners and the reformers. Nevertheless, the results demon- 
strated that Vietnam's leaders increasingly had come to the realiza- 
tion that rebuilding the country's war-torn economy was as difficult 
an undertaking as conquering the Saigon government. 

Political Culture 

Vietnam's political culture has been determined by a number 
of factors of which communism is but the latest. The country's 
political tradition is one of applying borrowed ideas to indigenous 
conditions. In many ways, Marxism-Leninism simply represents 
a new language in which to express old but consistent cultural orien- 
tations and inclinations. Vietnam's political processes, therefore, 
incorporate as much from the national mythology as from the prag- 
matic concerns engendered by current issues. 

The major influences on Vietnamese political culture were of 
Chinese origin. Vietnam's political institutions were forged by 1,000 
years of Chinese rule (111 B.C. to A.D. 939). The ancient Chinese 
system, based on Confucianism, established a political center sur- 
rounded by loyal subjects. The Confucians stressed the importance 
of the village, endowing it with autonomy but clearly defining its 
relationship to the center. Those who ruled did so with the "man- 
date of heaven." Although they were not themselves considered 
divine, they ruled by divine right by reason of their virtue, which 
was manifested in moral righteousness and compassion for the wel- 
fare of the people. A monarch possessing these traits received the 
unconditional loyalty of his subjects. Selection of bureaucratic offi- 
cials was on the basis of civil service examinations rather than 
heredity, and government institutions were viewed simply as con- 
duits for the superior wisdom of the rulers (see The Social Sys- 
tem, ch. 2). 

The Vietnamese adopted this political system rather than one 
belonging to their Southeast Asian neighbors, whose rulers were 
identified as gods. Nevertheless, Vietnamese interpretations of the 
system differed from those of the Chinese both in the degree of 
loyalty extended to a ruler and in the nature of the relationship 
between the institutions of government and the men who ruled. 
In Vietnam, loyalty to a monarch was conditional upon his suc- 
cess in defending national territory. A history of Chinese domina- 
tion had sensitized the Vietnamese to the importance of retaining 



200 



Government and Politics 



their territorial integrity. In China, territorial control did not arouse 
the same degree of fervor. In interpreting the role of government 
institutions, Vietnamese beliefs also conflicted with Confucian 
theory. Whereas the Confucians held that institutions were neces- 
sarily subordinate to the virtuous ruler, Vietnamese practice held 
the opposite to be true. Institutions were endowed with a certain 
innate authority over the individual, a trait manifested in the Viet- 
namese penchant for creating complex and redundant institutions. 
Despite Confucian influence, Vietnamese practice demonstrated 
a faith in administrative structures and in legalist approaches to 
political problems that was distinctly Vietnamese, not Confucianist. 

Nevertheless, Confucian traits were still discernible in Vietnam 
in the mid-1980s. To begin with, many of the first-generation com- 
munist leaders came from scholar-official backgrounds and were 
well- versed in the traditional requisites of "talent and virtue" (tai 
due) necessary for leadership. Ho Chi Minh's father was a Confu- 
cian scholar, and Vo Nguyen Giap and the brothers Le Due Tho 
and Mai Chi Tho were from scholarly families. They cultivated 
an image of being incorruptible and effective administrators as well 
as moral leaders. The relationship between the government and 
the governed was also deliberately structured to parallel the Con- 
fucian system. Like the Confucians, leaders of the highly central- 
ized Vietnamese communist government stressed the importance 
of the village and clearly defined its relationship to the center. 

In this link between ruler and subjects, the Confucian and com- 
munist systems appeared to co-exist more readily among the dis- 
ciplined peasants of the North than among their reputedly fractious 
brethren in the South, where the influence of India and France 
outweighed that of China. Searching for reasons to explain the 
phenomenon, some observers have suggested that the greater 
difficulty encountered in transforming Vietnam's southern 
provinces into a communist society stemmed, in part, from this 
region's having been the least Sinicized. In addition, Southeast 
Asian influences in South Vietnam, such as Theravada Buddhism, 
had created a cultural climate in which relations with a distant center 
of authority were a norm (see Religion, ch. 2). Moreover, the 
South' s political systems had tended to isolate the center, in both 
symbolic and physical terms, from the majority of the people, who 
had no clear means of access to their government. The South had 
also been the first to fall to the French, who had extended their 
influence there by establishing colonial rule. In the North, however, 
the French had maintained only a protectorate and had allowed 
a measure of self-government. As a result, French influence in the 



201 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

North was less than in the South and represented a smaller obsta- 
cle to the imposition of communism. 

The influence of modern China, and particularly the doctrines 
of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party, on Vietnamese 
political culture is a more complicated issue. Vietnamese leaders, 
including Ho Chi Minh, spent time in China, but they had formed 
their impressions of communism in Paris and Moscow and through 
Moscow-directed Comintern connections. The success of the Chi- 
nese Communist Revolution in 1949, however, inspired the Viet- 
namese communists to continue their own revolution. It also 
enabled them to do so by introducing the People's Republic of 
China as a critical source of material support. The Second National 
Party Congress, held in 1951, reflected renewed determination to 
push ahead with party objectives, including reconstruction of the 
society to achieve communist aims and land reform. 

The Soviet model, as well, can be discerned in Vietnamese 
political practice. In the areas of legal procedure, bureaucratic prac- 
tice, and industrial management, the Vietnamese system more 
closely resembles the Soviet system than the Chinese. In the late 
1950s and early 1960s, VCP leaders were attracted particularly by 
advances made in Soviet economic development. In the majority 
of cases, however, Vietnamese policies and institutions, rather than 
adhering strictly to either Chinese or Soviet models, have tended 
to be essentially Vietnamese responses to Vietnamese problems. 

Traditional adversarial relationships with neighboring states have 
also helped to define Vietnam's political culture. The country's 
long-standing rifts with Cambodia and China, which developed 
into open conflicts in 1978 and 1979 respectively, suggest the need 
to view contemporary relationships in historical perspective (see 
Early History and The Chinese Millennium, ch. 1; Foreign Rela- 
tions, this ch.). Hanoi's attitude regarding its relations with these 
two neighbors is grounded as much in accustomed patterns of inter- 
change as in current concerns for national security. It is also firmly 
based in the Vietnamese tradition of resistance to foreign rule, which 
has been a theme of great appeal to Vietnamese patriots since the 
time of Chinese domination. The founding members of the VCP 
were the dissenting elite of a colonized country. They were attracted 
to Marxism- Leninism not only for its social theories but also because 
of the Leninist response to colonial subjugation. Ho himself was 
reported to have been more concerned with the problem of French 
imperialism than with that of class struggle. 

Vietnam's agrarian economy also contributed to its political cul- 
ture. As an agricultural people, the Vietnamese lacked an urban 
industrial proletariat to carry out their revolution. Leadership, 



202 



Government and Politics 



therefore, necessarily passed into the hands of scholar-official intel- 
lectuals and peasants. 

Vietnam's political culture, in turn, has contributed to the coun- 
try's comparative isolation from noncommunist states. This isola- 
tion is partially a result of the ideology that has created self-imposed 
political barriers with the West, but it is also the result of the col- 
lective mentality of the nation's leadership, which views itself as 
set apart from communist as well as noncommunist nations. This 
view stems from years of preoccupation with the struggle for inde- 
pendence and the reunification of the country. Such an ethnocen- 
tric focus on domestic affairs resulted in a provincial outlook that 
continued in the late 1980s and was reinforced by the lack of inter- 
national experience of many of Vietnam's leaders whose foreign 
travel was limited to official visits to other communist states. In 
addition, Vietnam's military victories over reputedly superior mili- 
tary forces, including those of France, the United States, and, in 
1979, China, have created a sense of arrogance that a wider world 
view would not justify. 

Communist ideology, particularly as manipulated by the Viet- 
namese leadership, has also helped to shape Vietnam's political 
culture. The country's communist leaders have been adept at stress- 
ing the continuity of Marxist-Leninist doctrine with Vietnamese 
history. The VCP successfully identified communism with the 
historical goals of Vietnamese nationalism and achieved leadership 
of Vietnam's independence struggle by accommodating the aspira- 
tions of a number of ethnic, religious, and political groups. The 
party has presented the myths and realities of the past in a man- 
ner that suggests that they led naturally to the present. In his writ- 
ings, Ho Chi Minh used classical Vietnamese literary allusions to 
convey a sense of mystique about the past, and he cultivated the 
classical Vietnamese image of a leader who reflected uy tin (credi- 
bility), a charismatic quality combining elements of compassion, 
asceticism, and correct demeanor, which legitimized a leader's claim 
to authority. The communist regime additionally promoted the 
importance of archaeology, popular literature, and cultural trea- 
sures in order to emphasize its ties to Vietnam's classical tradi- 
tions. VCP historiography views the French colonial period 
(1858-1954) as more an interruption than a part of Vietnamese 
history. 

Despite the care taken to preserve Vietnamese identity, the party 
has hesitated to deviate from Marxist-Leninist doctrine even when 
its application resulted in failure. The planned rapid and total trans- 
formation of the South to communism in the 1970s failed because 
it was almost entirely ideologically inspired and did not sufficiently 



203 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

anticipate the scale of economic and social resistance that such a 
plan would encounter in the South. This failure paralleled the failure 
to collectivize the North rapidly in the 1950s. In both cases, how- 
ever, the party maintained that the predominantly ideological pro- 
grams had been instituted to attain nationalist goals and that 
nationalism had not been exploited for the purpose of furthering 
communism. 

Vietnam's political culture represents, therefore, the steadfast 
survival of what is Vietnamese in the face of a long history of out- 
side influence; integration of historical political ideals with an 
imported communist organizational model has created a communist 
identity that is no less Vietnamese. 

The System of Government 
Constitutional Evolution 

The communist party-controlled government of Vietnam has 
ruled under three state constitutions. The first was promulgated 
in 1946, the second in 1959, and the third in 1980. Significantly, 
each was created at a milestone in the evolution of the VCP, and 
each bore the mark of its time. 

The purpose of the 1946 constitution was essentially to provide 
the communist regime with a democratic appearance. The newly 
established government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV) was sensitive about its communist sponsorship, and it per- 
ceived democratic trappings as more appealing to noncommunist 
nationalists and less provocative to French negotiators. Even though 
such guarantees were never intended to be carried out, the consti- 
tution provided for freedom of speech, the press, and assembly. 
The document remained in effect in Viet Minh-controlled areas 
throughout the First Indochina War (1946-54 — see Glossary) and 
in North Vietnam following partition in 1954, until it was replaced 
with a new constitution in 1959. 

The second constitution was explicitly communist in character. 
Its preamble described the DRV as a "people's democratic state 
led by the working class," and the document provided for a nomi- 
nal separation of powers among legislative, executive, and judi- 
cial branches of government. On paper, the legislative function was 
carried out by the National Assembly. The assembly was empow- 
ered to make laws and to elect the chief officials of the state, such 
as the president (who was largely a symbolic head of state), the 
vice president, and cabinet ministers. Together those elected 
(including the president and vice president) formed a Council of 
Ministers, which constitutionally (but not in practice) was subject 



204 



Government and Politics 



to supervision by the Standing Committee of the National Assem- 
bly. Headed by a prime minister, the council was the highest execu- 
tive organ of state authority. Besides overseeing the Council of 
Ministers, the assembly's Standing Committee also supervised on 
paper the Supreme People's Court, the chief organ of the judiciary. 
The assembly's executive side nominally decided on national eco- 
nomic plans, approved state budgets, and acted on questions of 
war or peace. In reality, however, final authority on all matters 
rested with the Political Bureau. 

The reunification of North and South Vietnam (the former 
Republic of Vietnam) in 1976 provided the primary motivation 
for revising the 1959 constitution. Revisions were made along the 
ideological lines set forth at the Fourth National Congress of the 
VCP in 1976, emphasizing popular sovereignty and promising suc- 
cess in undertaking "revolutions" in production, science and tech- 
nology, culture, and ideology. In keeping with the underlying theme 
of a new beginning associated with reunification, the constitution 
also stressed the need to develop a new political system, a new econ- 
omy, a new culture, and a new socialist person. 

The 1959 document had been adopted during the tenure of Ho 
Chi Minh and demonstrated a certain independence from the Soviet 
model of state organization. The 1980 Constitution was drafted 
when Vietnam faced a serious threat from China, and political and 
economic dependence on the Soviet Union had increased. Perhaps, 
as a result, the completed document resembles the 1977 Soviet Con- 
stitution. 

The 1980 Vietnamese Constitution concentrates power in a newly 
established Council of State much like the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet, endowing it nominally with both legislative and executive 
powers. Many functions of the legislature remain the same as under 
the 1959 document, but others have been transferred to the 
executive branch or assigned to both branches concurrently. The 
executive branch appears strengthened overall, having gained a 
second major executive body, the Council of State, and the impor- 
tance of the National Assembly appears to have been reduced 
accordingly. The role of the Council of Ministers, while appear- 
ing on paper to have been subordinated to the new Council of State, 
in practice retained its former primacy (see Council of State and 
Council of Ministers, this ch.; Appendix A, table 12). 

Among the innovative features of the 1980 document is the con- 
cept of "collective mastery" of society, a frequently used expres- 
sion attributed to the late party secretary, Le Duan (1908-1986). 
The concept is a Vietnamese version of popular sovereignty that 
advocates an active role for the people so that they may become 



205 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



their own masters as well as masters of society, nature, and the 
nation. It states that the people's collective mastery in all fields is 
assured by the state and is implemented by permitting the partici- 
pation in state affairs of mass organizations. On paper, these orga- 
nizations, to which almost all citizens belong, play an active role 
in government and have the right to introduce bills before the 
National Assembly. 

Another feature is the concept of socialist legality, which dic- 
tates that "the state manage society according to law and constantly 
strengthen the socialist legal system." The concept, originally intro- 
duced at the Third National Party Congress in 1960, calls for 
achieving socialist legality through the state, its organizations, and 
its people. Law, in effect, is made subject to the decisions and direc- 
tives of the party. 

The apparent contradiction between the people's right to active 
participation in government suggested by collective mastery and 
the party's absolute control of government dictated by "socialist 
legality" is characteristic of communist political documents in which 
rights provided the citizenry often are negated by countermeasures 
appearing elsewhere in the document. Vietnam's constitutions have 
not been guarantors, therefore, of the rights of citizens or of the 
separation and limitation of powers. They have been intended 
instead to serve the party-controlled regime. 

The 1980 Constitution comprises 147 articles in 12 chapters deal- 
ing with numerous subjects, including the basic rights and duties 
of citizens. Article 67 guarantees the citizens' rights to freedom 
of speech, the press, assembly, and association, and the freedom 
to demonstrate. Such rights are, nevertheless, subject to a caveat 
stating "no one may misuse democratic freedoms to violate the 
interests of the state and the people." With this stipulation, all rights 
are conditionally based upon the party's interpretation of what con- 
stitutes behavior in the state's and people's interest. 

Government Structure 

The National Assembly 

Constitutionally, the National Assembly is the highest govern- 
ment organization and the highest-level representative body of the 
people. It has the power to draw up, adopt, and amend the consti- 
tution and to make and amend laws. It also has the responsibility 
to legislate and implement state plans and budgets. Through its 
constitution-making powers it defines its own role and the roles 
of the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, the People's Coun- 
cils and People's Committees, the Supreme People's Court, and 



206 



Government and Politics 



the Supreme People's Organs of Control. The assembly can elect 
and remove members of the Council of Ministers, the chief justice 
of the Supreme People's Court, and the procurator general of the 
People's Supreme Organ of Control. Finally, it has the power to 
initiate or conclude wars and to assume other duties and powers 
it deems necessary. The term of each session of the National Assem- 
bly is five years, and meetings are convened twice a year, or more 
frequently if called for by the Council of State. 

Despite its many formal duties, the National Assembly exists 
mainly as a legislative arm of the VCP's Political Bureau. It con- 
verts Political Bureau resolutions into laws and decrees and mobi- 
lizes popular support for them. In this role, the National Assembly 
is led by the Council of Ministers acting through the Council of 
State and a variable number of special-purpose committees. Actual 
debate on legislation does not occur. Instead, a bill originates in 
the Council of Ministers, which registers the bill and assigns a key 
party member to present it on the floor. Before presentation, the 
member will have received detailed instructions from the party 
caucus in the assembly, which has held study sessions regarding 
the proposed legislation. Once the legislation is presented, mem- 
bers vote according to party guidelines. 

A general national election to choose National Assembly delegates 
is held every five years. The first election following the reunifica- 
tion of the North and South was held in April 1976 and the voters 
selected 492 members, of which 243 represented the South and 249 
the North. In 1987 the Eighth National Assembly numbered 496 
members. Because successful candidates were chosen in advance, 
the electoral process was not genuine. No one could run for office 
unless approved by the party, and in many cases the local body 
of the party simply appointed the candidates. Nevertheless, every 
citizen had a duty to vote, and, although the balloting was secret, 
the electorate, through electoral study sessions, received directives 
from the party concerning who should be elected. The elections 
in 1987, however, were comparatively open by Vietnamese stan- 
dards. It was evident that the party was tolerating a wider choice 
in candidates and more debate. 

The Council of State 

The Council of State is the highest standing body of the National 
Assembly. Its members, who serve as a collective presidency for 
Vietnam, are elected from among National Assembly deputies. The 
Council of State is "responsible and accountable" to the National 
Assembly, according to Chapter VII of the 1980 Constitution. It 
plays a more active role than the titular presidency provided for 



207 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

in the 1959 constitution and, in addition, it has assumed the day- 
to-day duties of the former Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly under the old constitution. The council thus holds both 
legislative and executive powers, but in actuality it wields less power 
than the Council of Ministers. As stipulated in the Constitution, 
the Council of State comprises a chairman, several vice chairmen 
(there were three in 1987), a general secretary, and members (there 
were seven in 1987). Members of the Council of State cannot be 
concurrently members of the Council of Ministers. Its chairman 
concurrently commands the armed forces and chairs the National 
Defense Council, which controls the armed forces (see The Armed 
Forces, ch. 5). The Council of State nominally presides over the 
election of deputies to the National Assembly; promulgates laws 
and issues decrees; supervises the work of the Council of Ministers, 
the Supreme People's Court, the procurator general of the Supreme 
People's Organ of Control, and the People's Councils at all levels; 
decides, when the National Assembly is not in session, to form or 
dissolve ministries and state committees and to appoint or dismiss 
the vice chairmen of the Council of Ministers, ministers, and heads 
of state committees; declares a state of war, and orders general or 
local mobilization in the event of invasion. Such decisions, however, 
must be submitted to the next session of the National Assembly 
for ratification. The five-year term of the Council corresponds with 
that of the National Assembly, but the Council continues its func- 
tions until the new National Assembly elects a new Council of State. 

The Council of Ministers 

The Council of Ministers is entrusted by the 1980 Constitution 
with managing and implementing the governmental activities of 
the state. It is described in that document as "the Government 
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the highest executive and 
administrative state body of the highest body of state authority." 
It is accountable to the National Assembly, and, more directly, 
to the Council of State when the National Assembly is not in ses- 
sion. Its duties include submitting draft laws, decrees, and other 
bills to the National Assembly and the Council of State; drafting 
state plans and budgets and implementing them following the 
National Assembly's approval; managing the development of the 
national economy; organizing national defense activities and assur- 
ing the preparedness of the armed forces; and organizing and 
managing the state's foreign relations. Its membership includes a 
chairman, vice chairman, cabinet ministers, and the heads of state 
committees, whose terms of office coincide with that of the National 
Assembly. The Council of Ministers includes its own standing 



208 



Government and Politics 



committee, which serves to coordinate and mobilize the council's 
activities. In 1986 the standing committee was expanded from ten 
to thirteen members. 

Each ministry is headed by a minister, who is assisted by two 
to twelve vice ministers. The number and functions of the minis- 
tries are not prescribed in the Constitution, but in 1987 there were 
twenty-three ministries, and a number of other specialized com- 
missions and departments. In apparent response to the call by the 
Sixth National Party Congress in 1986 for a streamlined bureau- 
cracy, several ministries were merged. The former ministries of 
agriculture, food, and food industry were joined in a newly created 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry. The ministries of power 
and mines were merged to form the Ministry of Energy, and a newly 
created Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare con- 
solidated the duties of three former ministries. The addition of two 
new ministerial bodies also resulted from the 1986 Congress: a 
Ministry of Information to replace the Vietnam Radio and Tele- 
vision Commission, and a Commission for Economic Relations 
with Foreign Countries to act as a coordinating body for foreign aid. 

People's Courts and People's Organs of Control 

Vietnam's judicial bodies are the Supreme People's Court, the 
local People's Courts at the provincial, district, and city levels, the 
military tribunals, and the People's Organs of Control (see Inter- 
nal Security, ch. 5). Under special circumstances, such as show- 
case trials involving breaches of national security, the National 
Assembly or the Council of State may set up special tribunals. 
Judges are elected for a term equivalent to that of the bodies that 
elected them, and trials are held with the participation of people's 
assessors, who may also act as judges. The Constitution guaran- 
tees defendants the right to plead their cases. Cases are prosecuted 
by a procurator. 

The Supreme People's Court is the highest tribunal and is 
charged with the supervision of subordinate courts. As a court of 
first instance, it tries cases involving high treason or other crimes 
of a serious nature; and as the highest court of appeals, it reviews 
cases originating with the lower courts. Appeals are infrequent, 
however, because lower courts tend to act as final arbiters. 

Local people's courts function at each administrative level except 
at the village level, where members of the village administrative 
committees serve in a judicial capacity. Proceedings of local courts 
are presided over by people's assessors. 

The Supreme People's Organs of Control function as watchdogs 
of the state and work independently of all other government 



209 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



agencies, although they are nominally responsible to the National 
Assembly. They are subordinate to the Supreme People's Organ 
of Control also known as the Supreme People's Procurate, which, 
in turn, is headed by a chief procurator or procurator general. These 
organs exercise extraordinary powers of surveillance over govern- 
ment agencies at every level, including the court system and agen- 
cies for law enforcement. 

A new Penal Code was adopted in January 1986, replacing a 
1950 code of justice based on the French Civil Code. Under the 
new code, crime is defined very broadly. Authorities interpret a 
wide range of antisocial behavior as potentially criminal, such as 
graft, petty corruption, hoarding, and currency malpractice (see 
fig. 15). 

Local Government 

Vietnam in 1987 remained divided into thirty- six provinces, three 
autonomous municipalities, and one special zone directly under 
the central government (see fig. 1). Provinces are divided into dis- 
tricts, towns, and capitals. The autonomous municipalities directly 
under central authority are divided into precincts, and these are 
subdivided into wards. Provincial districts are divided into villages 
and townships; provincial towns and provincial capitals are divided 
into wards and villages. Each administrative level has a people's 
council and a people's committee. 

The people's councils represent the local authority of the state 
and are the top supervisory bodies at each level. They do not govern 
directly but instead elect and oversee people's committees that act 
as executive bodies and carry out local administrative duties. Coun- 
cil members are popularly elected — although candidates are 
screened by the party — and are responsible for ensuring strict local 
observance of the Constitution and laws and for ruling on local 
plans and budgets. Council members are further charged with over- 
seeing the development and maintenance of local armed forces units 
(see The Armed Forces, ch. 5). 

Following the Fourth National Party Congress in 1976, the dis- 
tricts became the basic administrative units of the government. The 
Congress had declared that the districts should become agro- 
industrial economic units, acting to orchestrate the reorganization 
of production. Formerly, they had functioned simply as intermedi- 
aries for channeling directives to the village level. After 1976 they 
functioned as agencies for economic planning, budgeting, and 
management, and as the chief political units of local government. 
Emphasis on this latter function has created an enormous bureau- 
cracy. Many provincial people's committees have in excess of thirty 



210 



Government and Politics 



separate departments, and each district people's committee has had 
to establish an equal number of counterparts. 

The three autonomous municipalities in Vietnam are Hanoi, 
Haiphong, and Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). The govern- 
ment of an autonomous municipality consists of an elected peo- 
ple's council that in turn elects an executive committee headed by 
a mayor. The executive committee oversees numerous departments 
administering various activities. 

The precinct wards of the three autonomous municipalities are 
divided into sectors, which are then further divided into neighbor- 
hood solidarity cells. As many as 28 to 30 cells, together number- 
ing 400 to 600 households, may make up a sector, and 10 sectors 
may compose a ward. The administration of a village corresponds 
to that of an urban ward. 

The ward executive committee ensures that government activi- 
ties prescribed by the precinct committee are carried out. The 
precinct committee simply represents an intermediary level between 
the municipal government and the ward committees. 

At the ward level, in addition to people's councils and executive 
committees, there are security departments with connections to the 
national security apparatus. The security departments monitor the 
activities of ward members, but the departments' decisions are kept 
secret from the chairpersons of the ward executive committees (see 
Internal Security, ch. 5). 

A sector, instead of having an executive committee, has a resi- 
dents' protective committee concerned with fighting fires and 
preventing petty crime. A sector security officer is charged with 
the suppression of dissent. Every head of household belongs to a 
subcell of only a few families and reports regularly to a neighbor- 
hood solidarity cell comprising twelve to twenty families. Party 
directives and policies reach the citizenry via the party's mass orga- 
nizations or the hierarchy of the party and its representatives at 
the ward level. 

Foreign Relations 

Until the fall of the South Vietnamese government in 1975, the 
VCP considered foreign policy interests to be subordinate to the 
overriding issue of national liberation and reunification. Only with 
the end of the war did Hanoi turn its full attention to foreign policy 
concerns. Among the more pressing were its relations with Laos, 
Cambodia, China, the Soviet Union, the member nations of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the West. 
Like domestic policy, foreign policy required the reconciliation of 
ideology and nationalism. 



211 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Li. _J 



q. b 
So 

£ o 

co O 



CO 
LU 
_J 
Q. 

2 o 

LU 

cc 

CL 

CO 



CO 

z 

< _l 

o o 

cc cc 

°z 
Wo 

UJ Q 
QL LU 

o o 





^0 



212 



Government and Politics 



From an ideological standpoint, the Vietnamese saw themselves 
as fulfilling their international socialist duty by defeating a major 
"imperialist" enemy and by carrying out a revolution that could 
be a model for the Third World. Communist ideology in turn served 
Vietnamese nationalism by providing a justification for the pur- 
suit of its nationalist goals. A Marxist- Leninist historical view, for 
example, justified creating an alliance of the three Indochinese coun- 
tries because such an alliance was instrumental in the struggle 
against imperialism. By the same reasoning, Hanoi's decision in 
1978 to overthrow the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia was defensible 
on the grounds that a new government more closely dedicated to 
Marxist-Leninist principles was required in Cambodia in order to 
reestablish an effective alliance against imperialism. Ideological and 
nationalist goals thus were often interchangeable, and Vietnamese 
foreign policy could be construed as serving national interests and 
international communism at the same time. In the final analysis, 
however, nationalism and national security remained the primary 
foreign policy concerns. 

Laos and Cambodia 

In 1987 Vietnam's relationships with Laos and Cambodia did 
not differ substantially from their historic patterns. Contemporary 
Vietnamese attitudes reflected the conviction of cultural and politi- 
cal superiority that had prevailed during the nineteenth century 
when weaker monarchs in Laos and Cambodia had paid tribute 
to the Vietnamese court in a system modeled on Vietnam's own 
relationship to China (see The Chinese Millennium, Nine Centu- 
ries of Independence, ch. 1). In the 1980s, Laos and Cambodia 
had once more become Vietnam's client states. Laos, with a com- 
munist party long nurtured by the Vietnamese, entered the rela- 
tionship with docility; Cambodia, however, under a ruthless, but 
anti- Vietnamese dictatorship of its own, resisted being drawn into 
the Vietnamese orbit. Tension between the two states escalated into 
open warfare and, in 1978, Hanoi launched an invasion that toppled 
the Pol Pot regime in Phnom Penh. In 1987 Cambodia remained 
a state governed precariously by a regime installed by Hanoi, its 
activities constrained by the presence of a substantial Vietnamese 
occupation force and a tenacious insurgency in the countryside. 
Repeated Vietnamese assurances that Hanoi would withdraw its 
troops from the beleaguered country by 1990 were received with 
skepticism by some observers. 

The communist victory in Vietnam in 1975 was accompanied 
by similar communist successes in Laos and Cambodia. The 
impression of the noncommunist world at the time was that the 



213 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



three Indochinese communist parties, having seized control in their 
respective countries, would logically work together, through the 
fraternal bond of a single ideology, to achieve common objectives. 
What appeared to be a surprising deterioration in relations, 
however, was actually the resurfacing of historical conflict that ideo- 
logical commonality could not override (see Early History, ch. 1). 
The victories of the Vietnamese communists and the Cambodian 
communist Khmer Rouge (see Glossary) in 1975 did not bring 
peace. Relations between the two parties had been strained since 
the close of the First Indochina War. The Geneva Agreements had 
failed to secure for the Khmer communists, as part of the first Cam- 
bodian national liberation organization, the United Issarak Front, 
a legitimate place in Cambodian politics. Some Khmer Communist 
and Issarak leaders subsequently went to Hanoi, but among those 
who stayed behind, Pol Pot and his faction, who later gained con- 
trol of the Khmer (Kampuchean) Communist party, blamed Viet- 
nam for having betrayed their party at Geneva. Pol Pot never lost 
his antipathy for Vietnam. Under his leadership, the Khmer Rouge 
adhered for years to a radical, chauvinistic, and bitterly anti- 
Vietnamese political line. Skirmishes broke out on the Cambodian- 
Vietnamese border almost immediately following the communist 
victories in Saigon and Phnom Penh, and in less than four years 
Vietnam was again at war, this time with Cambodia. Vietnam's 
offensive forces crossing the Cambodia border in December 1978 
took less than a month to occupy Phnom Penh and most of the 
country. 

When tensions between Cambodia and Vietnam broke into the 
open, the reason was ostensibly Cambodian demands that Hanoi 
return territory conquered by the Vietnamese centuries earlier. 
Vietnam's offers to negotiate the territorial issue were rejected, 
however, because of more urgent Khmer concerns that Hanoi 
intended to dominate Cambodia by forming an Indochina Federa- 
tion (see Glossary) or "special relationship." In any event, Viet- 
namese interest in resolving the situation peacefully clearly came 
to an end once the decisison was made to invade Cambodia. 

The invasion and the subsequent establishment of a puppet 
regime in Phnom Penh were costly to Hanoi, further isolating it 
from the international community. Vietnam's relations with a num- 
ber of countries and with the United Nations (UN) deteriorated. 
The UN General Assembly refused to recognize the Vietnamese- 
supported government in Phnom Penh and demanded a total 
Vietnamese withdrawal followed by internationally supervised free 
elections. The ASEAN nations were unified in opposing Vietnam's 
action. Urged by Thailand's example, they provided support for 



214 



representing Vietnamese and Cambodian solidarity, 

Prey Veng, Cambodia 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



215 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

the anti-Phnom Penh resistance. In February 1979, China moved 
to retaliate against Vietnam across their mutual border (see China, 
this ch.). 

The ensuing conflict in Cambodia pitted Vietnamese troops, 
assisted by forces of the new Phnom Penh government — the Peo- 
ple's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) — against a coalition of com- 
munist and noncommunist resistance elements. Of these elements, 
the government displaced from Phnom Penh by the Vietnamese, 
Pol Pot's communist Khmer Rouge (which had established the 
government known as Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodia in 
1975), was the strongest and most effective military force, mainly 
because of support from the Chinese. The extremism and brutality 
of the Khmer Rouge's brief reign in Phnom Penh, where it may 
have been responsible for as many as 2 million deaths, made it 
infamous. ASEAN 's concern that the reputation of the Khmer 
Rouge would lessen the international appeal of the anti- Vietnamese 
cause led it to press the Khmer Rouge and noncommunist resistance 
elements into forming a coalition that would appear to diminish 
the Khmer Rouge's political role. The tripartite Coalition Govern- 
ment of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was formed on June 22, 
1982. In addition to the Khmer Rouge, it comprised a noncom- 
munist resistance force called the Kampuchean People's National 
Liberation Front (KPNLF) — under the leadership of a former offi- 
cial of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's government, Son Sann — and 
Sihanouk's own noncommunist force (the Armee Nationale 
Sihanoukiste — ANS). The Cambodian government in exile needed 
the added legitimacy that noncommunist factions and the prestige 
of Sihanouk's name could contribute. The Chinese were reluctant 
to withdraw their support from the Khmer Rouge, which they 
viewed as the only effective anti-Vietnamese fighting force among 
the three coalition members. They were persuaded, however, to 
support the coalition and eventually began supplying arms to Son 
Sann and Sihanouk as well as Pol Pot. 

Despite an extensive record of internal squabbling, the coalition 
government in 1987 provided the international community with 
an acceptable alternative to the Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin 
regime in Phnom Penh. From 1982 to 1987, the coalition survived 
annual Vietnamese dry-season campaigns against its base camps 
along the Thai-Cambodian border, and, by changing its tactics 
in 1986 to emphasize long-term operations deep in the Cambodian 
interior, increased its military effectiveness. The coalition's mili- 
tary operations prevented the Vietnamese from securing all of Cam- 
bodia and helped create a stalemate. 



216 



Government and Politics 



In 1987 the situation remained deadlocked. Despite the costs, 
Vietnam's negotiating position remained inflexible. Hanoi appar- 
ently perceived itself to have gained enormously in terms of national 
security. The "special relationship" it had futilely sought with Pol 
Pot was effected almost immediately with the new Phnom Penh 
government when, in February 1979, a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation was signed. In 1982 and 1983 a substantial number 
of Vietnamese reportedly settled in Cambodia, although Vietnam 
did not seem to be making a concerted effort to colonize the coun- 
try. Instead, Hanoi appeared to be striving to build an indigenous 
regime that would be responsive to general Vietnamese direction 
and become part of an Indochinese community under Vietnamese 
hegemony. 

In contrast to its relationship with Cambodia, Vietnam's rela- 
tions with communist Laos have been fairly stable. Historically, 
the ethnic tribes comprising present-day Laos had been less resis- 
tant to Vietnamese subjugation, and relations had never reached 
the level of animosity characteristic of the Vietnam-Cambodia rela- 
tionship. 

Although Hanoi was a signatory to the Geneva Agreement of 
1962 that upheld the neutrality of Laos, it has failed to observe 
the agreement in practice. During the Second Indochina War (see 
Glossary), for example, the North Vietnamese obtained the cooper- 
ation of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (Pathet Lao) in con- 
structing and maintaining the Ho Chi Minh Trail (see Glossary), 
an unauthorized road communications network that passed through 
the length of Laos. Thousands of Vietnamese troops were stationed 
in Laos to maintain the road network and provide for its security. 
Vietnamese military personnel also fought beside the Pathet Lao 
in its struggle to overthrow Laos' neutralist government. Coopera- 
tion persisted after the war and the Lao communist victory. In 1976, 
agreements on cooperation in cultural, economic, scientific, and 
technical fields were signed between the two countries, followed 
in 1977 by a twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Coopera- 
tion. The treaty was intended to strengthen ties as well as sanction 
Vietnam's military presence in, and military assistance to, Laos. 
Following Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, Laos established links 
with the Vietnamese- supported PRK in Phnom Penh. Meanwhile, 
Hanoi maintained 40,000 to 60,000 troops in Laos. In 1985 the 
three governments discussed coordinating their 1986-90 five-year 
plans, and Vietnam assumed a larger role in developing Lao natural 
resources by agreeing to joint exploitation of Laotian forests 
and iron ore deposits. Nevertheless, such growth in cooperation 



217 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



prompted some debate on the Lao side over the country's grow- 
ing dependence on Vietnam. 

China 

The deterioration of Sino- Vietnamese relations was gradual, com- 
mencing perhaps most dramatically with Richard M. Nixon's 1972 
visit to China (which Hanoi later called the beginning of China's 
betrayal of Vietnam), but in the mid-1970s the signs of an impend- 
ing breakdown were barely discernible. Until 1977 the Vietnam- 
Cambodia dispute appeared to the outside world to be purely 
bilateral, and China's strategic considerations seemed only distantly 
connected to the skirmishes taking place on the Vietnamese- 
Cambodian border. The Chinese in the 1976-77 period were pre- 
occupied with internal affairs, including the deaths of Mao Zedong 
and Zhou Enlai, the arrest of Mao's widow, and the return to power 
of Deng Xiaoping. As the situation between Vietnam and Cam- 
bodia deteriorated, Cambodia's strategic importance to both China 
and Vietnam became more evident, and signs of a potential Sino- 
Vietnamese rift became clearer. Aside from risking the return of 
the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam viewed disengagement from Cambo- 
dia as tantamount to inviting China to establish a foothold on a 
second Vietnamese frontier. In China's view, Vietnam's sustained 
presence in Cambodia precluded such a development, but, more 
importantly, it placed Cambodia under the authority of an historic 
Asian adversary now closely allied with a superpower rival, the 
Soviet Union. 

Vietnam's and China's shared modern experiences, namely their 
common exploitation by colonial powers and adaptations to com- 
munist ideology, did little to alter Vietnam's historical view of 
China, which was colored by lengthy periods of Chinese conquest 
and domination. During the Second Indochina War, China acted 
as North Vietnam's closest ally, but, according to later Vietnamese 
statements, the Chinese tried to dominate the relationship from 
the beginning. Vietnam's desperate need for Chinese assistance 
forced it to maintain good relations with Beijing for the duration 
of the war, despite Vietnamese suspicions that China's ultimate 
purpose was to weaken Vietnam (see The Chinese Millennium and 
Nine Centuries of Independence, ch. 1). 

After the end of the Second Indochina War, underlying tensions 
between the two countries surfaced, and in 1978 a number of issues 
converged to bring the relationship to the breaking point. In addi- 
tion to the growing dispute in Cambodia, these issues included ter- 
ritorial disagreements and Vietnam's treatment of its own largest 



218 



Government and Politics 



minority group, the Hoa (see Glossary) or ethnic Chinese, who 
numbered nearly 2 million. 

The territorial dispute involved primarily delineation of territorial 
waters in the Gulf of Tonkin and sovereignty over two archipela- 
gos in the South China Sea, the Paracel and the Spratly Islands 
(the Xisha and the Nansha in Chinese; the Hoang Sa and Truong 
Sa in Vietnamese). A border dispute on land (over fewer than sixty 
square kilometers) was responsible for the relatively steady occur- 
rence of low-level border clashes involving cross-border violations 
and the exchange of small-arms fire. In 1958 the two governments 
decided to defer settling their border differences until after victory 
had been achieved in the South. 

Disagreement over territorial waters in the Gulf of Tonkin 
stemmed from agreements reached between China and France in 
1887, stipulating a territorial limit of no more than three nautical 
miles. These agreements had been adequate until 1973, when Hanoi 
announced to Beijing its intention to negotiate contracts with for- 
eign firms for the exploration of oil in the Gulf of Tonkin. The 
disputed islands in the South China Sea assumed importance only 
after it was disclosed that they were near the potential sites of sub- 
stantial offshore oil deposits. In January 1974, Chinese military 
units seized islands in the Paracels occupied by South Vietnamese 
armed forces, and Beijing claimed sovereignty over the Spratlys. 
Following their conquest of South Vietnam in the spring of 1975, 
units of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) nevertheless moved 
to occupy the Spratly Islands previously held by the Saigon regime. 

Vietnam's treatment of the Hoa became an issue in 1978, when 
Hanoi instituted a crackdown on the Chinese community because 
of its pervasive role in domestic commerce in the South and its 
alleged subversive activities in the North. The government action 
forced an unprecedented exodus of thousands of Hoa across the 
border into China, prompting Beijing to accuse Vietnam of per- 
secuting its Chinese community and of breaking a 1955 agreement 
that called for the gradual and voluntary integration of the Hoa 
into Vietnamese society. The situation was aggravated when Viet- 
nam denied landing privileges to three Chinese ships dispatched 
to evacuate Hoa seeking voluntary repatriation to China. Beijing 
threatened Hanoi with unspecified retaliation, and Chinese activities 
on the Sino- Vietnamese border escalated. 

The deterioration in bilateral relations became evident when China 
reduced in May 1978 and then cancelled on July 3 its remaining 
aid projects in Vietnam. The official announcement followed by only 
a few days Hanoi's admission on June 29 to the Soviet-dominated 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon — see Glossary). 



219 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



A few months later, in November 1978, a new era in Soviet- 
Vietnamese relations began with the signing of a Treaty of Friend- 
ship and Cooperation that called for mutual assistance and 
consultation in the event of a security threat to either country. The 
document facilitated Soviet use of Vietnamese airports and port 
facilities, particularly the former United States military complex 
at Cam Ranh Bay (see The Armed Forces, ch. 5). In return, it 
assured Vietnam of economic and military aid for the anticipated 
invasion of Cambodia and established the Soviet Union as a 
deterrent to possible Chinese intervention in Cambodia. 

Vietnam's decision to align with the Soviets, together with its 
invasion of Cambodia and mistreatment of the Hoa, provoked Bei- 
jing to "teach Hanoi a lesson." A "self-defense counterattack," 
mounted by China along the Sino-Vietnamese border on Febru- 
ary 17, 1979, ended less than a month later, on March 5, when 
Chinese leaders announced that their objectives had been met and 
proceeded to withdraw their forces (see History, ch. 5). Despite 
the Chinese boast of having shattered the myth of Vietnam's invinci- 
bility, the invasion effected little more than the diversion of some 
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. The bulk of the resistance 
reportedly was offered by local Vietnamese border units and 
regional forces. Outnumbered, they performed well, exposing sig- 
nificant weaknesses in Chinese tactics, strategy, logistics, equip- 
ment, and communications. In the final analysis, the results were 
far from conclusive. Peace negotiations were initiated following the 
disengagement of forces, but broke down several times before being 
discontinued in December 1979. 

The Cambodian crisis, too, remained stalemated, and Vietnam- 
ese dependence upon the Soviet Union continued. In 1987 ten- 
sions along the Sino-Vietnamese border erupted in sporadic 
fighting. China believed that the Cambodian conflict would serve 
Chinese interests by draining the Vietnamese economically and 
weakening Hanoi. China's sustained pressure on Vietnam's north- 
ern border would also tax Vietnam militarily, while satisfying 
ASEAN 's requests for Chinese assistance in the conflict and provid- 
ing Chinese armed forces with invaluable combat experience. Con- 
sequently, Vietnam's dry-season campaigns to eliminate CGDK 
resistance base camps along the Thai-Cambodian border were 
generally matched by corresponding Chinese acts along the Sino- 
Vietnamese border. China issued vague threats to Vietnam of a 
"second lesson" in the mid-1980s but as of 1987 had not acted 
on these threats. 

China imposed the removal of Vietnamese troops from Cam- 
bodia as a precondition to improved Sino-Soviet relations, and 



220 



Lang Son following 1979 Chinese invasion 
Courtesy Bill Herod 

diplomatic activity in late 1 986 indicated that Vietnam might mend 
its differences with China in the event the Soviets moved closer 
to the Chinese. Despite Hanoi's desire to ease tensions with Bei- 
jing, however, it was not willing to do so at the expense of its posi- 
tion in Cambodia. 

The Soviet Union 

Since the earliest days of the VCP, when the party's primary 
mentor was the Comintern, the Soviet Union has played a com- 
plex role in VCP affairs. Many of Vietnam's leaders had trained 
in the Soviet Union and had formed personal ties with their Soviet 
contemporaries. Historically, however, the relationship between 
the two nations has been characterized by strain, particularly on 
the Vietnamese side, and the record suggests several instances of 
Soviet neglect or betrayal of Vietnamese interests. These included 
Moscow's indifference to the founding of the VCP in 1930; failure 
to support materially or otherwise the Vietnamese resistance war 
against the French in the 1930s and early 1940s; failure to recog- 
nize North Vietnam until five years after its founding; failure to 
support Vietnam's application for membership in the UN in 1948 
and 1951; support for the partitioning of Vietnam at the Geneva 
Conference in 1954; and sponsorship of a proposal to admit both 
North and South Vietnam to the UN in 1956. These examples of 



221 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Soviet policy reminded the Vietnamese of the peril inherent in plac- 
ing too much trust in a foreign ally. 

The Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s favorably altered the Soviet 
attitude toward Vietnam. Beginning in 1965, the Soviets initiated 
a program of military assistance to Hanoi that proved invaluable 
in carrying on the Second Indochina War. Hanoi, however, con- 
tinued to suspect Soviet motives and perceived that Soviet aid, when 
offered, was insufficient and given only grudgingly after repeated 
appeals. 

Following the conquest of South Vietnam in 1975, Hanoi sought 
to retain the equilibrium of its wartime relations with both China 
and the Soviet Union, but mounting tensions with Beijing, cul- 
minating in the loss of Chinese aid in 1978, compelled Hanoi to 
look increasingly to Moscow for economic and military assistance. 
Beginning in late 1975, a number of significant agreements were 
signed between the two countries. One coordinated the national 
economic development plans of the two countries, and another 
called for the Soviet Union to underwrite Vietnam's first post- 
reunification Five- Year Plan. The first formal alliance was achieved 
in June 1978 when Vietnam joined Comecon. That organization, 
which facilitated the economic integration of the Soviet Union, six 
East European countries, Cuba, and Mongolia, was able to offer 
economic assistance for some of the projects abandoned by China 
(see Foreign Trade and Aid, ch. 3). 

Vietnam's decision to invade Cambodia, which the leadership 
apparently made shortly after joining Comecon, required more than 
economic assistance from the Soviets (see Laos and Cambodia, this 
ch.). The possibility of a formal alliance between Hanoi and 
Moscow had apparently been discussed since 1975, but the Viet- 
namese had rejected the idea in order to protect their relationship 
with China. In 1978 that relationship had deteriorated to the point 
where protecting it was no longer a consideration, and circum- 
stances in Cambodia confirmed the need for Vietnamese-Soviet 
military cooperation. In spite of Vietnam's needs, it is likely that 
the November 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was 
imposed by the Soviets as a condition for military assistance. As 
a result of the treaty, the Vietnamese granted the Soviets access 
to the facilities at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay. Use of the bases 
represented a substantial regional strategic gain for Moscow, whose 
naval bases in the Pacific Ocean, until then, had been limited to 
the Soviet Far East. 

Soviet support sustained Vietnamese operations in Cambodia. 
Military aid in 1978 approached US$800 million annually, but after 
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese attack on 



222 



Government and Politics 



Vietnam in February 1979, the figure rose to almost US$1.4 bil- 
lion. The sharp increase, reflecting the Soviet effort to replace 
quickly Vietnamese equipment losses on the Sino-Vietnamese 
border, was subsequently reduced to between US$800 and 900 mil- 
lion in 1980 and between US$900 million and 1 billion in 1981. 
Military aid increased to 1.7 billion annually in the 1982-85 period 
and decreased to an estimated US$1.5 billion in 1985. Reported 
Soviet dissatisfaction with Hanoi's handling of Cambodia, stem- 
ming from the stalemated battlefield situation and its high costs, 
did not appear to affect Moscow's decision to continue to provide 
assistance for the war. At the end of 1987, there was no indication 
that the Soviets were pressing Vietnam to resolve the conflict. 

In addition to its role as Vietnam's exclusive donor of military 
aid, the Soviet Union in 1987 was also Vietnam's largest contribu- 
tor of economic aid and its biggest trade partner. During the Third 
Five-Year Plan (1981-85), the Soviets provided some US$5.4 bil- 
lion in balance-of-payments aid, project assistance, and oil price 
subsidies. Total economic aid for 1986 was an estimated US$1.8 
billion. The Soviets also have been a major supplier of food and 
commodity aid on a mostly grant-aid or soft-currency basis. By 
1983 they were supplying 90 percent of Vietnam's petroleum, iron 
and steel, fertilizer, and cotton imports and 70 percent of its grain 
imports (see Foreign Trade and Aid, ch. 3). 

Soviet- Vietnamese ties in the mid-1980s were sound, although 
troubled by some underlying strain. The Vietnamese distrusted 
Soviet intentions and resented Hanoi's dependent role; the Soviets 
in turn distrusted the Vietnamese for not confiding in them. Report- 
edly, on a number of occasions Moscow learned of major Viet- 
namese policy plans and changes only after the fact. According to 
some foreign observers, the Soviets were not entirely prepared for 
the sudden deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1978, and 
they may not have been aware of the full extent of Vietnamese plans 
in Cambodia. Others believe the Soviet Union was aware of the 
deterioration and was allowing Vietnam to play the role of proxy 
in Moscow's own dispute with Beijing. 

Friction was particularly evident in economic relations. The 
Soviets resented the enormous burden of their aid program to Viet- 
nam and felt that much of it was wasted because of Vietnamese 
inefficiency. In turn, the Vietnamese were offended by Moscow's 
1980 decision to reduce aid in the face of severe economic hard- 
ships in Vietnam. In the mid-1980s, aid continued at a reduced 
rate although Vietnam's economic situation had worsened. 

The prospect of an improvement in the state of Sino-Soviet 
relations in the mid-1980s did not appear to threaten the Soviet 



223 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Union's ties with Vietnam. Although China demanded that 
Moscow ensure Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia as a con- 
dition to normalizing the Sino-Soviet relationship, Vietnamese lead- 
ers proceeded as if they were sure their existing policy in Cambodia 
would not be threatened. The Soviets even went so far as to pro- 
mote improved relations between Hanoi and Beijing. At Vietnam's 
Sixth Party Congress in December 1986, the senior member of the 
Soviet delegation suggested that the normalization of relations 
between Vietnam and China would improve the situation in Asia 
and the world as a whole. The Vietnamese agreed with this premise 
but were unwilling to seek improved ties at the expense of weakening 
their position in Cambodia. 

Eastern Europe 

In addition to relations with the Soviet Union, Vietnam main- 
tained close relations with other members of Comecon and the War- 
saw Pact. Between 1965 and 1975, Eastern Europe provided 
Vietnam with some US$844 million in aid amounting to 18 per- 
cent of all aid received during that period. Between November 1976 
and June 1977, Vietnam signed commodity and payments agree- 
ments with eight communist countries, cultural agreements with 
four, scientific cooperation agreements with eight, and separate 
agreements for economic, scientific, or technical cooperation with 
five. Its relations with Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic 
Republic (East Germany), and Hungary were particularly close. 

The United States 

The Communist victory in South Vietnam in 1975 abruptly con- 
cluded three decades of United States intervention in Vietnam and 
brought to a close a painful and bitter era for both countries. The 
war generated considerable social and political discord in the United 
States, massive disruption in Vietnam, and was enormously costly 
to both sides. Vietnam endured physical destruction — ravaged battle 
sites, leveled factories and cities, and untold numbers of military 
and civilian casualties. The United States escaped physical devasta- 
tion, but it suffered the loss of 58,000 lives (2,400 unaccounted 
for) and spent roughly $150 billion in direct expenses to sustain 
the war. The war also divided and confused American society. 

To the Vietnamese communists, the war against the United States 
simply extended the war for independence initiated against the 
French. In Hanoi's view, when the United States displaced the 
French in Indochina, it assumed the French role as a major-power 
obstacle to Vietnam's eventual reunification. 



224 



Government and Politics 



For the United States, intervention was derived from considera- 
tions that largely transcended Vietnam. In the closing months of 
World War II, the United States had supported the idea of an 
international trusteeship for all of Indochina. Subsequently, in spite 
of misgivings in Washington about French intentions to reimpose 
colonial rule in Indochina, the United States eventually tilted in 
support of the French war effort in the embattled region. Anti- 
colonial sentiment in the United States after World War II thus 
failed to outweigh policy priorities in Europe, such as the evolving 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) relationship. The for- 
mal creation of NATO and the communist victory in China, both 
of which occurred in 1949, led the United States to support materi- 
ally the French war effort in Indochina. The perception that com- 
munism was global and monolithic led the administration of 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower to support the idea of a noncom- 
munist state in southern Vietnam, after the French withdrawal 
under the Geneva Agreements of 1954. Although this goal arguably 
ran counter to two key features of the Geneva Agreements (the 
stipulation that the line separating North and South Vietnam be 
neither a political nor territorial boundary and the call for reunifi- 
cation elections), it was based on the United States assessment that 
the Viet Minh — which, contrary to the agreements, had left several 
thousand cadres south of the demarcation line — was already in 
violation. The first United States advisers arrived in the South 
within a year after Geneva to help President Ngo Dinh Diem estab- 
lish a government that would be strong enough to stand up to the 
communist regime in the North. 

Although Washington's advisory role was essentially political, 
United States policy makers determined that the effort to erect a 
non-communist state in Vietnam was vital to the security of the 
region and would be buttressed by military means, if necessary, 
to inhibit any would-be aggressor. Defending Vietnam's security 
against aggression from the North and from southern-based com- 
munist insurgency was a mission Washington initially perceived 
as requiring only combat support elements and advisers to South 
Vietnamese military units. The situation, however, rapidly deterio- 
rated, and in 1965, at a time when increasing numbers of North 
Vietnamese-trained soldiers were moving into South Vietnam, the 
first increment of United States combat forces was introduced into 
the South and sustained bombing of military targets in North Viet- 
nam was undertaken. Nearly eight more years of conflict occurred 
before the intense involvement of the United States ended in 1973. 

An "Agreement Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet- 
nam" was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, by Washington, 



225 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Hanoi, Saigon, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government, 
representing the Vietnamese communist organization in the South, 
the Viet Cong (see Glossary — contraction of Viet Nam Cong San). 
The settlement called for a cease-fire, withdrawal of all United States 
troops, continuance in place of North Vietnamese troops in the 
South, and the eventual reunification of the country "through 
peaceful means." In reality, once United States Forces were dis- 
engaged in early 1973 there was no effective way to prevent the 
North from overwhelming the South 's defenses and the settlement 
proved unenforceable. Following the fragile cease-fire established 
by the agreement, PAVN units remained in the South Vietnamese 
countryside, while Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN — 
see Glossary) units fought to dislodge them and expand the areas 
under Saigon's control. As a result, the two sides battled from 1973 
to 1975, but the ARVN, having to fight without the close United 
States air, artillery, logistical, and medevac (medical evacuation) 
support to which it had become accustomed, acquitted itself badly, 
losing more and more ground to the communists. 

The surprisingly swift manner in which the South Vietnamese 
government finally collapsed in 1975 appeared to confirm that the 
Paris agreement had accomplished little more than to delay an 
inevitable defeat for the United States ally, South Vietnam, and 
that Washington had been impotent to avert this outcome. 

Following the war, Hanoi pursued the establishment of diplo- 
matic relations with the United States, initially in order to obtain 
US$3.3 billion in reconstruction aid, which President Richard M. 
Nixon had secretly promised after the Paris Agreement was signed 
in 1973. Under Article 21 of the agreement, the United States had 
pledged "to contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post- 
war reconstruction of the DRV ..." but had specifically avoided 
using terminology that could be interpreted to mean that repara- 
tions were being offered for war damages. Nixon's promise was 
in the form of a letter, confirming the intent of Article 21 and offer- 
ing a specific figure. Barely two months after Hanoi's victory in 
1975, Premier Pham Van Dong, speaking to the National Assem- 
bly, invited the United States to normalize relations with Vietnam 
and to honor its commitment to provide reconstruction funds. 
Representatives of two American banks — the Bank of America and 
First National City Bank — were invited to discuss trade possibili- 
ties, and American oil companies were informed that they were 
welcome to apply for concessions to search for oil in offshore Viet- 
namese waters. 

Washington neglected Dong's call for normal relations, however, 
because it was predicated on reparations, and the Washington 



226 



Government and Politics 



political climate in the wake of the war precluded the pursuit of 
such an outcome. In response, the administration of President 
Gerald R. Ford imposed its own precondition for normal relations 
by announcing that a full accounting of Americans missing in action 
(MIAs — see Glossary), including the return of any remains, would 
be required before normalization could be effected. No concessions 
were made on either side until President Jimmy Carter softened 
the United States demand from a full accounting of MIAs to the 
fullest possible accounting and dispatched a mission to Hanoi in 
1977 to initiate normalization discussions. 

Although the Vietnamese at first were adamant about United 
States economic assistance (their first postwar economic plan 
counted on the amount promised by President Nixon), the condi- 
tion was dropped in mid- 1978 when Hanoi made additional gestures 
toward normal relations. At that time, Vietnamese Foreign Minister 
Nguyen Co Thach and the United States government reached an 
agreement in principle on normalization, but the date was left 
vague. When Thach urged November 1978, a date that in retrospect 
is significant because he was due in Moscow to sign the Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, Washing- 
ton was noncommittal. During this period, United States officials 
were preoccupied with the question of the Indochinese refugees, 
and they were in the process of normalizing relations with China. 
This was an action that could have been jeopardized had Washing- 
ton concurrently sought a rapprochement with Vietnam, a nation 
whose relationship with Beijing was growing increasingly strained. 
Policy makers in Hanoi correctly reasoned that the United States 
had opted to strengthen its ties with China rather than with Viet- 
nam, and they moved to formalize their ties with the Soviets in 
response. Their original hope, however, had been to gain both 
diplomatic recognition from the United States and a friendship 
treaty with Moscow, as a double guarantee against future Chinese 
interference. 

In the United States, the issue of normalizing relations with Viet- 
nam was complicated by Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 
December 1978, the continuing plight of Vietnamese refugees, and 
the unresolved MIA issue (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, 
ch. 2). In 1987, under President Ronald Reagan, the United States 
continued to enforce the trade embargo imposed on Hanoi in 1975 
and barred normal ties as long as Vietnamese troops occupied Cam- 
bodia. Any efforts to improve relations remained closely tied to 
United States willingness to honor its 1973 aid commitment to Viet- 
nam and to Hanoi's failure to account for the whereabouts of more 
than 2,400 MIAs in Indochina. From the signing of the Paris 



227 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



agreements in 1973 until mid- 1978. the Vietnamese had routinely 
stressed the linkage between the aid and MIA issues. Beginning 
in mid- 19 78. however. Hanoi dropped its insistence that the MIA 
and aid questions be resolved as a precondition for normalization 
and stopped linking the MIA question to other unresolved mat- 
ters between the two countries. Vietnamese leaders contrasted their 
restraint on the MIA issue with its alleged political exploitation 
by the United States as a condition for normal relations. As addi- 
tional signs of goodwill. Hanoi permitted the joint United States- 
Vietnamese excavation of a B-52 crash site in 1985 and returned 
the remains of a number of United States servicemen between 1985 
and 1987. Vietnamese spokesmen also claimed during this period 
to have a two-year plan to resolve the MIA question but failed to 
reveal details. 

Although Vietnam's Sixth National Partv Congress in Decem- 
ber 1986 officially paid little attention to relations with the United 
States, the report of the congress noted that Vietnam was continu- 
ing to hold talks with Washington on humanitarian issues and 
expressed a readiness to improve relations. .Although ambivalent 
in tone, the message was more positive than the 1982 Fifth National 
Partv Congress report, which had attributed the stalemated rela- 
tionship to Washington's "hostile policy." The improved word- 
ing was attributable to the influence of newly appointed Partv 
General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh. who was expected to attach 
high priority to expanding Vietnam's links with the West. 

Within a few months of the Sixth National Party Congress, 
however, Hanoi began to send conflicting signals to Washington. 
In mid- 198 7 the Vietnamese government, having determined that 
cooperation had gained few concessions from the United States, 
reverted to its pre- 1978 position linking the aid and MIA issues. 
The resumption of its hardline stand, however, was brief. A meeting 
between Vietnamese leaders and President Reagan's special envoy 
on MIAs. General John W. Vessey. in August 1987 yielded sig- 
nificant gams for both sides. In exchange for greater Vietnamese 
cooperation on resolving the MIA issue, the United States agreed 
officially to encourage charitable assistance for Vietnam. .Although 
the agreement fell short of Hanoi's requests for economic aid or 
war reparations, it marked the first time that the United States had 
offered anything in return for Vietnamese assistance in account- 
ing for the MIAs and was an important step toward an eventual 
reconciliation between the two countries. 

ASEAN 

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN") was formed 



228 



Ho Chi Minh City poster 
portrays American and Chinese "aggressors, " 1979. 

Courtesy Bill Herod 

in 1967 as a regional, economic, cultural, and social cooperative 
organization. The original five member nations — Indonesia, Malay- 
sia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (the sixth member, 
Brunei, was admitted in January 1984) — had little in common in 
their culture, history, or politics. Nevertheless, after a slow start 
the organization flourished; by 1987 it had the fastest growing GNP 
of all economic groups in the world and was a key force for regional 
stability. 

ASEAN 's charter declares that membership is open to all states 
in the region — a gesture toward Vietnam that Hanoi repeatedly 
rebuffed. Before Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambo- 
dia in December 1978, integration of the three Indochinese states 
and ASEAN into a larger regional organization was discussed within 
the ASEAN community as a possible solution to regional problems. 
The proposal surfaced at an ASEAN summit meeting held in Bali 
in January 1976, when, following reunification, Vietnam requested 
observer status at ASEAN meetings. It was understood at the time, 
however, that the inclusion of communist states within a grouping 
of free-market countries was unprecedented, and the idea was inter- 
preted to be more a goodwill gesture than a serious proposition. 

From 1976 to 1978, ASEAN's differences with Vietnam were 
both symbolic and real. ASEAN, for example, proposed establishing 



229 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality and 
invited Vietnam to support the proposal. Hanoi refused but coun- 
tered with its own proposal, calling instead for a region of peace, 
independence, and neutrality. Apparently, the Vietnamese objected 
to the term freedom because of their vulnerability to criticism on 
human rights issues. The term independence, on the other hand, was 
promoted by the Vietnamese as a concept opposing all foreign mili- 
tary bases in Southeast Asia, an idea that many of the ASEAN 
nations did not share. 

During the Second Indochina War, each ASEAN state pursued 
its own Vietnam policy. Malaysia and Indonesia maintained strict 
neutrality, whereas Thailand and the Philippines contributed per- 
sonnel and materiel to South Vietnam. Perceptions of Vietnam 
as a possible threat to the region also varied among member nations. 
Indonesia and Malaysia viewed Vietnam as a buffer against Chinese 
expansionism, whereas Thailand, wary of possible repetition of 
historic patterns of confrontation with Vietnam, turned to China 
for protection following the war's end and the subsequent with- 
drawal of United States forces from Thailand. 

Following the 1978 invasion of Cambodia, however, the ASEAN 
nations were united in their condemnation of Hanoi. They took 
the lead in mobilizing international opinion against Vietnam, and, 
in the UN General Assembly, they annually sponsored resolutions 
calling for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and for internationally 
supervised elections. The ASEAN nations also were instrumental 
in preventing the Vietnam-sponsored Heng Samrin regime in 
Phnom Penh from taking over Cambodia's UN seat. In June 1982, 
ASEAN was instrumental in persuading three disparate Cambo- 
dian resistance elements to merge into a coalition resistance govern- 
ment (see Laos and Cambodia, this ch.). 

ASEAN's position on Cambodia was important to Hanoi, 
because it was through ASEAN's efforts at the UN that the world's 
attention continued to focus on Cambodia in the late 1980s. The 
Vietnamese thus saw ASEAN as having the power to confer upon 
them or to deny them legitimacy in Cambodia. Vietnamese diplo- 
mats sought to convince the ASEAN countries that the invasion 
of Cambodia was intended to eliminate the threat posed by Pol 
Pot's alignment with China. Rather than have its activity in Cam- 
bodia perceived as potentially damaging to ASEAN's security, Viet- 
nam wanted to assure ASEAN members that it was in the group's 
interest to join with Vietnam in countering the Chinese threat to 
the region. Cultivating goodwill with key ASEAN members was 
an important part of this strategy. Thus, in 1978 Vietnam and the 
Philippines agreed to negotiate but failed to settle their conflicting 



230 



Government and Politics 



claims to the Spratly Islands. Foreign Minister Thach, during a 
late- 1982 visit to Indonesia, took a conciliatory position in discussing 
Vietnam's and Indonesia's competing claims to the Natuna Islands, 
and in 1984 Hanoi made a similar gesture to Malaysia in order 
to help resolve their conflicting claims over Amboyna Cay. In 1987, 
however, resolving the war in Cambodia remained the key to any 
further resolution of differences between Vietnam and ASEAN. 

Thailand 

As the ASEAN member most vulnerable to a Vietnamese attack, 
Thailand was foremost among the ASEAN partners opposing Viet- 
nam 's 1978 invasion of Cambodia. Thailand's suspicion of Viet- 
namese long-term objectives and fear of Vietnamese support for 
an internal Thai communist insurgency movement led the Thai 
government to support United States objectives in South Vietnam 
during the Second Indochina War. In 1979, after Vietnam's mili- 
tary occupation of Cambodia had raised these same concerns again, 
Bangkok was compelled once again to ally with an adversary of 
Vietnam and looked to Beijing for security assistance. In both 
instances, Thailand's actions hardened Hanoi's attitude toward 
Bangkok. 

In 1973 a new civilian government in Thailand created a chance 
for some degree of reconciliation with Vietnam, when it proposed 
to remove United States military forces from Thai soil and adopt 
a more neutralist stance. The Vietnamese responded by sending 
a delegation to Bangkok, but talks broke down before any progress 
in improving relations could be made. Discussions resumed in 
August 1976. They resulted in a call for an exchange of ambas- 
sadors and for an opening of negotiations on trade and economic 
cooperation, but a military coup in October 1976 ushered in a new 
Thai government that was less sympathetic to the Vietnamese. 
Contact was resumed briefly in May 1977, when Vietnam, 
Thailand, and Laos held a conference to discuss resuming work 
on the Mekong Development Project, a major cooperative effort 
that had been halted by the Second Indochina War. Beginning in 
December 1978, however, the conflict in Cambodia dominated 
diplomatic exchanges, and seasonal Vietnamese military offensives 
that included incursions across the Thai border and numerous Thai 
casualties particularly strained the relationship. 

Other Noncommunist Nations 

Relations with noncommunist nations were still in the early stages 
of development in the mid-1970s to mid-1980s. Noncommunist aid, 
nevertheless, was a significant part of Hanoi's budget prior to 



231 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. In 1976 and 
1977, for example, aid from noncommunist nations amounted 
to US$438.5 million, of which Sweden, France, Japan, and 
UN-related organizations accounted for 78 percent. With the excep- 
tion of aid from Sweden, however, such aid was either significantly 
curtailed or terminated following the invasion. 

Trade ties, after the invasion, suffered similarly. In 1976 four 
noncommunist trading partners — Japan, Hong Kong, France, and 
Sweden — accounted for 44 percent of Vietnam's imports, and more 
than half of Vietnam's exports went to noncommunist buyers such 
as Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, and France. A decade later, in 
1986, only 20 percent of Vietnam's imports were of noncommunist 
origin, and 40 percent of its exports were reaching noncommunist 
markets. 

By the mid-1980s, however, Vietnam was actively seeking to 
improve its economic and political ties with the noncommunist 
world community in order to stimulate aid, trade, and investment. 
With few exceptions, noncommunist nations were prepared to recip- 
rocate. The one obstacle preventing their doing so remained 
Hanoi's continued occupation of Cambodia and the absence of a 
resolution to the conflict. 

International Organizations 

In 1976 Vietnam was admitted to the UN and gained member- 
ship in a number of the organization's affiliated agencies, includ- 
ing the International Monetary Fund (IMF, see Glossary), the 
World Bank (see Glossary), and the Committee for Coordination 
of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (see Glossary). Hanoi 
also successfully claimed the seat formerly occupied by South Viet- 
nam in the Asian Development Bank (see Glossary). In the 1980s 
it was a member of Comecon, the Colombo Plan (see Glossary), 
the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(INTELSAT, see Glossary), and actively participated in the Non- 
aligned Movement (see Glossary) and the Group of 77 (see 
Glossary). 

The Media 

Although an official description of the press, offered by the Sixth 
National Party Congress, defines the media's role as being "the 
voice of the party and of the masses," and identifies its task as being 
to "propagate the party's lines and policies," as well as to report 
and analyze the news, the Vietnamese press is much more a medium 
for educating the public and filtering information, than for reporting 
news. It is controlled by the VCP Central Committee's Propaganda 



232 



Government and Politics 



and Training Department in accordance with guidelines established 
by the Ministry of Culture, and both agencies act to ensure that 
it reflects the policies and positions of the party. In mid- 1987, 
however, there emerged increasing evidence within the media that 
a movement might be underway to change the character of the 
press. Articles stressing the importance of investigative reporting, 
calling for more journalistic freedom to report accurately, and 
defending the right of the people to be heard appeared in many 
of the leading newspapers. The movement appeared to be led by 
a small but influential group of journalists seeking to make the press 
more assertive by emphasizing accurate reporting and a more 
balanced reflection of public opinion. 

In the late 1980s, there were approximately 350 national or local 
newspapers, magazines, journals, news bulletins, and newsletters 
published in Vietnam. Some local newspapers were published in 
the languages of tribal minorities and one, in Ho Chi Minh City, 
was published in Chinese. In addition, there were a small number 
of publications intended for distribution outside Vietnam. 

The national press included publications intended for the general 
public (e.g., Tap Chi Cong San, Communist Review) as well as those 
aimed at specific audiences, such as women (Phu Nu Vietnam, Viet- 
namese Women) or trade union members [Tap Chi Cong Doan, 
Trade Union Review). Separate journals and newspapers covered 
sports, culture, economics, social sciences, the military, and science 
and technology. Each of the thirty-six provinces and the three 
autonomous municipalities, as well as the special zone, published 
a newspaper and one or more journals dealing with culture, edu- 
cation, and science and technology. Local newspapers covered local 
events and did not compete with national publications. 

Party control of the press ensured the political correctness of a 
story and determined in which publication it would appear. Rarely 
was the same story covered in more than one national newspaper 
or magazine. Nhan Dan (People's Daily) — the VCP daily — and Quart 
Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army) — the armed forces daily — were nor- 
mally limited to national and international stories. Articles on sub- 
jects like sports or art appeared in newspapers or journals devoted 
to those subjects. Nhan Dan, the leading national newspaper and 
the official organ of the VCP Central Committee, began publica- 
tion in 1951. By 1987, as a four-page daily reporting domestic and 
international news, it published the full texts of speeches and arti- 
cles by party and government leaders and included feature arti- 
cles on the government, party, culture, and economy. Quan Doi 
Nhan Dan, published daily except Sunday by PAVN, was also four 



233 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

pages in length and included international and national news, but 
with an emphasis on military activities and training. 

The principal national magazine was Tap Chi Cong San (Com- 
munist Review), a monthly journal. Formerly called Hoc Tap 
(Studies), its name was changed in January 1977, after the Fourth 
Party Congress. It was a theoretical and political journal and was 
considered to be the voice of the VCP. In 1987 its table of con- 
tents was published for international dissemination in English, 
French, Spanish, and Russian. 

Publications intended specifically for foreign audiences in the 
1980s were Vietnam Courier, in English and French — a monthly with 
articles on current events as well as Vietnamese culture and history; 
Vietnam, in Vietnamese, Lao, Cambodian, Russian, English, 
French, and Spanish — a monthly with pictorial essays on all aspects 
of Vietnamese life; Vietnam Foreign Trade, in English; Vietnam Social 
Sciences, in English, French, and Russian; Vietnam Youth, in English 
and French; Vietnamese Scientific and Technical Abstracts, in English; 
Vietnamese Studies, in English and French; Vietnamese Trade Unions, 
in English, French, and Spanish; Women of Vietnam, in English and 
French; and Informado El Vjetnamio (Information on Vietnam) in 
Esperanto. 

The country's wire service, the Vietnam News Agency (VNA), 
was the principal source of domestic and international news for 
the nation's domestic and international media in 1987. It published, 
on a daily basis, a twelve-to-sixteen-page English-language com- 
pendium, Vietnam News Agency, which provided standard press- 
service coverage of the day's news events. 

By 1986 international shortwave news reports were broadcast 
by the Voice of Vietnam in eleven languages (Cambodian, 
Chinese — both Mandarin and Cantonese, English, French, Indone- 
sian, Japanese, Lao, Russian, Spanish, and Thai) as well as Viet- 
namese. The broadcast sites for these programs included five in 
Hanoi and fifteen in other locations throughout the country. Trans- 
missions reached neighboring Southeast Asian countries and regions 
as distant as Latin America, Africa, and Europe. Domestic ser- 
vice was provided from fifty-one AM transmission sites, of which 
five were located in Hanoi, three in Ho Chi Minh City, and the 
rest in other cities and districts. In addition an FM station was 
located in Ho Chi Minh City, and an unspecified number of other 
FM stations were located elsewhere in Vietnam. 

The Central Television network was created in 1970. By the 
mid-1980s, five channels were known to broadcast from twenty- 
one transmission sites in Vietnam. Viewers were served by two 
channels in Hanoi, one in Ho Chi Minh City and one in Da Nang; 



234 



Government and Politics 



Hue, Can Tho, and Qui Nhon were served by another channel. 
There may have been broadcasts from Nha Trang and Vinh as 
well. Television Vietnam offered programs in color and in black 
and white. Black and white daily national programming was broad- 
cast from Hanoi, on Monday through Friday, for ninety minutes 
a day and, on Saturday and Sunday, for three hours a day. 

Recent books on the political process in Vietnam are compara- 
tively few in number, and even fewer detail the structure and the 
inner workings of the party and the government. Among works 
that are extremely informative, however, are Vietnam since the Fall 
of Saigon and Vietnam: Nation in Revolution, by William Duiker, and 
Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective, the assembled views 
of a number of leading Vietnam scholars, edited by William Turley. 
Nguyen Van Canh's Vietnam under Communism, 1975-1982 is use- 
ful because of its discussion of party and government structure both 
at the national and local level. 

A legal discussion of the 1980 Constitution is provided in Chin 
Kim's article on "Recent Developments in the Constitutions of 
Asian Marxist-Socialist States." Party congresses are discussed in 
Ralph Smith's "Vietnam's Fourth Party Congress," Carlyle 
Thayer's "Development Strategies in Vietnam: The Fourth 
National Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party," An Tai 
Sung's "The All-Vietnam National Assembly: Significant Develop- 
ments," and Thai Quang Trung's "The Fifth Congress of the Viet- 
namese Communist Party." 

Vietnam's foreign relations, particularly the war in Cambodia 
and the Sino- Vietnamese conflict, have prompted a number of use- 
ful books and articles. First among these on the subject of the war 
in Cambodia is Nayan Chanda's Brother Enemy, a work also useful 
for its discussion of postwar United States- Vietnamese relations. 
The Third Indochina Conflict, edited by David Elliott, includes a num- 
ber of informative chapters on the subject. The Chinese- Vietnamese 
border war in 1979 is discussed in a historical context in CD. 
Loescher's "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in Recent Historical 
Perspective," and in Eugene Lawson's The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict. 
Vietnam's relations with Southeast Asia are covered in David 
Elliott's "Vietnam in Asia: Strategy and Diplomacy in a New Con- 
text," and Soviet-Vietnamese relations are discussed in Robert 
Horn's "Soviet- Vietnamese Relations and the Future of South- 
east Asia," Douglas Pike's "The USSR and Vietnam: Into the 



235 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Swamp," and Leif Rosenberger's "The Soviet-Vietnamese Alli- 
ance and Kampuchea." 

An overview of Vietnam since the end of the Second Indochina 
War is presented by Carlyle Thayer and David Marr in Vietnam 
since 1975 — Two Views from Australia and by William Turley in 
"Vietnam since Reunification." Additional articles focusing on 
Vietnam's domestic problems following unification include Carlyle 
Thayer's "Vietnam's New Pragmatism," William Turley's 
"Hanoi's Domestic Dilemmas," Stephen Young's "Unpopular 
Socialism in United Vietnam" and "Vietnamese Marxism: Tran- 
sition in Elite Ideology," and Jayne Werner's "Socialist Develop- 
ment: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Vietnam." 

To follow Vietnam's politics and government on a daily basis, 
some of the most useful reference sources are the Daily Report: Asia 
& Pacific, published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 
and Southeast Asia Report, published by the Joint Publication Research 
Service. The Indochina Chronology, a quarterly published by the 
Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California at Berke- 
ley, is also invaluable. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



236 



Chapter 5. National Security 



National hero Ngo Quyen (A.D. 899-944), who defeated the Chinese fleet 
in A.D. 938 to end 1,000 years of Chinese domination 



IN THE LATE 1980s, Vietnam's leaders continued to define 
national security in the same broad, all-encompassing terms used 
by other Marxist- Leninist societies. The basic precept was that any 
effort to alter the status quo was a threat to national security and 
was to be dealt with quickly and decisively. The threat could come 
from ideas as well as from invading armies. According to this doc- 
trine, responsibility for maintaining security rested with all the peo- 
ple and was not simply vested in the police, armed forces, or other 
coercive elements of the system. Finally, the achievement of national 
security was regarded as a function of proper communication with, 
and motivation of, the people by various party and government 
organs. This approach, a careful mix of compulsion and persua- 
sion, created in communist Vietnam a social discipline that con- 
tributed to the success of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, 
Viet Nam Cong San Dang) in the North and was extended to the 
South after unification in 1976. 

Overview of National Security 

Official attitudes in Vietnam toward national security have arisen 
from an amalgam of the country's heritage, historical experience, 
internal sociopolitical strengths and weaknesses, and geopolitical 
position. They are also the product of a singular kind of leader- 
ship, which in 1987 was undergoing gradual change. The Viet- 
namese look back at the great events of their past and see themselves 
as victims of history. They perceive that Vietnam always has been 
threatened by formidable enemies, frequently has been beleaguered, 
and on occasion has only narrowly escaped destruction. For cen- 
turies China repeatedly sought to establish hegemony over Viet- 
nam. A century of colonial control by the French was shaken off 
in 1954, following a long, bitter struggle that concluded by plant- 
ing the seeds for still another struggle for complete unification of 
the country. In 1987 the Vietnamese perceived their country to 
be isolated, surrounded by hostile neighbors, and dependent on 
the Soviet Union in an intimate association that was a military 
alliance in all but name. Internally, the country was viewed as 
divided by geographic regionalism stemming from ancient cultural 
differences among the people of the North, Center, and South (see 
The Chinese Millennium, ch. 1). Regardless of their veracity, such 
perceptions were widely held in Hanoi and conditioned the leader- 
ship's thinking about national security. 



239 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

The Tradition of Militancy 

Vietnam's past is characterized by a strongly martial spirit tem- 
pered by war, invasion, rebellion, insurgency, dissidence, and social 
sabotage. In their view, the Vietnamese have always lived in an 
armed camp. The first "deities" of Vietnam, before the time of 
recorded history, were not gods but generals. Vietnam's naval fleet 
in the ninth century supposedly was the largest on earth. In the 
tenth century, when its population could not have numbered more 
than 2 million, its army purportedly stood at 1 million. Asia's first 
military academy was founded in Hanoi in the thirteenth century. 
The fourteenth century produced Tran Hung Dao (1230-1300), 
the greatest of all Vietnam's many military geniuses, who was con- 
sistently able to win battles against vastly superior forces. Accord- 
ing to tradition Nguyen Hue (also known as Emperor Quan Trung, 
1742-92), another great military leader, fielded an army so dis- 
ciplined that for the battle of Dong Da in 1789 he force-marched 
his troops 600 kilometers to fight an uninterrupted five-day battle 
that left "mountains of enemy dead." Vietnamese of all political 
views take pride in these figures from antiquity and seem particu- 
larly fond of those most clever in combat, such as the general who 
persuaded his opponent that he had two armies when the second 
was only a phantom. Those who sacrificed themselves on some 
grand battlefield are also fondly remembered. For instance, the 
Hai Ba Trung legend, reminiscent of the story of Jeanne D'Arc, 
originated early in the first century A.D. It tells of the two Trung 
sisters, who led their army in a futile effort against a vastly superior 
Chinese force. Defeated, they drowned themselves in a Hanoi lake. 
Members of a thriving mystic cult continued to worship the lake 
in the 1980s despite official disapproval. Vietnam's standard his- 
tories depict the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as times 
of continual rebellion predating the rise of post-World War II Asian 
nationalism. The century of French colonialism is described as one 
long, unbroken battle involving virtually all Vietnamese. 

Contemporary Hanoi historians describe Vietnam's national tra- 
dition as one in which every Vietnamese is a soldier. They cite 
the famed historical record, Annam Chu Luoc (Description of Annam, 
by Le Tac, circa 1340): "During the Tran dynasty all the people 
fought the enemy. Everyone was a soldier, which is why they were 
able to defeat the savage enemy. This is the general experience 
throughout the people's entire history." This tradition is said to 
arise not from militarism, but rather from a spirit of chink nghia 
(just cause), which connotes highly moral behavior rooted in 
rationality, compassion, and responsibility. The historians assert 



240 



National Security 



that the spirit of chink nghia sustained the Vietnamese in their long 
struggle against the Sinicization (Han-hwa) efforts of the Han 
Chinese, and later against French colonialism and American 
neocolonialism. Drawn from this, then, is a special kind of mar- 
tial spirit, both ferocious and virtuous. It is because of chink nghia 
that the Vietnamese have been victorious, while usually outnum- 
bered and outgunned. Chink nghia is the mystique that imparts 
unique fighting capabilities to the Vietnamese: first, it mobilizes 
the people and turns every inhabitant into a soldier; second, it 
applies the principles of "knowing how to fight the strong by the 
weak, the great numbers by the small numbers, the large by the 
small." 

Just as Prussia has been Europe's most fought-over ground, Viet- 
nam is Asia's. For centuries the Vietnamese battled the Chinese, 
the French, the Americans, the Khmer, and again the Chinese. 
In between they battled the Thai, the Burmans, the Lao, the Cham, 
the Montagnards, and each other in regional and dynastic com- 
bat. In the view of Vietnam's neighbors, Vietnamese campaigns 
since the fifteenth century have been offensive rather than defen- 
sive. But Vietnamese school children are taught that in these wars 
the Vietnamese always were the victim, never the aggressor. With 
respect to Vietnam's national security, the point is not whether 
Vietnamese perceptions are factually correct, but that the Viet- 
namese act on them. 

In Hanoi's view, Vietnam faced an extraordinarily difficult and 
complex geopolitical scene in the 1980s, one that was filled with 
both external and internal dangers; in meeting these threats the 
country suffered from some strategic weaknesses and enjoyed cer- 
tain strategic strengths. The conclusion appeared to be that Viet- 
nam could deal with these dangers because of its confidence that 
its strengths outweighed its weaknesses and that, regardless of the 
threat presented, the Vietnamese cause, as in the past, would prove 
triumphant. The ruling Political Bureau and the People's Army 
of Vietnam (PAVN — see Glossary) High Command long ago 
developed several firm policies to achieve this end: that Vietnam 
must remain more or less permanently mobilized for war; that it 
must maintain as large a standing army as the system can sup- 
port; that, as far as it is able, it must be self-sufficient in protect- 
ing itself and not rely on outside assistance or alliance; and that 
internally it must maintain a tightly organized, highly disciplined 
society capable of maintaining a high level of militant spirit among 
the general population. 

This threat perception, and the leadership's response to it, have 
had the net effect of creating in Vietnam a praetorian society 



241 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

dedicated to the preservation of the existing order. It makes the 
Vietnamese, as Premier Pham Van Dong observed to a Western 
journalist, "incurable romantics." The society in the 1980s looked 
back at the First Indochina War (also known as the Viet Minh 
War — see Glossary) and Second Indochina War (see Glossary) as 
an era of high deeds and heroism contrasting unfavorably with hum- 
drum postwar life. 

Strategic Thinking 

The central factor in Hanoi's strategic thinking, applicable to 
both external and internal threats, is the VCP's concept of dau tranh 
(struggle). Briefly stated, dau tranh strategy is the sustained appli- 
cation of total military and nonmilitary force over long periods of 
time in pursuit of an objective. Its chief characteristic is its con- 
ceptual breadth, for it is of greater scope than ordinary warfare 
and requires the total mobilization of a society's resources and psy- 
chic energies. The strategy, it is held, is unique to Vietnam because 
of its close association with the sources of Vietnamese national secu- 
rity strengths. Since the mid-1970s, journals published in Hanoi 
on military theory have defined these strengths as the heritage of 
unity and patriotism, the supportive collectivist state system, the 
technologically and "spiritually" developed armed forces, a superior 
strategy (the dau tranh strategy), the undeviating justice of Viet- 
nam's cause, and the support of the world's "progressive forces." 
The leadership's faith in these strengths emboldens it to take an 
implacable approach to world affairs and to treat external activi- 
ties, such as diplomacy, like quasi-military campaigns. 

The aim of the dau tranh concept is to put warfare into a new 
conceptual framework. Its essence is the idea of people not merely 
as combatants or supporters but as weapons of war to be designed, 
forged, and hurled into battle — hence the term people's war. All peo- 
ple, even children, are regarded as instruments of dau tranh. Oper- 
ationally the strategy has two arms or pincers — armed dau tranh 
and political dau tranh. The two always work together to close on 
and crush the enemy. Political dau tranh is not politics but a mobiliz- 
ing and motivating program operating in a gray area between war 
and politics. Specifically, it consists of three van (action) programs: 
the all-important dich van (action among the enemy) includes activi- 
ties directed against the foreign enemy in his home country, the 
dan van (action among the people) includes activities conducted in 
a liberated area, and the binh van (action among the military) 
includes nonmilitary activities against the enemy's military forces. 
Of the three, the dich van program is particularly novel because 
it seeks to shape outside perception and, beyond this, to persuade 



242 



National Security 



outsiders not only that the Vietnamese will be successful in their 
struggle but that they deserve to be. Strategically, it seeks to 
undercut the enemy's war effort at home and its diplomacy world- 
wide. Tactically, it attempts to limit the enemy's military response 
by inhibiting the full use of his military potential. 

Dau tranh strategy defines the enemy narrowly — imperialists, 
militarists, landlords — but does not tar all in the enemy camp. Some 
are considered merely to have been misled, while others are 
regarded as foreign patriots who nevertheless support Hanoi's cause. 
In this way, dau tranh not only changes the definition of a combat- 
ant but also revises the rules of warfare. It asserts that the final 
test need not be military, and that the decisive action may take 
place away from the battlefield. 

The strategy requires the support of tremendous organizational 
resources as it seeks always to realize the ideal of total mobiliza- 
tion and motivation. It also requires meticulous attention to the 
mundane details of war and politics, such as logistics and adminis- 
tration. 

The great utility of dau tranh strategy, as evidenced by forty years 
of use against the French, the Americans, and the Chinese, is two- 
fold: it can cloud the enemy's perceptions and it can nullify his 
power. In the judgment of the Vietnamese leadership, it has proved 
to be highly effective in confounding the enemy's strategic response 
because it engenders misperception in the enemy camp. Vietnam's 
leaders have said that the nature of the Second Indochina War was 
never seen clearly either by the South Vietnamese or by the Ameri- 
cans. Dau tranh strategy, in effect, dictates the enemy's counter- 
strategy, even to the extent of forcing him to fight under unfavorable 
conditions. In circumscribing the enemy's military response by 
altering his perception of the war, dau tranh'?, guiding principle is 
that military force must always be politically clothed. Every battle 
must be cast in terms of a political act. When this is not possible — as 
in a purely tactical engagement, such as that with United States 
forces at Khe Sanh in early 1968 — the attack must be made to seem 
a military action for a political purpose (see The Second Indochina 
War, ch. 1). Theoretically, violence or military action defined or 
perceived as political becomes more acceptable to all parties, par- 
ticipant and onlooker alike. 

After the Second Indochina War, the dau tranh concept served 
the Vietnamese less well. It was employed, more by accident than 
by design, against the invading Chinese during the brief border 
war in 1979 and worked fairly well. It did not prove workable in 
Cambodia, however, and was for the most part abandoned there. 
Interestingly, many of its techniques were borrowed by the 



243 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Cambodian resistance forces and used against the Vietnamese- 
supported Khmer People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF), 
as well as against PAVN forces in Cambodia. Vietnam's experience 
in Cambodia inspired Hanoi to scrutinize the strategy more closely 
in order to assess its application to future needs. However, the 
strategy's past success weighed heavily in the assessment, and Viet- 
namese leaders in 1987 continued to place confidence in its viability. 

PAVN generals, in 1987, were in the process of evaluating Viet- 
nam's position in the world and reviewing the nature of its future 
strategic requirements. Vietnamese publications on the subject in 
the 1980s stressed continuity in strategic thinking and the need to 
treat the future as a logical extension of the past. The twin pillars 
with which the strategic planners sought to serve future national 
interests were, first, to exploit Vietnam's innate skill in strategic 
defense and, second, to capitalize on the party's ability to anchor 
the strategic process successfully in the people. 

Four major themes could be discerned in Hanoi's strategic think- 
ing in the mid-1980s. The first was the recognition that PAVN 
must be prepared to fight both limited, small-scale, orthodox wars 
and protracted, guerrilla wars. As a practical matter, renewed atten- 
tion was given to preparing for warfare in mountainous terrain 
(Vietnam is 40 percent mountainous and 75 percent forested — see 
Geography, ch. 2). 

The second theme was an increasing emphasis on military tech- 
nology. This resulted from PAVN's experience with the United 
States military machine in the Second Indochina War and with 
the war in Cambodia, as well as from the influence of Soviet mili- 
tary advisers. 

The third theme was a return to orthodox dau tranh strategy. This 
occurred partly as a result of the successes scored by Pol Pot's Cam- 
bodian guerrillas and partly as a result of the success of PAVN 
paramilitary forces against the invading Chinese. The counter- 
insurgency effort in Cambodia, for example, was regarded as simply 
a limited, small-scale, high-technology war. Another war against 
China, according to Vietnamese definitions, would require (as, 
indeed, the previous one had required) a mixture of orthodox 
limited-war strategy and elements of dau tranh strategy. The PAVN 
high command, in opposition to earlier practice, appeared increas- 
ingly to believe that high-technology warfare in the mountains was 
possible. 

The fourth theme was the acknowledgment that the strategy in 
Cambodia and the strategy designed for use against China depended 
on continued support from the Soviet Union. In order to meet Viet- 
nam's future external security needs, Hanoi's leadership probably 



244 



National Security 



will be led to conclude that it must eventually develop a new or 
revised strategic concept that is not overly dependent on past strate- 
gies or simple alliance with the Soviet Union. At the end of 1987, 
however, the leaders in PAVN and the Political Bureau appeared 
to have undiminished faith in the efficacy of their past doctrines 
and in the connection with Moscow. As long as they remained in 
power, a markedly new Vietnamese strategic approach to national 
security seemed unlikely. 

Security Concerns 

Victory did not bring Vietnam the security that Hanoi leaders 
had assumed would be theirs in the postwar world. Vietnam in 
the 1980s was beleaguered, in some ways more so than North Viet- 
nam had been during the Second Indochina War. It feared inva- 
sion, which it had not feared then, and Vietnamese society in what 
was formerly North Vietnam was far more restive and dispirited 
than it had been even during the darkest days of the war. Newly 
acquired South Vietnam remained largely unassimilated. Hanoi's 
chief instrument for assuring internal security and tranquility, the 
VCP, had seriously declined in effectiveness, tarnished by a decade 
of failure. The party's wartime reputation for being virtually omni- 
potent was all but gone. In addition, Hanoi's victory in the spring 
of 1975 had radically altered geopolitics, not only for Vietnam and 
Indochina, but also for all of Asia. It had precipitated drastic 
changes in relations among several of the nations of the Pacific, 
and some of these changes had severe consequences for Vietnam. 

In the 1980s, Hanoi regarded itself as a major force in Asia for 
the first time in history. Vietnam's population of about 60 million 
made it the thirteenth largest of the world's 126 nations, and the 
third largest of the communist nations (see Population, ch. 2). It 
was strategically located at a crossroads of Asia and had consider- 
able natural wealth and economic potential. It also had a large, 
battle-hardened, and well-equipped army. Ironically, the strength- 
ened Vietnamese geopolitical position that resulted from victory 
in war became something of a postwar weakness, for it thrust on 
an unprepared Hanoi leadership tasks in national security plan- 
ning that it was ill-prepared to handle. For decades Hanoi's secu- 
rity planners had been totally preoccupied with their struggle within 
the Indochina peninsula and had ignored the world beyond. With 
victory they were required for the first time to look outward and 
examine their nation's strategic position; to estimate potential 
threats and determine possible enemies and allies; to think in terms 
of strategic manpower, fire power, and weapons systems; and to 
plan strategies accordingly. Despite their great experience in 



245 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

warfare, they were relative novices in peace; their performance in 
the first postwar decade did not prove impressive. 

Vietnam suffered from other remediable liabilities, in addition 
to inexperienced strategic planners. These included an army still 
oriented toward guerrilla infantry; an inability to project air and 
naval forces over long distances; the lack of logistics and transport 
systems required by a modern armed force (particularly, lack of 
air transport); a low level of technical competence in the officer 
corps; and a shortage of good, reliable equipment and weapons. 
Hanoi's strategic planners, and their Soviet advisers, clearly recog- 
nized that new weapons systems were required for the vastly 
changed security conditions facing Vietnam. Efforts were under- 
taken to develop the Vietnamese navy, and new Soviet-built ships 
arrived to be added to the fleet captured in the South. Vietnam 
was also rumored to be creating a submarine force. Hanoi's vaunted 
military strongpoint, its divisions of light infantry, however, 
required conversion to a more orthodox high-technology force in 
order to become militarily credible in the region. Hanoi's military 
journals indicated that ambitious research and development projects 
were underway, but a significant upgrading of military technology 
was unlikely. In the late 1980s, Vietnam was at least a decade and 
a half away from a nuclear weapons delivery system — unless the 
Soviet Union were to provide a crash development program, which 
was considered unlikely. 

In the meantime, Vietnam remained a nation fully mobilized 
for war. This was a condition that eventually would require a change 
to a peacetime mode, accompanied by some demobilization of 
PAVN and the reallocation of most resources to the task of eco- 
nomic development, if the country were to keep pace with its Asian 
neighbors. The fact that PAVN continued to grow, in fact to dou- 
ble in size in the decade after 1975, was a government concession 
to entrenched PAVN interests as well as to internal and external 
security fears, many of them brought on by the fact that Vietnam 
had not renounced warfare as a foreign policy option. In any event, 
hard decisions lay ahead for the Hanoi leadership concerning the 
armed forces' share of the annual governmental budget, the ulti- 
mate size and deployment of PAVN, the kind of air and naval power 
to be developed, the levels of military spending, and the develop- 
ment of indigenous sources of military hardware. 

Vietnam in 1987 faced only one truly credible external threat — 
China (see The Chinese Millennium and Nine Centuries of Inde- 
pendence, ch. 1). The complex Sino- Vietnamese relationship, dat- 
ing back two thousand years, is deeply rooted in the Confucian 
concept of pupil-teacher. Thus, any issues under contention or 



246 



National Security 



problems that exist between the two on the surface normally are 
transcended by this basic relationship. Much of the behavior demon- 
strated by the two since 1975 — including Vietnam's invasion of 
Cambodia and China's subsequent "lesson" to Vietnam — is, in 
fact, traceable to the workings of this deep-rooted historic associa- 
tion (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). Victory in the Indochina War 
left Hanoi leaders determined to change the centuries-old relation- 
ship. The Vietnamese sought to end the notion of the rimland bar- 
barian's obligation to pay deference to the Middle Kingdom. They 
felt the tutelary relationship should give way to one of greater equal- 
ity. The Chinese, however, considered that nothing significant had 
changed and that the original condition of mutual obligation should 
continue. For the Chinese, the touchstone would always be the Sino- 
Soviet dispute and the need to reduce Soviet influence in Hanoi. 
Most important for China was the nature and future of the Soviet 
presence in Indochina. Beijing tried several approaches to induce 
Hanoi to maintain its distance from Moscow. However, none was 
successful. In the 1980s it pursued what might be called a cam- 
paign of protracted intimidation — military, diplomatic, and psy- 
chological pressure — on the Vietnamese, calculating that eventually 
Hanoi would seek some accommodation. 

In the minds of Hanoi's strategic planners, Vietnam's two Indo- 
china neighbors posed nearly as large an external security threat 
as did China. Strategically, Cambodia and Laos represented weak 
flanks where internal anticommunist forces could challenge the local 
regimes and threaten Vietnam itself. Geography increased this 
threat. Vietnam is an extraordinarily narrow country — at its 
"waist" near Dong Hoi it is only forty kilometers across — and could 
be cut in half militarily with relative ease either through an 
amphibious landing on its coast or through an invasion from Laos. 
It is also a long country, with some 8,000 kilometers of border and 
coastline to defend. For these reasons Hanoi was prepared to do 
whatever was necessary to achieve a secure, cooperative, non- 
threatening Laos and Cambodia. 

External security threats to Vietnam from the Southeast Asia 
region were also possible. Just as the relationship with China was 
tied to Hanoi's Cambodian and Laotian policies, so the relation- 
ship with Cambodia and Laos was bound up with policies toward 
the six nations comprising the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Vietnamese security goals in Southeast Asia 
in the 1980s appeared to be the elimination of any United States 
military presence; the diminution of American influence; a gen- 
eral balance of superpower activity in the region; and, possibly, 
the unified economic development of the region. PAVN dwarfed 



247 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

all of its ASEAN neighbors' armed forces and, in fact, was larger 
than all six combined. Its size and continued growth provided 
Hanoi's neighbors with legitimate cause for worry. PAVN, given 
the advantage of terrain, was sufficiently powerful to battle the 
Chinese army to a stalemate for a prolonged period, although not 
indefinitely. The composition of PAVN — large numbers of infantry 
with only guerrilla war experience, limited air power, and virtually 
no offensive naval capability — meant that Vietnam could not, 
however, project force over a long distance and could not, for 
instance, offer a credible threat even to Indonesia. Probably it could 
not even defend its holdings in the Spratly Islands against a deter- 
mined Chinese assault (see fig. 1). 

In strict strategic terms, PAVN was not as threatening to most 
of Vietnam's neighbors as its size suggested. Thailand, however, 
was a clear exception. PAVN had the military capability to crush 
Thailand's small, lightly equipped armed force in frontal battle. 
It could invade and occupy Thailand quickly, although most cer- 
tainly that action would trigger the same kind of resistance encoun- 
tered in Cambodia. Furthermore, such an invasion would incur 
the wrath of China and the displeasure of the Soviet Union, and 
would probably precipitate military support from the ASEAN states 
and the United States. In the long run, PAVN will be a credible 
threat to its remaining neighbors only when it develops adequate 
air and naval strength. Vietnam's acquisition of such a capability, 
however, will depend more on Moscow's inclinations than Hanoi's. 

The Armed Forces 

PAVN is a singular military establishment. (The full name 
is occasionally translated Vietnam People's Army, or VP A). Its 
singularity of purpose as well as form is a function of its Vietnamese 
cultural heritage, a centuries-old martial spirit, a history of mes- 
sianic military leadership possessing extraordinary insight, and four 
decades of combat experience. 

In the 1980s, PAVN was characterized by a sense of newly 
acquired destiny, a feeling of international prowess, and the real 
limitations imposed by economic stagnation, diplomatic isolation, 
and uncertainty regarding its closest ally, the Soviet Union. It was 
in the middle of a debate over the proper use of force (whether 
it should be applied nakedly as in Cambodia or in the more tradi- 
tional manner prescribed by "revolutionary force" doctrine) and 
was determined to modernize its organization, including reform- 
ing the officer corps and renewing the never-ending internal battle 
against inefficiency and corruption. Finally, PAVN was faced 
with the prospect of an inevitable generational change of military 



248 



National Security 



leadership. In 1987 PAVN numbered about 2.9 million personnel, 
including its Paramilitary Force, making it the third largest armed 
force in the world. Nevertheless, it was well integrated into Viet- 
namese society and enjoyed a good working relationship with both 
the government and the VCP. It was tightly controlled, chiefly by 
various mechanisms in the hands of the VCP apparatus within it. 

At the same time, PAVN was limited by critical weaknesses: it 
was technologically underdeveloped because it lacked various kinds 
of modern equipment, weapons, and training; its officer and non- 
commissioned officer corps were overaged; and it was highly 
dependent on outside military sources because there were no 
indigenous arms factories of any importance in Vietnam. 

The purpose to which PAVN has been dedicated over the years 
has varied greatly and has turned chiefly on the demands of the 
party. Its basic functions are similar to those of armed forces every- 
where: to defend Vietnam's territorial integrity, to support its for- 
eign policy and strategic goals where appropriate, to contribute to 
the maintenance of its internal security, and to assist in its eco- 
nomic development. These aims are set forth in Section IV (Arti- 
cles 50 through 52) of the 1980 Constitution. 

In the first several years after the end of the Second Indochina 
War, PAVN's performance was tested twice — in Cambodia and 
along Vietnam's northern border with China. Its ability to main- 
tain internal security has been tested continuously, although to a 
lesser degree. 

History 

PAVN's progenitor was a collection of guerrilla bands, many 
of them composed of ethnic minority highlanders, assembled in 
Indochina during World War II and armed and encouraged by 
the Allied Forces as opposition to the Japanese army, which had 
occupied much of Southeast Asia. A few of these guerrilla bands 
were organized by the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), as 
the VCP was known at the time (see Development of the Viet- 
namese Communist Party, ch. 4). 

Near the end of the war, the ICP began to experiment with a 
new kind of military force, called Armed Propaganda units. The 
first of these units was created in the mountains of northern Viet- 
nam near the China border. The armed propaganda team was the 
brainchild of Ho Chi Minh (known then as Nguyen Ai Quoc) and 
a thirty-two-year-old Hanoi history teacher named Vo Nguyen 
Giap. It was designed both to engage in combat and to do organiza- 
tional and mobilization work in the villages. Armed propaganda 
teams shaped the character of the subsequently formed PAVN. 



249 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

On September 2, 1945, when Ho Chi Minh officially proclaimed 
the independence of the nation and announced the formation 
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), a Ministry of 
National Defense was created and the ministerial portfolio was given 
to a noncommunist, a measure that reflected the apparently broadly 
nationalistic composition of the new government. Giap, at the time 
the second most powerful communist figure, became minister of 
the interior. A year later the National Defense Council (NDC) was 
created, and Giap was made chairman, giving him more direct 
control of the Viet Minh armed force (see Glossary), the precur- 
sor to PAVN. When the French returned to Indochina, the newly 
formed Viet Minh — consisting of approximately 1,000 men in 13 
infantry companies — was driven into the hills behind Hanoi. 

The Viet Minh's military force, which fought the French for eight 
years, was a united-front army, meaning it was communist- 
influenced but was not entirely communist. For much of the First 
Indochina War, it was essentially an irregular force, growing to 
about 60,000 at the end of the first year of the war and to about 
380,000 in 1954. Only about a third of these were considered regu- 
lars; the remainder were "regional" or "local" forces. This sys- 
tem was the forerunner of the three-elements concept of the armed 
forces — regulars, regionals (or territorials), and locals — which has 
been retained in PAVN. The regular force was organized into about 
30 infantry battalions of 600 men each and 8 heavy-weapons 
battalions. Many of the early units were organized along ethnic 
lines. A preponderance of the day-to-day battles in the First Indo- 
china War were fought by PAVN regional forces and local militia 
units. Regulars were used sparingly and were committed only to 
battles of strategic importance, such as the 1950 campaign to push 
French forces back from the China border region, the attempted 
capture of Hanoi in 1951 , and the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. 

In 1954, at the end of the First Indochina War, PAVN was still 
a united-front military force. It remained for the party to "regula- 
rize" it. Control mechanisms were introduced gradually and per- 
fected, reorganization was undertaken, military elements were 
enlarged, support units were added, and formal regulations on 
military service were developed. A tight system of party controls 
was introduced, military schools were opened and military assistance 
was solicited from abroad, chiefly from China. A directive of the 
Twelfth Plenum of the Central Committee (Second National Party 
Congress), issued in March 1957, established universal military 
conscription. By 1965 PAVN numbered 400,000; by 1975, 650,000. 
Of the approximately 2.9 million in uniform in 1987, about 



250 



Vo Nguyen Giap with Viet Minh troops, 1946 
Courtesy Indochina Archives 

1.1 million served in the PAVN Regular Force and 1.8 million 
served in the Paramilitary Force. 

In 1959 the VCP (known at the time as the Vietnam Workers' 
Party — VWP, or Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam) decided to launch 
an armed struggle in the South in the name of unification of the 
fatherland. Part of the effort involved creation of a united-front 
organization, the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet- 
nam (or Viet Cong, see Glossary) and a united-front armed force, 
initially called the People's Liberation Army (PL A) and later 
renamed the People's Liberation Armed Force (PLAF). The mis- 
sion of the PLAF was to liberate the South in order to permit its 
unification with North Vietnam, and Hanoi began supplying this 
force with doctrinal know-how and key personnel. In keeping with 
a principle of people's war that called on combatants to be self- 
sustaining, North Vietnamese leaders also admonished the PLAF 
to be self-supporting and self-contained and not to rely on, or make 
requests of, Hanoi. Then and later, however, authorities always 
stood ready to meet any critical need of their southern brethren. 

Until 1965 the war in the South was on the shoulders of the 
PLAF. Its rapid escalation in 1965, however, introduced PAVN 
troops to the South in ever-increasing numbers, and the burden 
of the war shifted to them. In 1972 in the so-called Easter offen- 
sive, about 90 percent of the combat was carried out by northern 



251 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

regulars. The final campaign in April 1975 was fought almost 
entirely by PAVN troops. At the time, almost all PAVN infantry 
divisions were outside North Vietnam in Laos, in Cambodia, or, 
overwhelmingly, in South Vietnam. After the war, the remnant 
PLAF force was disbanded, and its members were either demobi- 
lized or transferred to PAVN units. 

Throughout its developmental period, from the earliest proto- 
military organizations of the 1930s until the late 1970s, PAVN was 
heavily influenced by China and by Chinese military thought and 
doctrine. The original party-led armed force, the Viet Minh army, 
was created by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and 
fielded from China. Later, it was nurtured and funded largely by 
the Chinese Communist Party. Military manuals were of Chinese 
origin, first Nationalist then Communist, and in the early years 
nearly all imported logistic assistance came either directly from 
China or — if from the Soviet Union — through China and with 
Chinese cooperation. During the Second Indochina War, Chinese 
antiaircraft troops and Chinese railroad and warehousing personnel 
served in Vietnam. 

Postwar Development 

The chief changes in PAVN after April 1975 were enormous 
growth, augmented by increased war-making capability and fire 
power, and development away from a guerrilla-oriented infantry 
toward a more orthodox modern armed force. Hanoi's public state- 
ments indicated there would be a significant demobilization of 
PAVN immediately after the war and that many PAVN units would 
be converted into economic development teams. Within a few 
weeks, however, PAVN units were engaged in a border war in 
Cambodia with one-time ally the Khmer Rouge (see Glossary) and 
were preparing to defend Vietnam's northern border against China. 

Following the end of the Second Indochina War, PAVN was 
in worse condition than was generally realized. Having been deci- 
mated by ten years of combat, it was in organizational disarray, 
with a logistics system that was nearly worn out. Both PAVN and 
the country were suffering from war weariness, and restructuring 
and rebuilding were hampered in part because the war's sudden 
ending had precluded planning for the postwar world. Vietnamese 
military journals acknowledged at the time that the new situation 
required the transformation of PAVN from an army of revolu- 
tionary soldiers fighting with guerrilla tactics into an orthodox 
armed force that could defend existing institutions and fixed instal- 
lations from internal and external threats. It was a new and broader 
task, and Ho Chi Minh's observation made at the end of the First 



252 




Indochina War was frequently quoted: "Before we had only the 
night and the jungle. Now we have the sky and the water." 

Several problems had to be addressed. These included the dual- 
control system, i.e., the ill-defined division of authority between 
the military command structure and the party leadership within 
the armed forces, or between the military commander and the 
political commissar; the lack of esprit de corps among the rank and 
file, a general malaise termed "post-war mentality"; and the officer 
corps' inadequate military knowledge and insufficient military tech- 
nological skills for the kind of war that had emerged in the 1970s. 
There were also policy conflicts over the conduct of large-scale com- 
bined or joint military operations and the nature of future mili- 
tary training, a lack of standardization of equipment, materiel 
shortages, administrative breakdowns, general inefficiency and lack 
of performance by basic military units, and an anachronistic party 
structure within PAVN stemming from an outmoded organizational 
structure and inappropriate or out-of- touch political commissars. 

By 1978 the effort to restore PAVN had developed into the Great 
Campaign. This was a five-year program with five objectives: to 
increase the individual soldier's sense of responsibility, discipline, 
dedication, attitude toward solidarity, and mastery of weapons, 
equipment, and vehicles; to encourage more frugal expenditure 
of fuel, supplies, and materiel; to improve PAVN's officer corps, 
particularly at the basic unit level; to improve military-civilian 



253 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



relations and heighten international solidarity; and to improve the 
material-spiritual life of soldiers. Of these, the most important was 
the program to improve the PAVN officer corps, the heart of which 
was a four-part statute called the Army Officers' Service Law, 
drafted in 1978 and officially promulgated in 1981. The Service 
Law, as it came to be called, established systematic new criteria 
for the selection and training of officers; defined PAVN officers' 
rights and military obligations; and overhauled, upgraded, and for- 
mally instituted a new PAVN reserve officer system. It also set up 
new regulations concerning officer promotions, assignments, and 
ranking systems. 

The reorganization was a deliberate effort to professionalize the 
PAVN officer corps, in part by codifying the military hierarchy 
within PAVN, which had never been officially approved. Previ- 
ous emphasis on egalitarianism had led to virtual denial of even 
the concept of rank. There were no officers, only cadres; no enlisted 
personnel; only combatants. Uniforms were devoid of insignia, and 
references to rank or title were avoided in conversation. With profes- 
sionalization, distinctions emerged between officers and enlisted 
troops. Accompanying the basic law were directives from the Coun- 
cil of Ministers that dealt with PAVN ranks, uniforms, and insignia. 
A thirteen-rank officer system with appropriate titles was instituted. 
There were new designations for naval flag rank, which had previ- 
ously carried generals' titles (although apparently naval officers 
below flag rank continued to bear army ranks). Under the new 
regulations, PAVN officers were distinguished as either line com- 
manders, staff officers, political officers, administrative officers, 
or military-police officers. The new regulations additionally stipu- 
lated the use of unit insignia — bright red for infantry, sky blue for 
air force and air defense force, dark blue for navy, green for border 
defense, and light gray for specialist technicians — in all twenty- 
five separate services, each of which had its own emblem (see 
fig. 16). 

Technological improvements for PAVN were instituted chiefly 
under the Great Campaign. Intensive technical training programs 
were begun. Heavy emphasis was placed on the training of surface- 
to-air missile (SAM) battery commanders, advanced air defense 
technicians, fighter pilots, radar technicians, communications- 
systems operators, and naval officers. The program was fully 
supported by the Soviet Union, which provided military aid and 
technical advisers and trainers. A costly developmental effort, it had 
not been long under way before events began to conspire against it. 

Shortly after the Great Campaign was launched in 1978, Viet- 
nam's disputes with Cambodia and China sharply intensified. On 



254 



National Security 



March 5, 1979, the government issued a General Mobilization 
Order that established three "great tasks" for Vietnam: to enlarge 
the national defense structure, meaning to increase substantially 
the size of PAVN; to increase agricultural and industrial produc- 
tion in support of the war; and to develop better administrative 
systems in the party, PAVN, and the economic sector. The empha- 
sis was on young Vietnamese, who were called to perform separate 
"great tasks," i.e., "annihilate the enemy, develop the paramilitary 
system, do productive labor, insure internal security, and perform 
necessary ideological tasks." The order required all able-bodied 
persons to work ten hours a day — eight hours in productive labor 
and two hours in military training. It also required universal par- 
ticipation in civil-defense exercises. 

Conflict with Cambodia 

Serious trouble between Hanoi and the Khmer Rouge under Pol 
Pot began at the end of the Second Indochina War when both 
PAVN troops and the Khmer Rouge engaged in "island grabbing" 
and seizures of each other's territory, chiefly small areas in dis- 
pute between Vietnam and Cambodia for decades. What goaded 
Hanoi to take decisive action was Pol Pot's determination to indoc- 
trinate all Khmer with hatred for Vietnam, thus making Hanoi's 
goal of eventual Indochinese federation even more difficult to 
accomplish. Vietnam's Political Bureau had several options in 
"solving the Pol Pot problem," as it was officially termed. Viet- 
nam's wartime relationship with the Khmer Rouge had been one 
of domination, in which control had been maintained through the 
intercession of native Khmers, numbering approximately five 
thousand, who had lived and trained in North Vietnam. The 
Political Bureau reasoned that by controlling the Khmer Rouge 
"five thousand" faction it could control the Khmer (Kampuchean) 
Communist Party, which in turn would control the Cambo- 
dian state and society. This strategy broke down when most of the 
Khmer communist cadres trained in Vietnam were executed by 
Pol Pot. 

In another effort, the Political Bureau dispatched Le Duan to 
Phnom Penh soon after the end of the war for a stern meeting with 
Pol Pot, but his efforts to persuade or intimidate failed. A series 
of punitive military strikes followed with the objective of trigger- 
ing the overthrow of Pol Pot. Some of these assaults, such as the 
one in the Parrot's Beak (see Glossary) region in 1977, involved 
as many as 90,000 PAVN troops, but they came to nothing. There 
also were covert Vietnamese attempts to eliminate Pol Pot by brib- 
ing his bodyguards to assassinate him. 



255 



Vietnam: A Country Study 




256 



National Security 



Finally, in early 1978, Hanoi returned to tested methods of 
revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Special PAVN teams recruited 
volunteers for a future Khmer liberation army from Khmer refugee 
camps in southern Vietnam. About 300 of the most promising were 
taken to Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon), installed in the 
former Cambodian embassy building, and organized into armed 
propaganda teams, with Khmer Rouge defector Heng Samrin in 
charge of training. The plan, according to program defectors, was 
to send armed propaganda teams, like the Kampuchea Liberation 
Front, into Cambodian provinces along the Vietnamese border to 
infiltrate Khmer villages and begin organization and mobilization 
work. A Radio Liberation broadcast unit would be established, a 
liberated area would be proclaimed, and eventually a Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of Kampuchea would be formed that 
would then dispatch emissaries abroad in search of support. In late 
1978, however, this revolutionary guerrilla war strategy was sud- 
denly abandoned in favor of a full-scale, blitzkrieg-style attack on 
Cambodia. Later it became evident that the idea for the attack had 
come from young PAVN officers, many of whom had been trained 
in Moscow, who had assured the Political Bureau that the matter 
could be resolved in a maximum of six months. The Political 
Bureau's decision to attempt a military solution in Cambodia was 
taken against the advice of General Giap and probably most of the 
other older PAVN generals. 

PAVN struck across the Cambodian border from the Parrot's 
Beak area of Vietnam on Christmas Day 1978. The drive was 
characterized by a highly visible Soviet-style offensive with tank-led 
infantry that plunged suddenly across the border, drove to the Thai 
border, and then fanned out to occupy Cambodia within days. 
Heng Samrin and his 300 Khmer cadres proceeded to form a new 
government, called the People's Republic of Kampuchea, in Phnom 
Penh, and began building an army to take over from the occupy- 
ing PAVN by 1990. The first indication to the PAVN high com- 
mand in Hanoi that it was in fact trapped in a protracted conflict 
came in the summer of 1979, when a major pacification drive, 
launched by PAVN forces using some 170,000 troops, proved to 
be inconclusive. It was only in the wake of that drive that PAVN 
settled down to the slow task of pacifying Cambodia. 

Officially, PAVN troops in Cambodia were volunteers, perform- 
ing what were called their "internationalist duties." The number 
involved decreased over the years, from 220,000 in January 1979 
to 140,000 in January 1987. As the war progressed, Hanoi offi- 
cials increasingly portrayed it as a struggle against China and labeled 
the Khmer insurgent forces as Chinese surrogates. By late 1982, 



257 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

they had begun to portray the war as a thing of the past, claiming 
that Vietnamese dominance had become irreversible, with only 
mopping up of scattered pockets of opposition yet to accomplish. 
The Cambodian resistance, however, continued, never able to 
challenge PAVN seriously, certainly not able to drive it from the 
country, but still gaining in strength. By 1987 the resistance was 
stronger than it had been at any time since 1979. To reduce strain 
on its system and to quiet outside criticism, PAVN lowered the 
profile of the war. There were fewer military sweeps into guerrilla 
lairs and greater use of artillery, more static guard duty, and less 
road patrolling. Military forces concentrated on keeping open the 
lines of communication, guarding the towns, and building up 
Phnom Penh's fledgling army — the Khmer People's Revolutionary 
Armed Forces (KPRAF). At the same time, increments of PAVN 
forces were withdrawn from Cambodia each year in what the 
Chinese press labeled the "annual semi-withdrawal performance." 
By 1986 Hanoi was stating that all PAVN forces would be with- 
drawn from Cambodia by 1990, a decision officials insisted was 
"absolute and without conditions." In retrospect, Vietnam's inva- 
sion of Cambodia appears to have been a serious mistake. 
Apparently it was a decision hastily taken in the belief that a quick, 
successful takeover would force the Chinese to accept the new situa- 
tion as a fait accompli. The undertaking was also based on the 
estimate that Pol Pot had neither the political base nor the military 
power to resist a traumatic assault, which would shatter his capa- 
bility to govern and cause the Khmer people to rally overwhelm- 
ingly to the new government. Assumptions proved wrong, and the 
strategy failed. The invasion did not solve the Pol Pot problem, 
but rather bogged Vietnam down in a costly war that tarnished 
its image abroad and undermined relations with China that might 
otherwise have been salvaged. The war drained the economy and 
continued to be one of Vietnam's unsolved national security 
problems in late 1987. 

Conflict with China 

China has posed a far more serious challenge to Vietnam's 
national security since the Second Indochina War, especially 
because of its twenty-nine-day incursion into Vietnam in Febru- 
ary 1979, which, according to the Vietnamese, has continued as 
a "multifaceted war of sabotage." China's 1979 invasion was a 
response to what China considered to be a collection of provoca- 
tive actions and policies on Hanoi's part. These included Viet- 
namese intimacy with the Soviet Union, mistreatment of ethnic 
Chinese (Hoa — see Glossary) living in Vietnam, hegemonistic 



258 



Vietnamese soldiers returning from duty on the Chinese border 

Courtesy Bill Herod 

"imperial dreams" in Southeast Asia, and spurning of Beijing's 
attempt to repatriate Chinese residents of Vietnam to China. The 
Chinese attack came at dawn on the morning of February 17, and 
employed infantry, armor, and artillery. Air power was not 
employed then or at any time during the war. Within a day, the 
Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) had advanced some eight 
kilometers into Vietnam along a broad front. It then slowed and 
nearly stalled because of heavy Vietnamese resistance and difficulties 
within the Chinese supply system. On February 21, the advance 
resumed against Cao Bang in the far north and against the all- 
important regional hub of Lang Son. Chinese troops entered Cao 
Bang on February 27, but the city was not secured completely until 
March 2. Lang Son fell two days later. On March 5, the Chinese, 
saying Vietnam had been sufficiently chastised, announced that 
the campaign was over. The PLA withdrawal was completed on 
March 16. 

Hanoi's post-incursion depiction of the border war was that 
Beijing had sustained a military setback if not an outright defeat. 
Nevertheless, the attack confirmed Hanoi's perception of China 
as a threat. The PAVN high command henceforth had to assume, 
for planning purposes, that the Chinese might come again and 
might not halt in the foothills but might drive on to Hanoi. By 
1987 China had stationed nine armies (approximately 400,000 



259 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

troops) in the Sino- Vietnamese border region, including one along 
the coast. It had also increased its landing craft fleet and was peri- 
odically staging amphibious landing exercises off Hainan Island, 
across from Vietnam, thereby demonstrating that a future attack 
might come from the sea. 

In the early 1980s, China began pursuing what some observers 
have described as a semi- secret campaign against Vietnam that was 
more than a series of border incidents and less than a limited small- 
scale war. The Vietnamese called it a "multifaceted war of sabo- 
tage." Hanoi officials have described the assaults as comprising 
steady harassment by artillery fire, intrusions on land by infantry 
patrols, naval intrusions, and mine planting both at sea and in the 
riverways. Chinese clandestine activity (the "sabotage" aspect) for 
the most part was directed against the ethnic minorities of the border 
region (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). According to 
the Hanoi press, teams of Chinese agents systematically sabotaged 
mountain agricultural production centers as well as lowland port, 
transportation, and communication facilities. Psychological warfare 
operations were an integral part of the campaign, as was what the 
Vietnamese called "economic warfare" — encouragement of Viet- 
namese villagers along the border to engage in smuggling, currency 
speculation, and hoarding of goods in short supply. 

The Vietnamese responded to the Chinese campaign by turn- 
ing the districts along the China border into "iron fortresses" 
manned by well-equipped and well-trained paramilitary troops. In 
all, an estimated 600,000 troops were assigned to counter Chinese 
operations and to stand ready for another Chinese invasion. The 
precise dimensions of the frontier operations were difficult to deter- 
mine, but its monetary cost to Vietnam was considerable. 

The Legal-Constitutional Basis of the Military 

The 1980 Constitution establishes the legal basis for PAVN in 
Section IV (Articles 50 through 52), titled Defense of the Socialist 
Homeland. Supervision of the armed forces is vested in the Coun- 
cil of State (see The System of Government, ch. 4). The Council 
of State, newly formed under the 1980 Constitution, assumes the 
equivalent authority of the previous National Assembly Standing 
Committee in that it can declare war and mobilize the country if 
the assembly is not in session. The Council chairman (Truong 
Chinh in 1987), according to the Constitution, concurrently chairs 
the National Defense Council (NDC) — retained from the 1959 
constitution — and serves as commander in chief of PAVN. The 
latter function, however, is ceremonial. Under the Constitution, 
the role of the NDC is "to mobilize all forces and potentials of the 



260 



National Security 



country to defend the homeland." It thus is made explicitly respon- 
sible for what is the National Assembly's implicit duty, mobiliza- 
tion in the broadest sense. By comparison with the previous 
constitution, the 1980 document gives the National Assembly (see 
Glossary) legal authority with respect to PAVN that is perhaps 
broader but is less clearly defined. For example, "The National 
Assembly has the duty and power ... to decide on matters of war 
and peace," but its chairmanship (under Nguyen Huu Tho in 1987) 
is a merely nominal position. 

The highest operational authority over PAVN is exercised by 
the Council of Ministers, equivalent to a cabinet, which is respon- 
sible for "organizing national defense activities and building the 
people's armed forces." In 1987 the chairman of the Council of 
Ministers was Premier Pham Van Dong. 

Basic national defense policy is fixed by the NDC, then trans- 
mitted first to the Ministry of National Defense and second to the 
PAVN High Command. As is common throughout the Vietnam 
ruling apparatus, there is a great deal of overlap because of "two 
hat" (or concurrent) assignments. The chairman of the NDC is 
the president of the State Council; the vice chairman is the prime 
minister. NDC members include the VCP secretary general, the 
chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, the 
PAVN chief of staff, the minister of national defense, the minister 
of foreign affairs, the minister of interior, and the chairman of the 
State Planning Commission. In time of war, the NDC acts as a 
supreme headquarters for mobilizational purposes and is vested 
with the authority to command all manpower and other resources 
in the country (see fig. 17). 

The Military's Place in Society 

PAVN exerts a great deal of complicated direct and indirect influ- 
ence both on party and government policy-making and on every- 
day non-military life. It is so well integrated into the social system 
that there is no precise point at which it can be said that the mili- 
tary ends and the civilian world begins. 

By official definition, Vietnam is an egalitarian, proletarian-based 
classless society. This means that PAVN is not an army of the 
people — although it must serve all of the people — but that it is an 
army of the proletariat. Society is supposed to support PAVN as 
well as police it to assure that the armed forces meet the require- 
ments of the new social order. Conversely, PAVN is charged with 
assuming, in alliance with the party, the leadership of the proletariat 
and of society in general. PAVN is expected to be all things to the 
people and special things to the party. It must both lead the people 



261 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

and serve them. It must be loyal both to the political line and to 
the military line, even when these conflict. It must act as the van- 
guard of the party yet be scrupulously subservient to it. 

Despite the praetorian qualities of Vietnamese society — the result 
of centuries of martial cultural influence — PAVN, like its predeces- 
sors, is not militaristic in the sense the term is understood in the 
West. Nor is there in Vietnam what might be called a military- 
industrial complex, that is, a coalition of military and political vested 
interests that are distinctly separate from the rest of the social sys- 
tem. Rather, the relationship of the military and the rest of the 
society is symbiotic, marked by a strong sense of material and 
psychological dependence. Society's responsibility to PAVN, which 
is rooted in the Constitution, requires that all of the people sup- 
port the armed forces in all ways. PAVN's duties x to society, in 
turn, incorporate political and economic responsibilities as well as 
defense of the country. Complicating this relationship is the party, 
which is neither civilian nor military but has some of the charac- 
teristics of both. 

The chief obligation of the average citizen to PAVN is military 
service, which is universal and compulsory. This duty long predates 
the advent of communism to Vietnam. Conscription in traditional 
Vietnam was carried out in a manner similar to the requisitioning 
of corvee labor. Village councils were required to supply conscripts 
according to population ratio (one link or soldier for every three 
to seven villagers, depending on the section of the country). The 
1980 Constitution stipulates that "citizens are obliged to do mili- 
tary service" and "take part in the building of the national defense 
force." Article 52 mandates compulsory military service as part 
of the state's efforts to "stimulate the people's patriotism and revolu- 
tionary heroism." In December 1981, the National Assembly 
promulgated a new Military Obligation Law stating that "mili- 
tary obligation is mandated by law and is a glorious task for a 
citizen. . . . All male citizens from all rural areas, city districts, 
organs, state enterprises, and vocational schools from elementary 
to college level, regardless of the positions they hold, if they meet 
the induction criteria of the annual state draft plan, must serve in 
the armed forces for a limited time in accordance with the draft 
law." Under the law there are no exemptions to military service, 
although there can be deferments. This practice has led to charges 
that extensive corruption allows the sons of influential party and 
state officials one deferment after another. 

The draft is administered by PAVN itself and is conducted chiefly 
by a corps of retired officers stationed in district offices through- 
out the country. The process begins with registration, which is 



262 



National Security 



voluntary for all males at age sixteen and compulsory at seven- 
teen. A woman may register if she is a member of the Ho Chi Minh 
Communist Youth League. The draft age is from eighteen to 
twenty-seven. The enlistment period is three years for ordinary 
enlistees, four years for technical specialists and naval personnel, 
and two years for certain ethnic minorities. Youths who do not 
enlist and await the draft receive a military service classification, 
of which there are six. Draft calls are issued twice a year. 

Since the beginning of the war in Cambodia, the draft call has 
been accompanied by enlistment campaigns to persuade youths to 
volunteer rather than wait for conscription. Recruitment drives have 
been conducted by PAVN veterans of the Cambodian war who 
have met with prospective soldiers in school yards, where they have 
presented lectures or shown films. A quota was set for each province, 
by village and urban ward, but often was not met. To make mili- 
tary service more equitable and attractive, a system of options was 
established, which included the "three selects program" and the 
"six opens program." The three who could "select," or have a 
voice in the draft process, were the family, the local mass organi- 
zation (Vietnam Fatherland Front), and the production unit, such 
as a commune or factory. The "six opens program" involved the 
unrestricted posting of six elements of military conscription infor- 
mation in which there was a high level of public interest. This infor- 
mation included highlights of draft procedures, lists of draftees and 
deferments, and names of party officials, their children and their 
draft status. The purpose was to allow everyone to know who was 
and was not being drafted and why. A system of perquisites also 
was established as an inducement for families whose sons joined 
PAVN. The families were offered assistance in resolving their legal 
or class-status problems, in getting work papers or added food 
rations, and in obtaining permission to return from new economic 
zones (see Glossary). 

The General Mobilization Order of March 5, 1979, in the wake 
of the Chinese invasion, suspended the voluntary enlistment 
periods. In 1987 the period of PAVN service was indefinite. The 
mobilization order also eased some restrictions on drafting south- 
erners, such as the requirement that each draftee have a "clear 
history," meaning a proletarian background with no strong ties 
to the previous government or to its army, the Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam (ARVN— see Glossary). After 1979 certain ARVN 
enlisted men and noncommissioned officers, chiefly technicians 
and military specialists (but not ex- ARVN officers) were drafted. 
Increasingly, draftees sent to Cambodia were from the South. The 
mobilization order also cracked down on draft resistance, which 



263 



Vietnam: A Country Study 







o 

3 O 


TATE 


O 


to 


O 





-i LU _j 

z£o 

I— Li. 3 
<LUO 
Z Q O 



>- LJJ 
DC LU 

< o 

Z DC 
LU < 
O CL 



CC CL 
(— 

co 
z 
2 



LU 

CO 

z 

LU DC 



O CO 

II 

O LU 

£S 

O LU 
> Q 
DC LL 
I — LL 

w O 

z 

2 



> 00 

P < 



b < 

DC I- 
O Q 
LU Z 
DC < 



<C Q Z 
t Z LU 
=j < 2 
T> -, LU 

^ n 01 

Z CJ — j 

52 o 

LU < O 

DC Zi DC 
O 0_ 



Z LU O 
< £ ? 
DC O Z 



CO 

Z CO 
< DC 



O o Z 

Z 3 2 

o O — i 

LU DC CL 
CL 



264 



National Security 



appeared to be widespread and even socially acceptable, especially 
in the South. A common method of draft avoidance was use of coun- 
terfeit military discharge papers, the fabrication of which was an 
extensive and lucrative enterprise; in 1981 two of five persons con- 
victed of producing counterfeit discharges were sentenced to death 
in Haiphong. A common form of draft evasion was termed irregular 
compliance, i.e., the failure of a young man to register in the hope 
that the cumbersome bureaucracy would fail to catch up with him. 
In 1985 it was estimated that 20 percent of male youths in the South, 
and perhaps as many as 5 percent in the North, had not registered. 
Communes or factories, which did not want to lose the services 
of draftable individuals, may have tried to protect them from the 
local draft board. Because a quota system was employed, a com- 
mon avoidance tactic was to supply a substitute known to be in 
bad health, who would then fail his physical examination. The 
People's Security Service (PSS) continually rounded up draft 
dodgers and deserters. Special teams called bandit hunters raided 
coffee shops, noodle stands, and other likely hangouts. Draft evaders 
faced a mandatory five-year jail sentence; deserters were returned 
to their military units for punishment. Measures were also taken 
against the families of inductees who failed to report. For instance, 
a draftee's family could be jailed, and the family's home or other 
property could be impounded until he reported for duty. 

PAVN's chief function is to defend the homeland. Its second, 
equally important, function is to ensure the perpetuation of the 
existing sociopolitical system. It also has economic responsibilities 
and acts as a role model for the general population. PAVN's 
behavior is expected to instill the basic tenets of a Leninist system 
among the populace. It is expected to engage in class struggle and 
to eliminate antiproletarian sentiment in its ranks and in society 
in general. Individual soldiers are expected to set an example of 
proper socialist behavior by being dedicated, hard-working, incor- 
ruptible, and highly skilled in the performance of their duty. Above 
all, PAVN is expected to be a model of loyalty to the party and 
to Vietnam. 

PAVN also is expected to bear a material responsibility in the 
economic sector. It is commonplace in Marxist-Leninist systems 
for the armed forces to contribute in some way to the economy. 
In Vietnam during the First Indochina War, PAVN units, mostly 
guerrilla bands, were forced to fend for themselves by living off 
the countryside and on the charity of friendly villagers. During the 
Second Indochina War, PAVN had a weak quartermaster system 
in the South and adopted what was called the "three-nine system," 
under which a PAVN unit was supplied with food for nine months 



265 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

of the year but supported itself for the remaining three, usually 
by gardening or bartering (lumber traded for food, for example). 
Implicit in this system was the notion that it was proper for a soldier 
to engage in nonmilitary economic production activities, an idea 
that was increasingly challenged with the growth of professionalism 
in PAVN's ranks. After the Second Indochina War, PAVN was 
instructed to assume a greater economic role. The Fourth National 
Party Congress (December 1976) called on the military to "dedi- 
cate itself to the single strategic mission of carrying out the socialist 
revolution and building socialism." PAVN not only accepted this 
challenge but proceeded to stake out a central claim in the economic 
life of the country. PAVN's soldiers, said General Giap, would 
fight the "bloodless war" of economic development as the "shock 
troops" of the economic sector. Military units began operating state 
farms, mining coal, building roads and bridges, repairing vehi- 
cles, engaging in commercial fishing, and participating in countless 
other economic ventures. Although the invasion of Cambodia in 
1978 followed by China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979 necessitated 
heavy reinforcement of the China border region and the allocation 
of resources for combat, an enlargement of PAVN in 1983 made 
it possible for the troops to resume most of their economic activities. 

It was clear from the discussion of economic duties in Vietnam's 
military journals that not all PAVN generals were enthusiastic about 
the idea. The chief criticism was that it detracted from what was 
seen as the central PAVN mission — defense of Vietnam — which 
was regarded as a full-time task. Some military critics complained 
that economic duty "dissipate[d] the thoughts" of the soldiers, 
undermined military discipline, and was a cause of corruption. 
Troops themselves also complained of the arduous work involved, 
such as digging miles of irrigation ditches, the most hated assign- 
ment of all. 

The armed forces, nevertheless, engaged in the production of 
weapons and military hardware, undertakings identified in the press 
as "national defense enterprises" and defined by PAVN as "pro- 
duction establishments of the armed forces." These included vehicle 
assembly plants, ordnance plants, and explosives factories. As in 
other societies with large standing armies, the question in Viet- 
nam was whether it made sense economically for a military unit 
to engage in production: whether, for instance, it could grow rice 
more productively or build a bridge more efficiently than a civilian 
counterpart. Vietnamese officials appear to have decided in favor 
of military participation, for they incorporated PAVN production 
potential into long-range economic planning (see Economic Roles 
of the Party and the Government, ch. 3). Contingency plans existed 



266 



National Security 



that called for PAVN units to sign production contracts with central- 
level ministries or provincial-level agencies, just as agricultural 
collectives or construction enterprises were required to do. Tap- 
ping the skilled manpower pool represented by PAVN may very 
well be the key to significant long-range economic development 
in Vietnam. 

Party Control in the Military 

It is a fundamental tenet of any Marxist-Leninist system that 
the communist party must dominate the system's military. Lenin, 
it is said, coined the slogan, "the party controls the gun," reflect- 
ing a deep and abiding fear that political power can be lost to the 
armed forces. 

The party's relationship with PAVN in Vietnam is one of neither 
coercion nor repression. Instead, the VCP and the armed forces 
are integrated and mutually dependent. Control is exercised by 
means of parallel military and party hierarchies that are both part 
of the overall political system. These parallel hierarchies may best 
be depicted by two pyramids: the VCP organization within PAVN, 
represented by the smaller pyramid, enclosed within the organi- 
zation of the armed forces, represented by the larger pyramid. These 
two hierarchical pyramids may also be divided horizontally into 
levels of command. At each level, from the Ministry of National 
Defense to the infantry company, there is a military command struc- 
ture and a corresponding party apparatus consisting of a political 
officer and party committee. VCP control of the military thus is 
not from the outside, but from within. 

PAVN and the VCP worked together harmoniously over the 
years, more so perhaps than their counterpart institutions in China 
or the Soviet Union. Party-military relations in the early days of 
the First Indochina War were clear and unequivocal. Indochinese 
patriots faced a highly visible, commonly hated enemy, and the 
single goal that united all — to expel the French — was something 
each could understand and approve. Party representatives led the 
cause because they seemed to possess an inherent superiority. Young 
Viet Minh recruits, mostly from the villages, willingly deferred to 
the well-traveled, more experienced, better educated party cadres, 
who understood the complicated relationship between war and 
politics and always seemed to know what to do. Eventually, 
however, these perceptions changed, and by the 1980s the unques- 
tioned acceptance of VCP superiority by the PAVN rank and file 
had dissipated. In its place there emerged a growing ambivalence 
fueled by resentment, not only of the party's postwar failures, but 
also of the privileged status enjoyed by party cadres and the party's 



267 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

exclusive authority over both the military leadership in place and 
the manpower pool from which future officers were drawn. To some 
degree the PAVN high command shared this ambivalence, but 
senior PAVN leaders were in a difficult position. Although per- 
mitted to exercise great influence within the party, preservation 
of their privileged status at times required them to put party interests 
over those of the armed forces. In the postwar years, relations with 
the party increasingly placed a severe strain on the high command. 
Factionalism, however, a condition that existed both within the 
ranks of PAVN's military leadership and within PAVN's party 
apparatus, apparently did not create a problem between the two. 

Divisive Issues 

During the postwar years, a number of nettlesome issues arose 
to trouble the generally symbiotic relationship between the armed 
forces and the party. A point of major contention was the dual com- 
mand system, in which responsibility for a military unit was shared 
between its commander and political officer. During the First Indo- 
china War, the military had been directed entirely by the party. 
What had counted chiefly in a leader was not military knowledge 
but political acumen, organizational skills, and the ability to per- 
suade and motivate. However, as the war had increased in inten- 
sity, a need had developed for experienced combat officers. When 
the demand soon exhausted manpower pools, the party had been 
obliged to turn to large numbers of officers with military rather 
than party credentials to fill PAVN officer ranks. Fearing it would 
lose control, the party in 1952 introduced in PAVN the position 
of political commissar or political officer (borrowed from the Soviet 
Union and China), thereby creating the so-called two-commander 
system. It was dogma at the time, however, that even with two 
commanders neither was a purely military officer. A large part of 
officer training consisted of political orientation to military activity. 
Nevertheless, the division of power between the two officers was 
not clearly defined. In theory, they shared authority in tactical mat- 
ters, but in reality they competed for power over the years. The 
system generated party-military friction, bitter jurisdictional dis- 
putes, sharp personality clashes, and confusion in authority. Despite 
its many flaws it endured for nearly three decades, surviving the 
Second Indochina War. As that conflict intensified in the early 
1960s, however, the balance of power between the two figures began 
to favor the military officer. 

Pressure to revise the role of the political officer and to end the 
dual command structure developed only after the Second Indochina 
War. Selected PAVN units were experimentally restructured in 



268 



National Security 



1977 in such a way that the functions of military commander and 
political officer were combined in a single officer. Gradually, this 
system was extended throughout PAVN, but as a concession to 
the party, PAVN agreed that the authority formerly wielded by 
the political officer in company-, battalion-, and regimental-level 
units should be vested in the party committee at each level. The 
chief difficulty encountered in this plan was that a dual command 
became a multiple command. Party committees sending orders 
directly to specific military, logistic, or technical officers in a unit 
could bypass the military commander, with the result that PAVN 
units were run by committee. When this system was taken into 
Cambodia, it proved totally unworkable. In 1980 the arrangement 
was supplanted by a "one-man-command system." Authority was 
vested in the unit commander, who was responsible to higher 
authorities, including the party committee at his level, but who 
exercised actual control of his unit. A March 1982 party resolu- 
tion endorsed this change but added a new arrangement that sup- 
ported retaining the position of political officer as an institution 
but spelled out its subordinate status to the military commander. 
Still in the developmental stage in 1987, this new arrangement 
clearly established the authority of the military commander over 
the political officer, but left his authority with respect to the party 
committee somewhat ambiguous. The military commander was 
permitted greater latitude in initiating decisions, but remained ulti- 
mately accountable to the party for whatever actions he took. 

A second major divisive issue between the party and PAVN was 
commonly termed the "red versus expert" argument. This doc- 
trine, imported from China and reflective of Mao Zedong's thinking 
about the conduct of war, began with the assumption that war- 
fare was a test of all adversarial strengths — ideological, economic, 
psychological, and spiritual, as well as military. It then asked suc- 
cessively which ranked higher in such a test — the material or the 
immaterial, men or weapons, and whether it was more important 
for the individual soldier to be ideologically motivated ("red") or 
technologically skilled in combat ("expert"). As expressed, the 
choice raised a false dichotomy, but it was an argument that raged 
within PAVN for decades. It was not simply a philosophical ques- 
tion, but a question that manifested itself in party-PAVN personnel 
relations, in strategic and tactical military planning, in officer selec- 
tion, assignment, and promotion, and in training programs 
designed to produce the ideal soldier. The debate surfaced in Viet- 
nam after the First Indochina War when a PAVN modernization 
program was launched. Part of that effort involved creating a series 
of specialized military schools and academies. Planning the course 



269 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

work for these new institutions triggered a spirited dispute over 
the relative value and importance of military expertise and revolu- 
tionary consciousness. In 1987 an easy resolution of this dichotomy 
was still beyond reach. Even in a politicized military organization 
such as PAVN, nonprofessional influences, whether political, 
ideological, or social, were limited by the demands of the work itself. 
New technology, requiring the mastery of complicated weapons 
and military processes, increasingly demanded the soldier's atten- 
tion and time. 

The Model Soldier 

At a fundamental level, the "red-expert" debate concerned Viet- 
nam's military ethos, the basic qualities and virtues of the model 
soldier. The prototypical, or composite, PAVN soldier in the 1970s 
and 1980s was twenty-three years old, had been born and raised 
in a village, was a member of the ban co class (poor for many genera- 
tions), was unmarried, and had less than five years' formal educa- 
tion. His rural, agrarian background was the dominant influence 
in his thinking. He was one of five children and had lived his pre- 
army life in an extended family that included several generations 
of his immediate family as well as collateral relatives. He tended 
to resent outsiders as well as city people. His limited schooling made 
it difficult for him to cope with certain aspects of army life, for 
example, technical duties. He was raised as a nominal Buddhist 
but had always been subject to many direct and indirect 
Confucianist and Taoist influences. He was uninformed about the 
outside world, even other parts of Vietnam. He firmly believed 
in the importance and collective strength of the ho or extended 
family, and seldom questioned its demands on him, an attitude 
that served him well in his military career. 

At the age of nine, the model future soldier joined the Ho Chi 
Minh Young Pioneers and spent much time involved in its activi- 
ties. At sixteen, if he impressed his elders as being worthy, or if 
his family had influence, he became one of four youths (on an aver- 
age) in his village to join the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth 
League, participation in which led more or less automatically to 
admittance to the party as an adult. At twenty or twenty-one he 
was drafted, received two months' basic training, and was assigned 
to a unit. He did not particularly want to enter the army, nor did 
his parents wish it. However, he was obedient and accepted dis- 
cipline easily. He had faith that PAVN and the state would treat 
him in a generally fair manner, which chiefly meant to him that 
they would assist him or his family if he was disabled or killed 
in battle. He was nonmaterialistic, got along easily on the bare 



270 



National Security 



necessities of life, and regarded simplicity as a great virtue — a 
fortunate coincidence as he received little material reward; his pay 
per month averaged the price of a dozen bottles of beer. Despite 
extensive indoctrination by the party, the soldier was not politi- 
cally conscious. Much of what he knew about politics consisted of 
slogans he had been obliged to memorize, the meanings of which 
he only dimly comprehended. Beyond his brief basic training he 
received little military training, but, if he was illiterate, he was 
taught to read. He was a survival-oriented, tough, disciplined com- 
bat fighter, who persevered with stubborn determination, often 
against hopeless odds. He could be stubbornly hostile, even rebel- 
lious on occasion, without regard to consequences. He knew little 
about strategy or tactics, but believed that warfare consisted largely 
of careful planning, meticulous preparation, and then sustained, 
intensive mass attack. 

The party's contribution to this ethos of the model Vietnamese 
soldier was ideological. To his innate virtues of courage, tenacity, 
boldness, and cleverness, the party sought to add a commitment 
to revolutionary ideals. The party thus stimulated an ongoing 
debate, encompassing sociological, philosophical, psychological, and 
technological arguments over the fundamental relationship of 
ideology to technology in modern warfare, an understanding of 
which was the key to understanding the mind of the Vietnamese 
soldier. Over the years, the party debate pitted the revolutionary 
model, that is, the peasant soldier — perhaps ill-equipped but 
nevertheless infused with revolutionary zeal — against the expert 
model, the superbly trained but ideologically neutral military tech- 
nician. The revolutionary model always dominated the debate and 
found many allies , some transient and some permanent, both inside 
and outside PAVN. Supporting the expert model, on the other 
hand, was a small, shifting collection of technologically minded mili- 
tary professionals and civilians. In late 1987, the "experts" in 
PAVN's general officer corps remained outnumbered, but they had 
gained the support of a powerful ally — the Soviet military advisers 
in Vietnam. In reality, the debate between preserving the revolu- 
tionary character of PAVN and building a thoroughly modern 
professional armed force was overtaken by the imperatives of mili- 
tary technology, and the issue became obsolete. 

Finally, there were the PAVN-party vested-interest conflicts, in 
which what was best for the party was not always interpreted as 
best for PAVN. Subjects of conflict included party and state secu- 
rity controls over PAVN personnel, party use of the military for 
economic and other nonmilitary tasks, party use of political criteria 
in selecting generals and senior staff officers who planned grand 



271 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



strategy or directed major military campaigns in the field, the role 
of the paramilitary, officer-enlisted relations and command author- 
ity of the militia within PAVN, and intermilitary and military- 
civilian relations. 

Mechanisms of Control 

The VCP controls PAVN through an organizational and motiva- 
tional mechanism that can monitor, guide, influence, and if neces- 
sary coerce. Its interest in the process is to ensure ideological purity 
and to improve military efficiency. Party cadres and members who 
are part of PAVN are charged with imparting to the ranks the 
proper ideological spirit and are responsible for ensuring good 
individual military performance. At their command is a set of 
impressive institutional instruments that promote loyalty and 
dedication to the party and work against deviationism, personalism 
(selfishness), and other negative phenomena. Essentially the effort 
is one of indoctrination, which can be divided into three specific 
functions. 

The first of these functions is "information-liaison group" work 
and consists of discussion group meetings or lectures by political 
officers, who shore up existing beliefs and behavioral patterns and 
explain new party lines. The second is the kiem thao (self-criticism) 
session, which has no counterpart in noncommunist armies. Kiem 
thao requires "criticism and self-criticism from below to expose and 
eliminate shortcomings in work and to fight against a show of com- 
placent well-being." Rooted in group dynamics, it is aimed at har- 
nessing peer pressure. Thematic material in indoctrination sessions 
tends to focus on whatever is of major concern to the leadership 
at the moment (in 1987 it was the China threat). The kiem thao 
weekly session usually lasts about two hours and requires the indi- 
vidual to be constructively critical of himself, his peers, and his 
superiors. As such it gives the leadership insights into PAVN morale 
and provides a means of signaling present or potential problems. 
It also acts as a release valve, a means of reducing pressure, in 
circumstances for which no other remedy is available. 

The third function is the "emulation movement," a party con- 
trol mechanism used in PAVN and in Vietnamese society at large. 
It was borrowed from the Soviet Union and China and also has 
no counterpart in noncommunist systems. The "emulation 
movement" campaigns incite people to imitate standards estab- 
lished by the party. Most are short-run mobilization efforts, 
although some are semipermanent, having been in existence for 
a decade or more. Each is designed to serve a specific purpose. 
In PAVN the campaigns seek to heighten vigilance against spies 



272 



National Security 



and counterrevolutionaries, reduce logistic expenditures, improve 
weapon and vehicle maintenance, or increase the individual soldier's 
sense of international solidarity. The "emulation movement" in 
PAVN is viewed as "an essential means of advancing the Revolu- 
tion," which in practice means increasing unit solidarity, increas- 
ing the sense of discipline in the individual soldier, and improving 
military-civilian relations. The institution that runs these campaigns 
is a vast enterprise that requires the services of thousands of cadres 
who expend millions of man-hours in labor. 

All of these control devices are supervised by the PAVN politi- 
cal officer, the figure who breathes life into the abstraction of the 
party. The political officer has no exact counterpart in noncom- 
munist armies; some of his functions may be performed by the 
chaplain, the troop information and education officer or the special 
services officer in the armed forces of other nations, but his role 
in some respects is far more tangibly authoritative and significant. 
His duties are many and varied but chiefly involve political indoc- 
trination, personal-problem solving, and maintenance of his unit's 
morale. He mobilizes the emotions and will through intensive 
moralistic exhortation, and he personalizes the impersonal party 
by representing the distant Political Bureau to the individual soldier. 
He is a figure of consequence who over the years has acquired a 
mystique of legendary proportions. 

Within PAVN, party control of a different type is exercised 
through control of party membership. Party membership can be 
granted, denied, suspended, or removed permanently. The suc- 
cess or failure of a soldier's career is almost always determined by 
his having gained or failed to gain party membership. Weeding 
out of party members in PAVN takes place annually and averages 
about 1 percent of the total PAVN party membership, although 
in some units it can run as high as 6 percent. At the same time, 
intensive recruitment drives are held to induce soldiers to join the 
party. Prior to 1987, party members constituted 5 percent of PAVN; 
in 1987 the figure was between 10 and 20 percent. 

Organization 

PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam) is the formal name given 
to all elements of the Vietnamese armed forces; hence the desig- 
nation PAVN (or People's) Navy and PAVN (or People's) Air 
Force. This usage is traceable to the 1954 Geneva Agreements under 
which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was permitted 
to keep such armed forces as it already possessed. To adhere to 
the letter of the agreements, DRV leaders immediately created a 
navy and air force, but listed these new services as part of PAVN. 



273 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Separate naval and air forces with distinct military identities evolved 
over the years, however, and traditional interservice rivalries quickly 
began to assert themselves (see fig. 18). 

From their earliest days, the Vietnamese communists organized 
their armed forces into three basic categories described informally 
as "types of troops." Within the first category, the PAVN Regu- 
lar Force ("main force troops"), are the army, the navy, and the 
air force. In 1987 the army consisted of about 1.2 million officers 
and enlisted personnel; the navy, about 15,000; and the air force, 
about 20,000. The second grouping, the Regional Force (or "terri- 
torial troops"), is organized geographically and consists chiefly of 
infantry units with limited mobility. In 1987 it totaled about 
500,000. The third category, the PAVN Militia/Self-Defense Force 
(or "local troops"), is a semi-mobilized element organized by com- 
munity (village, urban precinct) or economic enterprise (commune, 
factory, worksite). In 1987 it numbered about 1.2 million. 

Military writers in Hanoi have tended to refer to the Regional 
and Militia/Self-Defense forces collectively as the Strategic Rear 
Force. The Regional Force is deployed at the provincial level and 
has units headquartered in each provincial capital, at the very least. 
The Militia/Self-Defense Force fulfills combat, combat support, 
and police functions from the district to the village level. The 
Regional and Militia/Self-Defense forces are two of about a dozen 
separate military organizations that constitute the Paramilitary 
Force, which is an integral part of PAVN. 

The Paramilitary Force has four functions: to defend its local 
area in time of war and to delay, not to halt, the enemy; to sup- 
port PAVN regular units in combat; to maintain local security in 
peace and in wartime; and to engage in economic activity, chiefly 
food production and road-building. In the deployment of troops 
during wartime for the purpose of repelling a full-scale invasion, 
PAVN strategists make a doctrinal distinction between the Regu- 
lar Force, which would use conventional tactics, and the Paramili- 
tary Force, which would employ guerrilla tactics in "local people's 
warfare. " 

Backing up the Regular and Paramilitary Forces is a reserve of 
about 500,000 personnel designated the Tactical Rear Force. This 
semi-mobilized body is composed mainly of veterans and overage 
males, who in time of emergency would replace personnel in the 
Militia/Self-Defense Force. The latter would move up to the 
Regional Force, whose units might in turn be upgraded into the 
Regular Force. 



274 



National Security 



Augmenting the Regular and Paramilitary Forces are two other 
military bodies whose status or functions appear anomalous. 
In the North, a "super" paramilitary force called the People's 
Guerrilla Force was created in 1979. It was described as a special 
combat organization with units deployed in villages along the China 
border and seacoast. However, in late 1987, little more was known 
about it. In the South, a somewhat better-known organization, 
designated the Armed Youth Assault Force (AYAF) or Youth 
Assault Force (YAF), is reported to perform paramilitary functions. 
The AYAF is organized along military lines (from platoon to 
brigade) and usually is commanded by retired PAVN officers. 
However, it appears to be more a party organization than a mili- 
tary body reporting through defense channels. Units at various 
echelons are under the supervision of local district party commit- 
tees, and the chain of command apparently leads to Hanoi. AYAF 
strength in 1986 was estimated at 1.5 million. 

In 1986 the PAVN chain of command was headed by the 
party- government military policy-making apparatus: the National 
Assembly, the Ministry of Defense, and the National Defense Coun- 
cil on the government side; and the Political Bureau of the VCP 
Central Committee and the Central Military Party Committee on 
the party side. Because of overlapping Political Bureau and Cen- 
tral Military Party Committee membership, the Central Military 
Party Committee could be regarded as the ultimate power for all 
military matters. It was reorganized in 1982 and consisted of a secre- 
tary, a first deputy secretary, two deputy secretaries, and six mem- 
bers. Under guidance from the Political Bureau or the Central 
Committee, the Central Military Party Committee translated the 
will of the party — expressed in broad political terms — into specific 
instructions for the military. 

The Ministry of Defense Party Committee, at the very top of 
the Ministry of Defense, had an entirely military membership. It 
was the highest operational party arm that dealt directly with 
PAVN, and consisted of a secretary, the PAVN commander in 
chief, the chiefs of the five military general-directorates (Military 
General Staff Directorate, General Political Directorate, General 
Rear Services Directorate, General Technical Directorate, and 
General Economic Construction Directorate), and the senior 
political commissars of the major subordinate commands, that is, 
the air force, the navy, and the four theaters of operation (the China 
border, the coast from the China border to below Da Nang, North- 
ern Vietnam and Northern Laos, and Cambodia). Its secretariat 
was composed of a secretary general, two deputies, and ten mem- 
bers. The committee administered other party committees from 



275 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



2 

< 



> o 



>- cc 
<< 

a ^ 

£ o 
oo 



g 



o 



111 

-=! H O 

1 1 1 v -' 



> DC 

55 



< LU 

oc dc 

^5 



> t 

DC LLI 
LU I- \ 
CO < I 

LU H 

<£ 

DC Q 



2 

<LU 

>o 

S3 

oc- 
< > 

CO 5 

2 s 



2 2 



< CO 
O Z LLI 

S 0. > LU 

-J S CC CO 
5 < LU DC 

5 LU LU DC X 

- o. I O i~ 

co O co O 



CO 

LU Z > 
O LU X 
X 

ec<9Cbc|QH 

< Z < < 52 2 ^ 



< 

o m 

2p 



276 



National Security 



the military-theater level to the basic party-unit level. At the divi- 
sion level and above, party committees were sizable permanent insti- 
tutions whose function was to interpret Political Bureau and Central 
Committee directives for their respective organizations. 

The major services, such as the air force and navy, had at head- 
quarters level a Command Party Committee with a secretariat 
headed by the top political officer for the service and including the 
heads of all departments. At the company level was the party chap- 
ter, or chi bo (see Glossary), run by an executive committee of two 
or three full-time officials and made up of a collection of party cells 
(to dang, see Glossary), each run by a cell leader. The leaders of 
party chapters communicated the party line, indoctrinated both 
party and nonparty members within PAVN, directed "emulation 
movement" drives and other motivational programs, recruited and 
purged the membership, and generally ensured the party's partici- 
pation in all military matters. 

The Ministry of Defense, organizationally, consisted of the Office 
of the Minister of Defense and offices of seven vice ministers of 
defense. These vice ministries were fairly small and for the most 
part coordinated the activities of the Ministry of Defense with other 
ministries and state organs whose activities concerned the armed 
forces (see fig. 17). 

The highest level of authority for military operations in PAVN 
was the PAVN High Command, an institution encompassing the 
Office of the Commander in Chief, the five military directorates, 
and the offices of seven deputy chiefs of staff. The most important 
element of the High Command, under the chief of staff, was the 
Military General Staff Directorate, which can be likened to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in the United States Department of Defense. At the 
next lower echelon were four other Military General Directorates 
that functioned roughly as staff sections of the high command. Also 
under the chief of staff were seven deputy chiefs of staff, whose 
purpose was liaison rather than command, and a number of special- 
ized military commands. The PAVN Military Intelligence Depart- 
ment reported directly to the commander in chief (see fig. 18). It 
had personnel at lower levels of PAVN, and its chief responsibility 
appeared to be military intelligence activities within Vietnam and 
in Cambodia, where it reportedly had a large staff. It is not known 
whether this department operated outside Indochina. 

The PAVN command structure was divided geographically into 
four military theaters and nine military regions or zones, includ- 
ing a Capital Military Region around Hanoi and Quang Ninh 
Province Special Region (see fig. 19). It was also divided tactically 
into military units ranging in descending order from corps to 



277 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, and 
squads. The military- theater designation was introduced in the 
midst of a postwar buildup when PAVN increased its regular force 
from 400,000 to about 1.2 million members and its divisions from 
25 to 51 (38 infantry divisions and 13 support or economic con- 
struction divisions). The number of PAVN corps was also increased 
from six to eight. Creation of the military theater and the military 
corps was designed to facilitate what was called the combined arms 
strategy, meaning larger and more complex military operations that 
might include use of indigenous military forces from Cambodia 
and Laos. 

A corps ranged in size from 30,000 to 50,000 troops and normally 
consisted of 4 infantry divisions plus service and support elements. 
A PAVN infantry division normally was composed of 3 infantry 
regiments (2,500 men each), 1 artillery regiment, 1 tank battalion, 
and the usual support elements. A regiment in turn was divided 
into battalions (600 men each) and the battalion into companies 
(200 men each). 

As of mid- 1986, the thirty-eight PAVN regular infantry divisions 
were assigned thus: nineteen in Cambodia, sixteen in Vietnam (ten 
in northern Vietnam, six in central and southern Vietnam), and 
three in Laos. Most of the thirteen economic construction divisions 
were in the China border region. A construction division was made 
up of older soldiers, including many who had fought in the South 
during the Second Indochina War. Each construction division was 
fully armed, had a specific tactical purpose, and continued to carry 
out its military training in addition to economic tasks, usually road 
building (see The Military's Place in Society, this ch.). These units 
carried the burden of the brief 1979 war with China and generally 
acquitted themselves well. 

In 1987 PAVN's major combat services — artillery, armor, air 
defense, and special operations — were organized along standard 
lines, similar to armies elsewhere. Each consisted of a force whose 
commanding officer reported to the Military General Staff Direc- 
torate. A mystique surrounded the PAVN Special Operations 
Force, successor to the legendary Sapper Combat Arm of the First 
and Second Indochina Wars that specialized in sabotage and clan- 
destine military operations. In 1987, the Special Operations Force 
consisted of two elements, the Sapper Command and the Airborne 
Command (the 305th Airborne Brigade). Reportedly there was a 
third element, an amphibious commando unit, about which little 
was known. 

The Army in 1986 was estimated to maintain 1,600 Soviet-made 
T-34/-54/-55/-62, Type-59 tanks and 450 PT-76 and Type 60/63 



278 



National Security 



light tanks. It was also equipped with an estimated 2,700 recon- 
naissance vehicles; approximately 600 artillery guns and howitzers; 
an unknown number of rocket launchers, mortars, and antitank 
weapons; and 3,000 air defense weapons. 

The PAVN Navy, begun in 1955 as the PAVN Riverine and 
Maritime Force, in 1959 became the Coastal Defense Force. Its 
"tradition day" is celebrated annually on August 5 to mark the 
1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident in the Second Indochina War. The 
PAVN Navy began a buildup in the mid-1960s with the arrival 
of twenty-eight gunboats from China and thirty patrol torpedo boats 
from the Soviet Union. At the end of the Second Indochina War, 
it assumed the normal dual missions of a navy, that is, coastal 
defense and sea surveillance. 

In 1986 the PAVN Navy continued to receive Soviet assistance 
and encouragement and was the largest naval force in Southeast 
Asia. Including some 1,300 former United States and South Viet- 
namese naval vessels, naval and civilian junks, and coasters, the 
PAVN Navy had a total of about 1 ,500 vessels. Its inventory con- 
tained two principal combat vessels, 192 patrol boats, 51 amphibious 
warfare ships, 104 landing ships, and 133 auxiliary craft. 

The command structure of the PAVN Navy originated in Hanoi, 
where the commander in chief of naval forces was located. His 
office, the Naval Directorate, reported to the Military General Staff 
Directorate, i.e., the high command. The top operational Com- 
mander was the Commander, Vietnam Naval Forces, headquar- 
tered in Haiphong. The two posts were usually held by the same 
individual. Regulations issued in April 1982 established three flag- 
rank officers: rear admiral, equivalent to a major general; vice 
admiral, equivalent to a lieutenant general; and full admiral, 
equivalent to a colonel general. 

Five naval regions made up the operational command. Head- 
quartered at Haiphong, Vinh, Da Nang, Vung Tau, and Rach 
Gia, each region had two or more naval installations or facilities 
for which it was responsible. Within this structure were the naval 
fleets or naval groups, in turn divided into naval brigades. In 1987 
the Ham Tu Fleet patrolled the northern Gulf of Tonkin as a stra- 
tegic deterrent to China; its Chuong Duong Brigade was designed 
to oppose amphibious landings; its Kiet Brigade was assigned to 
defend the offshore islands and to perform troop transport duties. 
The Bach Dang Fleet served in the South. Its Ham Tu Naval 
Brigade (with 80 percent of its personnel South Vietnamese Navy 
veterans) operated almost entirely in Cambodian waters. 

The PAVN Air Force fixed April 3, 1965, as its tradition day, 
the day when its pilots supposedly first engaged their United States 



279 



Vietnam: A Country Study 




Figure 19. Military Regions, 1986 



280 



National Security 



counterparts in a dogfight over North Vietnam, and celebrates it 
annually. The Soviet Union increased the PAVN air inventory late 
in the Second Indochina War and again in 1979 after the Chinese 
attack. As of 1985 it was estimated that the PAVN Air Force con- 
sisted of about 1,600 planes and 20,000 personnel, making it the 
largest air force in Southeast Asia (somewhere between China's 
and India's in size). The operational element of the PAVN Air 
Force was the air regiment, of which there were seventeen in 1987 
grouped into air divisions and headquartered at Noi Bai (Hanoi), 
Da Nang, Tho Xuan, and Tan Son Nhut (Ho Chi Minh City). 
The air regiments included 7 attack fighter-plane regiments (450 
planes); 4 basic and advanced training regiments (225 trainers); 
3 cargo-transport regiments (350 planes); and 3 helicopter regiments 
(600 helicopters). One light bomber force (60 planes) existed 
separately from the air regiments. The commander of the Air Force, 
headquartered at Bac Mai Air Base outside Hanoi, reported to the 
General Staff Directorate of PAVN. Strategic use of the Vietnamese 
Air Force, from its inception until 1979, was entirely defensive. 
During the Second Indochina War it existed to defend North Viet- 
nam from United States air attack, but after the war, and espe- 
cially in 1979, it existed to defend Vietnam from attack by China. 
Although defense remained its primary strategic function, the air 
force increasingly developed an offensive capability after 1979 — 
chiefly through its attack-helicopter regiments — for use in Cambodia 
and presumably, should the need arise, against China. The PAVN 
Air Force made a first tentative venture into space flight in 
1981, when Lt. Col. Phan Tuan (son of former defense minister 
Vo Nguyen Giap) took part in the Soviet Union's Soyuz 37 
mission, a linkup with the orbiting Soviet space laboratory, 
Salyut 6. 

In 1987, the PAVN Border Defense Command was the newest 
military organization. Until 1979, responsibility for border secu- 
rity was vested in the People's Armed Public Security Force 
(PAPSF), under the control of the Ministry of Interior, and para- 
military units acted collectively as a border patrol. Border defense 
became a full-time task only with the rise of the China threat. As 
a result, the Border Defense Command was transferred to the 
Ministry of Defense in 1979 and divested of such responsibilities 
as dealing with smugglers and illegal border crossings so that it 
could devote full attention to border defenses. The command was 
organized into battalions and included a mixture of PAVN and 
paramilitary units. Their duties included operating border check- 
points, patrolling the border, operating boats in the coastal water- 
way network, maintaining security on nearby islands, and operating 



281 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

roving border-area units (mostly composed of Montagnards) to 
guard against incursions by Chinese patrols. 

Leadership 

PAVN's officer corps and its underlying concept of command 
have changed significantly since the first officer corps was formed 
in the 1930s. The initial leaders were a few dozen individuals chosen 
primarily for their ability to mobilize villagers and motivate troops, 
rather than for their tactical knowledge. As the corps developed, 
its lack of trained and experienced batdefield commanders was made 
the best of, and a premium was placed on collective military deci- 
sion making (the dual command system) and on a military strategy 
that did not require a large number of military tacticians. Hier- 
archy among officers was played down, and the concept of "officer" 
was not applied. Leaders were cadres, and were required to guide 
the revolution, but it was not necessary that leaders be distinguished 
from one another, only from those they led (combatants). Cadres 
were either military, nonmilitary, or a mix of the two — it did not 
matter which; only cadre status was important. Gradually, mili- 
tary cadres evolved into PAVN officers, a trend that was intensi- 
fied following the Second Indochina War when PAVN moved to 
develop a military structure to conform with other armed forces 
around the world. The influence of Soviet advisers and the growing 
importance of military technology accelerated the trend. Military 
professionalism, as a result, became one of the chief characteris- 
tics of the PAVN officer and soon distinguished him from military 
cadre, such as the political officer. 

Although the exact size of the PAVN officer corps was not known 
in 1987, various estimates suggested it comprised about 180,000 
officers, or roughly 15 percent of a force of approximately 1.2 
million. In 1955 the officer corps reportedly had accounted for only 
9.5 percent of a force of about 210,000. 

The general officer corps in 1987 included the ranks of senior 
general, colonel general, lieutenant general, major general, and, 
in some cases, senior colonel, depending on the command held. 
The number of general officers totaled at least 450. The central 
feature of their interaction with one another was based on the 
Chinese political custom of bung di or faction-bashing, which high- 
lighted factional infighting and reflected a broader power struggle 
within the party and within the system as a whole. Senior generals, 
colonel generals, and some lieutenant generals had their own con- 
stituencies, which in part they controlled and which in part con- 
trolled them. There were political alliances, some permanent and 



282 



Women militia members in 
Hanoi just after the 
Chinese invasion, 1979 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



some temporary, as well as relations based on familial ties, past 
associations, common interests, and personalities. 

The end of the Second Indochina War found the PAVN officer 
corps seriously debilitated. Its ranks had been thinned by battle 
casualties, and the remaining officers were for the most part over- 
aged and undereducated. An ambitious officer development pro- 
gram was launched as part of the "Great Campaign" (see History, 
this ch.). The officer training system was overhauled, modernized, 
and greatly expanded with the assistance of Soviet military advisers. 
The curriculum in officer-training schools was revised to introduce 
new leadership methods, modern managerial techniques, and 
greater use of technology in administering the armed forces. The 
age bulge was addressed by encouraging retirements, and, for the 
first time, specific retirement ages were established: for company- 
grade officers the age was set at thirty-eight; for majors, forty-three; 
for lieutenant colonels, forty-eight; for colonels, fifty-five; and for 
senior colonels and general officers, sixty. Modern military adminis- 
tration and management methods were introduced, especially in 
personnel matters, and greater attention was directed toward such 
concerns as officers' pay, benefits, career development, uniforms, 
commendations, and intangible honors. 

PAVN leaders were commonly believed to be men of implacable 
determination, indifferent to reverses and failures, enormously self- 
confident, and confident in their chosen strategy and their cause. 



283 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

If there was a weakness in the ability of the individual PAVN officer, 
it was compensated for by the collective decision-making process 
that put several minds to work on a single problem. The net effect 
was a military leadership that could mobilize the Vietnamese soldier 
and instill in him the necessary discipline to fight repeatedly against 
overwhelming odds. 

Administration 

PAVN's systems for dealing with administrative, managerial, 
logistic, and manpower problems remained rudimentary in 1987. 
Vietnam's two major military operations, against Cambodia and 
China, caused serious administrative difficulties to surface. Many 
were traceable to the condition of the Vietnamese economy, which 
in the late 1970s and 1980s had declined in virtually every sector 
(see Economic Setting, ch. 3). As more than one observer noted, 
Vietnam had stayed in the bicycle age while the rest of Asia had 
moved into the computer age. PAVN's logistic requirements 
suffered accordingly. 

Vietnam's military budget remained a closely guarded secret and 
was doubly difficult to estimate because it was largely covered by 
Soviet military assistance that reportedly did not need to be repaid. 
According to a generally accepted estimate, about 50 percent of the 
state budget was devoted to national defense. Soviet military 
assistance to Vietnam has varied greatly from year to year depending 
on PAVN's precise needs. In the mid-1980s, it was authoritatively 
estimated to be the equivalent of at least US$350 million per year. 

Vietnam's manpower resources are relatively extensive. In 1987 
its population was about 62 million, with approximately 6.5 million 
males of military-service age and 650,000 reaching draft age each 
year. Normally, 60 percent of those screened for military duty were 
found to be physically and mentally fit for full service. Other restric- 
tions, such as those based on class, race, religion, and place of origin 
(i.e., the South), reduced the manpower pool somewhat. In 1986 
PAVN was conscripting at the rate of about 300,000 annually. 

To reassert discipline within PAVN ranks, a system of "mili- 
tary inspection and control" was instituted that served both judi- 
cial and police functions within PAVN. Under this system, the 
activities of enlisted men and officers were monitored to prevent 
wrongdoing (such as corruption) and to ensure continued discipline, 
obedience to orders, and adherence to PAVN regulations and state 
laws. This system was backed by a new code of military justice 
that regulated personal conduct. For enlisted personnel the code 
specified, in ascending order of severity, the following punishments 
for misconduct: censure, restriction to camp on days off (denial 



284 



National Security 



of shore-leave in the case of naval personnel), warning, discipli- 
nary detention of from one to ten days (not applied to female 
military personnel), assignment to a lesser position, demotion, dis- 
charge, and dismissal from military service. Officers were not sub- 
jected to disciplinary detention as noncommissioned officers and 
enlisted men were. The seven punishments for officers (in ascend- 
ing order of severity) were censure, warning, assignment to a lesser 
position, dismissal from position, reduction in rank, deprivation 
of officers' insignia, and dismissal from military service. 

The new regulations also established commendations and a series 
of incentive awards. Approximately 100,000 PAVN officers and 
enlisted men received medals and other commendations each year. 
PAVN pay has always been notoriously low. Although pay was 
increased in the 1978 overhaul of the armed forces, it remained 
below comparable income levels elsewhere in the society and was 
constantly undercut by high inflation. Pay was based on rank, length 
of service, size of family, and honors and awards received. Seniority 
pay (1 percent of base pay times years of service), family allowances, 
a 30-percent hardship-service bonus for those assigned to Cambodia, 
and a 10-percent cost-of-living bonus for those assigned to the South 
were added to base pay. 

A veteran PAVN soldier who was discharged, retired, or demobi- 
lized became a "revolutionary retiree." In 1987 at least 50 percent 
and possibly 60 percent of all adult males in Vietnam had served 
in the armed forces. 

The veteran in Vietnam has become a figure of increasing impor- 
tance. Officially he has been viewed with a mixture of apprecia- 
tion and obligation, but privately leaders have worried that the 
socioeconomic isolation of veterans could lead to the formation of 
a vested interest bloc. In general, veterans have been treated well 
by the society and have been provided with social welfare benefits. 
Vietnamese women were assigned a major place in the revolution 
by VCP cadres quite early. Several of the early PAVN military 
cadres were women, including the legendary Ha Thi Que, a mili- 
tary theorist who adapted Maoist guerrilla war strategy to Viet- 
nam. The principle that women represent a potent source of support 
continued to be upheld in the 1980s. Military service for women 
was voluntary and was open to those over eighteen who were mem- 
bers of the VCP or party youth organizations. Estimates of the num- 
ber of women in PAVN ranged from 5 to 15 percent of the 
2.9-million-member force. Most held technical or administrative 
assignments, although, in earlier years, combat assignments in guer- 
rilla units were common and command assignments were not 
unknown. For instance, the third-ranking general officer in the 



285 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

PLAF during the war in the South was a woman. There were no 
confirmed reports of women in PAVN engaged in combat duty 
in Cambodia, although it is possible that some were there; and there 
was no general conscription program for women, although they 
were encouraged to volunteer and the VCP asserted that it was 
their duty to do so. 

Foreign Military Relations 

In the 1950s and 1960s, the primary influence on PAVN was 
Chinese (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). Early military thinking, 
organization, and strategy drew heavily on the Chinese, and 
particularly the Maoist, example, although Hanoi later officially 
denied Chinese influence and military assistance.- 

PAVN's dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s 
for weaponry, military hardware, and technical training assured 
the Soviets an influential role, if not always a dominant one, in 
the Vietnamese military's activity and development. At the end 
of the Second Indochina War, the Soviet Union was supplying 
about 75 percent of North Vietnam's military hardware (China 
about 15 percent and Eastern Europe about 10 percent). Without 
Soviet assistance, Vietnam would have been unable to defend itself 
against China in 1979. By the 1980s, the estimate was that the 
Soviets provided 97 percent of such equipment and that the German 
Democratic Republic (East Germany), Poland, and Czechoslovakia 
together supplied the remaining 3 percent (see Appendix A, table 
9). Military aid to PAVN in 1987 was almost exclusively Soviet 
in origin. In the mid-1980s, the Soviets contributed some 15,000 
military advisers and military aid estimated to range from US$1 .3 
to US$1.7 billion annually. 

The Soviet Union's relations with PAVN allowed Moscow to 
establish a military presence on the Indochina Peninsula. Access to 
the naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang provided 
transit facilities for the Soviet Pacific Fleet and boosted Soviet 
intelligence-collecting efforts. The effect was to augment Moscow's 
military strength and facilitate global deployment of its forces. 

The value of the relationship for Vietnam was logistic, not geo- 
political. Hanoi had no arms factories, although it could make 
explosives and small armaments such as bullets, shells, and hand 
grenades. Sophisticated weaponry and equipment, mandatory for 
modern warfare, however, had to be imported. 

The kind of Soviet military aid provided in the postwar years 
varied. In the first year or so, the Soviet Union routinely resup- 
plied and replaced PAVN military inventories. After PAVN 
invaded Cambodia, the Soviets provided counterinsurgency aid, 



286 



National Security 



such as helicopters, and after the Chinese invaded Vietnam, 
Moscow gave Hanoi military hardware for conventional limited 
warfare. An analysis of the weapons supplied reveals that the Soviets 
were interested not only in enhancing Vietnam's defensive capa- 
bility against China but also in developing a joint Soviet- Vietnamese 
offensive capability. Soviet generals, determined to pass on to the 
Vietnamese some of the burden of containing China, assigned 
PAVN specific strategic missions and provided the military hard- 
ware required to perform them. In late 1987, PAVN had no signifi- 
cant military relations with any nation except the Soviet Union. 

Internal Security 

Internal security was never much of a problem in North Viet- 
nam; it was probably somewhat more tenuous in unified Vietnam. 
Unification, understandably, introduced new internal threats, which 
the regime in the 1980s was able to keep in check. As perceived 
in Hanoi theoretical journals, the most significant internal threat 
was the danger of counterrevolution, a possibility that had both 
internal and external implications. Hanoi feared that a resistance 
effort in Vietnam would mount an effective guerrilla war aided by 
outsiders who sought either to roll back communism in Indochina 
or to effect change in Hanoi's leadership. These outsiders might 
include not only foreign governments but also emigre Vietnamese 
seeking to destroy the ruling system. 

There was widespread latent opposition to the regime, particu- 
larly in the South. In general it was low-level, widely scattered, 
and poorly organized and led. Opposition activities ranged from 
graffiti and similar token gestures to fairly large-sized guerrilla 
attacks in the Central Highlands. In the early 1980s, an active mili- 
tant resistance force was estimated by observers abroad to num- 
ber about 25,000 combatants. That figure tended to dwindle later 
in the decade. Given the extraordinary amount of social control 
in Vietnam, as in other Marxist-Leninist societies, it would be 
difficult for a resistance force to achieve sufficient size, strength, 
and cohesiveness to present a serious challenge to the existing sys- 
tem. The regime's strategy, therefore, was to keep the opposition 
off balance and prevent it from organizing. 

Police, crime-detection, and law-enforcement activities tended 
to be treated collectively under the heading of "public security." 
These activities were conducted by overlapping, but tightly compart- 
mentalized, institutions of control, separated by only hazy lines 
of jurisdiction. In particular, there was no sharp division between 
the internal security duties of PAVN forces and those of the civilian 
elements of the Ministry of Interior. This amorphous organization 



287 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

of law enforcement and internal security work can be traced to the 
VCP's early heritage and its experiences in the First Indochina 
War when functional distinctions within the party organization were 
less pronounced. Contributing to it is the clandestine character of 
such activity and the penchant for secrecy and covert action endemic 
in Vietnamese culture. Both party and state have paid enormous 
attention to the maintenance of public order. Perhaps it is for this 
reason that internal security has always been well managed and 
security threats have always been contained. The methods employed 
are sophisticated, often subtle, and there is less use of naked repres- 
sion than many outsiders believe. 

Four clusters of agencies were responsible for crime prevention 
and the maintenance of public order and internal security under 
the 1985 Criminal Code. The enforcement bodies were the People's 
Security Force (PSF) or People's Police, operating chiefly in urban 
areas; the People's Public Security Force (PPSF), called the People's 
Security Service or PSS at the village level; the plain-clothes or 
secret police; and the People's Armed Security Force (PASF), a 
quasi-military organ, including some PAVN personnel, operating 
chiefly in the villages and rural areas and concerned both with crime 
and antistate activities. These agencies of control had the broad 
responsibility of mobilizing the general population to support 
internal security programs, in addition to performing internal 
auditing, inspection, and general monitoring of both party and state 
activity. The judiciary promoted security and law enforcement. 
The courts, i.e., the investigative elements of the judicial system, 
were charged with uncovering evidence in addition to prosecuting 
the accused. 

These institutions were charged under the Criminal Code with 
protecting the public from crime, broadly defined as "any act dan- 
gerous to society." Supporting them, although independent of 
them, was the party apparatus, which reached to the most remote 
hamlets of the country. In the mid-1980s, both urban and rural 
geographic areas were divided into wards, sub- wards, and blocks 
and were administered by security cadres, who were aided and sup- 
ported by the mass organizations. Each of the basic units (generally 
the ward or block) had a security committee. In addition, in key 
or sensitive areas, there was a special party unit (called Red Flag 
Security) also organized at the ward or block level. The philosophy 
of this internal security system was that self-implemented, self- 
motivated, social discipline was required for true internal security 
and that this was both the duty and the right of the individual 
citizen. An important characteristic of the public security sector 
was that, although it extended equally across the civilian (the 



288 



National Security 



Ministry of Interior) and the military (PAVN, especially its 
paramilitary forces) sectors, the dominant influence was civilian 
and, ultimately, the party. 

Problems 

North Vietnam, before and during the Second Indochina War, 
experienced few serious internal security challenges. Disorders were 
recorded, however, the most famous being the so-called Quynh 
Luu uprising in 1956, in which farmers in predominantly Roman 
Catholic Nghe An Province demonstrated and rioted against the 
agricultural collectivization program. During the war, however, 
and despite South Vietnamese and American clandestine efforts 
to provoke resistance to the Hanoi regime, little internal opposi- 
tion resulted. After the war, security problems were experienced 
in the newly occupied South, and a rise in dissidence was recorded 
in the North. As far as can be determined, however, in neither 
case were the problems serious enough to be considered a challenge 
to the regime. In 1987 public attitudes in the south remained widely 
anticommunist and there was greatly increased antipathy for the 
party in the North. In official circles, these conditions were labeled 
negative phenomena and were explained in the press as rising 
criminal and counterrevolutionary activity caused by a decline in 
social responsibility. 

The most dangerous negative phenomenon was organized inter- 
nal resistance to the regime that occurred chiefly in, but was not 
limited to, the South. For the most part this resistance found expres- 
sion in graffiti, antiparty poetry, outlaw theater, rumor mongering, 
and general disinformation efforts. Less common, but still in 
evidence, were more militant resistance elements, who attempted, 
but rarely succeeded in, sabotaging the transportation and com- 
munication systems, party and state facilities, and economic enter- 
prises. Finally, there were the armed resistance groups, which 
engaged in guerrilla war. By far the most challenging resistance 
effort was carried on by the people of the Central Highlands in 
the South, who are usually called Montagnards (see Ethnic Groups 
and Languages, ch. 2). Many were associated with the organiza- 
tion known as the Unified Front for the Struggle of Oppressed 
Races (Front Unifie pour la Lutte des Races Opprimees — FULRO) 
and operated in the region known in the Hanoi press as the "name- 
less front," that is, the area between Buon Me Thuot and Da Lat. 
They were supplied and supported by Khmer Rouge forces 
in Cambodia and, through them, by the Chinese. Hanoi handled 
the Montagnards in the South after the Second Indochina War far 
less skillfully and effectively than it had managed the northern 



289 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Montagnards a generation earlier. The primary reason appeared 
to be that in the North in the mid-1950s the problem had been 
handled by trained party cadres, some of them Montagnards them- 
selves, who had dealt carefully with their ethnic brethren. In the 
South in 1975 (because the war ended so unexpectedly), respon- 
sibility was given to combat troops, who were ill-prepared to handle 
such a sensitive problem. Since the war's end, large battles 
reportedly have taken place occasionally in the Highlands, some 
involving as many as 1,000 resistance fighters. 

The Montagnard resistance has not represented a revolutionary 
movement in the modern sense because it has not tried to over- 
throw or change the government in Hanoi. Rather, the upland 
dwellers of southern Vietnam have sought autonomy, and they 
would settle for being left alone. In 1987 a stabilized condition of 
local accommodation appeared to have been achieved between local 
PAVN commanders in the "nameless front" region and indigenous 
Montagnard tribes. 

The second most important resistance elements were the mili- 
tant southern socioreligious sects called the Hoa Hao (see Glos- 
sary) and Cao Dai (see Glossary), whose total membership was 
more than a million (see Religion, ch. 2). The Hoa Hao sect is 
concentrated in Chau Doc Province and adjacent provinces. The 
Cao Dai is headquartered in Tay Ninh Province, and most of its 
followers live in this region. In the early years after the Second 
Indochina War, the two sects offered considerable armed resistance 
to the new government. By the mid-1980s, however, resistance had 
fallen off because it was widely believed local accommodation had 
been achieved. 

A third resistance element comprised various nationalistic and 
patriotic groups, many of whom came under the generic term chu 
quoc or "national salvation." The bulk of these were members of 
the Dai Viet and the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, two militant anti- 
communist nationalist organizations dating from the 1930s, or were 
ARVN holdouts in the far south. Other resistance groups, with 
more exotic names, reported by emigres included the Black Sail 
Group (Catholics in the Ho Nai region); the Black Dragon Force 
(ex-ARVN 7th-Division Catholic soldiers in the My Tho vicinity); 
the Yellow Crab Force (Cao Dai in Tay Ninh Province); the White 
Tigers (Hoa Hao in An Giang Province); the Laotian National 
Cobra Force (Vietnamese and Lao along the Laos- Vietnam border); 
and the Cambodian Border Force (a similar group in the Cambodia- 
Vietnam border region). Armed resistance, as practiced by these 
groups, commonly consisted of attacks on reeducation camps, 
remote military installations, and VCP offices. Reported resistance 



290 



National Security 



activities during the 1980s included launching rocket attacks on 
a Phan Rang reeducation camp and on a Xuan Loc camp (during 
which 6,000 inmates escaped), dynamiting a Ho Chi Minh City 
water pumping station, detonating a bomb near that city's Conti- 
nental Hotel, and throwing a grenade into the yard of the former 
United States ambassador's residence, which had been transformed 
into living quarters for several PAVN generals. There were also 
reports of road mining incidents and booby-trapped railroad switch- 
ing equipment. 

Catholics in Vietnam, who number almost 3 million, have 
represented a significant potential resistance force of increasing con- 
cern to Hanoi officials. Initial policy was to control the church as 
an institution, while allowing free religious expression. In the late 
1970s, however, all religious groups increasingly were harassed, 
and attendance at religious services was discouraged. A few well 
publicized trials of clergy followed. By the mid-1980s, it was 
apparent that the initial tolerance for religion had waned. Some 
observers, including church officials in the Vatican, speculated that 
Hanoi officials were concerned because of the growing appeal of 
religion to the young. 

Intellectual dissent also was reported to be increasing in the 
mid-1980s. Fueled by the obvious failure of the party and state to 
solve the country's more pressing economic problems, intellectual 
dissent took the form of psychological warfare conducted by liter- 
ary and cultural figures and ordinary people alike. There had been 
a similar outbreak of intellectual dissent in North Vietnam in the 
1956-58 period, when the regime experimented, to its regret, with 
a "hundred flowers movement" similar to that in China. In the 
late 1980s, the most common medium was graffiti such as "Born 
in the North to Die in Cambodia" and "Nothing is More Precious 
than Independence and Liberty — Ho Chi Minh" (a famous Ho 
quotation used as an ironic commentary by southerners). The 
slogan Phuc quoc, or "restore national sovereignty," was reported 
to have been seen on walls in Ho Chi Minh City and in Hue. 
Propaganda leaflets also were scattered along city sidewalks at night 
or left in schoolroom desks, and underground literary societies were 
founded, including the Hanoi Barefoot Literary Group, the Danang 
Han River Literary Society, the Ho Literary Society of Hue, and 
the Stone Cave and Literary Flame societies of Ho Chi Minh City. 
According to editorials in the official press, the writings of these 
subversive groups "depict resentment and incite antagonism" 
through the use of "ambiguous symbolism and double entendres. ' ' 
An example cited by Lao Dong (August 22, 1985) was the follow- 
ing excerpt from a poem: "Biting our lips, hating the North 



291 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



wind/We lay with aching bones/Lamenting the West wind. ' ' Poets 
have been incarcerated for their works. A cause celebre in 1984 
was the arrest of a leading novelist. Doan Quoc Sv. of the Danang 
Han River Literary Society. 

Resistance activity is supported by the nearly 1 million Viet- 
namese emigres living abroad. There is a welter of supportive 
organizations — more than fifty in California alone — about which 
little reliable information is available. The broadest-based group 
is the Overseas Free Vietnam Association, which has chapters in 
the United States. Europe, and Australia. 

Development of the Internal Security System 

During the First Indochina War. police and internal-security 
functions were regarded as a single activity. Security cadres and 
personnel had three duties: guarding Viet Minh facilities, high- 
level personnel, lines of communication, and troop movements: 
insuring public safety in the Viet Minh-controlled areas: and con- 
ducting counterintelligence and antisabotage work. 

At the time of the DRVs formation in 1945. all of this activity 
was vested in the Ministry of Interior. Within the ministry was 
a large sub-element called the Directorate General for Security, 
concerned with counterrevolution. This arrangement was abolished 
in 1954. when the police and internal- security functions were sepa- 
rated and the Ministry of Public Security was created. After the 
takeover of the South in 1975. which imposed new internal security 
tasks, the two functions were again combined, this time into the 
Ministry of Interior, wmich was then vastly enlarged. 

By the mid-1980s, the ministry was composed of seven major 
departments: the People's Police Department, responsible for gen- 
eral law enforcement: the Traffic Police Department, responsible 
for traffic control: the Public Security Department, responsible for 
general internal security; the Social Order Department, respon- 
sible for detention, the family registration system, immigration- 
emigration, border control, and port-of-entry security: the Public 
Security Forces, responsible for both law enforcement and inter- 
nal security in the rural areas: the Counterespionage Department, 
chiefly responsible for investigative work and dossier compilation; 
and the Counterreactionary Department, chiefly responsible for 
investigation of religious organizations in the South. 

Also in the ministrv were smaller, more specialized offices 
under vice ministers, including those concerned with counter- 
intelligence, foreign intelligence coordination (shared with PAVX 
intelligence agencies and primarily concerned with Cambodia and 
Laos), official communication systems operations (including mail 



292 



National Security 



censorship), political indoctrination of ministry personnel, and 
ethnic minorities' activities. 

The Ministry of Interior was again enlarged and restructured 
in 1979, when, according to Hanoi, China launched its "multi- 
faceted war of sabotage." This brought increased and more sys- 
tematic coordination with PAVN, especially in the China border 
region. The restructuring moved the ministry closer to the Soviet 
model of internal security organizations, a development undoubt- 
edly encouraged by Soviet Komitet Gosudavstvennoy Bezopasnosti 
(KGB, Committee of State Security) advisers. It is possible that 
in these shifts the ministry gained a certain degree of autonomy 
from the VCP. 

Tran Quoc Hoan created Hanoi's state security system in the 
1940s and ran it until he stepped down or was forced out in 1982. 
He then served as a director of the Central Committee's 
Proselytizing and Front Department. Hoan continued to publish 
extensively on security problems, and he remained an influential 
figure in the field until his death in late 1986. Pham Hung replaced 
Hoan as Minister of Interior in 1982 and served until December 
1986, when he relinquished the post to Mai Chi Tho. Before his 
elevation to the ministry and the Political Bureau, Tho was in charge 
of security in southern Vietnam as the mayor of Ho Chi Minh City. 

The Police 

Police functions, such as routine crime detection, apprehension 
of suspects, and enforcement of judicial orders, were vested in two 
elements that differed both conceptually and functionally. The PSF 
was a law enforcement agency in the same sense as the term is used 
in the West. It operated chiefly in urban rather than in rural areas 
and was first established in 1962. Its purpose was "to execute the 
laws of the state, maintain public order and security, protect public 
property, protect the lives and property of individuals, and pre- 
vent juvenile delinquency." These functions were expanded and 
made more specific in 1972, and again in 1976, by National 
Assembly directives authorizing the PSF to "arrest, temporarily 
detain, and temporarily release suspects; search people, homes, 
belongings, and mail; temporarily hold evidence; issue identifica- 
tion certificates, travel permits, and other documents; motivate 
citizens to observe the law and security measures; stop acts of 
sabotage; prevent juvenile delinquency; give aid to victims of 
accidents, including commandeering transportation to perform this 
function; and punish or carry out other compulsory measures 
against those who infringe on public order and security regula- 
tions." Fire fighting was also administered by the PSF. Members 



293 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

of the PSF were admonished to "serve the people wholeheartedly, 
show bravery, and constantly demonstrate responsibility, revolu- 
tionary vigilance, and political and military professionalism." 

The second unit was the PASF, a combination of gendarmerie 
and police field force, which operated chiefly in the villages and 
rural areas. The PASF had a broader security function than the 
PSF, since its concern extended beyond criminal and illegal political 
activity to insurgency threats and transprovincial organized coun- 
terrevolutionary activity. It was a hybrid security institution com- 
posed of party security cadres and PAVN personnel whose duties 
were in a gray area between ordinary police work and guerrilla 
warfare. The PASF was similar to the militia of the Soviet Union, 
with a domain described as "inland security," and functioned both 
as a protective and investigative body. PASF units guarded defense- 
industry installations, state and party offices, communication 
facilities, and important economic centers and supplied bodyguards 
for high-level officials. It was also charged with handling antigovern- 
ment conspiracies requiring sensitive political investigations and 
with investigating interprovincial crimes such as counterfeiting, 
smuggling, and hijacking. 

PASF was created in March 1959 by combining several small 
party-security and PAVN special units. From the start it had a 
semimilitary character. In 1960, the Third National Party Con- 
gress assigned it the "leading mission of defense against counter- 
revolution" and stressed the political character of its work, which 
in part meant activities designed to make security measures more 
acceptable to the general public through what was termed PASF's 
"people-motivating mission." Its formation also relieved PAVN 
regular forces of certain border and coastal static-defense duties. 
In the decade that followed unification in 1976, it became some- 
thing of a catch-all security institution. 

The structure of the PASF was quasi-military — that is, it was 
organized by battalions and companies with administrative centers 
in provincial capitals. In 1987 the PASF was estimated to have at 
least 500 personnel in each province, with a total strength of at 
least 21,000. It was more heavily armed and more mobile than 
ordinary police. 

The PASF headquarters in Hanoi was in a Ministry of Interior 
building, once the Don Thuy French Military Barracks on Hang 
Bai Street. It was divided into eight bureaus. The first handled 
administration, including personnel, supply, and housing. The 
second maintained criminal records and handled correspondence. 
The third was responsible for the Hanoi capital area and super- 
vised crime detection, fire fighting, traffic control, and issuance of 



294 



National Security 



identity cards. The fourth conducted investigations, including 
interrogations. The fifth handled incarceration of persons under 
arrest, including their detention while awaiting trial. The sixth con- 
trolled political and indoctrination training, as well as internal police 
affairs. The seventh handled budget and fiscal matters for the 
organization, and the eighth managed communication surveillance, 
censored mail, and controlled unauthorized publications. 

PAVN's function is dual in nature, having been derived from 
the French concept of police duty, introduced in the colonial period, 
and the Soviet Union's idea of militia. It rests on the belief that 
all challenges to the regime should be treated as law-enforcement 
rather than military problems. Even in the suppression of insur- 
gency movements such as FULRO, PAVN's responsibilities were 
carried out as an exercise in law enforcement rather than as a mili- 
tary enterprise. 

PAVN shared command responsibilities with the Ministry of 
Interior over a host of specific police organizations, including 
Regional Police Force units operating out of the country's forty 
provincial capitals; the Border-Control Police or Port-of-Entry 
Police, established by the Ministry of Interior in 1981; and Naval 
Security units, which used armed civilian fishing boats to appre- 
hend persons illegally leaving the country. In theory, all such 
organizations functioned under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Interior. Their place in PAVN's organizational structure, however, 
remained ambiguous. 

Deputized, nonprofessional law-enforcement units were report- 
edly numerous, but they were only vaguely described in press 
reports. They included the People's Protection Squads (active in 
both street-patrol work and fire fighting), the Enterprise Protec- 
tion Force (active in factories, government buildings, and com- 
munes), the Municipal Security Protection Force (active in major 
cities), the Neighborhood Protection Civil Guard Agency, the Capi- 
tal Security Youth Assault Units, the Township Public Security 
Force, and the Civil Defense Force. Many of the personnel in these 
units served concurrently with the Paramilitary Force. 

In addition, PAVN elements were detailed to police duty, usually 
on a temporary basis, and assigned chiefly in the South and along 
the China border. Their primary responsibilities in these areas were 
the prevention of smuggling and of illegal departures or entries. 

The Ministry of Interior divided Vietnam into "security inter- 
zones," and the major cities — Hanoi, Haiphong, and Ho Chi Minh 
City — were allotted separate security status. The interzone head- 
quarters coordinated law enforcement and internal security work 
with the judiciary, local military commanders, and provincial party 



295 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



officials. Each of the interzone directors (as well as the director of 
the Hanoi Security Service) reported directly to the Ministry of 
Interior and the Political Bureau Secretariat. 

The villages, which normally experienced little crime, had only 
rudimentary law enforcement, usually in the hands of a deputized 
nonprofessional working part-time and often without a regular 
salary. If a major crime occurred — for example, a murder — it was 
investigated by an official sent from the provincial capital. 

The function of the nonprofessional deputized law-enforcement 
officer, indeed even his existence, was not formally established or 
codified. The position of the village deputy was conceived as a 
means by which local authority could organize the village to police 
itself. Crime prevention and security became the responsibility of 
all, under the guidance of a local figure backed by the local party 
committee. This made for a pervasive surveillance system. It could 
also result in inept law enforcement and the accruing of enormous 
power by the deputy, who was privy to information gathered 
through the surveillance system. 

Public Security 

Vietnam did not have a secret police force of the same kind as 
Nazi Germany's Gestapo. The PPSF (or PSS at the village level), 
a plainclothes internal security organization charged with handling 
sensitive security threats, bore the closest resemblance. 

Actually, the secret police function in Vietnam appeared to be 
distributed among the Ministry of Interior, the party, PAVN, and 
the Paramilitary Force, with the PPSF as the pivotal element. The 
PPSF was more a party than a state organization, and observers 
believe that its chain of command ran from the district level through 
a hierarchy to the Political Bureau Secretariat in Hanoi. In its 
reporting responsibilities as an organ of the party, the PPSF largely 
bypassed or coordinated only laterally with the minister of interior, 
its nominal superior in the government hierarchy. This organiza- 
tional arrangement was instituted in the early 1950s by two top 
party security figures, Le Giang and Tran Hieu, at the time the 
director and deputy director respectively of what was then the First 
Directorate for Security of the Ministry of Public Security. Some 
observers believe that the PPSF was in reality an institution of 
professional police and trained security agents disguised as ordinary 
party administrative cadres. 

During the First Indochina War, the PPSF supervised the issue 
of travel permits and identification cards, checked on the move- 
ments of marine fishermen, identified strangers in the villages, and 
maintained family census and travel records. At one point it also 



296 



National Security 



monitored and reported on public health, apparently in the belief 
that North Vietnam was to be subjected to chemical warfare attacks. 

The PPSF assumed new importance in the late 1970s with the 
rise of the China threat and the increased prospect of a serious 
sabotage and espionage effort by outsiders. In order to cope with 
these developments, authorities in 1980 enlarged the hamlet- village- 
level structure. A nationwide system was instituted, with a PSS 
chief and two cadres detailed to every hamlet and a chief and five 
cadres assigned to each village. In many instances, they replaced 
PASF personnel. At the same time, higher recruitment standards 
were established (for education and age), a six-month training pro- 
gram was introduced, and an effort was made to create a more 
professional service with more sophisticated operations. In 1983 
plans for putting the PPSF into uniform were announced, but in 
1987 they had yet to be acted upon. 

In the South, the PPSF (or PSS) was more or less under direct 
party control. Members wore yellow armbands with a red inscrip- 
tion, Order and Security Control, to differentiate them from PAVN 
security units, whose members wore red armbands with a yellow 
inscription, Military Control, and from the PASF forces, whose red 
and blue arm bands bore the yellow legend Order. 

The rise of the China threat highlighted certain weaknesses in 
the security system related to the proper division of labor between 
the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of National Defense. In 
1981 a concerted effort was launched to increase and improve 
coordination between the two ministries: they signed two inter- 
ministerial directives, one establishing the mechanism for system- 
atic, joint security work and the other spelling out the respective 
duties of each in "the three tasks of maintaining political security, 
strengthening social discipline, and insuring public safety." 

Under the new arrangement, there was unified recruiting for 
the two services. A recruit could choose the service he would enter 
and, in many instances, the province to which he would be assigned. 
PAVN made available to the Ministry of Interior some of its mili- 
tary hardware, including such highly desirable items as equipment 
used by special weapons and tactics teams. The Ministry of Interior 
relieved the Defense Ministry of its responsibility for guarding for- 
eign missions in Hanoi and for supplying guards to the country's 
prisons. Personnel also were transferred, most from the Ministry 
of Interior to PAVN, and a new PAVN unit called the Police Pro- 
tection Regiment was formed. Transfers from this ministry to 
strengthen PAVN units along the China border were probably due 
to the growing China threat, the nature and size of which was 



297 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

perceived as simply beyond Ministry of Interior capabilities. Some 
PASF units were converted into PAVN Border Defense Command 
regiments, although their duties, like those of the Police Protec- 
tion regiments, were not known in 1987. 

Some observers noted that the net effect of the security reorgani- 
zation initiated in 1981 was the Ministry of Interior's improved 
ability to check on the actions and loyalties of high-ranking PAVN 
generals. Others observed that PAVN authority now extended 
deeper into the civilian sector. The new arrangement also high- 
lighted the underlying competition between the Ministry of Interior 
and the Ministry of National Defense with respect to security 
responsibilities and authority. 

One other dimension of security activity was the use of youth 
and youth organizations for internal security purposes. Hanoi 
appeared to have calculated that young people tended to have 
greater loyalty to the existing order than their elders, and that they 
represented a vast manpower pool ideally suited to mass surveil- 
lance work. The mass media commonly referred to Vietnam's three 
security forces as PAVN, public security, and "fourth generation" 
youth (that is, the fourth generation since the founding of the VCP). 
The security role of youth was stressed more in southern Vietnam, 
where, through an umbrella youth group called the Revolutionary 
Action Movement (RAM), the energies of the young were har- 
nessed in the name of social improvement. Much of this activity 
was economic and related to various nation-building programs; 
some, however, concerned political security, social order, and safety, 
areas of activity commonly given the collective label of "revolu- 
tionary action against negativism." 

RAM had a large corps of organizations from which to draw. 
In the mid-1980s, the total party youth force was about 4.5 mil- 
lion; this included the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth League 
(2 million) and the organizations for those younger in age — the 
Vanguard Teenager Organization, the Ho Chi Minh Young 
Pioneers, and the Ho Chi Minh Children's Organization (2.5 mil- 
lion). A front organization called the Vietnam Youth Federation 
included about 10 million party and nonparty youth. 

The most important RAM subgroup was the Ho Chi Minh 
Assault Youth Force (usually termed the AYF), the core of an amor- 
phous organization called the Young Volunteers Force or Volun- 
teer Service. The AYF was open to males seventeen to twenty-five 
years of age and females seventeen to twenty, who volunteered for 
two years' service (the males thus could escape the military draft). 
The AYF was organized along quasi-military lines and was assigned 
chiefly economic duties, mostly in the rural areas of the South. 



298 



National Security 



Within the AYF were smaller organizations, such as the Assault 
Security Team and the Assault Control Team, which had security 
assignments. Some teams focused on ordinary crime; others were 
engaged in covert surveillance, particularly of other youth. The 
most elite of these were the Youth Union Red Flag teams, which 
were made up entirely of Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth League 
members. (AYF teams, by contrast, were a mix of party and non- 
party youth.) Red Flag teams were entrusted with the most sensi- 
tive assignments given to the young. The high point of AYF security 
activity apparently came in the few years immediately following 
the 1979 China incursion. After that, vigilance in security matters 
tapered off somewhat. 

Law Enforcement 

Vietnamese legal thought with regard to the treatment of crimi- 
nals is the result of three major influences: classic Confucianism, 
the Napoleonic Code, and Marxism- Leninism. The relevant Con- 
fucian concept is that society is to be governed not by law but by 
moral men and that crime is symptomatic of an absence of virtue 
that engenders conflict and disharmony. Most important, the Con- 
fucian ethic provides no principle of judicial administration. In 
imperial China, justice was an interpretation of the moment by 
the emperor and his mandarins, meaning that in every instance 
imperial will was superior to the law. The spirit of the law the French 
brought to Vietnam was that guilt should be determined by fair 
and impartial means and should be assigned appropriate punish- 
ment. However, French colonialism inculcated a view of the law 
as something to be manipulated and the courts as institutions to 
be bribed or subverted. The result was a general lack of respect 
for the judicial process. Marxism-Leninism added to this attitude 
the perspective that crime is a reflection of environmental factors 
that victimize the individual by turning him into a criminal. The 
proper remedy for this condition is to eliminate the causal factors 
while rehabilitating the criminal. The combination of the three 
legacies has produced in Vietnamese society a legal philosophy that 
is inquisitional rather than adversarial, seeking reform rather than 
punishment. The system imposes on the individual and the state 
the responsibility of bringing all members of society to a condition 
of self-imposed moral rectitude in which behavior is defined in terms 
of collective, rather than individual, good. In contrast to the West, 
where law is the guarantor of rights that all may claim, in Viet- 
nam the law concerns duties that all must fulfill. 

Vietnamese law seeks to give the prisoner the right to reforma- 
tion. In theory, at least, there are very few incorrigibles. It also 



299 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

permits a relativist approach in fixing sentences, much more so 
than do the precedent-based systems of the West. Mitigating cir- 
cumstances, such as whether the accused acted out of passion or 
premeditation, loom large as a factor in sentencing. Murder by 
stabbing is treated more leniently than murder by poison, for 
example, because the latter is perceived to require a greater degree 
of premeditation than the former. The personal circumstances of 
the accused are also a factor in determining punishment. In the 
administration of criminal justice in Vietnam, an effort is made 
to understand the criminal, his crime, and his reasons; and the 
notion of permanent or extended incarceration is rejected in favor 
of an effort to determine whether or not and, if so, how the crimi- 
nal can be rehabilitated and restored to society. 

Political crimes are treated less liberally, however. In such cases, 
the administration of justice can be arbitrary and harsh. Politics 
clearly plays a role in the arrest, trial, and sentencing procedures. 
The rationale for this policy, which is openly acknowledged, is that 
the revolution must be protected and that the individual may be 
sacrificed, perhaps even unjustiy, for the common cause. The courts 
also take a more jaundiced view of the rehabilitation of political 
prisoners than of common criminals. 

The court system was reorganized in 1981 into four basic levels: 
the Supreme People's Court; the provincial/municipal courts report- 
ing to Hanoi; the local courts, chiefly at the district/precinct levels, 
reporting respectively to provincial or municipal governments; and 
military courts. In addition, a number of specialized courts were 
created. In judicial procedure the courts still owed much to the 
French example, particularly with respect to the role of the procu- 
rator, who had much broader responsibilities than the prosecutor 
or district attorney under the Anglo-Saxon system. 

On January 1 , 1986, a new Penal Code officially went into effect 
after nearly five years of preparation. It contained 280 articles 
divided into 12 chapters or sections. Unlike earlier laws, the new 
code included detailed sections on juvenile and military offenders. 
The first eight chapters defined jurisdiction and judicial procedures; 
distinguished among infractions, misdemeanors, and felonies; and 
outlined sentencing procedures. The last section, consisting of four 
chapters, defined specific crimes and fixed penalties. The code iden- 
tified seven categories of legal punishment: warning, fine, reform 
without detention, house arrest, imprisonment, life imprisonment, 
and death. There was no parole, but remission of punishment was 
possible and the conditions for it appeared to be lenient (eligibility 
for remission of a life-imprisonment sentence began after seven 
years). In general, definitions of crime were broad, vague, and could 



300 



National Security 



be interpreted so that virtually any antisocial word or deed was 
indictable. Penalties were stern and included capital punishment 
for a lengthy list of crimes. In 1986 Minister of Justice Phan Hien 
defended in writings and interviews the new code's long list of 
capital crimes, arguing that in general the code was liberal. He 
cited as evidence that polygamy was a crime, whereas adultery was 
not. Most serious crimes (all drawing the death penalty) were crimes 
endangering the national security, i.e., treason, "taking action 
to overthrow the people's government," espionage, rebellion, 
sabotage, terrorism, "undermining unity," spreading "anti- 
socialist" propaganda, "disrupting security," obstructing or 
inciting to obstruct state agencies' activities, hijacking, destroying 
important national security projects and property, and "crimes 
against humanity." 

Upon arrest, an individual was taken first to a Ministry of Interior 
records office where he was fingerprinted and interrogated, and 
where his record was checked. He was then remanded to a deten- 
tion cell to be held until his trial. Posting bail to obtain temporary 
release was not practiced, although in some instances release on 
one's own recognizance was permitted. 

Trials themselves were brief, businesslike, and conducted in an 
informal, somewhat nonjudicial atmosphere. All participants were 
expected to seek justice rather than simply to observe the letter of 
the law. The defense was supposed to proceed in an objective man- 
ner, meaning it was expected to pursue the truth and not to engage 
in courtroom tactics "that distort the truth or conceal the guilty 
person's faults." The defendant was expected to confine his efforts 
to presenting facts that proved his innocence or that supported his 
plea to the tribunal for reduction of the gravity of the charge. In 
most trials, defense strategy was not directed toward exoneration 
but toward a sentence of reform without detention. 

Sentences for nonpolitical crimes, and particularly for less serious 
felonies, tended to fall into three categories: reform without deten- 
tion, reform with detention, and detention (i.e., an ordinary prison 
sentence). Perhaps half of the sentences imposed for these crimes 
were of the first category, and the remaining half were divided more 
or less equally between the other two categories. The system rested 
on the assumption that most criminals could be rehabilitated, but 
the procedure required that the individual petition the court for 
rehabilitation. The court might also sentence a person to loss of 
civil rights, an auxiliary penalty that deprived the individual of cer- 
tain rights for a specific period of time (see Social Control, this 
ch.). Formal incarceration that resulted from judicial proceedings 
might be either in a prison or a work-reform camp (detention with 



301 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

labor). Vietnamese prisons imposed confinement in a manner more 
or less like prisons anywhere in the world. Work reform camps 
incarcerated prisoners as well, but also required them to perform 
outside physical labor, constructing roads, clearing brush, and simi- 
lar tasks on contract for the state. Beyond confinement arising from 
judicial proceedings, there was also administrative detention that 
did not involve the courts and was usually the result of action by 
party officials. Eligible for this type of incarceration was a host of 
offenders that included juvenile delinquents, foreigners (chiefly 
Laotians), northerners who had defected to the South during the 
war, and "enemies of the people" (those judged to be dangerous 
to society by virtue of their social, political, economic, or family 
background). The largest and best known facilities for adminis- 
trative detention were the re-education camps and social-labor 
camps. Both were "educative" in purpose and both were designed 
for "social negatives." The difference between the two, insofar as 
there was any, was that the re-education camp was for those whose 
attitudes, ideas, and beliefs required correction, while the social- 
labor camps were for those of ' 'backward behavior, ' ' such as draft 
dodgers, tax evaders, and persons who "spread social negativism." 

In official Hanoi thinking, there was a sharp difference between 
confinement as a result of judicial proceedings and administrative 
detention. Those who were incarcerated in a prison or a work- 
reform camp as the result of a court sentence were considered 
incorrigible or without social value. Prisoners confined under 
administrative detention were those for whom there was some hope 
of rehabilitation. While the individual inmate caught up in the sys- 
tem might find the distinction meaningless, it was important for 
an observer of the Vietnamese judicial and internal security sys- 
tem to bear in mind the distinction between the two institutions. 

Detailed information on Vietnam's prison system — the number 
and location of its prisons and the size of its prison population — 
has always been extraordinarily difficult to obtain, and much of 
the information available in 1987 was questionable. Hanoi had not 
published anything of consequence on the subject. Credible avail- 
able data tended to combine statistics on prison, work-reform 
camps, and administrative detention facilities. Each of the forty 
Vietnamese provinces had at least one prison with a capacity rang- 
ing from about 1,000 to 5,000 inmates. Some provinces also had 
what were called model prisons, which resembled new economic 
zones in that, in the spirit of modern penology, they offered the 
prisoners financial incentives to engage in agricultural production. 
Most of the district capitals had small prisons or detention centers, 
and the PPSF (or PSS) operated detention cells in most villages 



302 



National Security 



and some hamlets. In addition, there were perhaps a dozen central 
(or national) prisons that could hold as many as 40,000 inmates. 
The largest of these were the Hoa Lo prison in Hanoi (with a branch 
in Haiphong) and the Chi Hoa prison outside Ho Chi Minh City. 
The major cities also had detention centers (Hanoi had 18, which 
could hold 500 prisoners each) where individuals were held 
awaiting trial. 

Life in a Vietnamese prison, as reported by ex-prisoners, was 
harsh. There were work details for those in prisons, as well as in 
the work-reform camps, that chiefly involved agricultural produc- 
tion for prison use. Rehabilitation lectures were held daily, and 
prisoners spent much time describing past behavior and thoughts 
in detail in their dossiers. Visitors were permitted only infrequently 
in most prisons. Discipline was strict, and prisons in particular were 
well guarded; usually there was 1 guard for every 250 prisoners. 
In general, the use of torture, corporal punishment, and what might 
be termed police brutality were no longer legal but were still con- 
doned by officials and even accepted by the general public. 

Social Control 

Under the Hanoi government, "control" was a legal term used 
both as a verb and a noun. "Control" meant use of state power 
to deal with individuals who committed either civil or political crimes 
judged not serious enough to warrant imprisonment, but serious 
enough to deserve reform without detention. "Control" referred 
also to the status of an individual under such sentence (also one 
released from prison but considered not fully reformed). Hence 
it combined the condition of being on parole with that of being 
in the custody of the court or under state surveillance. A person 
under "control" had to report periodically to local authorities to 
account for his activities and detail his efforts to reform. He was 
proscribed from certain occupations, including teaching, publish- 
ing, practicing medicine or pharmacy, and operating a restaurant, 
hotel, or bookstore. Such restrictions were deemed legal because 
one under "control" was considered to have already forfeited some 
of his civil rights, at least temporarily. 

The mechanism of "control," called the People's Organ of Con- 
trol, was hierarchically organized and formally defined by the 1980 
Constitution (Articles 127, 138, and 141). At the top was the 
Supreme People's Organ of Control, and at the bottom were the 
district and precinct organs of control. These institutions functioned 
to "control the observance of the law by the ministries, armed 
forces, state employees and citizens; to exercise the right of public 
prosecution; and to insure strict and uniform observance of the 



303 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

law. ' ' Their purview was "any act encroaching upon the interests 
of the State, the collective, or the lives, property, freedom, honor, 
and dignity of citizens." The underlying justification for their 
existence was that major internal security problems developed 
because of a breakdown in social discipline and that restoration 
of discipline was best achieved with a system of self-control or self- 
discipline. The system was composed of many activities: physical 
control; re-education and reform; indoctrination, emulation, and 
motivation; and education. Its essence was organization and moti- 
vation, and in the hands of skilled cadres it could harness social 
pressure to induce new attitudes and ways of thinking. 

Population Relocation 

Massive relocation of the population, blandly called the "state 
redistribution of labor" program, began after reunification in 1976 
and has been an integral part of the security effort. At least 5 mil- 
lion people have been uprooted in this process, known as "break- 
ing the machine." While partly economic in its motivation, the 
relocation's main purpose has been to break up the existing social 
structure. In assigning individuals to new economic zones, for 
instance, care has been taken to scatter those from a single urban 
area or village to separate locations. The formation of new associa- 
tions by these people was then supervised by the VCP, which used 
various mass movements and proletarian social organizations — 
augmented by communication and education programs intended 
to raise class consciousness — to help foster class struggle and to turn 
the middle and upper classes into social pariahs. This social 
ostracism was one of the reasons that many middle-class Vietnamese 
left the South after 1975 as "boat people" (see Glossary). 

Re-education Camps 

The re-education camp remained the predominant device of 
social "control" in the late 1980s. It was used to incarcerate mem- 
bers of certain social classes in order to coerce them to accept and 
conform to the new social norms. This type of camp was one fea- 
ture of a broader effort to control the social deviant and to cam- 
paign against counterrevolution and the resistance. The concept 
of re-education was borrowed from the Chinese communists and 
was developed early in the First Indochina War, at least in part 
because the nomadic government of North Vietnam was unable 
to maintain orthodox prisons. The process was continued in the 
North in 1954, but it came fully to the world's attention only after 
North Vietnam's takeover of the South in 1975. The camps were 
administered by PAVN or the Ministry of Interior, but they were 



304 



National Security 



not regarded as prisons and indeed were separate from the prison 
system. They were considered to be institutions where rehabilita- 
tion was accomplished through education and socially construc- 
tive labor. Only those who "deserved rehabilitation" (as opposed 
to those who deserved jail) were sent to the camps, where their 
political attitudes, work production records, and general behavior 
were closely monitored. 

The re-education camp system, as it developed in the South, was 
both larger and more complex than its counterpart in the North. 
Three types of camps were created to serve three purposes — short- 
term re-education, long-term re-education, and permanent incar- 
ceration. The system was also organized into five levels. 

There were two levels of short-term re-education. The first was 
the study camp or day study center which was located in or near 
a major urban center, often in a public park, and allowed attendees 
to return home each night. Courses, chiefly lectures to "teach 
socialism and unlearn the old ways lasted about thirty days." They 
were attended mostly by southern proletarians and juvenile delin- 
quents. These level-one camps, which instructed perhaps 500,000 
people, were the most common kind in the South in the first few 
years after the end of the Second Indochina War, but were phased 
out near the end of the 1970s. The level-two camps were similar 
in purpose to level one camps, but they required full-time attendance 
for three to six months, during which time the inmate was obliged 
to supply his own food. Security was minimal, and it was possible 
simply to walk away from the camp, although later arrest was likely. 
During the 1970s, there were some 300 of these level-two camps 
in the South, with at least 200,000 inmates. Some level-two camps 
remained in the 1980s, although most had been phased out. 

Long-term re-education was undertaken at level-three camps. 
Termed the collective reformatory, level three had thought reform 
as its purpose. Whereas re-education of individuals in the first two 
levels of camps was regarded chiefly as a matter of informing them 
of the "truth" and making them aware of facts about the new social 
order, reforming the thought of those in level-three camps required 
a process of deeper examination and analysis. The orientation was 
both more psychological and more intellectual. Although the inmate 
was apt to be better educated, and thus less susceptible to manipu- 
lation, than most Vietnamese, the system considered him salvage- 
able. The level-three camps at their most prevalent, in the late 
1970s, were found in every province in southern Vietnam and 
dealt with at least 50,000 persons. Although the camps were 
still in use both in the North and South, by 1987 the number 
had decreased. 



305 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



The third type of re-education camp, the socialist-reform camp, 
was intended for permanent incarceration, and re-education 
involved indoctrination and forced labor. When these camps were 
first established in the South, individuals were assigned according 
to the probable time that each person's re-education would require. 
Level-four camp inmates were said to require three years and level- 
five camp inmates, five years. For this reason the two were com- 
monly termed "three-year-sentence" and "five-year-sentence" 
camps. Their true purpose, it became apparent eventually, was 
to incarcerate certain southern individuals — including educators, 
legislators, province chiefs, writers, and supreme court judges — 
until the South was judged stable enough to permit their release. 
In 1987 at least 15,000 were still incarcerated in level-four and 
level-five camps. When the three-year or five-year period expired, 
they were simply sentenced to three or five more years of 
re-education. 

Initially, the five levels of re-education were structured in 
ascending order of perceived individual recalcitrance and ascend- 
ing length of incarceration. In 1987, however, only the level-three 
camp remained dedicated to its original purpose. The level-four 
and level-five camps were simply detention centers for those judged 
potentially dangerous to the system. Camp conditions were 
reportedly poor, with little food, no medicine, and a high death rate. 

Surveillance 

Perhaps the most effective instrument of social control in the 
1980s was the "revolutionary vigilance" surveillance system, com- 
monly called "the warden method." In theory at least, every 
hamlet, city block, state farm, factory, school, and state and party 
office had its own Revolutionary Vigilance Committee headed by 
a warden and made up of a team of neighbors, usually 25 to 40 
households (120 to 300 persons). Institutionally, the Vigilance Com- 
mittee was described as neither party nor state, but a form of 
alliance. Its purpose was to "help the government in all ways and 
aspects," specifically by monitoring the behavior of its members, 
reporting public opinion to higher authorities, and promoting 
various state and party policies and programs locally. The com- 
mittee's authority was shored up by the Ho Khau registration system, 
which required each individual to have an identity card and each 
family to have a family registration certificate or residence permit 
(listing the names of all persons authorized to live at one address). 
Both identification cards and family registration certificates were 
checked frequently by security cadres. 



306 




Gate to Ben Tre Re-education Camp 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



It is historical fact that social "control" as administered by the 
Vietnamese party and government worked impressively over the 
years to organize, mobilize, and motivate the society to serve the 
interests of national security. It produced an implacably determined 
military force and an internal security system that virtually policed 
itself. However, it was evident by the late 1980s that the system 
no longer worked as well as it once had. The Political Bureau 
acknowledged the influence of "negativism" that endangered the 
"quality of socialist life," and military and security service profes- 
sional journals emphasized the need to improve security methods, 
including "techniques for suppressing rebellions." Although the 
spread of full-scale social unrest in Vietnam was not likely, the idea 
was no longer unthinkable. 

What developed in Vietnam in the 1980s was not so much a rise 
in internal security consciousness on the part of the government 
as a change in public attitudes toward security problems. Military 
and public alertness to the dangers of counterrevolution, crime, 
and antisocial behavior diminished to the point of indifference. 
Nguyen Van Linh, before his appointment as VCP general secre- 
tary in 1986, complained that the "spirit of vigilance" was lagging 
in Vietnam and that "some individuals suffer[ed] from revolu- 
tionary vigilance paralysis." Massive indoctrination campaigns, 
undertaken to correct this shortcoming by arousing public concern, 



307 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

apparently met with indifferent results. The condition was symp- 
tomatic of a society that was beginning to be buffeted by the winds 
of change. 

* * * 

The major source of research materials for this chapter was the 
Indochina Archive at the University of California at Berkeley. The 
archive has 2.5 million pages of documentary material, 15 percent 
of which relates directly to Vietnam's armed forces, internal 
security, law, and judiciary. Much of the archive is original source 
material from Vietnam, including official newspaper and journal 
articles translated and published by the Foreign Broadcast Infor- 
mation Service and the Joint Publications Research Service of the 
United States Government. 

PA VN: People's Army of Vietnam, by Douglas Pike, is the only book- 
length study of Vietnam's armed forces; William Turley has writ- 
ten several lengthy articles on the subject. Human rights violations 
in Vietnam have been dealt with in journal articles by Karl Jackson 
and Jacqueline Desbarats. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



308 



Appendix A 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population, 1979, 1984, and 1988 

3 Ethnic Composition, 1979 

4 Economic Growth Rate, 1976-90 

5 National Income by Sector, Selected Years, 1975-85 

6 Agricultural and Industrial Production, 1975-84 

7 Rice Production, 1975-85 

8 Electricity and Coal Production, Selected Years, 1975-85 

9 Soviet Economic and Military Assistance to Vietnam, 1978-86 

10 Foreign Trade, 1976-86 

11 Trade with the Soviet Union, 1976-86 

12 Ministries, State Commissions, and Special Agencies of the 

Council of Ministers, 1987. 



309 



Appendix A 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



311 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Table 2. Population, 1979, 1984, and 1988 
(in thousands) 

1979 Census Estimated 1984 Estimated 1988 



Place Population Population Population 



Municipalities 

Hanoi 2,571 2,878 3,170 

Haiphong 1,279 1,397 1,500 

Ho Chi Minh City 3,420 3,564 3,685 

Provinces 

An Giang 1,532 1,765 1,980 

Bac Thai 815 903 980 

Ben Tre 1,042 1,164 1,275 

Binh Tri Thien 1,902 2,020 2,120 

Cao Bang 480 540 595 

Cuu Long 1,504 1,686 1,850 

Dac Lac 490 611 735 

Dong Nai 1,305 1,502 1,690 

Dong Thap 1,183 1,314 1,430 

Gia Lai-Kon Turn 596 692 785 

Ha Bac 1,663 1,892 2,110 

Ha Nam Ninh 2,781 3,061 3,315 

Ha Son Binh 1,537 1,705 1,850 

Ha Tuyen 782 881 975 

Hai Hung 2,145 2,396 2,625 

Hau Giang 2,233 2,495 2,735 

Hoang Lien Son 778 866 950 

Kien Giang 995 1,123 1,245 

Lai Chau 322 378 432 

Lam Dong 397 487 580 

Lang Son 485 534 580 

Long An 957 1,081 1,195 

Minh Hai 1,220 1,550 1,900 

Nghe Tinh 3,112 3,398 3,655 

Nghia Binh 2,095 2,355 2,600 

Phu Khanh 1,189 1,332 1,465 

Quang Nam-Da Nang 1,530 1,678 1,810 

Quang Ninh 750 812 870 

Son La 488 562 635 

Song Be 659 734 805 

Tay Ninh 684 758 830 

Thai Binh 1,506 1,653 1,790 

Thanh Hoa 2,532 2,780 3,010 

Thuan Hai 938 1,085 1,220 

Tien Giang 1,265 1,388 1,505 

Vinh Phu 1,488 1,656 1,805 

Special Zone 

Vung Tau-Con Dao 92 94 98 



TOTAL 52,742 58,770 64,385 



312 



Appendix 



o 

3 

O 

h 



- c 

o .a 
K -a 
5-§ 



u 



c 

o 



E Q EC 



c ° 

O M ho 



00 



03 ,H 

3 «J 

to g J 

ea X y 

CQ 03 

W PQ 

O «3 



o3~ c 

►2 § 

X GO 

as 

r- 1 o 

„ CO 

I £ 
H 3 



0^ 



to 



Z o % 

J5 - Q 
a s £ 



PQ 
^ 3 

.5 co 

° >: 

3 .tS 

.a u 

to-l 

§ o 
be - 

03 



O TO 

_c c 

-3 - 

^ § 
-CO 
3 G 

w J 

o bo 

03 73 
03 O .5 

XX 2 



03 



03 



= 4 

03 CO • - 

u 

" <U _3 

y j .S 

03 

PQ boS 
- 3 ._ 



3 y E 

- 03 s 

torcg 



u C be 
O ^ 2 q 
03 3 3. O 



bo 
3 

o 
Q 



5/ 



o 03 



N 



to 

2 

o" 
-a 
H 



c to 

(3.0 -a 



-3 E- » 
h o 



topq 



< . _, 



^ 03 

•03 H 

H ^ 

u 

03 

(2" 



H 03 



^ £ 

3 -£3 



03 



CO 3 

3^ 

.3 « 
Ch - 
3 

„ o 

bo 1— 1 

3 „ 
03 o 

O £ 

bo° 
3 bo 
O 3 
3 3 

X 2 



bo 
3 
3 

2 



3 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



_C y 

w bO 

'S Z 

J . 

„ c 

c o 

O t/3 

C/3 h n 



bo bfl 
3 C 
03 03 
o pQ 

S o 

„ 03 



c 

o 

c/3 y 

„ Ri 

o U DC 

CO « J3 

3 ^ 3 C 

3 * z 



PQ 



a Ch 

rs ~ 

O y 

Mi pg 



3 



o 

o ffi 

C 03 

>2 « ,42 r 13 



C 



Z OC 

bo - 

c c 

o3 o 
3,00 



r bo 
y 3 

PQ PQ 



£^ 

bo 3 

c .£ 
< pq 



HJ bo 



3 >- 



o 
Q 

« c 

S £ 
*■ 

S3 03 

O ~ 

V O 

03 . 

O ^ 

PC z 



m y 

s Q 



2 n^a 

- «S _3 - 



.2 Q 

N 



£ HQ 



o 

.. R3 
03 N 

X - O - 
bO 03 PQ 



H - c 
S ° 

03 GO 



- e RJ 



U 



J* S _3 - bo 



be 



2 3 



c PQ 
3 

X 3 

03 ^ 

< R3 

03 W 
G. 

^ o" 

- PQ 

u 

Q y 
„ 3 
-2 P< 



5 O 
- PQ 



o 

a b^ 

* rcj 
- D, 

o *y 

03 HH 

bo „ 
•7 bo 



5 O X 



5 ~o _ 

R5 S / — ^ 

CQ ^ 03 

y rV 

c X 

o « o 

X 3 ^ 



° c y 

03 o °3 

O oo J 

3 f 2 

M 3 PQ 

„ u o 

3 O 

03 J£ J3 

^ 03 

O O oo 



N 



314 



Appendix 



o o 
o o 

CT> CO 



o o 
o o 
o o 



o/ 

£ 

3 

H 

a 

o 



O 2 



3 

H 

bo 

c 
o 
Q 



J3 

bo 
2 



■a 3 
> H 

2 ffi 



PQ 



.a c 
H ° 



2 J 



o „ 
S a° 



bo 



bo 



bo o 
3 Q r «< 

bo be • - 



o « § 
X PC J 



5 



bo 
C 

O 



G 

N — 



3 o 



bo 
C 
o 
O 



Ph PQ 



03 <ti 

U E 



a c 



« 

bo^ 

a - 

3 

-3 jT, 

z u 



bo 

a 
H 



bo 
C 
O 
3 

-3 

Ph 



bo 
3 
O 
3 

5 



31 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



o o 
o o 



o o 
o o 

o a> 



bO 

z 



bo 
c 
o 

p 



9 £ 



& 



u 



c. 

03 

bo 

z 



as a 
2 2 

1,3 03 



> 

w bo 

2 S 

u ^ * 

«j - H 

L_ , bo 
n G «S 
- v \A 

<u H - 
•5b 



6 s 



o 

3 
P3 
-C 

O 
o~ 

o 
N 



o 
ji 
Ph 

o" 

Pl, 

03 

X 

03" 

^ C 
N N 

« £ 

J o 

a x 

O 03 

« > 



U 



316 



Appendix A 



© o o © 
o o o o 

CM CO CO CM 



G 

>• 

H 



g 2 

3 -G 



6/ 



<5 



cy 

-C 

be o 

G c3 

£ s 

cS 

bfi 

1 8 

3 * 

-G c« 



3 

a j| 

< o a 
b^X 
c - ~ 

4J b/D O 

j a s 

u 3 
3 bfid 
G 

bc w 
■g G 



«J -G 



C/5 >- U 



Q W> 
_ G 



~3 

C „ 

° § 

"5 DQ 

x « 

<a X 

o - 

a <j 

js o 

* X 

X X 



o 



a 

8 



»C5 



317 



Vietnam: A Country Study 




318 



Appendix A 



Table 4. Economic Growth Rate, 1976-90 



(in percentages) 

National Agricultural Industrial 

Income Production Production 

Five-Year Plans Projected Actual Projected Actual Projected Actual 



Second Five-Year 

Plan (1976-80) 13-14 0.4 8-10 1.9 16-18 0.6 

Third Five-Year 

Plan (1981-85) 4.5-5 6.4 6.0-7 4.9 4.0-5 9.5 

Fourth Five-Year 

Plan (1986-90)* 8.0 4.3 6.2 1.4 9.0 5.6 



*Projected figures through 1987; actual figures for 1986. 

Source: Based on information from Tetsusaburo Kimura, Vietnam: International Relations and 
Economic Development, Tokyo, 1987, 164-65. 



Table 5. National Income by Sector, Selected Years, 1975-85 
(in percentages) 



Sector 1975 1980 1982 1984 1985 



Agriculture 46.8 50.1 57.2 42.4 44.6 

Industry 24.0 19.9 25.3 32.8 32.4 

Commerce 13.5 18.2 10.5 12.8 17.9 

Construction 6.2 3.4 2.4 4.5 2.4 

Transport and services 4.0 4.1 2.2 2.8 0.9 

Other 5.5 4.3 2.4 4.7 1.8 



TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 



Source: Based on information from Statisticheskii ezhegodnik stranchlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoi 
Vzaimopomoshchi (Statistical Yearbook of Member Countries of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance), Moscow, 1986, 42-43. 



319 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Table 6. Agricultural and Industrial Production, 1975-84 
(in millions of dong)* 



Year Agriculture Industry 



1975 6,429.5 7,288.4 

1976 7,087.8 8,208.9 

1977 , 6,740.2 9,028.9 

1978 6,743.6 9,520.1 

1979 7,204.1 9,089.9 

1980 7,622.5 8,218.4 

1981 7,867.1 9,463.0 

1982 81,135.6 72,095.0 

1983 84,116.3 82,999.8 

1984 89,331.8 88,995.2 



* 1975-81 based on fixed 1970 prices; 1982-84 based on fixed 1982 prices. 

Source: Based on information from Tong Cue Thong Ke, So Lieu Thong Ke, 1930-1984 
(Statistical Data, 1930-1984), Hanoi, March 1985, 40-82; Thong Ke (Statistics), 
Hanoi, March 1985, 31-33; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Southeast 
Asia Report, JPRS-SEA-85-100, June 1985, 96-97. 



Table 7. Rice Production, 1975-85 



Production Area Cultivated Yield 
Year (million tons) (1,000 hectares) (100 kilograms/hectare) 



1975 10.54 4,940 21.3 

1976 11.87 5,314 22.3 

1977 10.89 5,409 20.1 

1978 10.04 5,442 18.5 

1979 , 10.76 5,483 19.8 

1980 11.68 5,544 21.1 

1981 12.55 5,645 22.2 

1982 14.17 5,709 24.8 

1983 14.73 5,603 26.3 

1984 15.61 5,671 27.5 

1985* 16.50 5,750 28.7 



* Estimated. 

Source: Based on information from Tong Cue Thong Ke, So Lieu Thong Ke, 1930-84 
(Statistical Data, 1930-84), Hanoi, March 1985, 93. 



320 



Appendix A 



Table 8. Electricity and Coal Production, Selected Years, 1975-85 





1975 


1978 


1980 


1983 


1984 


1985 




2428 


3846 


3680 


4184 


4853 


5400 


Coal 2 


5.20 


6.00 


5.30 


6.20 


4.90 


6.00 



Millions of kilowatt hours. 
Millions of tons. 



Source: Based on information from Statisticheskii ezhegodnik stranchlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoi 
Vzaimopomoshchi (Statistical Yearbook of Member Countries of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance), Moscow, 1986, 73, 74. Translation of Hanoi, Statisti- 
cal General Department, Statistics Publishing House, So Lieu Thong Ke, 1930-84, 
1985, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Southeast Asia Report, Reference Aid, 
Vietnam, Statistical Data 1930-84, JPRS-SEA-86-108, June 25, 1986, 44. 



Table 9. Soviet Economic and Military Assistance to Vietnam, 1978-86 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Economic Military Military Assistance 

Year Assistance Assistance Total as Percentage of Total 



1978 700-1,000 600-800 1,300-1,800 46.1-44.4 

1979 800-1,100 900-1,400 1,700-2,500 52.9-56.0 

1980 2,900-3,200 800-900 3,700-4,100 21.6-22.0 

1981 900 900-1,000 1,800-1,900 50.0-52.6 

1982 1,200 1,000 2,200 45.4 

1983 1,300 1,200 2,500 48.0 

1984 1,400 1,300 2,700 48.1 

1985 1,600 1,700 3,300 51.5 

1986* 1,800 1,500 3,300 45.4 



*Estimated. 

Source: Based on information from Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, Boulder, 
Colorado, 1987, 139. 



321 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Table 10. Foreign Trade, 1976-86 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Year Imports Exports Trade Balance 



1976 825.9 215.0 -610.9 

1977 1,044.1 309.0 -735.1 

1978 1,465.8 406.7 - 1,059.1 

1979 1,653.0 383.1 - 1,269.9 

1980 1,576.7 398.6 - 1,178.1 

1981 1,697.3 388.3 - 1,309.0 

1982 1,599.6 479.7 - 1,119.9 

1983 1,689.2 534.5 - 1,154.7 

1984 1,802.5 570.5 - 1,232.0 

1985 2,046.3 660.3 - 1,386.0 

1986 2,506.9 739.5 - 1,767.4 



Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statis- 
tics Yearbook, Washington, 1987, 412-13. 



Table 11. Trade with the Soviet Union, 1976-86 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Trade with 
Soviet Union as 
Percentage of 



Year 


Imports 


Exports 


Trade Balance 


Total 


Total Foreign Trade 


1976 


308.4 


84.4 


- 224.0 


392.8 


37.7 


1977 


372.0 


176.1 


- 195.9 


548.1 


40.5 


1978 


446.4 


222.5 


- 223.9 


668.9 


35.7 


1979 


680.3 


225.0 


-455.3 


905.3 


44.5 


1980 


700.1 


242.4 


-457.7 


942.5 


47.7 


1981 


1,006.4 


232.2 


- 774.2 


1,238.6 


59.4 


1982 


1,107.4 


284.4 


-823.0 


1,391.8 


66.9 


1983 


1,213.9 


315.3 


-898.6 


1,529.2 


68.8 


1984 


1,230.1 


316.0 


-914.1 


1,546.1 


65.2 


1985 


1,410.9 


339.3 


- 1,071.6 


1,750.2 


64.7 


1986 


1,878.1 


419.2 


- 1,458.9 


2,297.3 


70.8 



322 



Appendix A 



Table 12. Ministries, State Commissions, and Special 
Agencies of the Council of Ministers, 1987 



Ministries 



Agriculture and Food Industry 
Building 

Communications and Transportation 

Culture 

Education 

Energy 

Engineering and Metals 
Finance 
Foreign Affairs 
Foreign Trade 
Forestry 

Higher and Vocational Education 



Home Trade 
Information 
Interior 
Justice 

Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare 

Light Industry 

Marine Products 

National Defense 

Public Health 

Supply 

Water Conservancy 



State Commissions 



Capital Construction Commission 
Commission for Economic Relations with 

Foreign Countries 
State Inspection Commission 
State Law Commission 
State Nationalities Commission 



State Planning Commission 
State Price Commission 
State Prize Commission 
State Science and Technology 

Commission 
State Bank of Vietnam 



Special Agencies 

Commissions 

Vietnam News Agency Social Science Commission 

Government Organization Commission 



Departments 



Chemicals General Department 
Civil Aviation Department 
Food Administration Department 
Forestry Administration Department 
General Information Department 
General Rubber Department 
Geography Department 
Geology Department 
Land Management General Department 
Metereorology and Hydrology General 
Department 



Oil and Natural Gas General Department 
Physical Education and Sports General 

Department 
Political Tasks Department 
Posts and Telecommunications 

Department 
Railway General Department 
Statistics General Department 
Vocational Training General Department 



Source: Based on information from United States Central Intelligence Agency Directorate 
of Intelligence, Directory of Officials of Vietnam, Washington, July 1985, 27-52. 



323 



Appendix B 



Party Leaders in the 1980s 

The Political Bureau elected during the Sixth National Party 
Congress in December 1986 consisted of thirteen full members and 
one alternate member. Five were new, one was appointed in June 
1985, and the remainder were carried over from the previous 
Political Bureau, elected at the Fifth National Party Congress in 
1982. The Political Bureau elected in 1982 numbered thirteen full 
and two alternate members. Between 1982 and 1986, one mem- 
ber died, three were voluntarily retired, three were removed, and 
one was promoted from alternate to full membership. Top party 
leadership during this period was therefore restricted to twenty- 
one individuals. The inner circle of party leadership, however, 
extended to a secondary, but nevertheless critical, tier of leader- 
ship represented by members of the Secretariat of the Central Com- 
mittee who were not simultaneously members of the Political 
Bureau. In 1986 there were nine. 

Political Bureau Members in December 1986 

(Members listed in decreasing order of political importance.) 

Nguyen Van Linh, elected Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, 
Viet Nam Cong San Dang) general secretary in 1986, had been 
a rising political star since the end of the Second Indochina War. 
Born in the North in 1915, he had spent most of his political career 
in the South and much of that time underground in Saigon, where 
he worked closely with Le Duan in 1956. In 1960, because of his 
underground role in the South, he was elected secretly to the VCP's 
Central Committee. At war's end in 1975, Linh was appointed 
party secretary for Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) for a brief 
period, only to be replaced by Vo Van Kiet at the Fourth National 
Party Congress in 1976. In 1976 he was elected for the first time 
to the Political Bureau and ranked twelfth. He was dropped from 
the Political Bureau in 1982, however, apparently for his opposi- 
tion to the rapid socialization of the South after the 1975 victory. 
He was renamed party secretary for Ho Chi Minh City in Decem- 
ber 1981, where the success of his reformist economic policies gained 
the attention of the Political Bureau. Linh's reappointment in 1985, 
when he was ranked sixteenth, may have resulted from the inter- 
cession of then-party general secretary Le Duan and had the effect 
of strengthening the reform contingent of the VCP's leadership. 



325 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Following Le Duan's death in July 1986, he was returned to the 
Secretariat where he ranked immediately behind Duan's heir 
apparent, Truong Chinh. Before assuming the party's top posi- 
tion in December 1986, Linh advocated an end to discrimination 
against intellectuals who had served the former regime in South 
Vietnam and better treatment for Vietnam's Roman Catholics and 
the Chinese minority. He publicly thanked representatives of the 
Chinese community for their contribution to Vietnam. 

Pham Hung, formerly ranked fourth in the Political Bureau, was 
promoted to the second-ranked position in December 1986. In June 

1987, he was named to succeed Pham Van Dong as premier. Hung 
had been minister of interior from 1980 to 1986, and a vice premier 
since 1958. He began his career fighting the French in the South 
and directed the political campaign in the South during the Sec- 
ond Indochina War as head of the Central Office for South Viet- 
nam (COSVN) and the Political Bureau's chief representative in 
South Vietnam from 1967 to 1975. His deputy during this period 
was Nguyen Van Linh. He was the first native South Vietnamese 
to attain senior party and government rank and was considered 
a hard-liner not because he was an ideologue but because he believed 
communist orthodoxy promoted better security. Although Hung 
was associated with the implementation of unpopular economic poli- 
cies on money, prices, and wages, his career apparently suffered 
no lasting damage. He was born in 1912 and died on March 10, 

1988, after having held the post of premier for only nine months. 
Vo Chi Cong, who was ranked seventh in the 1982 Political 

Bureau and was promoted to third in 1986, was appointed to the 
largely ceremonial post of president in place of Truong Chinh in 
June 1987. His previous experience had been mainly in the field 
in Central Vietnam, and during the Second Indochina War he was 
a formal communist representative on the Hanoi-sponsored 
National Liberation Front central committee. From 1976 to 1980 
Vo Chi Cong held the government posts of vice premier, minister 
of agriculture, and minister of fisheries, but reportedly he was fired 
from each post for administrative incompetence. A strong advo- 
cate of liberalization in agriculture, he was counted as being among 
Nguyen Van Linh's reform advocates on the Political Bureau and 
was an advocate for openness in the party. Cong was born in 1912. 

Do Muoi, ranked eleventh on the Political Bureau in 1982 and 
fourth in 1986, directed the party's failed effort to socialize southern 
industry and commerce rapidly. Nevertheless, in 1986 he was iden- 
tified with the reform program and subsequently was named to 
the Secretariat of the Central Committee as a resident economic 
expert. In 1984 he was called upon to explain the party's Sixth 



326 



Appendix B 



Plenum resolution on reforming industrial management, and he 
has since spoken on behalf of agricultural reform. Following the 
death of Pham Hung in March 1988, he was named to replace 
Hung as premier. He was born in 1920 and established his career 
in Haiphong. 

Vo Van Kiet, vice premier and chairman of the State Planning 
Commission in 1986, moved from the tenth to the fifth position 
on the Political Bureau. During the Second Indochina War, he 
worked with the Hanoi-controlled People's Revolutionary Party 
in the South; after the war, he became Ho Chi Minh City party 
secretary. In this capacity, Kiet initiated liberalized local trade and 
commerce policies that became the models for later national eco- 
nomic reforms. His rise in the party was comparatively rapid. Until 
the Fourth National Party Congress in 1976, when he appeared 
as an alternate member on the Political Bureau and as a member 
of the Central Committee, he had not been listed on any list of 
senior party officials. In company with Nguyen Van Linh, however, 
Kiet was initially elected to the Central Committee in 1960. Because 
of their sensitive positions in the South at the time, their Central 
Committee memberships were not revealed until after the war in 
1976. He was an advocate of pragmatic economic reform, such 
as decentralized planning, loosened central controls, and socializa- 
tion of the South without production disruption. The youngest 
Political Bureau member in 1986, he was born in 1922. 

Le Due Anh, formerly ranked twelfth on the Political Bureau 
and promoted to sixth in 1986, was appointed Minister of National 
Defense in early 1987. He was almost totally unknown until given 
full Political Bureau status in 1982. During the Second Indochina 
War, he worked closely with Vo Van Kiet and was deputy com- 
mander of the Ho Chi Minh City campaign; afterwards, he was 
appointed commanding general and political commissar of the mili- 
tary region bordering Cambodia. He commanded the Vietnamese 
task force that invaded Cambodia in 1978. 

Nguyen Due Tam, previously ranked thirteenth on the Political 
Bureau, was promoted in 1986 to seventh despite his position as 
head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, 
which was the target of heavy criticism at the Sixth National Party 
Congress. His department was blamed for an unprecedented decline 
in the quality of party cadres. A protege of Le Due Tho, whom 
he replaced as head of the Organization Department, he built his 
career in his native Quang Ninh Province. 

Nguyen Co Thach, promoted from alternate to full Political 
Bureau membership in 1986, was Vietnam's Minister of foreign 
affairs and ranked eighth on the Bureau. Immediately following 



327 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

the Sixth National Party Congress, he was promoted to vice pre- 
mier (deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers). Thach had 
been a career diplomat serving in diplomatic posts until his elec- 
tion to the Political Bureau as an alternate member in 1982, marking 
the first time that an official from a diplomatic background had 
entered the top party leadership. A protege of Le Due Tho, Thach 
was apparently a political moderate, although his support of Viet- 
nam's occupation of Cambodia demonstrated his alignment with 
official policy. Once a specialist on American affairs (he partici- 
pated in the Paris negotiations to end the Second Indochina War 
with then-United States national security adviser Henry Kissinger), 
Thach became increasingly associated with Soviet and East Euro- 
pean affairs and traveled to Moscow in 1978 with other top Viet- 
namese officials to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. 
He was the first Political Bureau member after Ho Chi Minh to 
speak English, having learned it while serving in India in the late 
1950s. According to one Western author, Thach 's greatest value 
to the leadership may have been his ability to interpret the views 
of the English-speaking world. He was born in 1920. 

Dong Sy Nguyen, promoted from alternate to full Political 
Bureau membership in 1986, was a cadre of surprising resilience. 
His election to the Political Bureau in 1982 was a surprise to most 
outsiders. Previously, Nguyen had been known as a middle-ranking 
communist and an unspectacular member of the Quartermasters 
and Engineers Corps of the armed forces. He was removed as 
minister of communications and transportation in June 1986 
because of his alleged involvement with widespread corruption in 
that ministry. 

Tran Xuan Bach, a relatively unknown official newly elevated 
to the Political Bureau in 1986, formerly headed the secret Viet- 
namese organization code-named "B-68," which supervised the 
administration of Cambodia. Bach was in Phnom Penh in 1979 
as the personal secretary of Le Due Tho, the Political Bureau mem- 
ber in charge of Cambodia at that time. In the early 1960s he led 
the Vietnam Fatherland Front, and from 1977 to 1982 he chaired 
the Central Committee cabinet. In 1982 he was elected a full mem- 
ber of the Central Committee and secretary of the Secretariat of 
the Central Committee. Following the Sixth National Party Con- 
gress in December 1986, he ranked third on the Secretariat and 
tenth on the Political Bureau. 

Nguyen Thanh Binh, newly elected to the Political Bureau, was 
elected secretary of the Hanoi municipal party committee in 1986. 
Before that he had been a Central Committee secretary. A force- 
ful advocate for the party's agricultural reforms and for the gradual 



328 



Appendix B 



rather than rapid socialization of southern agriculture, Binh was 
a strong critic of the party's failure to revise agricultural policies. 

Doan Khue, a new member of the Political Bureau in 1986, was 
first elected to the Central Committee in 1976, but was virtually 
unknown except for his military background. He was former com- 
mander and political officer of Military Region V (central Viet- 
nam) of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), and in 1987 was 
appointed PAVN chief of staff. 

Mai Chi Tho, the lowest ranking of the new full Political Bureau 
members, was appointed minister of interior in early 1987. He was 
a former Ho Chi Minh City deputy secretary and mayor and was 
believed to have overall responsibility for security in southern Viet- 
nam. Having been a past subordinate of Nguyen Van Linh and 
Vo Van Kiet, Tho was a strong supporter of economic reform and 
increased openness in the party. He was born in 1916 and is a 
brother of Le Due Tho. 

Dao Duy Tung, named as an alternate member of the Political 
Bureau in 1986 and a full member in 1988, was criticized, neverthe- 
less, in the political report of the Sixth National Party Congress 
for his leadership of the Propaganda and Training Department. 
During his tenure, the department was faulted for failing to meet 
the party's goals in carrying out propaganda and training work. 
First appointed deputy chief of the Propaganda and Training 
Department in 1974, he was promoted to chief in 1982. In 1976 
he was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee, and 
he attained full membership in 1982. He was named editor-in-chief 
of Tap Chi Cong San (Communist Review) in 1977 and director of 
the Vietnam News Agency (VNA) in 1982. In 1986 he ranked 
fourth on the Secretariat of the Central Committee. 

Political Bureau Members Voluntarily Retired in 1986 

Truong Chinh retired at age 79 as the incumbent VCP general 
secretary, having held the position for some five months following 
the death of Le Duan. Previously Chinh had ranked second on 
the Political Bureau and was chairman of the Council of State and 
of the National Defense Council, as well as chief of state. He stepped 
down as president in June 1987 and was succeeded by Vo Chi Cong. 
A founding member of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), 
Chinh was viewed by party colleagues as a theoretician and as the 
leader of the party ideologues. He initially opposed economic and 
liberal agricultural reforms and was firm in seeking to maintain 
Vietnam's "special relationship" with Laos and Cambodia. He 
suffered a brief eclipse from 1956 to 1958 for his leading role in 
the failed agrarian reform program in the North, but he retained a 



329 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

strong following among party cadres. A firm believer in such Maoist 
theories as relying on poor and landless peasants to carry out revo- 
lution, he was the leader of a pro-Chinese element in the party 
hierarchy in the early 1970s. But after 1979 Chinh strongly con- 
demned the Chinese, rejected the idea of emphasizing the role of 
the peasantry and ignoring the role of the working class, and sup- 
ported Hanoi's alliance with Moscow as essential. As early as 1985 
he publicly endorsed reform, but by 1986, nevertheless, he appeared 
out of step with the direction the party was beginning to take. He 
died September 30, 1988. 

Pham Van Dong, the only one of the three retirees known to 
be ill when he stepped down, resigned from his number- two Political 
Bureau position, but retained his prime ministership until June 
1987, when he was replaced by Pham Hung. Like Chinh, Dong 
was a founding member of the ICP, but he was a political moder- 
ate and probably the most popular of his generation of leaders. 
He was born in 1906. 

Le Due Tho was ranked fourth on the Political Bureau when 
he retired, but his rank belied his true power. Tho was a protege 
of Le Duan and before Duan's death was arguably the most influ- 
ential Political Bureau member and possibly the party chief's 
preferred successor. As an adviser to the Central Committee after 
his retirement, his influence probably remained considerable. Tho 
was also a founding member of the ICP; he apparently was at Pac 
Bo for the formation of the Viet Minh in 1940 and with Ho Chi 
Minh when the provisional government was established in Hanoi 
in August 1945. Like many of his generation of communists, he 
spent much of his early adulthood in prison. In 1950 Tho was sent 
south by the party, and in 1951 he helped establish the VCP's Cen- 
tral Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), where he assisted Le 
Duan. Later, he played the role of trouble-shooter for Duan, 
representing the party secretary in the South during the final offen- 
sive in 1975, on the Cambodian border when fighting erupted there 
in 1978, and on the Chinese border immediately before and after 
the Chinese invasion in 1979. Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia 
was apparently Tho's responsibility after 1978, and he headed Com- 
mission Sixty-Eight, the VCP special commission handling Cam- 
bodian affairs. In 1982 he emerged as a supporter of economic 
reform. His birth date is variously given as 1911 or 1912. 

Political Bureau Members Removed in 1986 

Van Tien Dung was one of the most prominent casualties of the 
Sixth National Party Congress in 1986. He was minister of national 
defense and ranked sixth on the Political Bureau before being 



330 



Appendix B 



dropped for his or his family's involvement in corruption scandals. 
He was, nevertheless, permitted to retain his seat on the Central 
Committee. PAVN had earlier given Dung a vote of no-confidence 
when it failed to elect him as one of the seventy-two delegates chosen 
for the Sixth Party Congress. Considered a government lame duck 
following the loss of his Political Bureau seat, he lost his defense 
post to his protege, Le Due Anh, shortiy afterward. Dung had com- 
manded the forces that won Hanoi's final victory over the Saigon 
government in 1975 and is credited with the "blooming lotus" tech- 
nique of warfare, which was used to take Saigon and was used again 
in Cambodia four years later. The technique calls for troops first 
to assault the heart of a city in order to seize the enemy command 
center and then to proceed to occupy suburban areas at leisure. 
He was a formidable conservative, vocal in stressing the need for 
a strong defense, and an adamant supporter of the continued Viet- 
namese occupation of Cambodia. He was born in 1917. 

To Hull, fired as vice chairman of the Council of Ministers in 
June 1986, was reported to be responsible for a currency change 
in September 1985 that led to disastrous inflation. He had ranked 
ninth on the Political Bureau before his removal and had held more 
truly significant party and government positions than virtually any 
other senior Political Bureau member. As a protege of Truong 
Chinh, Huu was a leader among the ideologues and an opponent 
of economic reforms. He had been in charge of party propaganda 
when tapped to be vice premier and, in the early 1980s, was a lead- 
ing candidate to succeed Premier Pham Van Dong. Huu was born 
in 1920. 

Chu Huy Man ranked eighth when removed from the Political 
Bureau and the Central Committee. Prior to the Sixth National 
Party Congress, he had headed the army's political department 
and reportedly was severely criticized by PAVN for his autocratic 
leadership style. Like Van Tien Dung, he was not initially elected 
to represent PAVN at the Sixth Party Congress. Man was a protege 
of former Minister of National Defense Vo Nguyen Giap and one 
of the most important battlefield commanders during the Second 
Indochina War, most notably in the Central Highlands. He was 
born in 1920. 

Political Bureau Members Deceased in 1986 

Le Duan, until his death in July 1986, was VCP general secre- 
tary; he had been elevated to the post following the 1969 death 
of Ho Chi Minh, who had groomed Duan as his successor begin- 
ning in the late 1950s. Under Duan's leadership, the war in 
the South was successfully concluded, the country was reunified, 



331 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Cambodia was invaded and occupied, relations with China were 
severed, and dependence upon the Soviet Union for economic and 
military aid increased dramatically. After initially supporting overly 
ambitious policies that worsened Vietnam's economic condition, 
he encouraged gradual political change coupled with moderate eco- 
nomic reforms. These included financial incentives for peasants 
and workers, some decentralization in planning, and a broaden- 
ing of economic relations with the rest of the world. Le Due Tho, 
Nguyen Van Linh, Pham Hung, and Vo Van Kiet were close col- 
leagues. During his career, Duan was considered to be colorless, 
more an organizer than a diplomat. He never held a government 
position. In the spring of 1985, a year before his death, he was 
described in a series of articles in the party newspaper, Nhan Dan 
(People's Daily), as the architect of the 1975 victory in the South 
and as the dominant figure in Vietnamese communist history next 
to Ho Chi Minh. He was born in 1908. 

Central Committee Secretariat Members in 1986 

Membership on the Secretariat of the Central Committee stood 
at thirteen in 1986. The four highest ranking members — Nguyen 
Van Linh, Nguyen Due Tarn, Tran Xuan Bach, and Dao Duy 
Tung — held concurrent positions on the Political Bureau and are 
described above. The remaining nine are listed below in order of 
decreasing political importance. 

Tran Kien, also known as Nguyen Tuan Tai, was formerly secre- 
tary of party chapters in Haiphong, Gia Lai Kon Turn, Dac Lac 
Province, and Nghia Binh Province. He was first appointed secre- 
tary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and chairman of 
the Central Control Commission in 1982 and reappointed in 1986. 
He was minister of forestry from 1979 to 1981. 

Le Phuoc Tho was elected an alternate member of the Central 
Committee in 1976 and a full member in 1982. He was appointed 
a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in 1986. 
At the Fifth National Party Congress in 1982, he was selected to 
address the congress on the subject of agriculture, and in 1987, 
he was listed in Soviet sources as head of the party's agriculture 
department. 

Nguyen Quyet, a lieutenant general in PAVN in 1986, was 
appointed to full membership on the Central Committee at the 
Fourth National Party Congress in 1976 and reappointed in 1982 
and 1986. In December 1986, at the Sixth National Party Con- 
gress, he was appointed to the Secretariat of the Central Commit- 
tee. Previously he had been commander of the Capital Military 
Region, Hanoi, and commander of Military Region III. In 1986 



332 



Appendix B 



he was a member of the Central Military Party Committee and 
deputy head of the General Political Department. He replaced Chu 
Huy Man as director of the General Political Department in Febru- 
ary 1987. 

Dam Quang Trung, an ethnic Tay, was a major general and 
commander of Military Region I (the Sino-Vietnamese border 
region) at the time of the Chinese invasion in 1979. He was pro- 
moted to lieutenant general in 1981 . In 1976 he was elected to the 
Central Committee, and in 1982, while still commander of Mili- 
tary Region I, became a member of the Central Military Party 
Committee. He was a member of the National Assembly from 1976 
to 1981 and in 1981 was appointed to the Council of State. 

Vu Oanh was elected an alternate to the Central Committee at 
the Fourth National Party Congress in 1976. He was elevated to 
full membership in 1982 and assumed the directorship of the VCP's 
Agriculture Department, a position he continued to hold until 1987. 
He was elected to the Secretariat at the Sixth National Party Con- 
gress in December 1986. 

Nguyen Khanh, elected as an alternate to the Central Commit- 
tee in 1982, gained full membership and a seat on the Secretariat 
in 1986. Appointed chief of the Central Committee cabinet (replac- 
ing Tran Xuan Bach) and director of the General Affairs and 
Administration departments of the Central Committee in 1982, 
he assumed similar duties in the government when appointed gen- 
eral secretary and a vice chairman of the Council of Ministers in 
February 1987. 

Tran Quyet, when appointed to the Secretariat at the Sixth 
National Party Congress in December 1986, had been a full member 
of the Central Committee since 1976. As a vice minister of Public 
Security from the mid-1960s and vice minister of Interior from 1975, 
he specialized in security matters. A northerner, he was sent to 
Ho Chi Minh City in 1976 to establish the Ministry of Interior's 
Permanent Office for South Vietnam as a measure to more firmly 
impose North Vietnamese control. Between 1975 and 1980, he was 
commander and political officer of the Ministry of Interior's Peo- 
ple's Public Security Force and held the rank of lieutenant general. 

Tran QllOC Huong, also known as Tran Nach Ban and Muoi 
Huong, was elected to full membership on the Central Commit- 
tee in 1982, under the name Tran Nach Ban. A southerner, he 
was formerly a standing member of the Ho Chi Minh City Party 
Committee and head of its Organization Department. In 1983, 
under the name Tran Quoc Huong, he was appointed deputy secre- 
tary of the Hanoi Party Committee, and in 1986 was named 
to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the VCP. His 



333 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

government positions have included vice chairmanship of the State 
Inspection Commission, to which he was appointed in 1985, and 
chairmanship of the Vietnam Tourism General Department, which 
he assumed in 1986. 

Pham The Duyet, previously a coal mine director in Quang Ninh 
Province and vice chairman and general secretary of the Vietnamese 
Confederation of Trade Unions, was elected a Central Commit- 
tee alternate member at the Fifth National Party Congress in 1982. 
At the time of his election to full Central Committee membership 
at the Sixth National Party Congress in 1986 and his succeeding 
appointment to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, he was 
also acting chairman of the Confederation. In 1987 he was promoted 
to chairman. 



334 



Bibliography 



Chapter 1 

Bowman, John S. (ed.). The Vietnam War: An Almanac. New York: 

World Almanac Publications, 1985. 
Burchett, Wilfred. Catapult to Freedom. London: Quartet Books, 

1978. 

Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: 
Praeger, 1967. 

Vietnam: A Political History. New York: Praeger, 1968. 

Vietnam: The Unforgettable Tragedy. New York: Horizon 

Press, 1977. 

Cady, John Frank. The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia. 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1954. 

Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. Boul- 
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981. 

. The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900-1941. Ithaca, New 

York: Cornell University Press, 1976. 

Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analy- 
sis. New York: Praeger, 1967. 

Fall, Bernard B. (ed.). Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings, 
1920-66. New York: Praeger, 1967. 

Gruening, Ernest, and Herbert Wilton Beaser. Vietnam Folly. 
Washington: National Press, 1968. 

Gurtov, Melvin. The First Vietnam Crisis. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1967. 

Halberstam, David. The Making of a Quagmire. New York: Ran- 
dom House, 1964. 

Hall, David George Edward. A History of South- East Asia. New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1968. 

Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina, 1940-1955. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1965. 

Hejzlar,J. The Art of Vietnam. London: Hamlyn Publishing, 1973. 

Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Viet- 
namese Central Highlands , 1954-1976. New Haven: Yale Univer- 
sity Press, 1982. 

Hodgkin, Thomas Lionel. Vietnam: The Revolutionary Path. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 

Huynh Kim Khanh. Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945. Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1982. 

Kahin, George McTurnan. Intervention. New York: Knopf, 1986. 

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983. 



335 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Knoebl, Kuno. Victor Charlie: The Face of War in Viet-Nam. New 
York: Praeger, 1967. 

Komer, Robert W. Bureaucracy at War. Boulder, Colorado: West- 
view Press, 1986. 

Lacouture, Jean. Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography. New York: 
Random House, 1968. 

Lawson, Eugene K. The Sino- Vietnamese Conflict. New York: Prae- 
ger, 1984. 

McAleavy, Henry. Black Flags in Vietnam. London: George Allen 

and Unwin, 1956. 
McAlister, John T. Viet-Nam: The Origins of Revolution. New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. 
Marr, David G. Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925. Berkeley: 

University of California Press, 1971. 
Neher, Clark D. "The Bronze Drum Tradition," Asian Studies 

Professional Review, 14, Nos. 1 and 2, 1974-75, 186. 
Pike, Douglas. A History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1976. Stan- 
ford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. 
Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National 

Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966. 
War, Peace, and the Viet Cong. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 

1969. 

Porter, Gareth (ed.). Vietnam. A History in Documents. New York: 

New American Library, 1981. 
Shaplen, Robert. The Lost Revolution. New York: Harper and Row, 

1955. 

Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie. New York: Random House, 
1988. 

Smith, Ralph B. An International History of the Vietnam War. 2 vols. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 

. Viet-Nam and the West. Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univer- 
sity Press, 1968. 

Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960. 
Washington: United States Army Center of Military History, 
1983. 

Taylor, Keith Weller. The Birth of Vietnam. Berkeley: University 

of California Press, 1983. 
Thayer, Thomas C. War Without Fronts: The American Experience in 

Vietnam. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985. 
Turley, William S. The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and 

Military History, 1954-75. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 

1986. 

United States. Congress. 98th, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on 
Foreign Relations. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: 



336 



Bibliography 



Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships. Washing- 
ton: GPO, 1984. 

Van Dyke, Jon M. North Vietnam's Strategy for Survival. Palo Alto, 
California: Pacific Books, 1972. 

Whitfield, Danny J. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Vietnam. 
Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1976. 

Woodside, Alexander Barton. Community and Revolution in Modern 
Vietnam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976. 

. Vietnam and the Chinese Model. Cambridge: Harvard Univer- 
sity Press, 1971. 

Chapter 2 

American University. Cultural Information Analysis Center. 

Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam. (Ethnographic Study 

Series.) Washington: GPO, 1966. 
Anh Phong. "Catholicism in Vietnam and Catholic Reintegration 

into the National Community," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 66, 

November 1977, 24-30. 
Anh Thu. "Family Planning in Vietnam and Prospects, ' ' Vietnam 

Courier [Hanoi], No. 5, 1985, 26-27. 
Chanda, Nayan. "The New Revolution: The South Leads the Way 

Away from Subsidized Socialism," Far Eastern Economic Review 

[Hong Kong], 132, No. 15, April 10, 1986, 24-28. 
Che Viet Tan. "A Major Question of the Second Five- Year Plan 

(1976-1980): Population Growth, Labor Redeployment, and 

Population Relocation," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 58, March 

1977, 9-11. 

"Climatic Evolution in Vietnam," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 2, 
1979, 25. 

Communist Party of Vietnam. "General Resolution of the Fourth 
National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam," Viet- 
nam Courier [Hanoi], No. 56, January 1977, 5-7. 

Crawford, Ann Caddell. Customs and Culture of Vietnam. Rutland, 
Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle, 1966. 

Crossette, Barbara. "Vietnam Punishing Party Corruption: Un- 
usually Detailed Accounts in Press Tell of Crackdown," New 
York Times, March 27, 1987, Al. 

"Cultural and Social Achievements in Five Years (1976-1980): 
From the Fourth to the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party 
of Vietnam," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 3, 1982, 5-6. 

Dang Nghiem Van. "Sketch of the Ethnic Composition of Reuni- 
fied Vietnam," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 58, March 1977, 
28-29. 



337 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Dao Hung. "Ethnographical Notes: The Tay and the Nung," Viet- 
nam Courier [Hanoi], No. 3, 1985, 29-31. 

DeFrancis, John Frances. Colonialism and Language Policy in Viet- 
nam. The Hague: Mouton, 1977. 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975. 

Desbarats, Jacqueline, and Karl D.Jackson. "Vietnam 1975-1982: 
The Cruel Peace," Washington Quarterly, 8, No. 4, Fall 1985, 
169-82. 

"The DRVN Advances: Transfer of Population to New Economic 
Areas," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 27, August 1974, 14-15. 

Due Uy, and Vu Van Thao. "New Features of Family Structure 
in Vietnam's Rural Areas," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 8, 1980, 
12-13. 

Duiker, William J. "The Legacy of History in Vietnam," Current 
History, 83, No. 497, December 1984, 409-12. 

, . "Vietnam Moves Toward Pragmatism," Current History, 

86, No. 519, April 1987, 148-51. 

. Vietnam: Nation in Revolution. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 

Press, 1983. 

Elliott, David W. P., et al. Vietnam: Essays on History, Culture, and 
Society. New York: Asia Society, 1985. 

The Europa Year Book, 1986: A World Survey. London: Europa Pub- 
lications, 1986. 

"The Fifth National Congress of the Communist Party of Viet- 
nam: Socio-Economic Problems as seen by the Congress," Viet- 
nam Courier [Hanoi], 2, No. 5, 1982, 6-10. 

Fisher, Charles A. South- East Asia: A Social, Economic, and Political 
Geography. London: Methuen, 1964. 

Foreign Broadcast Information Service — FBIS (Washington). The 
following articles are from the FBIS Daily Report series: 
Asia and Pacific 

"AFP Cites 'Observers' on Economic Difficulties." Agence 
France Presse (AFP) [Hong Kong], broadcast in English 0154 
GMT, September 15, 1986. (FBIS-APA-86-178.) Septem- 
ber 15, 1986, K6-K8. 

"All the People Participate in Building the Draft Marriage and 
Family Law," Nhan Dan [Hanoi], July 30, 1986. (FBIS- 
APA-86-153.) August 8, 1986, K1-K2. 

"Renovation and Progress," Nhan Dan [Hanoi], January 1, 
1987. (FBIS-APA-87-009.) January 14, 1987, K2-K5. 

"The Outcome of the Sixth CPV Congress, Nhan Dan [Hanoi], 
December 24, 1986. (FBIS-APA-87-005.) January 8, 1987, 
K1-K21. 



338 



Bibliography 

Fraser, Stewart E. "The Four R's of Vietnamese Education: Revo- 
lution, Reunification, Reconciliation, and Redevelopment," Phi 
Delta Kappan, 58, June 1977, 730-34. 

. ' 'Vietnam Struggles with Exploding Population, ' ' Indochina 

Issues, No. 57, May 1985, 1-7. 

"From the Paris Agreement to Vietnam's Major Internal and Ex- 
ternal Problems," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 6, 1985, 7-15. 

"General Education in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Inter- 
view with Education Minister Nguyen Thi Binh," Vietnam Cou- 
rier [Hanoi], No. 10, 1984, 16-18. 

"A Glimpse at Modern Medicine in Vietnam, 1945-1980," Viet- 
nam Courier [Hanoi], 16, No. 9, 1980, 16-17. 

Hawthorne, Lesleyanne. Refugee: The Vietnamese Experience. Mel- 
bourne: Oxford University Press, 1982. 

Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Viet- 
namese Central Highlands, 1954-1976. New Haven: Yale Univer- 
sity Press, 1982. 

Sons of the Mountains: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central 

Highlands to 1954. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982. 

. Village in Vietnam. New Haven: Yale University Press, 

1964. 

"Ho Chi Minh City: A Turning Point (An Interview with 
Dr. Nguyen Khac Vien)," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 4, 1981, 
10-13. 

"Ho Chi Minh City Ten Years after Liberation," Vietnam Courier 

[Hanoi], No. 6, 1985, 18-19. 
Hoang Bao Chau. "Vietnamese Traditional Medicine," Vietnam 

[Hanoi], No. 309, September 1984, 19. 
Hoang Mai. "Family Planning in Vietnam," Vietnam Courier 

[Hanoi], No. 7, 1981, 20-22. 
Hoang Van Chi. From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of 

North Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1964. 
Houtart, Francois, and Genevieve Lemercinier. Hai Van: Life in 

a Vietnamese Commune. London: Zed Books, 1984. 
Hung, G. Nguyen Tien. Economic Development of Socialist Vietnam, 

1955-80. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics 

and Development.) New York: Praeger, 1977. 
"Implementation of the 1984 State Plan and Socio-Economic Tasks 

for 1985," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 2, 1985, 6-8. 
"An Important Question for the Advancement of Women in Viet- 
nam," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 4, 1983, 18-19. 
Jackson, Graeme. "An Assessment of Church Life in Vietnam," 

Religion in Communist Lands, 10, Spring 1982, 54-68. 



339 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Jenkins, David. "A Country Adrift," Far Eastern Economic Review 

[Hong Kong], 126, No. 45, November 8, 1984, 25-32. 
Joint Publications Research Service. Southeast Asia Report: Vietnam 

Fact Book. (JPRS-SEA-85-121 .) Washington, August 1985. 
Kaylov, Robert. "Vietnam Firmly on Course but Losing the 

Peace," U.S. News and World Report, 100, No. 25, June 30, 1986, 

30-31. 

Khong, Dien. "Population Distribution in Urban and Rural Areas 
of Vietnam," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 10, 1983, 27. 

Kunstadter, Peter (ed.). Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Na- 
tions. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967. 

Le Dan. "Vietnam's Ethnic Minorities — Pawns in Beijing's 
Game?" Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 3, 1982, 14-17. 

Le Duan. "The New Woman in the Socialist Society," Vietnam 
Courier [Hanoi], No. 24, May 1974, 8-9. 

. "The Present Tasks of the Vietnamese Youth," Vietnam 

Courier [Hanoi], No. 12, 1980, 3-6. 

Le Hong Tarn. "Vietnam's Revolution, Hard Work, Not Mira- 
cles," Southeast Asia Chronicle, No. 76, December 1980, 22-25. 

Le Van Hao. "Hue, A Center of Culture and Tourism," Vietnam 
Courier [Hanoi], No. 2, 1981, 20-21. 

Le Van Khue. "The Hoa People in Southeast Asia," Vietnam Courier 
[Hanoi], No. 5, 1981, 3-5. 

Long, Robert Emmet (ed.). Vietnam Ten Years After. New York: 
H.W. Wilson, 1986. 

Mai Quang. "A Glance at Some Major Ethnic Groups in Viet- 
nam," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 59, April 1977, 25-29. 

Mai Thi Tu. "Educational Problems: Professional Orientation for 
General School Students," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 2, 1982, 
22-24. 

. "Vietnamese Women in the 80's," Vietnam Courier 

[Hanoi], No. 10, 1981, 19-23. 

McAlister, John T., Jr., and Paul Mus. The Vietnamese and Their 
Revolution. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. 

McWilliams, Edmund. "Vietnam in 1982: Onward into the Quag- 
mire," Asian Survey, 23, No. 1, January 1983, 62-72. 

Marr, David G. Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1981. 

Mole, Robert L. The Montagnards of South Vietnam: A Study of Nine 
Tribes. Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle, 1970. 

"Nationalities in Vietnam and the Nationality Policy of the Com- 
munist Party of Vietnam," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 11, 
1984, 30-31. 



340 



Bibliography 



Netter, Thomas W. "Vietnam's Deforestation Brings New Alarm," 
New York Times, May 21, 1983, 63. 

Nghiem Chuong Chau. "Thirty-five Years of Educational Develop- 
ment," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 10, 1980, 13-15. 

Ngo Nhat Quang. "From One Region to Another: Haiphong 
City," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 5, 1985, 20-21. 

Nguyen Cong Thang and Nguyen Thi Xiem. "Population Growth 
and Family Planning," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 10, 1983, 
22-24. 

Nguyen Duy Hinh and Tran Dinh Tho. The South Vietnamese Society. 
Washington: United States Army Center of Military History, 
1981. 

Nguyen Huu Chung. "Catholicism and the Revolution," Vietnam 

Courier [Hanoi], No. 8, 1980, 14-16. 
Nguyen Huu Thuy. Chinese Aggression: Why and How It Failed. 

Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1979. 
Nguyen Khac Kham. An Introduction to Vietnamese Culture. (East Asian 

Cultural Studies Series, No. 10.) Tokyo: The Center for East 

Asian Cultural Studies, 1967. 
Nguyen Khac Thuat. "Health for All by the Year 2000: Caring 

for Patients at Their Homes," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 12, 

1983, 22-25. 

Nguyen Khac Vien. "Meo Country," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], 

No. 66, November 1977, 14-16. 
. Tradition and Revolutions in Vietnam. Berkeley, California: 

Indochina Resource Center, 1974. 
"Writing About Vietnam," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], 

No. 57, August 1976, 8-9, 28-29. 
Nguyen Khac Vien (ed.). Donnees Ethnographiques. (Etudes Viet- 

namiennes, No. 36), Hanoi: Xunhasaba, 1973. 
Nguyen Long. After Saigon Fell: Daily Life under the Vietnamese Com- 
munists. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of 

California, 1981. 
Nguyen Thi My Huong, Patricia (ed.). Language in Vietnamese Society: 

Some Articles by Nguyen Dinh Hoa. Carbondale, Illinois: Asia Books, 

1980. 

Nguyen Thi Xiem. "Family Planning in Vietnam: Fifteen Years' 
Birth Control by Contraception," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], 
No. 71, April 1978, 19-20. 

Nguyen Van Canh (with Earle Cooper). Vietnam Under Communism, 
1975-1982. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1983. 

Nguyen Van Chien. "Compiling the National Atlas," Vietnam Cou- 
rier [Hanoi], No. 12, 1983, 19-21. 



341 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Nguyen Van Huong. "Women's Rights in the Democratic Repub- 
lic of Vietnam," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 35, April 1975, 
8-12. 

Nong Quoc Chan. "Cultural Work among Ethnic Minorities in 
Southern Vietnam: Problems and Tasks," Vietnam Courier 
[Hanoi], No. 53, October 1976, 23-24. 

Ognetov, S. Divilkovsky I. The Road to Victory: The Struggle for Na- 
tional Independence, Unity, Peace and Socialism in Vietnam. Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1980. 

Oliver, Victor L. Cao Dai Spiritism: A Study of Religion in Vietnamese 
Society. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976. 

Pfeiffer, Egbert W. "The Conservation of Nature in Vietnam," 
Environmental Conservation [Geneva], 11, No. 3, Autumn 1984, 
217-21. 

Phan Quang. "The MeKong Delta," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], 
No. 8, 1983, 23-26. 

. ' 'The MeKong River Delta: The MeKong River in Nam 

Bo," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 7, 1983, 14-17. 

Pham Van Dong. "Two Objectives: Building the Material and 
Technical Foundations of Socialism and Improving the Living 
Conditions of the Working People Step by Step," Vietnam Cou- 
rier [Hanoi], No. 53, October 1976, 2-4. 

Pham Van Hoan. "On Educational Reform: The New Educational 
System," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 11, 1979, 10. 

Pike, Douglas (ed.). Indochina Chronology, 5, No. 3, July-September 
1986, 3-28. 

Provencher, Ronald. Mainland Southeast Asia: An Anthropological Per- 
spective. Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear, 1975. 

Quinn-Judge, Paul. "Hanoi's Bitter Victory," Far Eastern Economic 
Review [Hong Kong], 128, No. 17, May 2, 1985, 30-34. 

. "Vietnam: Acceptable Face of Capitalism," Far Eastern 

Economic Review [Hong Kong], 130, No. 44, November 7, 1985, 
32-33. 

Quinn-Judge, Sophie. "Tailoring Education to Meet Vietnam's 
Needs," Indochina Issues, No. 61, October 1985, 1-7. 

Rambo, A. Terry. A Comparison of Peasant Social Systems of Northern 
and Southern Vietnam: A Study of Ecological Adaptation, Social Succes- 
sion, and Cultural Evolution. (Monograph Series III.) Carbondale, 
Illinois: Center for Vietnamese Studies, Southern Illinois Univer- 
sity at Carbondale, 1973. 

Ramsay, Ansil. "Thailand: Surviving the 1980s," Current History, 
86, No. 519, April 1987, 164-167. 

"Recent Ethnological Works in North Vietnam," Vietnam Courier 
[Hanoi], No. 18, November 1973, 22. 



342 



Bibliography 



"Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Viet- 
nam on Educational Reform," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 10, 
1979, 6-7. 

Richards, Paul W. "The Forests of South Vietnam in 1971-72: 
A Personal Account," Environmental Conservation [Geneva], 11, 
No. 2, Summer 1984, 147-53. 

Rosner, Sara. "Vietnam's Revolution, Hard Work, Not Mira- 
cles: Those Who Have Stayed," Southeast Asia Chronicle, 76, De- 
cember 1980, 26-28. 

"Rural Medicine and Preventive Medicine in the DRVN," Viet- 
nam Courier [Hanoi], No. 5, October 1972, 24-25. 

Sagan, Ginetta, and Stephen Denney. Violations of Human Rights 
in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, April 30, 197 5- April 30, 1983. 
Atherton, California: Aurora Foundation, 1983. 

Schonberg, Andre. Social Structure and Political Order: Traditional and 
Modern Vietnam. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, Magnes 
Press, 1979. 

Schrock, Joann L., et al. Minority Groups in North Vietnam. (DA 
Pamphlet 50-110 Ethnographic Study Series.) Washington: 
GPO, 1972. 

Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Vietnam Social Sciences [Hanoi], March 
and April 1986, 172-76. 

"Some Data on Economic and Cultural Achievements in the 
DRVN, 1945-1975," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 40, Septem- 
ber 1975, 16-17. 

"Some Data on Marriages in a Highland Area of Vietnam," Viet- 
nam Courier [Hanoi], No. 3, 1980, 8-9. 

"South Vietnam '76," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 48, May 1976, 
3-7. 

Spinks, Charles N., John C. Durr, and Stephen Peters. The North 
Vietnamese Regime: Institutions and Problems. Washington: Center 
for Research in Social Systems, The American University, April 
1969. 

Stern, Lewis M. "The Overseas Chinese in the Socialist Repub- 
lic of Vietnam, 1979-82," Asian Survey, 25, No. 5, May 1985, 
521-36. 

Sully, Francois (ed.). We the Vietnamese: Voices from Vietnam. New 

York: Praeger, 1971. 
Ta Xuan Linh. "Armed Uprisings by Ethnic Minorities along the 

Truong Son," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 28, September 1974, 

15-20. 

Thanh Tung. "A Pharmaceutical Factory," Vietnam Courier 
[Hanoi], No. 12, 1983, 26-27. 



343 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Thuy, Vuong G. Getting to Know the Vietnamese and Their Culture. 

New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing, 1976. 
To Lan. "The Dinh and the Traditional Vietnamese Village," 

Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 17, June 1981, 28-29. 
Tran Dang Van. "Re-deployment of the Labor Force in Vietnam," 

Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 69, February 1978, 10-12. 
Tran Van Ha. "Food and Population by the Year 2000," Vietnam 

Courier [Hanoi], No. 11, 1983, 25-26. 
Truong Chinh. "Strengthening the Proletarian Dictatorship State 

in Order to Build Socialism Successfully," Vietnam Courier 

[Hanoi], No. 58, March 1977, 4-8. 
"Twenty Years of the Law on Marriage and the Family 

(1960-1980): The Application of the Law on Marriage and the 

Family in Vietnam over the Past Twenty Years," Vietnam Cou- 
rier [Hanoi], No. 3, 1980, 8-9. 
Ululff, Erich. "Vietnam's Revolution, Hard Work, Not Miracles: 

Must We Make All the Old Mistakes Again? " Southeast Asia 

Chronicle, No. 76, December 1980, 19-21. 
Whitfield, Danny, J. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Vietnam. 

Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1976. 
Woodside, Alexander Barton, "The Triumphs and Failures of Mass 

Education in Vietnam," Pacific Affairs [Vancouver], 56, No. 3, 

Fall 1983, 401-27. 



Chapter 3 

Bekaert, Jacques. "Eye on Indochina: Scant Progress Achieved 
in Ho Chi Minh City," Bangkok Post, October 17, 1986, 6. 

. "Eye on Indochina: Vietnam 'Serious' about Revitaliz- 
ing Economy," Bangkok Post, November 28, 1986, 4. 

Bogatova, Y., and M. Trigubenko. "The Sixth CPV Congress 
on the Strategy of Vietnam's Socio-Economic Development," 
Far Eastern Affairs [Moscow], March 1987, 1-13. 

"Bottom of Marx's League: Mr. Gorbachev Can't Go On Ignor- 
ing Vietnam's Self-Ruination," The Economist, No. 301, 7470, 
November 1, 1986, 15. 

Chanda, Nayan. "The New Revolution: The South Leads the 
Country away from Subsidized Socialism," Far Eastern Economic 
Review [Hong Kong], 132, No. 15, April 10, 1986, 24-28. 

Conboy, Kenneth. "Hanoi's Newest Friend, Tokyo," Executive 
Memorandum, Heritage Foundation, 160, May 6, 1987. 

Dejevsky, Mary. "Vietnam Radical Reform Encourages Profits in 
Return of Free Enterprise," Times [London], April 18, 1987, 6. 



344 



Bibliography 



Duiker, William J. "Vietnam in 1985: Searching for Solutions," 

Asian Survey, 26, No. 1, January, 1986, 102-11. 
. "Vietnam Moves Toward Pragmatism," Current History, 

86, No. 519, April 1987, 148-51. 
Esterline, John H. "Vietnam in 1986: An Uncertain Tiger," Asian 

Survey, 27, No. 1, January 1987, 92-103. 
"First in, First Served in Vietnam," Asiaweek [Hong Kong], 12, 

No. 48, November 30, 1986, 54-55. 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service — FBIS (Washington). The 

following articles are from the FBIS Daily Report series: 

Asia and Pacific 

Dawson, Alan. "Eye on Indochina: Vietnam's Money Trou- 
bles Pile Up," Bangkok Post [Bangkok], August 4, 1982. 
(FBIS-APA-82-150.) August 4, 1982, J1-J2. 

"Further Reportage on National Assembly Session: Vo Van Kiet 
Report, Installment 1," Hanoi Domestic Service, 1100 GMT, 
December 26, 1986. (FBIS-APA-250.) December 30, 1986, 
K5-K12. 

East Asia 

Bertinetto, Gabriel. "Interview with Communist Party of Viet- 
nam General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh," L'Unita [Milan], 
June 21, 1987, 13. (FBIS-EAS-87-122.) June 25, 1987, 
N2-N8. 

Campion, Gilles. "AFP Gives Details of New Investment Code," 
Agence France Presse (AFP) [Hong Kong] broadcast in En- 
glish 0515 GMT, June 25, 1987. (FBIS-EAS-87-123.) June 
26, 1987, N5-N6. 

"Details of 1986-90 Export Development Plan," Vietnam News 
Agency (VNA) [Hanoi] broadcast in English 1456 GMT, 
November 10, 1987. (FBIS-EAS-87-219.) November 13, 
1987, 48-49. 

"Foreign Currency Transactions," Hanoi International Service 
[Hanoi], broadcast in English, 1000 GMT, June 29, 1987. 
(FBIS-EAS-87-127.) July 2, 1987, N9. 

"Fruit, Vegetable Exports to USSR Increase," Hanoi Domestic 
Service [Hanoi], broadcast in Vietnamese 1000 GMT, Septem- 
ber 10, 1987. (FBIS-EAS-87-180.) September 17, 1987, 40. 

"Further on Eighth National Assembly Session," Hanoi Domes- 
tic Service [Hanoi], broadcast in Vietnamese 1430 GMT, 
June 22, 1987. (FBIS-EAS-87- 120.) June 23, 1987, N2-N12. 

Vo Chi Cong, "Some Basic Issues Concerning the Renovation 
of the Economic Management Mechanism in Our Country," 
NhanDan [Hanoi], September 18, 1987. (FBIS-EAS-87- 190.) 
October 1, 1987, 31-42. 



345 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Foreign Broadcast Information Service — FBIS. Analysis Report- 
Vietnam: Party Plenum Boosts Economic Reform Agenda. (FBIS-87- 
10011.) Washington, May 22, 1987. 

"Hanoi's Saigon Solution," Asiaweek [Hong Kong], 14, No. 6, 
February 5, 1988, 42-43. 

International Monetary Fund. Annual Report on Exchange Arrange- 
ments and Exchange Restrictions, 1987. Washington: 1987. 

. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1981. Washington: 1987. 

Jenkins, David. "A Country Adrift," Far Eastern Economic Review 
[Hong Kong], 126, No. 45, November 8, 1984, 25-27. 

Joint Publications Research Service — JPRS (Washington). The fol- 
lowing articles are from the JPRS series: 
Southeast Asia Report 

"Agricultural Production Statistics Reported as of 5 February," 
Hanoi Domestic Service [Hanoi], broadcast in Vietnamese 
1100 GMT, February 10, 1987. QPRS-SEA-87-034.) 
March 11, 1987, 114-16. 

Dang Van Tiep. "About Export Policy," Nhan Dan [Hanoi], 
January 13, 1987. (JPRS-SEA-87-048.) April 6, 1986, 86-87. 

"The Industrial Sectors in Recent Years: Production Capabili- 
ties Have Increased; Results, Productivity, and Product Qual- 
ity Have Declined," Nhan Dan [Hanoi], December 8, 1986. 
(JPRS-SEA-87-037.) March 16, 1987, 110-12. 

So Lieu Thong Ke, 1930-1984 (Vietnam Statistical Data, 
1930-1984) [Hanoi], 1985. (JPRS-SEA-86- 108.) June 25, 
1986. 

Tong Cue Thong Ke. Thong Ke (Statistics) [Hanoi], No. 3, 
March 1985, 31-33. (JPRS-SEA-85-100.) June 1985, 96-97. 
Kimura, Tetsusaburo. Vietnam: International Relations and Economic 
Development. Tokyo: Tokyo Institute of Developing Economics, 
1987. 

. "Vietnam — Ten Years of Economic Struggle," Asian Sur- 
vey, 26, No. 10, October 1986, 1039-55. 

Kurian, George Thomas. Encyclopedia of the Third World. New York: 
Facts on File, 1986, 1987. 

Luong Dan. "Hanoi in Early 1987: Facts and Reflections," Viet- 
nam Courier [Hanoi], No. 4, April 1987, 16-18. 

Marr, David G. "Central Vietnam Rebuilds: An Eyewitness 
Account," Indochina Issues, No. 59, July 1985. 

Nivolon, Francois. "Interview/Tran Phnong: Rescheduling, 
Rethinking," Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], 130, No. 
50, December 1985, 98-99. 

"Oil for the Lamps of Vietnam," Pacific Defense Reporter, 14, No. 2, 
August 1987, 7. 



346 



Bibliography 

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Ex- 
ternal Debt Statistics: The Debt and Other External Liabilities of De- 
veloping, CMEA, and Certain Other Countries and Territories. Paris: 
1987. 

. Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Coun- 
tries, 1982-1985. Paris: 1987. 

. Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Coun- 
tries, 1986. Paris: 1987. 

Petrov, M. "Vietnam's Cooperation in the Comecon Framework," 
Foreign Economic Affairs [Moscow], 1, 1983, 168-79. 

Pike, Douglas. Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987. 

Quinn-Judge, Paul. "Acceptable Face of Capitalism: Changes to 
Economic System Bewilder Party Faithful," Far Eastern Economic 
Review [Hong Kong], 130, No. 44, November 7, 1985, 32-33. 

. "Hanoi's Bitter Victory," Far Eastern Economic Review 

[Hong Kong], 128, No. 17, May 2, 1985, 30-36. 

. "Policies Weather Criticisms: Major Economic Problems 

Still Dog Vietnam," Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], 
130, No. 50, December 19, 1985, 98-99. 

Richburg, Keith. "A Glimmer of Light in the East," The Guardian 
[Manchester], August 15, 1987, 6. 

"In South of Vietnam, It's Business as Usual," Washington 

Post, July 14, 1987, Al. 

Sherwell, Chris. "Hanoi Takes Steps to Come in from the Cold," 
Financial Times [London], April 12, 1985, 6. 

Statisticheskii ezhegodnik stran-chlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoi Vzaimopomosh- 
chi (Statistical Yearbook of Member Countries of the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance). Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 
1986. 

Stern, Lewis M. "The Overseas Chinese in the Socialist Repub- 
lic of Vietnam, 1979-82," Asian Survey, 25, No. 5, May 1985, 
521-36. 

"The Scramble Toward Revitalization: The Vietnamese 

Communist Party and the Economic Reform Program," Asian 
Survey, 27, No. 4, April 1987, 477-93. 

"The Vietnamese Communist Party During 1984 and 

1985: Economic Crisis Management, Organizational Reform and 
Planning for the Sixth National Party Congress," Asian Profile, 
15, No. 3, June 1987, 267-79. 

Thai QuangTrung. "The Moscow-Hanoi Axis and the Soviet Mili- 
tary Buildup in Southeast Asia," Indochina Report, 8, October 
1986. 



347 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



"Thousand of Citizens Sent to Uncertain East Block Future," In- 
sight, 3, No. 30, July 27, 1987, 30-31. 

Tong Cue Thong Ke. So Lieu Thong Ke, 1930-1984 (Statistical Data, 
1930-1984) [Hanoi], March 1985, 40-82. 

Trigubenko, M. "On the Participation of the Soviet Union's Far 
Eastern Areas in the USSR's Trade and Economic Coopera- 
tion with Vietnam," Far Eastern Affairs [Moscow], 4, 1983, 28-36. 

United Nations. Quarterly Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific. New York: 
June 1984. 

United States: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Mili- 
tary Expenditures and Arms Transfers. Washington: GPO, 1986. 

Central Intelligence Agency. Handbook of Economic Statis- 
tics. Washington: September 1987. 

USSR. Ministry of Foreign Trade. Vneshniaia togovlia SSSR v 1986 
(Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1986). Moscow: Finansy i Statis- 
tika, 1987. 

"Vietnam Stresses Need for Reforming Its Economy," Asian Wall 

Street Journal [Hong Kong], April 20, 1987, 5. 
Vo Nhan Tri. "Vietnam: The Third Five-Year Plan, 1981-1985." 

Indochina Report, 4, October-December 1985. 
Wain, Barry. "Popular Outcry Brings Vietnam Reforms," Asian 

Wall Street Journal [Hong Kong], May 27, 1987, 1. 
"Vietnam Eases Foreign Investment Rules," Asian Wall 

Street Journal [Hong Kong], May 29-30, 1987, 1. 
. "Vietnam Turns to Its Capitalists for Help," Asian Wall 

Street Journal [Hong Kong], May 28, 1987, 1. 
World Bank. World Development Report, 1987. Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 1987. 



Chapter 4 

An Tai Sung. "The All-Vietnam National Assembly: Significant 
Developments," Asian Survey, 17, No. 5, May 1977, 432-39. 

Bekaert, Jacques. "Hanoi Willing to Talk to All," Bangkok Post, 
January 21, 1987, 1. 

"VN Continues to Ignore Voice of World Assembly," 

Bangkok Post, October 23, 1986, 4. 

Bonavia, David. "The Climax of a Bad Dream," Far Eastern Eco- 
nomic Review [Hong Kong], 99, No. 2, January 13, 1978, 13. 

Buszynski, Leszek. "Vietnam's Asian Diplomacy: The Assertion 
of a Fait Accompli," World Today [London], 42, No. 4, April 
1986, 63-66. 



348 



Bibliography 



Carney, Timothy. "Kampuchea in 1982: Political and Military 
Escalation," Asian Survey, 23, No. 1, January 1983, 73-83. 

Chanda, Nayan. "Anatomy of the Conflict," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, [Hong Kong], 99, No. 2, January 13, 1978, 11-16. 

. Brother Enemy: The War after the War. New York: Harcourt 

Brace Jo vanovich, 1986. 

. "Clash of Steel among the Comrades," Far Eastern Eco- 
nomic Review [Hong Kong], 99, No. 2, January 13, 1978, 10-11. 

. "Not Soft on Cambodia," Far Eastern Economic Review 

[Hong Kong], 135, No. 1, January 1, 1987, 11-13. 

. "Vietnam in 1983: Keeping Ideology Alive," Asian Sur- 
vey, 24, No. 1, January 1984, 28-36. 

Chang Pao-min. "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict over Kam- 
puchea," Survey [London], 27, Autumn- Winter 1983, 177-206. 

"China, Vietnam 'Exploit Clashes'," Bangkok Post, October 28, 
1986, 7. 

"Congress Casualties," Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], 
134, No. 52, December 25, 1986, 9. 

Crossette, Barbara. "Many Top Leaders Shifted in Vietnam," 
New York Times, February 18, 1986, A7. 

"Vietnam Punishing Party Corruption: Unusually 

Detailed Accounts in Press Tell of Crackdown," New York Times, 
March 27, 1987, Al. 

Doan Van Toai and David Chanoff. "Learning from Vietnam: 
The Pattern of Liberation Movements," Encounter [London], 59, 
No. 3-4, September-October 1982, 19-26. 

Draguhn, Werner. "The Indochina Conflict and the Positions of 
the Countries Involved," Contemporary Southeast Asia [Singapore], 
9, No. 1, June 1983, 95-116. 

Duiker, William J. The Comintern and Vietnamese Communism. Athens, 
Ohio: Center for Southeast Asia Studies, Ohio University Center 
for International Studies, 1975. 

. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. Boulder, Colo- 
rado: Westview Press, 1981. 

"Ideology and Nation-building in the Democratic Repub- 
lic of Vietnam," Asian Survey, 17, No. 5, May 1977, 413-31. 

"The Legacy of History in Vietnam, ' ' Current History, 83 , 

No. 497, December 1984, 409-12. 

The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900-1941. Ithaca, New 

York: Cornell University Press, 1976. 

. "Vietnam in 1984: Between Ideology and Pragmatism," 

Asian Survey, 25, No. 1, January 1985, 97-105. 

"Vietnam in 1985: Searching for Solutions," Asian Sur- 
vey, 26, No. 1, January 1986, 102-11. 



349 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



. Vietnam: Nation in Revolution. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 

Press, 1983. 

. Vietnam since the Fall of Saigon. Athens, Ohio: Center for 

Southeast Asian Studies, Ohio University Center for Interna- 
tional Studies, 1985. 

Elliott, David, W.P. (ed.). The Third Indochina Conflict. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1981. 

. "Vietnam in Asia: Strategy and Diplomacy in a New Con- 
text," International Journal [Toronto], 38, No. 2, Spring 1983, 
287-315. 

Esterline, John H. "Vietnam in 1986: An Uncertain Tiger," Asian 
Survey, 27, No. 1, January 1987, 92-103. 

Gates, John M. "Vietnam: The Debate Goes On," Parameters: Jour- 
nal of the US Army War College, 14, No. 1, Spring 1984, 15-25. 

Hamilton-Smith, M.L.J. "The Development of Revolutionary 
Warfare Strategy, Vietnam 1946-64, Part I," Army Quarterly and 
Defense Journal [Tavistock, United Kingdom], 113, No. 3, July 
1983, 329-39. 

"Hanoi's Displeasure Stalls MIA Talks," Muslim [Islamabad], 

March 25, 1987, 4. 
Hellmann, John. American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam. New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1986. 
Hiebert, Murray. "A New Gerontocracy," Far Eastern Economic 

Review [Hong Kong], 135, No. 1, January 1, 1987, 10-11. 
. "Vietnam Holds Elections for National Assembly," 

Washington Post, April 20, 1987, A19. 
Hodgkin, Thomas. Vietnam: The Revolutionary Path. New York: St. 

Martin's Press, 1981. 
Horn, Robert C. "Soviet- Vietnamese Relations and the Future 

of Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs [Vancouver], 51, No. 4, Winter 

1978-79, 585-605. 
Kahin, George McTurnan. Intervention: How America Became Involved 

in Vietnam. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986. 
Kendall, Harry H. "Vietnamese Perceptions of the Soviet 

Presence," Asian Survey, 23, No. 9, September 1983, 1052-61. 
Kiernan, Ben. "Vietnam's New Broom Targets Economic Errors," 

Guardian [Manchester], February 13, 1987, 10. 
Kim Chin. "Recent Developments in the Constitutions of Asian 

Marxist-Socialist States," Case Western Reserve Journal of Interna- 
tional Law, 13, No. 3, Summer 1981, 483-500. 
Kulkarni, V.G. "Under the Counter Trade," Far Eastern Economic 

Review [Hong Kong], 124, No. 14, April 5, 1984, 54-56. 
Lawson, Eugene K. The Sino- Vietnamese Conflict. New York: Prae- 

ger, 1984. 



350 



Bibliography 



Leifer, Michael. "The Balance of Advantage in Indochina," World 
Today [London], 38, No. 6, June 1982, 232-38. 

Leighton, Marian Kirsch. "Perspectives on the Vietnam-Cambodia 
Border Conflict," Asian Survey, 18, No. 5, May 1978, 448-57. 

. "Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Rivalry," Asian Affairs 6, 

No. 1, September-October 1978, 1-31. 

Lewy, Guenter. "Some Political-Military Lessons of the Vietnam 
War," Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, 14, No. 1, 
Spring 1984, 2-14. 

Loescher, G.D. "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in Recent Histor- 
ical Perspective," Survey [London], 24, Spring 1979, 129-41. 

"Long-Term Program for Vietnamese-Soviet Economic Cooper- 
ation," Vietnam Courier [Hanoi], No. 12, December 1983, 4-7. 

"The Longest War," Asiaweek [Hong Kong], 11, No. 18, May 3, 
1985, 12-42. 

McWilliams, Edmund. "Vietnam in 1982: Onward into the Quag- 
mire," Asian Survey, 23, No. 1, January 1983, 62-72. 

Marr, David G. Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1981. 

Moise, Edwin E. "Land Reform and Land Reform Errors in North 
Vietnam," Pacific Affairs [Vancouver], 49, No. 1, Spring 1976, 
70-92. 

Myers, Michael J. "How Vietnam Negotiates: A Personal 
Glimpse," Asia Record, 2, No. 9, December 1981, 26. 

Nguyen Van Canh (with Earle Cooper). Vietnam under Communism, 
1975-1982. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1983. 

Pike, Douglas. PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam. Novato, Califor- 
nia: Presidio Press, 1986. 

"The USSR and Vietnam: Into the Swamp," Asian Sur- 
vey, 19, No. 12, December 1979, 1159-70. 

Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance. Boul- 
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987. 

"Vietnam During 1976: Economics in Command," Asian 

Survey, 17, No. 1, January 1977, 34-42. 

Porter, Gareth. "Hanoi's Strategic Perspective and the Sino- 
Vietnamese Conflict," Pacific Affairs [Vanouver], 57, No. 1, 
Spring 1984, 7-25. 

"The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in Southeast Asia," Cur- 
rent History, 75, No. 442, December 1978, 193-96. 

Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Hunan Decisions. 

Stanfordville, New York: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, 1979. 

Rees, David. The New Vietnam: Hanoi's Revolutionary Strategy. Lon- 
don: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1977. 



351 



Vietnam: A Country Study 

Rees, Jacqueline. ''Partners on the Quiet," Far Eastern Economic 
Review [Hong Kong], 124, No. 14, April 5, 1984, 56-57. 

Richburg, Keith B. "Cambodians Fight Poverty Through Free 
Enterprise," Washington Post, April 9, 1987, Al. 

. "Vietnam Reshuffles Government; Changes Likely to 

Spur Reform," Washington Post, February 18, 1987, A12. 

Rosenberger, Leif. "The Soviet- Vietnamese Alliance and Kam- 
puchea," Survey [London], 27, Autumn- Winter 1983, 207-31. 

Schonberg, Andre. Social Structure and Political Order: Traditional and 
Modern Vietnam. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, Magnes 
Press, 1979. 

Shaplen, Robert. "A Reporter at Large: Return to Vietnam," 

Pt. 1, New Yorker, April 22, 1985, 104-25. 
. "A Reporter at Large: Return to Vietnam," Pt. 2, New 

Yorker, April 29, 1985, 92-108. 
Simons, William B., and Stephen White (eds.). The Party Statutes 

of the Communist World. The Hague: Martinns Nijhoff, 1984. 
Smith, Ralph B. "Vietnam's Fourth Party Congress," World Today 

[London], 33, No. 5, May 1977, 195-202. 
Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years of the United 

States Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960, New York: Collier Macmillan, 

1985. 

Stern, Lewis M. "The Overseas Chinese in the Socialist Repub- 
lic of Vietnam, 1979-82," Asian Survey, 25, No. 5, May 1985, 
521-36. 

Szulc, Tad. "The War We Left Behind," New York, 11, No. 3, 

January 16, 1978, 30. 
Thai Quang Trung. Collective Leadership and Factionalism: An Essay 

on Ho Chi Minh's Legacy. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 

Studies, 1985. 

. "The Fifth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist 

Party," Contemporary Southeast Asia [Singapore], 4, No. 2, Sep- 
tember 1982, 236-45. 

Thayer, Carlyle A. "Development Strategies in Vietnam: The 
Fourth National Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party," 
Asian Profile, 7, No. 3, June 1979, 275-86. 

. "Vietnam: Beleaguered Outpost of Socialism," Current 

History, 79, No. 461, December 1980, 165-69. 

"Dilemmas of Development in Vietnam, ' ' Current History, 

75, No. 442, December 1978, 221-25. 

. "Vietnam's New Pragmatism," Current History, 82, 

No. 492, April 1983, 158-61. 

Thayer, Carlyle A., and David G. Marr. Vietnam since 1975 — Two 
Views from Australia. Nathan, Australia: Centre for the Study of 
Australian-Asian Relations, Griffith University, 1982. 



352 



Bibliography 



Tong Cue Thong Ke, So Lieu Thong Ke, 1930-1984 (Statistical Data, 
1930-1984) [Hanoi], 1985. Joint Publications Research Service, 
Southeast Asia Report. QPRS-SEA-86-108.) June 25, 1986. 

"Top Posts Shuffled in Hanoi," Times [London], February 18, 
1987, 7. 

Truong Nhu Tang (with David Chanoff and Doan Van Toai). A 
Vietcong Memoir . New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985. 

Turley, William S. "Hanoi's Domestic Dilemmas," Problems of 
Communism, 29, No. 4, July- August 1980, 42-61. 

. The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military His- 
tory, 1954-1975. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986. 

. "Urban Transformation in South Vietnam," Pacific Af- 
fairs, 49, No. 4, Winter 1976-77, 607-24. 

. "Vietnam since Reunification," Problems of Communism, 

26, No. 2, March-April 1977, 36-54. 

Turley, William S. (ed.). Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Per- 
spective. (Special Studies on South and Southeast Asia.) Boul- 
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980. 

Turner, Robert F. Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Develop- 
ment. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1975. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelli- 
gence. Directory of Officials of Vietnam. (CR85- 12955.) Washing- 
ton: July 1985. 

Van Der Kroef, Justus M. "Hanoi and ASEAN: A New Con- 
frontation in Southeast Asia?" Asia Quarterly [Brussels], No. 4, 
1976, 245-69. 

"Vietnam's Aging Leaders Step Down," Bangkok Post, Decem- 
ber 18, 1986, 1. 

"Vietnam's Economic Growth and Debt Problem," Indonesian 
Observer [Jakarta], September 4, 1984, 7. 

Watts, David. "Three Top Communist Party Leaders Quit Viet- 
namese Hierarchy," Times [London], December 18, 1986, 12. 

. "Vietnam Leader Admits Mistakes," Times [London], 

December 16, 1986, 10. 

. "Vietnam Party Picks Reformer in a Rout for the Old 

Guard," Times [London], December 19, 1986, 12. 

Werner, J ayne. "Socialist Development: The Political Economy 
of Agrarian Reform in Vietnam," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scho- 
lars, 16, No. 24, April-June 1984, 48-55. 

"What Future?" Asiaweek [Hong Kong], 12, No. 14, April 6, 1986, 
31-38. 

Whebell, C.F.J. "Empire on the Mekong: Does Vietnam Have 
Further Territorial Ambitions," Canadian Defence [Toronto], 14, 
No. 4, Spring 1985, 39-42. 



353 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Woodside, Alexander Barton. Community and Revolution in Modern 

Vietnam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976. 
"Problems of Education in the Chinese and Vietnamese 

Revolutions," Pacific Affairs [Vancouver], 49, No. 44, Winter 

1976-77, 648-66. 
Young, Stephen B. "Good Government in Hanoi: The Dubious 

Harvest of Uncle Ho," The American Spectator, 15, No. 4, April 

1982, 20-24. 

. "Unpopular Socialism in United Vietnam," Orbis, 21, 

No. 1, Summer 1977, 227-34. 
"Vietnamese Marxism: Transition in Elite Ideology," 

Asian Survey, 19, No. 8, August 1979, 770-79. 



Chapter 5 

Aurora Foundation. Re-education Camps and Prisons in the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam. Atherton, California: March 1985. 

Bardain, Ernest F., et al. Profile of North Vietnam Prisoners of War. 
4 vols. Washington: Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1971. 

Beck, Carl, and Karen Eide Rawling. "The Military as a Chan- 
nel of Entry into Positions of Political Leadership in Communist 
Party States," Armed Forces and Society, 3, No. 2, Winter 1977, 
199-218. 

Bernstein, Alvin H. "The Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay," National 
Interest, No. 3, Spring 1986, 17-29. 

Boudarel, George (ed.). Banner of People's War: The Party's Military 
Line. Praeger: New York, 1970. 

Bowman, John S. (ed.). The Vietnam War: An Almanac. New York: 
World Almanac Publications, 1985. 

Butterfield, Fox. "Veterans Issue Troubling Hanoi," New York 
Times, October 28, 1971, 7. 

"Who Was This Enemy?" New York Times Magazine, 

February 4, 1973, 8-9. 

Chanoff, David, and Doan Van Toai. Portrait of the Enemy. New 
York: Random House, 1986. 

Vietnamese Gulag. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. 

Conley, Michael Charles. The Communist Infrastructure in South Viet- 
nam: A Study of Organization and Strategy. 2 vols. Washington: 
Center for Social Systems, American University, 1967. 

Dang Vu Hiep. "Basic Problems in the New Mechanism of Party 
Leadership over the Army and National Defense," Nhan Dan 
[Hanoi], April 23, 1984. Foreign Broadcast Information Ser- 
vice, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific. (FBIS-APA-84- 108.) June 4, 
1984, K8-K15. 



354 



Bibliography 



Desbarats, Jacqueline, and Karl D. Jackson. "Political Violence 
in Vietnam: The Dark Side of Liberation," Indochina Report [Sin- 
gapore], No. 6, April-June 1986. 

Duiker, William J. China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict. (Indo- 
china Research Monograph 1, IEAS.) Berkeley: University of 
California, 1986. 

. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. Boulder, Colo- 
rado: Westview Press, 1981. 

. The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900-1941. Ithaca, New 

York: Cornell University Press, 1976. 

Duncanson, Dennis J. Government and Revolution in Vietnam. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1968. 

Dunstan, Simon. Vietnam Tracks: Armor in Battle, 1945-75. Novato, 
California: Presidio Press, 1982. 

Fall, Bernard B. Breaking Our Chains: Documents on the Vietnamese Revo- 
lution of August 1945. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1960. 

The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. New 

York: Praeger, 1967. 

. The Viet Minh Regime. New York: Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions, 1956. 

Garrett, Banning N., and Bonnie S. Glaser. War and Peace: The 
Views from Moscow and Beijing. (Policy Papers in International 
Affairs, No. 20.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 
University of California, 1984. 

Gurtov, Melvin. Viet Cong Cadres and the Cadre System. (Rand 
Memorandum 5414.) Rand: Santa Monica, California, 1967. 

Heinzig, Dieter. Sowjetische Interessen in Indochina (Soviet Interests 
in Indochina). Cologne: Bundesinstitut Fur Ostwissenschaftliche 
und Internationale Studien, 1980. 

Hoang Van Thai. Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare in Vietnam. Hanoi: For- 
eign Languages Publishing House, 1965. 

Horn, Robert C. "Soviet- Vietnamese Relations and the Future 
of Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs [Vancouver], 51, No. 4, Winter 
1978-79, 585-605. 

Huynh Kim Khanh. Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945. Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1982. 

Jacobs, G. "Vietnam's Potential Threat to ASEAN," Asian Defence 
Journal [Kuala Lumpur], May 1982, 16-27. 

Joint Publications Research Service — JPRS (Washington). The fol- 
lowing articles are from the JPRS series: 
Southeast Asia Report 

Haubjld, Erhard. "Their Job is to Shoot, Breed Pigs, and Build 
Power Plants — Vietnam's Armed Forces as the Nation's Big 



355 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Classroom," Frankfurter Allgemeine [Frankfurt], March 1, 1984. 

(JPRS-SEA-84-054.) April 12, 1984, 80-82. 
Khanh Van. "The Han River Literary Society Case," Lao Dong 

[Hanoi], August 22, 1985; August 29, 1985; September 12, 

1985; September 19, 1985. QPRS-SEA-85- 1 91 .) December 

17, 1985, 120-37. 
Le Due Anh. "The Vietnam People's Army and Our Noble 

International Mission in the Friendly Country of Cambodia," 

Tap Chi Quan Doi Man Dan [Hanoi], December 1984. QPRS- 

SEA-85-056.) April 2, 1985, 78-94. 
Le Duy Luong. "Some Legal Terms," Giao Due Ly Luan 

[Hanoi], October 1985. QPRS-SEA-86-084.) May 16, 1986, 

62-69. 

"Military Academies, Military Colleges, and Advanced 
Schools." Nhan Dan [Hanoi], December 17, 1984. (JPRS- 
SEA-85-037.) February 22, 1985, 93-96. 

Pham Hung. "Building People's Armed Forces That Are Worthy 
of Being the Reliable Tool of the Party, the Effective Instrument 
of the Proletarian Dictatorship State, the Beloved Sons and 
Daughters of the People," Tap Chi Cong San [Hanoi], October 

1984. (JPRS-SEA-84-170.) December 11, 1984, 13-26. 
Phan Hien. "Understanding Our State's Criminal Code," Nhan 

Dan [Hanoi], July 2-3, 1985. (JPRS-SEA 85-138.) Septem- 
ber 12, 1985. 

. ' 'The Party's Leadership Is the Decisive Factor in Each 

Victory Won in the Struggle to Maintain National Security 
and Social Order," Tap Chi Cong San [Hanoi], September 

1985. (JPRS-SEA-85-186.) December 5, 1985, 33-44. 
"Rank Changes for Colonels, Naval Officers Cited," Quan 

Doi Nhan Dan [Hanoi], January 14, 1983. (JPRS83068.) 

March 15, 1983, 78. 
"SRV Criminal Code." Nhan Dan [Hanoi], July 12,15-17, 1985. 

(JPRS-SEA-85-135.) September 3, 1985. 
"SRV Criminal Code on Crimes Against State, Economic 

Crime, Articles 74-278," Nhan Dan [Hanoi], November 8, 

1984. Quan Doi Nhan Dan [Hanoi], November 9, 1984. 
QPRS-SEA-84-178.) December 26, 1984, 93-158. 

"SRV Draft Constitution Contents, Terminology Explained." 

(JPRS-75213.) February 27, 1980. 
"Terminology of Criminal Code Explained." (JPRS- 

SEA-86-220.) December 18, 1986. 
Tran Le. "Twenty-Five Years of Activities and Growth of the 

People's Control Sector," Tap Chi Cong San [Hanoi], July 

1985. QPRS-SEA-85-148.) September 27, 1985, 22-30. 



356 



Bibliography 



Tran Van Tra. Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B-2 Theater. Vol. 5: 
Concluding the Thirty Years War. Ho Chi Minh City: Van Nghe 
Publishing House, 1982. (Report No. 1247, JPRS-SEA 
82-783.) 1983. 

Lao Dong Party. Historic Documents of the Lao Dong Party. Hanoi: 

Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1970. 
Lawson, Eugene K. The Sino- Vietnamese Conflict. New York: Prae- 

ger, 1984. 

Le Duan. Hold High the Revolutionary Banner. Hanoi: Foreign Lan- 
guages Publishing House, 1964. 

This Nation and Socialism Are One. Chicago: Vanguard 

Books, 1976. 

. The Vietnamese Revolution. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Pub- 
lishing House, 1970. Reprint. New York: International Pub- 
lishers, 1971. 

Lent, Michael. Decision Making in the DRV. Kensington, Maryland: 
American Institute for Research, July 1973. 

Luxmoore, Jonathan. Vietnam: The Dilemmas of Reconstruction. (Con- 
flict Studies Monograph 147.) London: Institute for the Study 
of Conflict, 1983. 

McBeth, John. "Buildup on the Bay, ' ' Far Eastern Economic Review 
[Hong Kong], 122, No. 52, December 29, 1983, 16. 

. "Vietnam's Reluctant Soldiers," Far Eastern Economic 

Review [Hong Kong], 108, No. 25, June 13, 1980, 43-44. 

McGarvey, Patrick J. Visions of Victory: Selected Vietnamese Communist 
Military Writings, 1964-68, Stanford, California: Hoover Insti- 
tution Press, 1969. 

McLane, Charles B. Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration 
of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1966. 

Nguyen Long (with Harry H. Kendall). After Saigon Fell: Daily Life 
under the Vietnamese Communists. (Research and Policy Studies 4.) 
Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of Califor- 
nia, 1981. 

Nguyen P. Hung. "Communist Offensive Strategy and the Defense 
of South Vietnam," Parameters, 14, No. 4, Winter 1984, 3-19. 

Nguyen Van Canh (with Earle Cooper). Vietnam under Communism, 
1975-82. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1983. 

O'Neil, Robert J. General Giap: Politician and Strategist. New York: 
Praeger, 1969. 

People's Army of Vietnam General Political Directorate. The Party 
Military Committee: Its Organization, Mission, Leadership Principles 
and Governing Regulations, Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1972. 



357 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Pham Huy Le (ed.). Our Military Traditions. (Vietnam Studies 
No. 55.) Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d. 

Pike, Douglas. "Conceptions of Asian Security: Indochina," Asian 
Forum, 8, Autumn 1976, 77-84. 

"Hanoi Looks to the Southwest." Pages 82-92 in Robert 

A. Scalapino and Jusuf Wanadi (eds.), Economic, Political and Secu- 
rity Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980's. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1982. 

. "Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on Southeast Asia." 

Pages 185-205 in Herbert J. Ellison (ed.), The Sino-Soviet Con- 
flict: A Global Perspective. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1982. 

. Life in North Vietnam, Part Two: The Law. Berkeley: Univer- 
sity of California, January 1973. (Unpublished.) 

"The Military Draft and Induction Process in the DRV, 

1963-75." Berkeley: University of California. (Unpublished.) 

. PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam. Novato, California: Presi- 
dio Press, 1986. 

"The Peoples Army of Vietnam." Unpublished paper 

presented at United States Asian Security Affairs Conference, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1982. 

"Soviet Response to an Intra-Communist Crisis: Indo- 
china, 1979." (Unpublished paper read at the Eighteenth An- 
nual Conference on Slavic Studies). October 1979. 

. "The USSR and Vietnam." Pages 251-66 in Robert H. 

Donaldson (ed.), The Soviet Union in the Third World. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1981. 

Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liber- 
ation Front of South Vietnam. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966. 

. Vietnam and the USSR: Anatomy of an Alliance. Boulder, 

Colorado: Westview Press, 1986. 

"Vietnam's Military Assistance," Pages 160-168 in 

John F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp (eds.), Communist Nations' 
Military Assistance. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983. 

. War, Peace, and the Viet Cong. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 

1969. 

Polmar, Norman. Guide to the Soviet Navy. (3rd ed.) Annapolis, 

Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 
Quinn-Judge, Paul. "New Troops for Old," Far Eastern Economic 

Review [Hong Kong], 117, No. 31, July 30, 1982, 18-19. 
"Guns over Butter," Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong 

Kong], 127, No. 2, January 17, 1985, 18. 
Richardson, Michael. "Hanoi's Nuclear Hand-Me-Down," Far 

Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], 100, No. 21, May 26, 

1978, 8-9. 



358 



Bibliography 



Rolph, Hammond. "Vietnamese Communism and the Protracted 
War," Asian Survey, 12, No. 9, September 1972, 783-92. 

Rosenberger, Leif. "The Soviet- Vietnamese Alliance and Kam- 
puchea," Survey [London], 27, Autumn-Winter 1983, 207-31. 

Sagan, Ginetta, and Stephen Denney. Violations of Human Rights 
in theSRV, April 30, 1975-April 30, 1983. Atherton, California: 
Aurora Foundation, 1983. 

Shaplen, Robert. Bitter Victory. New York: Harper and Row, 1987. 

Song Hao. Ten Years of Fighting and Building PAVN. Hanoi: For- 
eign Languages Publishing House, 1965. 

. Discipline in PAVN. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publish- 
ing House, 1975. 

Stetler, Russell (ed.). The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writ- 
ings of Vo Nguyen Giap. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970. 

Tilman, Robert. "The Enemy Beyond: External Threat Percep- 
tions in the ASEAN Region." {Research Notes and Discussion Papers, 
No. 42.) Singapore: Institute of Southwest Asian Studies, 1986. 

Tran Van Tra. A Bitter Dry Season for the Americans . Hanoi: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1966. 

. Five Lessons of a Great Spring Victory (Winter 1 965-Spring 

1967). Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1967. 

Turley, William S. "Civil-Military Relations in North Vietnam," 
Asian Survey, 9, No. 12, December 1969, 879-99. 

"Origins and Development of Communist Military 

Leadership in Vietnam," Armed Forces and Society, February 3, 
1977, 219-47. 

The Second Indochina War; A Short Political and Military His- 
tory, 1954-75. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986. 

"The Vietnamese Army." Pages 63-82 in Jonathan R. 

Adelman (ed.), Communist Armies in Politics. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1982. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelli- 
gence. Directory of Officials of Vietnam. Washington, 1985. 

Congress. 93rd, 1st Session. Senate. Committee on the 

Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate Administration of the 
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. The 
Human Cost of Communism in Vietnam: II, The Myth of No Blood. 
(Hearing January 5, 1973.) Washington: GPO, 1973. 

Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power: 1985. Wash- 
ington, 1985. 

United States Information Service. "The Party in Command: 
Political Organization and the Viet Cong Armed Forces," 
(Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, No. 34.) Saigon: 
1968. 



359 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



University of California Indochina Archive Files. The following 

materials are from the University of California Indochina Archive 

Files, Berkeley, California: 
File No. 4, Section 7: 

Part 24 — "General Data on Armed Forces." 

Part 25 — "Armed Forces Chronology." 

Part 26 — "Party-Military Relationship." 

Part 27— "Para-Military and Militia." 

Part 28 — "Armed Forces and the Economy." 

Part 29 — "Armed Forces Recruitment and Training." 

Part 30 — "Veterans and Military Dependents." 
File No. 9, Section 7: 

Part 50 — "Judicial and Legal Affairs." 

Part 51 — "Law Enforcement." 

Part 52— "Internal Security." 
Van Tien Dung. People's War and National Defense. 2 vols. Hanoi: 

Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1979. 
Vo Nguyen Giap. Dien Bien Phu (rev. ed.). Hanoi: Foreign Lan- 
guages Publishing House, 1964. 
General Strength of the Revolution. Hanoi: Su That Publish- 
ing House, 1978. 
National Liberation War in Vietnam: General Line, Strategy, and 

Tactics. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971. 
. One Year of Revolutionary Achievement. Bangkok: Vietnam 

News Publication, 1946. 
. Orders of the Day, Speeches, and Mobilization Letters. Hanoi: 

Su That Publishing House, 1963. 
Selected Writings. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing 

House, 1977. 

To Arm the Revolutionary Masses to Build the People's Army. 

Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975. 
Unforgettable Days. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing 

House, 1975. 

. War for National Liberation. Hanoi: Su That Publishing 

House, 1979. 

Warner, Denis (ed.). Pacific Defense Reporter, 1983; Annual Reference 
Edition. Victoria, Australia: Peter Issacson, 1983. 

Wolf, Eric R. Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. New York: Har- 
per and Row, 1969. 

Young, Stephen. "The Legality of Vietnamese Re-education 
Camps," Harvard International Law Journal, 20, No. 3, Fall 1979, 
519-38. 

Zagoria, Donald. "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," 
International Security, Fall 1980, 66-78. 



360 



Bibliography 



. Soviet Policy in East Asia. New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 1982. 

(Various issues of the following Vietnamese language publica- 
tions published in Hanoi, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, were 
also used in the preparation of this chapter: Giao Due Ly Luan, Hoc 
Tap, Lao Dong, Luat Hoc, Nhan Dan, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, Tap Chi 
Cong San, and Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan.) 



361 



Glossary 



Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) — The military ground 
forces of the South Vietnamese government (Republic of Viet- 
nam) until its collapse in April 1975. ARVN originated in the 
Vietnamese military units raised by French authorities to defend 
the Associated State of Vietnam in the early 1950s. During the 
Second Indochina War (q.v.), it grew to over 1 million men 
and women organized into eleven army divisions (plus special- 
ized units, such as Rangers and Special Forces) deployed in 
four Corps Tactical Zones (redesignated as Military Regions 
in 1971). 

Asian Development Bank (ADB) — Established in 1966, the ADB 
assists in economic development and promotes growth and 
cooperation in developing member countries. Membership 
includes both developed and developing countries in Asia and 
developed countries in the West. 

Black Flag forces — A band of mostly Chinese adventurers who fled 
to northern Vietnam after the collapse of the Taiping Rebel- 
lion (1851-64) in China. They eventually placed themselves 
at the service of the imperial court in Hue and fought the French 
forces in the 1883-84 Tonkin campaign. 

boat people — Refugees who fled Vietnam by sea after 1975. Many 
fell victim to pirate attacks in the Gulf of Thailand, drowned, 
or endured starvation and dehydration as a result of their escape 
in ill-equipped and undersized vessels. Those who reached 
safety in neighboring Southeast Asian countries were accorded 
temporary asylum in refugee camps while awaiting permanent 
resettlement in industrialized Western nations willing to accept 
them. 

bonze — A general term for a Buddhist monk (as opposed to the 
more specific bhikku, meaning an ordained monk). 

Cao Dai — Indigenous Vietnamese religion centered in Tay Ninh 
Province, southern Vietnam. It was founded and initially prop- 
agated by Ngo Van Chieu, a minor official who, in 1919, 
claimed to have had a series of revelations. The faith grew under 
the leadership of Le Van Trung, its first "pope" or Supreme 
Chief, chosen in 1925. Doctrinally, the religion is a syncretic 
blend of Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism, Confuciancism and 
Western nineteenth-century romanticism. Before the fall of 
Saigon, the Cao Dai had about 1 to 2 million adherents. 



363 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



chi bo — A party chapter composed of a collection of party cells {to 
dang), the lowest organizational echelon of the Indochinese and 
later the Vietnamese Communist Party. 

chua — A lord or prince. The hereditary title used by the Trinh and 
Nguyen families, who ruled Vietnam in the name of the em- 
peror during the later Le Dynasty in the sixteenth through the 
eighteenth centuries. 

Colombo Plan — Founded in 1951 and known as the Colombo Plan 
for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast 
Asia until it was expanded in 1977 and called the Colombo Plan 
for Cooperative Economic Development in Asia and the Pacific. 
It is an arrangement that permits a developing member coun- 
try to approach a developed member country for assistance on 
a one-to-one basis. Assistance may be technical or in the form 
of capital or commodity aid. 

Co Mat Vien — An advisory council set up by Emperor Minh Mang 
following the rebellion of Le Van Khoi in the 1830s. 

Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong 
Basin — Established in 1957 under the sponsorship of the United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific, the Committee aims to develop water resources in the 
lower Mekong basin through improvements in hydroelectric 
power, irrigation, flood control, watershed management, and 
navigation. Its membership is limited to Laos, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. 

Communist International — Also called the Comintern or Third 
International, it was founded in Moscow in 1919 to coordinate 
the world communist movement. Officially disbanded in 1943, 
the Comintern was replaced from 1947 to 1954 by the Comin- 
form (Communist Information Bureau), in which only the 
Soviet and the ruling East European communist parties (except 
for Yugoslavia, which was expelled in 1948) and the French 
and the Italian communist parties were represented. The Corn- 
inform was dissolved in 1956. 

comprador — Vietnamese communist term (used originally in China 
to mean purchasing agent) applied disparagingly to the mid- 
dleman who extracts a profit without engaging in economic 
production, that is, a "comprador capitalist." The term is also 
applied to an entrepreneur in Cholon, Ho Chi Minh City's 
predominantly Chinese sister city. 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) — Also abbre- 
viated CEMA and CMEA, the organization was established 
in 1949 to promote economic cooperation among socialist bloc 
countries and is headquartered in Moscow. Its members in the 



364 



Glossary 



1980s included the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Cuba, Mongo- 
lia, and Vietnam, 
democratic centralism — A basic Marxist- Leninist organizational 
principle accepted by all communist parties, including the Viet- 
namese (most recently at the Fourth National Party Congress 
in December 1976). It prescribes a hierarchical framework of 
party structures purportedly established through democratic 
elections. 

dong (D) — Vietnam's monetary unit, which in mid- 1989 had an 
exchange rate of US$1 to D4,500. 

First Indochina War (1946-54) — The anticolonial conflict, also 
known as the Viet Minh War, between France and the Viet 
Minh, a Vietnamese communist-dominated coalition of 
Indochinese nationalist elements led by veteran revolutionary 
Ho Chi Minh. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 
1954 marked the final episode of the war. The conflict was 
brought to an end officially by the Geneva Conference of July 
1954 and its resulting agreements. 

fiscal year (FY) — January 1 to December 31. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — The value of domestic goods and 
services produced by an economy over a certain period, usually 
one year. Only output of goods for final consumption and 
investment is included because the values of primary and inter- 
mediate production are assumed to be included in final prices. 
Reductions for depreciation of physical assets are normally not 
included. 

Group of 77 — Founded in 1964 as a forum for developing coun- 
tries to negotiate with developed countries for development aid, 
the original 77 developing nations had expanded by the 1980s 
to include the 127 members of the Nonaligned Movement (q. v.). 

Hoa — Term applied by the Vietnamese to the ethnic Chinese resi- 
dents of Vietnam. 

Hoa Hao — Indigenous Vietnamese religion centered in An Giang 
Province, southern Vietnam. It was founded in the 1930s by 
Huynh Phu So, the son of a village elder in Chau Doc Province. 
Doctrinally, the faith is a variant of Mahay ana Buddhism, but 
allows no intermediary between man and the Supreme Being. 
Before the fall of Saigon in 1975, the Hoa Hao had more than 
1 million adherents. 

Ho Chi Minh Trail — An intricate network of jungle trails, paths, 
and roads leading from the panhandle of northern Vietnam 
through Laos and Cambodia into the border provinces of 
southern Vietnam. At the height of the Second Indochina War 



365 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



(q. v.), it was a major resupply artery for Hanoi's armed forces 
operating in South Vietnam. 
Indochina Federation — A political concept, never fully realized, 
joining the three Indochinese states into a confederation, first 
proposed at the Indochinese Communist Party Central Com- 
mittee meeting in October 1930. The government of France 
resurrected the term in 1946 to describe a limited internal self- 
government granted to the states of Vietnam (including Cochin- 
china), Laos, and Cambodia. In the 1980s, the term was used 
disparagingly by some observers and analysts to categorize Viet- 
nam* s military presence in, and influence over, Laos and 
Cambodia. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affili- 
ated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing 
international exchange loans to its members (including indus- 
trialized and developing countries) when they experience 
balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry 
conditions that require substantial internal economic adjust- 
ments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries. 

International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(INTELSAT) — Established by two international agreements 
concluded at Washington, D.C. in August 1971, and effective 
in February 1973, INTELSAT was formed to carry forward 
the development, construction, operation, and maintenance of 
the global commercial telecommunications satellite system. In 
the 1980s, there were 109 signatory member nations and 30 
nonsignatory user nations. 

Khmer Rouge — The name given to the Cambodian communists 
by Prince Norodom Sihanouk in the 1960s. Later, the term 
(although a misnomer) was applied to the insurgents of vary- 
ing ideological backgrounds who opposed the Khmer Repub- 
lic regime of Lon Nol. Between 1975 and 1978, it denoted the 
Democratic Kampuchea regime led by the radical Pol Pot fac- 
tion of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist Party. After 
being driven from Phnom Penh by the Vietnamese invasion 
of Cambodia in December 1978, the Khmer Rouge went back 
to guerrilla warfare and joined forces with two noncommunist 
insurgent movements to form the Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea. 

missing-in-action (MIA) — United States military term for service- 
men who remained unaccounted for at the end of the Second 
Indochina War (q.v.). In the 1980s, rumors persisted that some 
MIAs were still alive and had been detained involuntarily in 
Vietnam after the war. 



366 



Glossary 



National Assembly — The highest organ of government in Vietnam, 
according to the 1980 Constitution. The National Assembly 
is empowered with both constitutional and legislative author- 
ity. It can, theoretically at least, elect and remove members 
of upper-echelon government bodies, such as the Council of 
State and Council of Ministers; it may also pass laws, raise 
taxes, approve the state budget, and amend the constitution. 

new economic zones — Population resettlement scheme undertaken 
in southern Vietnam after 1975 to increase food production 
and alleviate population pressure in congested urban areas, 
especially Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon). The sites selected for 
resettlement previously had been undeveloped or had been 
abandoned in the turbulence of war. 

Nonaligned Movement (NAM) — Formed as the result of a series 
of increasingly structured nonaligned conferences, the first of 
which met at Belgrade, Yugoslavia in September 1961, the 
NAM's purpose is to insure the sovereignty and territorial in- 
tegrity of nonaligned nations. In the 1980s, there were 127 
member nations. 

Parrot's Beak — The part of the Cambodian province of Svay Rieng 
that juts into the southern Vietnamese provinces of Tay Ninh 
and Long An. During the South Vietnamese and United States 
incursion into Cambodia in 1970, and again during the Viet- 
namese invasion that drove the Khmer Rouge from power in 
1978, the area was the scene of heavy fighting. 

People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) — The military forces of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (until 1976) and, after 
reunification, of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. During the 
Second Indochina War (q. v.), PAVN bore the brunt of the fight- 
ing against the United States military forces in Vietnam, but 
was consistently able to recoup its losses and infiltrate units 
south by means of the Ho Chi Minh Trail (q.v.). Failing to 
topple the Saigon government during the Tet Offensive of 1968, 
PAVN undertook its first conventional invasion of South Viet- 
nam in the Easter Offensive of 1972. This attempt ended in 
defeat, but PAVN's next effort, the Spring Offensive of 1975, 
quickly overran the ineffectual ARVN resistance and toppled 
the Saigon government, thereby bringing to a close the Second 
Indochina War. 

Produced National Income (PNI) — A measure of an economy's 
material production that excludes income generated by the ser- 
vice sector and depreciation on capital equipment. It is used 
to measure controlled or communist economies where account- 
ing procedures may ignore the service sector as "unproduc- 
tive." 



367 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Ruble — Monetary unit of the Soviet Union, which in mid- 1989 
had an exchange rate of US$1 to Ruble 0.63. 

search and destroy missions — Offensive military operations under- 
taken by United States combat units in Vietnam to find and 
neutralize the enemy, especially when the enemy's strength and 
disposition had not been fixed precisely. The capture and hold- 
ing of territory during such operations was not a priority. 

Second Indochina War (1954-75) — Armed conflict that pitted Viet 
Cong insurgents native to southern Vietnam and regular PAVN 
(q. v. ) units with Chinese and Soviet logistical and materiel sup- 
port on one side against ARVN (q.v.), United States, and 
smaller forces from the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Aus- 
tralia, Thailand and New Zealand on the other. Most of the 
ground fighting occurred in southern Vietnam. However, part 
of the conflict also involved an intensive air war over North 
Vietnam and Laos from 1965-73 and combat between com- 
peting indigenous forces in Laos and Cambodia. 

to dang — A party cell, the lowest organizational echelon of the Indo- 
chinese and later the Vietnamese Communist Party. 

Viet Cong — Contraction of the term Viet Nam Cong San (Viet- 
namese communists), the name applied by the governments 
of the United States and South Vietnam to the communist 
insurgents in rebellion against the latter government, begin- 
ning around 1957. The Vietnamese communists never used 
the term themselves, but referred to their movement as the 
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (also known 
as the National Liberation Front), formally inaugurated in 
December 1960. 

Viet Minh — Contraction of the term Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong 
Minh Hoi (Vietnam Independence League), a coalition of 
nationalist elements dominated by the communists and led by 
veteran revolutionary Ho Chi Minh. The movement first identi- 
fied itself in May 1941, when it called for an uprising against 
the French colonial government. It proclaimed the indepen- 
dence of Vietnam on September 2, 1945, and led the anti- 
French guerrilla war that followed, until the victory at Dien 
Bien Phu brought the conflict to an end. 

World Bank — The informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund 



368 



Glossary 



administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in less developed 
countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD 
hold the same positions in the ICF. The three institutions are 
owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their 
capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states 
must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (q.v.). 



369 



Index 



Abrams, Creighton W., 72 
administrative divisions, 210 
Aeroflot, 185 

Agreement on Ending the War and 
Restoring Peace in Vietnam, 73, 76, 
225 

Agrexport, 169 

agriculture, xxxvii; plan for development 

of, 104-5, 151; policy for, 154-58 
airfields, 185 

Air Force (PAVN), 280-81 
airports, 185 
Air Vietnam, 185 
Amboyna Cay, 231 

Americans missing in action (MIAs), xl, 

xlvi, 227, 228 
An Binh, 119 
An Duong Vuong, 8 
animism, 83, 93, 128 
An Loc, 73 

Annam, 4, 12, 14, 33, 35 
anti-colonial activity (see also indepen- 
dence; nationalism), 35-40 
apatite, 146 

armed forces (see also National Defense 
Council; People's Army of Vietnam 
(PAVN)), 208; contributions to econ- 
omy by, 265-67, 278; party control 
over role of, 193, 196, 267-73 
armed propaganda detachments, 48, 249 
Armed Youth Assault Force (AYAF), 275 
Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS), 
216 

Army Officers' Service Law, 254 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN), 62, 64-66, 70, 72-73, 76, 78, 
226, 263, 290 

ARVN. See Army of the Republic of Viet- 
nam (ARVN) 

ASEAN. See Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

A Shau Valley, 73 

Asian Development Bank, 167, 176, 232 

associated statehood, 55 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), 170, 171; position on Cam- 
bodia and Hanoi government of, xl, 
230; role in Cambodian conflict, xliv; 



Vietnam's relations with members of, 
xlvii, 211, 214, 216, 229-30, 247, 248 

Au Co, 7 

Au Lac, 8 

Australia, 170 

Austroasiatic languages, 93 

Austronesian language, 5, 7 

autonomous municipality, 210 

AYF. See Ho Chi Minh Assault Youth 
Force (AYF) 



Bac Bo, 4, 31, 43 

Bac Giang Province, 49 

Bac Mai Air Base, 281 

Bac Son, 46 

Bac Thai Province, 45 

Ba Dinh Square, 50, 51 

Bahnar people, 98, 99 

Bank for Agricultural Development, 181 

banking (see also central bank), 181 

Ban Me Thuot, 76, 78 

Bao Dai, 51, 58, 60 

Ba Son naval arsenal, 40 

bauxite, 146 

Belgium, 176 

beliefs, 128 

Binh Dinh Province, 25, 67, 73 
Binh Long Province, 73 
Black Dragon Force, 290 
Black Flag army, 31-32 
Black Sail Group, 290 
Blum, Leon, 45 
boat people, xlvii, 304 
bonzes, 15, 62 

Border Defense Command (PAVN), 281 

boundary: with Cambodia, 84-85, 86; 
with China, 85, 218-21; with Laos, 84, 
86; of Thailand and Cambodia, 220 

Brezhnev, Leonid, 65 

bridges, 183 

bronze casting, 7 

Brunei, 229 

Buddhism (see also Cao Dai religious sect; 
Hoa Hao religious sect), 4, 11, 12, 83, 
93, 120-23; Mahayana and Theravada, 
98, 121, 201; as state religion, 15 

Buddhists: discrimination against, 62 



371 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



budget, government, 178 
Bui Quang Chieu, 39 
Buon Me Thuot, 100, 185 
bureaucracy, 209 



cadre system, 197 

Ca Mau Peninsula, 89 

Cambodia (see also Association of South- 
east Asian Nations (ASEAN)), 4, 190; 
attack by PAVN forces, 255; dispute 
with, 252-58; 332; French protectorate 
over, 31, 33; invasion by United States 
of, 72; military occupation by Vietnam 
of, xxxix, 143, 176-77, 213, 220, 227, 
255-58; PAVN troop withdrawal from, 
xliii-xliv, 257; position of ASEAN 
members toward, xl, 230; relations 
with, 211, 213-18; secret bombing by 
United States in, 72; strategic impor- 
tance of, 218; Vietnamese-Siamese pro- 
tectorate, 28 

Cambodian Border Force, 290 

Cambodian conflict (see also Jakarta Infor- 
mal Meeting (JIM); attempts at reso- 
lution of, xliv; Paris conference 
concerning, xliv-xlv 

Cam Ranh Bay, 220, 222, 286 

Canada, 170, 176 

Can Vuong movement, 32, 36, 44 

Cao Bang Province, 45, 49, 173, 259 

Cao Dai religious sect, 49-50, 51, 52, 61, 
76, 126, 128, 290 

Cao Lan people, 96 

capitalism, 83; conflict with socialism of, 
83, 109 

capitalist class, 109, 110 

Carter, Jimmy, 227 

Catholics, 83, 93, 123-26, 291 

central bank, 181 

Central Committee (VCP), 192, 194, 
195-96, 275, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329; 
Propaganda and Training Department, 
232-33, 329; role of, xlii; Secretariat, 
195, 196, 325, 328, 334 

central control, 155 

Central Control Commission (VCP), 196, 
332 

Central Highlands (Tay Nguyen), 76, 86, 

100-101, 289-90 
centralized system, 189 
Central Military Party Committee 

(VCP), 196, 275, 333 



Central Mountains. See Giai Truong Son 
(Chaine Annamitique) 

Central Office for South Vietnam 
(COSVN), 61, 326, 330 

Central Office to Supervise Foreign 
Investment, xlvii 

CGDK. See Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) 

Chaigneau, Jean-Baptiste, 29 

Champa, 4, 16-17, 19-20 

Cham people, 4, 19, 28, 96, 98, 100 

Chatichai Choonhavan, xlvii 

Chau Doc Province, 290 

Che Bong Nga, 16 

Chiang Kai-shek, 41, 51 

children and childrearing, 114-15 

China (see also Sinicization (han hwa)), 150, 
190; conflict with Vietnam over Spratly 
Islands, xlv; influence in Vietnam, 
xxxvi, 3, 95, 201-2, 252; invasion of 
Vietnam by, xxxix, 85, 182, 216, 220, 
263, 330, 333; military aid from, xxxix; 
occupation of Paracel Islands, 85; role 
in Second Indochina War of, 64; sup- 
port of Khmer Rouge by, xlv; territo- 
rial dispute with, 176, 177, 219, 254, 
255; troops at Sino-Vietnamese border, 
258-60; Vietnam's relations with, 211, 
218-21, 227 

China, Nationalist (see also Chinese expe- 
ditionary forces): occupation forces in 
Vietnam, xxxv 

Chinese Communist Party, 252 

Chinese culture: impact of, 9, 11, 17, 19 

Chinese empire: in Vietnam, 3, 38 

Chinese expeditionary forces, 51 

Chinese language, 7, 12, 95 

Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), 
41, 252 

Chinese people in Vietnam. See Hoa (Han 

Chinese) people 
Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), 

259 

chink nghia, xxxv, 240-41 
Chinh, Truong, 194, 199, 329-30 
Christians in Vietnam, 29 
chromite, 146, 161 
Chua, 21 

Chu Huy Man, 331, 333 
chu nom, 95 
Chu Van Tan, 49 
Clifford, Clark, 71 
climate, 89-90 



372 



Index 



coal industry, 146, 158, 160, 168, 176 
Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea (CGDK), 216, 220, 230 
Cochinchina, 4, 31, 32-33, 39 
coffee, 104 

collective mastery concept, 205, 206 
collectivization, rural, 119, 155, 163, 190 
colleges, 131, 132, 136 
Co Loa, 8, 14 

Co Mat Vien (Privy Council), 33 
Colombo Plan, 232 
Colonial Council of Cochinchina, 39 
colonial rule of France. See France 
Comecon (see also International Bank for 
Economic Cooperation; International 
Investment Bank), 164, 166; admission 
of Vietnam to, xxxix, 219, 222, 232; 
assistance to Vietnam by, 177; lending 
terms for members of, 167; relations of 
Vietnam with members of, 177, 224 
Comintern, 40, 42, 43, 191, 221 
Command Party Committee, 277 
Commission for Economic Relations with 

Foreign Countries, 209 
Commission Sixty-Eight, 330 
Committee for Solidarity of Patriotic 

Catholics, 126 
Committee of the South, 51, 52, 54 
communist forces: war and victory in 

Vietnam of, xxxv 
communist government, 83; changes in 
social structure by, 105, 118-19; con- 
trol of religious groups by, 121-23, 
124-28 

Communist International. See Comintern 

communist parties, 42 

comprador class. See capitalist class 

concubinage, 114, 118 

Confucianism, xxxvi, 4, 9, 11, 17, 20, 83, 
129, 200-201; in formation of family 
structure, 112; as foundation for tradi- 
tional society, 102-4 

Congress of National Trade Unions, xlii 

conscription, 250, 262 

Con Son Island, 185 

Constitution, 120, 191, 204-6, 208, 209; 
legal basis for PAVN, 260-61 

Constitutionalist Party, 39, 40 

contract system (see also quotas), xliii, 155, 
180 

cooperatives, 105 

cooperatives, agricultural, 155, 156 
copper, 146 



COSVN. See Central Office for South 

Vietnam (COSVN) 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 

(Comecon). See Comecon 
Council of Ministers, 166, 204-5, 206-7, 

208, 261; role and importance of, 208- 

9, 254 

Council of State, 205, 206-7, 329; role 
and importance of, 207-8, 209, 260 

courts, 209-10 

credit, domestic, 179 

crime prevention, 288 

crimes: political and nonpolitical, 299- 
301 

cult of the ancestors, 113 

cultural influence: of Chinese, 3, 9, 11, 
17, 19; of France, 201-2; of other peo- 
ples, 4 

Cuong De, 36, 37 

currency (see also dong); devaluation of, 

153, 179 
Cuu Chan, 8 
Czechoslovakia, 224 



Dac Lac Province, 100 

Dai Co Viet (Great Viet), 14 

Dai La (Hanoi), 15 

Dai Viet (see also Nam Viet; Viet Nam), 

15, 27, 290 
Da Lat, 185 

Dam Quang Trung, 333 

Da Nang, 78, 183, 185, 222, 281, 286; 

United States air base at, 66 
Dan Hoi Xuan, 135 
Dao Duy Tung, 196, 329 
dau tranh concept, xxxv, 242-44 
de Behaine, Pigneau (bishop), 25-26 
debt, external, 173, 176 
decentralization, xxxviii, 168-69 
de la Grandiere, Admiral, 31 
demilitarized zone (DMZ), 67, 70, 71, 72, 

76 

democratic centralism, 192 
Democratic Kampuchea, 216 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), 

66; constitution of, 204; formation of, 

51, 250 
Deng Xiaoping, 218 
Denmark, 176 

de Rhodes, Alexandre, 23-24 

De Tham, 37 

Diem. See Ngo Dinh Diem 



373 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Diem regime, 107, 117-18: discrimina- 
tion against Buddhists by. 62; support 
by United States for, 61 

Dien Bien Phu, 55-56. 58. 250 

dinh, 20. 44, 50 

Dinh Bo Linh, 14-15 

Dinh Tien Hoang (Dinh Bo Linh), 14. 15 

Dinh Tuong, 67 

Directorate General for Political Affairs 

(PAVN), 196 
diseases, 134-35 
Doan Khue. 329 
dot moi, xli 

Do Muoi. xli. 196, 326-27 
don dien system, 20 
Dong. See Pham Van Dong 
dong. 153 

Dong Nai Province. 161 

Dong Son culture. 7 

Dong Sy Nguyen, 328 

Doumer, Paul, 33 

draft call (military). 262-63. 265 

drought, 154 

DRV. See Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam (DRV) 
dual quota planning, 163-64 
Duong Van Minh, 64. 78 
Duy Tan, 37 

Duy Tan Hoi (Reformation Society), 36, 
37 



Eastern Europe, 150, 224 
Easter offensive, 73 

economic development, xxxviii, xl-xli, 
178; changes in priorities for, xlii-xliii, 
xlvii-xlviii 

economic growth: among ASEAN coun- 
tries, 229 

economic performance, 83, 143 

economic planning (see also National Party- 
Congress; Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VCP: Viet Nam Cong San 
Dang)); First Five- Year Plan, 148, 149, 
150: Fourth Five-Year Plan, 153-54, 
166, 169; Second Five-Year Plan, 
xxxviii, 149, 150, 151, 154, 160, 166. 
190, 193: Third Five-Year Plan, 
xxxviii, 147, 151, 156. 160. 166. 169. 
171-72, 177, 223 

economic policy, 151-52; of communist 
party, xxxviii. 143, 152-53; influence 
of VCP on, 149-50; reform of. 158 



Ede people, 98. 100 

education (see also re-education camps). 

129-32; Confucian basis for. 103-4. 

129; effect of war on, 108: under 

French colonial rule, 35; reforms for 

system of. 129-32 
educational system: ties with Soviet 

Union. 131-32 
Eisenhower, Dwight D.. 58. 225 
election process, 207 
elitism, 112 

emigres, Vietnamese. 90 ' 
energy consumption and production. 158. 
160. 161 

enterprises. See private enterprises; state 

enterprises 
epidemics. 135 
European trade, 23 
exports, 172; incentives for, 167-68 
Export Support Fund. 168 

family: historical structure of, 112-15, 
117; loyalty to. 83; new law governing 
structure of, 91. 119: nuclear opposed 
to extended, 119; reform legislation in 
South for. 118-19: reform legislation 
under communists for. 116-17: tradi- 
tional structure in Vietnamese society. 
112-15 

family economy concept. 151-52. 163 
familv planning. 84. 90-92. 119-20 
Fan Si Pan. 86 
fisheries. 147. 168 

Five-Year Plans. See economic planning 

flood control. 85-86 

floods, 85. 89. 154 

folk medicine, 135-36 

forced labor camps. Ill 

Ford. Gerald R., 227 

foreign aid {see also China; Soviet Union: 

United States), xxxix. 150. 172-73. 

176-77, 231-32: to South Vietnam. 

149 

foreign exchange. 167-68. 177-78 
foreign investment: code, xxxviii. 170: 

policy for, xlvii 
foreign policy, xxxviii-xxxix. xlv-xlviii. 

211-32 

foreign trade. See trade, foreign 
Foreign Trade Bank. 167. 181 
Foreign Trade Office, xlvii 



374 



Index 



France, 170, 176, 232; assistance to Viet- 
nam by, 183; colonial period and policy 
of, xxxvi, 5, 32-33, 35-40, 104, 148, 
203; conquest of Vietnam, 30-32; 
establishment of Indochinese Union by, 
33; influence in Vietnam of, 103, 
201-2; support by United States in 
Indochina war, 225; in Vietnam, 4-5, 
28, 98; Vietnamese war of indepen- 
dence against, xxxv 

France-China treaties of 1887 and 1895, 
85 

free enterprise economy policy, xxxviii, 
152 

French Communist Party, 45 
French Foreign Legion, 54 
French language, 95 
French Socialist Party, 45 
French Societe des Missions Etrangeres, 
29 

French Union, 52, 55 

FULRO. See Unified Front for the Strug- 
gle of Oppressed Races (Front Unifie 
pour la Lutte des Races Opprimees: 
FULRO) 

Gamier, Francis, 31-32 
Gautama, 120 

gender: effect of imbalance in population, 
145 

General Mobilization Order, 255, 263 

Geneva Agreements of 1954, 5, 58, 60, 
225, 273 

Geneva Agreement of 1962, 217 

geography, 84-86, 89-90 

German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
many), 224 

Germany, Federal Republic of, 170, 176 

Gia Dinh (Saigon), 25, 26, 30 

Giai Truong Son (Chaine Annamitique), 
85, 86 

Gia Lam airfield, 54 

Gia Long Code, 27 

Gia Long (Nguyen Anh), xxxvi, 4, 26-27 
Giao Chi, 8 

Giao Chau Province, 12, 14 
Giap. See Vo Nguyen Giap 
Giay people, 96, 101 
Gobi Desert, 89 
Gorbachev, Mikhail, xliv 
government: centralized nature of, 189, 
192; local, 210-11 



government administration. See adminis- 
trative divisions 
graphite, 146 

Great Britain, 170; occupation forces in 

Vietnam, xxxv 
Great Campaign, 253-55, 283 
Group of 77, 232 
guerrilla warfare, 61-62, 67, 257 
Gulf of Tonkin, 64, 85, 89, 219 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 65 



Ha Bac Province, 16 

Hai Hung Province, 16, 161 

Hainan Island, 260 

Haiphong, 104, 183, 211, 295 

Ham Nghi, 32 

Ha Nam Ninh Province, 185 

Han dynasty, xxxvi, 3, 8, 11 

Hanoi, 8, 35, 42, 49, 51, 5, 104, 131, 167, 
181, 183, 185, 211, 295 

Hanoi government {see also communist 
government); control in Cambodia by, 
213; and control of South Vietnam, 
109; extension of family law to South, 
119; and Khmer Rouge, 255; opposi- 
tion to, 287, 289-90; position of 
ASEAN members toward, 230; recog- 
nition of minorities by, 99; relations 
with Cambodia, 214; Tet offensive of, 
70-72 

Hanoi Party Committee, 333 

Han- Viet ruling class, 9, 11 

Harmand Convention, 32 

Harkins, Paul D., 61 

Ha Thi Que, 116 

Ha Tinh Province, 44 

Ha Truong Hoa, xlii 

Ha Tuyen Province, 45 

health. See public health 

Heng Samrin, 230, 257 

High Command (PAVN), 277 

Hinduism, 98, 120 

Hmong (Meo) people, 96, 98, 101 

Hoa Binh, 161 

Hoa (Han Chinese) people, 90, 93, 96, 
101-2, 104-5; increase in number of, 
104; mistreatment by Vietnamese of, 
xxxix, 218-19, 220 

Hoa Hao religious sect, 49-50, 51, 52, 54, 
61, 76, 126, 128, 290 

Hoang Van Hoan, 199 

Hoang Xuan Tuy, 132 



375 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Ho Chi Minh, xxxvii, 5. 78. 83. 93. 189. 
191. 199. 201. 202, 203. 205. 249, 
252-3. 332: and establishment of Viet 
Minh. 47-50; influence in communist 
activities, 40, 41; as president of provi- 
sional government. 52: as Vietnam 
Workers Party Chairman. 55 

Ho Chi Minh Assault Youth Force 
(AYF), 298-99 

Ho Chi Minh Children's Organization, 
298 

Ho Chi Minh City, 111. 112. 125. 131. 
136. 152. 167. 181. 183. 185. 211. 295: 
economic zone of, xlvii-xlviii 

Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee. 333 

Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth League. 
116. 191. 197. 198. 263. 270. 298-99 

Ho Chi Minh Trail, 64. 73, 217 

Ho Chi Minh Young Pioneers. 270, 298 

Ho dynasty. 17 

Ho familv. 24 

Ho Khau registration system. 307 

Ho Quy Ly, 17 

Hong Due legal code. 19. 27 

Hong Kong, 169, 232: trade with, 170-71 

hospitals. 134 

household economy. See family economy 

concept 
Hre people. 100 

Hue. xxxvi, 4, 27. 32. 35. 70-71. 78. 103 

Hungary, 224 

Hung dynasty. 7. 8 

Hung Vuong. 7 

Hun Sen, xliv 

Huvnh Phu So. 54 



ICP. See Indochinese Communist Party 
(ICP) 

ideological goals, 211. 213 
Imexco, 168-69 

imports, 169-70: from Soviet Union, 
171-72 

independence: after World War II. 51: 
from Chinese, 3; move toward. 5.11. 
32, 35-40 

India, 170, 176; influence on Vietnam of. 
201 

Indochina Federation. 214 

Indochina Peninsula, 5 

Indochina War, First (Viet Minh War), 

54-58, 117, 192, 204, 214, 250-51, 

267, 268, 292, 296, 304 



Indochina War. Second, xxxvi. 60-78, 
117, 148, 149. 182. 183, 217. 218, 222, 
230, 252, 253, 255. 281. 290; effect on 
economy of. 148-49: escalation of, 64: 
opposition in United States to. 67; Tet 
offensive during, 70-72 

Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). 
42-43, 44-45, 47-50. 191-92. 329. 
330, 332; Armed Propaganda units of, 
249; illegality declared for. 45 

Indochinese Union, 33 

Indonesia. 229. 230. 231 

Indrapura. 15 

industrial development. 104. 152 
industrial production. 160 
inflation. 179 

Institute of Folk Medicine. 135 

INTELSAT. See International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization 
(INTELSAT) 

International Bank for Economic Coop- 
eration. 167 

International Control Commission, 58 

International Investment Bank. 167 

International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
167, 176, 232 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Organization (INTELSAT). 232 

iron ore. 146. 161. 217 

Islam. 98 

Italy. 170. 176 



Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM), xliv, 
xlvi 

Japan. 169. 176. 232: invasion of Viet- 
nam by, 46; occupation of Vietnam by. 
xxxv, 5, 46, 48-50; trade with, 170-71; 
Vietnamese in. 36-37 

Japan-Vietnam Trade Association. 171 

Jarai people. 98. 100 

Johnson. Lyndon B.. 64-65 

Johnson administration. 67. 71 

judiciary, 205. 209-10 



Kampuchea Liberation Front. 257 
Kampuchean People's National Libera- 
tion Front (KPNLF), 216 
Kennedy. John F.. 61. 64 
Khe Sanh. 72 

Khmer civilization. 4. 19. 96. 98 



376 



Index 



Khmer (Kampuchean) Communist 

Party, 72, 214, 255 
Khmer people, 255, 257 
Khmer People's Revolutionary Armed 

Forces (KPRAF), 244, 258 
Khmer Rouge (see also Cambodia; Pol 

Pot), xxxix, 214, 216, 252, 255; 

attempts to eliminate or weaken, xliv- 

xlv 

Khrushchev, Nikita, 60, 65 
kiem thao, 272 
Kiet. See Vo Van Kiet 
Kinh. See Viet 
kinh hoc, 33 
kinship system, 113 
Kohor people, 98 
Kontum, 73 

Kosygin, Aleksey, 65, 66 
KPRAF. See Khmer People's Revolution- 
ary Armed Forces (KPRAF) 
Kublai Khan, 16 

Kuomintang. See Chinese Nationalist 
Party (Kuomintang) 

labor force (see also employment), 104, 

145-46 
Lac Long Quan, 7 
Lac people, 7, 8 
landowners, 104 
land reform, 62, 72, 105, 107 
land-to-the-tiller. See land reform 
land tenure laws, xliii 
Lang Son, xlvi, 46, 259 
Lang Son Province, 45, 49 
languages, 95 
Lao Cai, 183 

Lao People's Revolutionary Party (Pathet 
Lao), 217 

Laos, 28, 64, 73, 183; French protectorate 
over, 33; relations with, 211, 217-18; 
Vietnamese army troops in, 217 

Laotian National Cobra Force, 290 

law enforcement, 287 

lead, 146 

Le Duan, 45, 55, 194, 199, 205, 255, 

325-26, 329, 330, 331-32 
Le Due Anh, 327, 331 
Le Due Tho, 194, 199, 327, 328, 329, 330 
Le dynasty, 4, 19-21, 25-26 
legal code, 19, 27 
Le Giang, 296 
Le Hoan, 15 



Le Hoang, 173, 176 
Le Loi (Le Thai To), 19 
Le Phuoc Tho, 332 
Le Thanh Tong, 19-20 
Le Van Duyet, 29 

Liaison Committee of Patriotic and 

Peace-Loving Catholics, 124, 126 
Liang dynasty, 12 
limestone, 146 
Linh. See Nguyen Van Linh 
living standard, xxxvii, 83, 136-37 
Loc Ninh, 76 
Lolo people, 96 
Long Bien, 12 
Lon Nol, 72 
Ly Bi, 11-12 

Ly Cong Uan (Ly Thai To), 15 

Ly dynasty, 15-16 

Ly Thanh Tong, 15 

Ly Thai To (Ly Cong Uan), 15 

Ly Thuy (see Ho Chi Minh) 



Mac Dang Dung, 21 
Machine-import, 169 
MACV, Vietnam (MACV). See United 
States Military Assistance Command 
Mai Chi Tho, 112, 201, 293, 329 
Malaysia, 229, 230 
Mandarin Road, 28 
manganese, 146 
Maoist theory, 330 
Mao Zedong, 5, 55, 202, 218, 269 
Maranimex, 169 
marine products. See fisheries 
Ma River, 7 

market system, 158; regulation and con- 
trol of, 161-64 
marriage, 114 

Marxism-Leninism, xxxvi, 40, 45, 106, 

129, 200, 202, 203, 213, 299 
Marxist-Leninist Institute, xlii 
Ma Yuan, 9 
media, 232-35 

Mekong Development Project, 231 
Mekong River, 86, 89, 183 
Mekong RiverDelta, 3, 4, 39, 51, 52, 60, 
64, 67, 72, 76, 85, 89, 92, 120, 153, 183 
merchants, European, 23 
metals, 146 

MI As. See Americans missing in action 

(MIAs) 
mica, 146 



377 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Middle Kingdom, 247 

military assistance: by Soviet Union, 222- 

23, 284 
military equipment, 278-79 
Military Intelligence Department (PAVN), 

277 

Military Management Commission, 190 
Military Obligation Law, 262 
military policy-making structure, 275 
military relations, 287 
military service, 262-63 
Militia/Self-Defense Force (PAVN), 274 
mineral resources, 146 
Ming dynasty (China), 17 
Minh Mang, 28 

Ministry of Agriculture and Food Indus- 
try, 209 

Ministry of Culture, 233 

Ministry of Defense, 275; organization of, 
277; Party Committee within, 275 

Ministry of Energy, 209 

Ministry of Finance, 168, 178 

Ministry of Foreign Trade, xlvii, 164 

Ministry of Information, 209 

Ministry of Interior, 131, 281, 335; orga- 
nization of, 292-93 

Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and 
Social Welfare, 209 

Ministry of National Defense, 131, 250, 
261 

minority peoples: languages and dialects, 
98; location of, 96, 98, 100-101; seden- 
tary and nomadic, 96, 98, 100 

missionaries, European, 23, 29-30, 31 

Mnong people, 100 

money supply. See inflation 

Mongols: invasion by and defeat of, 
16-17 

Mon-Khmer language, 7, 93 
monsoon, 89 

Montagnards, 96, 128, 289-90 
mountains, 86 
Muc Quan, 183 

municipalities, autonomous, 211 
Muong people, 14, 28, 96, 98 

Naforimex, 169 
Nam Bo, 4, 43 
Nam Viet, 8, 12 
Nan-chao, 14 

National Assembly, 156, 170, 190, 204, 
205, 206-7, 208, 209, 261; changing 



goals set by, xli-xlii; role in military 
policy-making, 275; Standing Commit- 
tee of, 178, 205, 260 
National Committee on Family Planning, 
92 

National Congress of Red Trade Unions, 
42 

National Defense Council (NDC), 208, 

250, 260-61, 275, 329 
National Front for the Liberation of South 

Vietnam (Viet Cong). See National 

Liberation Front (NLF) 
nationalism, 5, 11, 35-40, 204, 211, 213 
nationalization, xxxviii, 158, 163; effect 

on industry of, 190 
National Liberation Front (NLF), 61, 62, 

99, 197, 226, 251; 326; forms PRG 

with allies, 72; mission in Moscow of, 

65 

National Party Congress, 195; Fifth 
(1982), xxxviii, 151, 166, 228, 332; 
First (1935), 191, 194; Fourth (1976), 
xxxvii, xxxviii, 92, 150, 190, 192, 193, 
199, 205, 210, 266, 327; Second (1951), 
191, 202, 250; Sixth (1986), xxxvii, xl, 
xli, 111, 112, 137, 143-44, 166, 190, 
194, 194-96, 200, 209, 224, 228; Third 
(1960), 192, 206, 294 

National Salvation Army, 49 

National Salvation Associations (Cuu 
Quoc Hoi), 49 

national security, 213 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 
nization (NATO) 

Natuna Islands, 231 

natural gas, 146 

natural resources, 146 

Navy (PAVN), 278 

Navarre, Henri, 56 

Nazi-Soviet Non- Agression pact, 45 

NDC. See National Defense Council 
(NDC) 

the Netherlands, 176 

new economic zones, xxxvii, 92, 110-11, 
118, 147, 304 

New Revolutionary Party (Tan Viet 
Party), 42 

new social order. See social structure 

ngai {see also Hoa), 101 

Nghe An Province, 35, 40, 43, 44 

Nghe-Tinh revolt, 43-45 

Nghia Binh Province, 183 



378 



Index 



Ngo Dinh Diem, 5, 55, 99, 107, 123-24, 
225; in new Republic of Vietnam, 58, 
60, 64 

Ngo Dinh Nhu, 62, 64 

Ngo Quyen, xxxvi, 14, 16 

Nguyen Ai Quoc. See Ho Chi Minh 

Nguyen Anh. See Gia Long 

Nguyen Cao Ky, 70 

Nguyen Chi Thanh, 61, 67 

Nguyen Co Thach, 227, 231, 327-28 

Nguyen Due Tarn, 196, 327 

Nguyen family, 21, 23-24 

Nguyen Hai Than, 52 

Nguyen Hue. See Quang Trung 

Nguyen Huu Tho, 261 

Nguyen Khac Nhu, 41 

Nguyen Khanh, 333 

Nguyen Nhac, 25, 25-26 

Nguyen Quyet, 332-33 

Nguyen Sinh Cung. See Ho Chi Minh; Ly 
Thuy 

Nguyen Thai Hoc, 40 

Nguyen Thanh Binh, 328-29 

Nguyen The Phan, xlii 

Nguyen Tuan Tai, See Tran Kien 

Nguyen Van Linh, xl, xli-xlii, 144, 190, 

194, 199, 228, 307, 325-26 
Nguyen Van Thieu, 70, 72-73, 78 
Nguyen Van Vinh, 38-39 
Nhan Dan, 111, 131, 132 
Nhat Nam, 8 
Nha Trang, 183, 185 
Nhu. See Ngo Dinh Nhu 
nickel, 146 

Nixon, Richard M., 72, 76, 218, 226, 227 
NLF. See National Liberation Front 
(NLF) 

Noi Bai airport, 185, 281 
Nonaligned Movement, 232 
Norodom Sihanouk. See Sihanouk, 
Norodom 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), 225 
Number One Frozen Seafood Export 

Company, 169 
Nung people, 96, 98 

offensives: Easter, 73; Tet, 70-72 
officer corps of PAVN, 282-84 
Official Development Assistance (Japan), 
176 

oil industry, 146, 169, 176, 177 



Operation Rolling Thunder, 65 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 

and Development (OECD), 173 
Overseas Free Vietnam Association, 292 
overseas remittances, 177, 178, 181 

Pac Bo, 47 

Paracel Islands, 85, 219 

Paramilitary Force (PAVN), 251-52, 

274-75 
paramilitary system, 274 
Paris Agreement (Agreement Ending the 

War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam), 

225-26, 227-28 
Parrot's Beak region, 255, 257 
partition (1954), 204 
party. See Vietnam Communist Party 

(VCP; Viet Nam Cong San Dang) 
party caucuses, 196-97 
party control. See Vietnamese Communist 

Party (VCP: Viet Nam Cong San 

Dang) 

party front organizations, 197-99 
party leadership, 199-200 
party membership in PAVN, 273 
PASF. See People's Armed Security Force 
(PASF) 

Pathet Lao. See Lao People's Revolution- 
ary Party (Pathet Lao) 

Patriotic Buddhist Liaison Committee, 
122 

PAVN. See People's Army of Vietnam 
(PAVN) 

Penal Code, 210, 300 

People's Armed Security Force (PASF), 
288, 294-95, 297 

People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) (see 
also Great Campaign; Viet Minh), 64, 
66-67, 72, 78, 196, 219, 225; armed 
propaganda teams of, 249; combat 
services of, 278; command structure of, 
277-78; constitutional basis and 
administration of, 260-61; develop- 
ment of, 248-52; officer corps in, 254; 
police functions of, 295; postwar 
development of, 252; role in First Indo- 
china War, 251; role in social structure, 
261; two-commander system in, 268 

People's Committees, 206 

People's Councils, 206, 208 

People's Courts, 209 

People's Guerrilla Forces, 275 



379 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



People's Liberation Armed Force (PLAF), 
62, 64, 66, 67, 72, 73, 78, 251-52 

People's Liberation Army (PLA). See Peo- 
ple's Liberation Armed Force (PLAF) 

People's Organ of Control. See Supreme 
People's Organ of Control 

People's Public Security Force (PPSF) {see 
also secret police), 288, 296 

People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), 
xliv, 216, 217, 257 

People's Revolutionary Committees 
(VCP), 190 

People's Revolutionary Party, 327 

People's Security Force (PSF), 288, 293- 
95 

People's Security Service (PSS), 265, 
296-98 

People's Self-Defense Force Program, 73 
People's Supreme Procurate. See Supreme 

People's Organ of Control 
people's war, 242 
pepper, 104 
Pha Lai, 161 

Pham Hung, xli, 61, 199, 293, 326, 330 

Pham Quynh, 39 

Pham The Duyet, 334 

Pham Van Dong, 45, 51, 110, 194, 199, 

225, 261, 326, 330 
Phan Boi Chau, 5, 35-38, 40, 44 
Phan Chu Trinh, 5, 36-37 
Phan Dinh Phung, 32 
Philippines, 229, 230 
Phnom Penh, xxxix, 89, 214, 255, 257 
Phnom Penh government, 216-17 
Pho Hien, 23 
Phu Bai, 185 
Phu Khanh Province, 183 
Phung-nguyen culture, 7 
Phuoc Binh, 76 
Phuoc Long Province, 76 
Phuoc Tuy, 73 
Phu Quoc, 185 
Phu Xuan, 26 
Pike, Douglas, 199 
pipeline, 183 

PLA. See Chinese People's Liberation 
Army (PLA), See People's Liberation 
Army (PLA) 

PLAF. See People's Liberation Armed 
Force (PLAF) 

plateaus, 86 

Pleiku, 76, 78, 185 



police functions {see also secret police), 287, 
293 

Police Protection Regiment, 297 

Political Bureau (VCP), xli, 194, 196, 
199, 205, 207, 255, 275, 325-32 

political commissar, 253, 268-69 

political officer in PAVN (see also politi- 
cal commissar), 273 

political parties, noncommunist, 51, 52 

political prisoners, xlvi, 44-45 

political struggle, 67 

political system {see also Confucianism); 
historical foundation for, 200 

Pol Pot, xliv-xlv, 72 

Pol Pot regime {see also Democratic Kam- 
puchea; Khmer Rouge), 213, 214, 216, 
230, 255 

polygyny, 114, 118 

population: density and growth of, xxxvii, 
90-91, 144; displacement by war of, 
107-8; redistribution/relocation plan 
for, 92-93, 100, 110, 117, 304 

population control. See family planning 

ports, 183 

Potsdam Conference, 51 
Poulo Condore (Con Dao), 30, 37, 45 
PPSF. See People's Public Security Force 
(PPSF) 

price structure {see also contract system; 
quotas; market system), 157-58, 179; 
differentials for state and free-market 
commodities, 180 

Prince Canh, 25 

prison system, 302-3, 305 

private enterprises, xliii 

PRK. See People's Republic of Kam- 
puchea (PRK) 

productivity, 156 

Propaganda and Training Department. 

See Central Committee 
propaganda teams, 257 
Protectorate of Annam, 12 
Protestants, 128 

Provisional Revolutionary Government of 
the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG), 
72, 189, 226 

PSS. See People's Security Service (PSS) 

publications, 233-34 

public health, 134-36 



Qin dynasty (China), 8 
Qing dynasty (China), 26, 28 



380 



Index 



Quart Doi Nhan Dan, 137 

Quang Nam Province, 25, 36, 37 

Quang Ngai Province, 37, 49, 67 

Quang Ninh Province, 329 

Quang Tri city, 73 

Quang Tri Province, 73, 76 

Quang Trung, 26, 240 

Qui Nhon, 25, 183 

quoc ngu, 23-24, 35, 38-39, 49, 95 

quotas {see also dual quota planning); for 

production, 180 
Quynh Luu uprising, 289 



Rach Gia, 185 
Raglai people, 100 
railroads, 182-83 
rationing, 13-7, 179 
Reagan, Ronald, xliv, 227 
Red Flag Security, 288 
Red RiverDelta, 3, 4, 7, 8, 85, 92, 119, 
120, 153 

Red River (Song Hong), 85, 183 
Red-Scarf Teenagers' Organization, 197 
re-education camps, xlvi, 110, 118, 304-6 
reform camps, 111 

refugees, 102, 108, 110-11, 257; Indo- 
chinese, 227; relaxation of policy con- 
cerning, xlvii; from Vietnam to China, 
219 

Regional Force (PAVN), 274 
registration system, 306 
Regular Force (PAVN), 274 
Religious Affairs Committee, 126 
relocation strategy, 92-93, 107-8, 147 
remittances, overseas, 177-78 
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), 

60, 189, 205 
reunification of Vietnam, xxxv, 4-5, 189, 

190, 205; problems of, xxxvii 
revenue, 178 

Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), 
298-99 

Revolutionary Vigilance Committees, 
306 

rice cultivation, 7, 86, 104 
Riviere, Henri, 32 
roads, 182-83 

rubber industry, 104, 168, 172-73 
Sadang people, 100 

Saigon {see also Gia Dinh; Saigon-Cholon; 



Ho Chi Minh City), 5, 30, 35, 40, 49, 

107, 214; in Tet offensive, 70, 72 
Saigon government {see also Diem regime), 

76; recognition of minorities by, 99 
salvation associations, 49 
San Chay people, 96 
satellite-ground stations, 185 
scholar-officials, xxxvi, 16, 95, 102, 103, 

129, 201, 203 
schools, 130; under French colonial rule, 

35; state control and reform of, 129-30; 

vocational, 130-31 
search and destroy missions, 66 
secret police, 296 

security, internal, 287-88; role of youth 
organizations for, 298; security inter- 
zones for, 295-96 

shipping, 183, 185 

Siam, 31 

Sihanouk, Norodom, xliv, 72, 216 
silica sand, 146 

Singapore, 229; trade with, 170-71 
Sinicization {Han-hwa), xxxvi, 3, 9, 201 
Sitthi Sawetsila, xlvii 
slash-and-burn farming, 98 
social control mechanisms {see also 

re-education camps; surveillance), 1 10— 

11, 303-5 

socialism, 83; conflict with capitalism of, 

83, 109 
socialist family, 119 
socialist legality concept, 206 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), 

189, 190 
social reconstruction, 118 
social structure: development and changes 

in, 102-5; new social order in, 106, 

110-12 
Song Be Province, 173 
Song Da (Black River; Riviere Noire), 85 
Song dynasty (China), 14-15 
Song Hong (Red River), 85 
Song Lo (Clear River; Riviere Claire), 85 
Son Sann, 216 
South China Sea, 86, 219 
Southeast Asia: influence in Vietnam of, 

201 

sovereignty of people concept, 205-6 
Soviet Intersputnik Communication 

Satellite Organization, 185 
Soviets (Bolshevik term), 44 
Soviet Union, 146, 150; alignment of 

Vietnam with, 194; economic aid to 



381 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



Vietnam by, xxxix-xl, 173, 177, 223; 
educational ties with, 131-32; food and 
commodity aid to Vietnam, 223; mili- 
tary assistance to Hanoi government 
by, xxxix-xl, 222-23, 254, 284, 
286-87; political influence in Vietnam 
of, 202; presence in Vietnam of, 286; 
relations with, xxxix, 190-91, 211; role 
in Second Indochina War of, 64-65; 
role in Vietnamese affairs of, 221-22; 
shipping in Vietnam by, 183; trade 
treaty with, 166, 172; trade with, 169, 
169-70, 171-72 

Special Operations Force (PAVN), 278 

special zone, 210 

Spratly Islands, xlv, 219, 230-31 

SRV. See Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
(SRV) 

State Bank of Vietnam, 167, 181 
State Commission for Cooperation and 

Investment, xlvii 
state enterprises, 178, 180 
State Planning Commission, 136, 178 
Stieng people, 100 
strategic hamlet program, 61 
strategic planning (see also dau tranh), 

242-45 
Strategic Rear Force, 274 
strikes, 43 

student exchange, 131 

subsidies, 179; for commodities, 180; for 

procurement, 168 
Sun Yat-sen, 37 

supply shortages, xxxvii-xxxviii, 158 
Supreme People's Court, 205, 206-7, 

208, 209, 300 
Supreme People's Organs of Control, 

207, 208, 209, 209-10, 303 
surveillance, 111, 307 
Sweden, 170, 176, 232 



Tactical Rear Force, 274 

Tai language, 7, 93 

Tai people, 14 

Taiping Rebellion, 31 

Tang dynasty (China), xxxvi, 12, 14 

Tan Son Nhut airport, 70, 185, 282 

Tan Trao conference, 50 

Tan Viet Party, 42 

Taoism, 83, 128 

Tap Chi Cong San (Communist Review), 
234, 329 



taxation, 178 

Tay Ninh Province, 67, 290 
Tay Nung people, 28, 45 
Tay people, 96, 98 
Tay Son Rebellion, 24-26 
tea, 104 

Technoimport, 169 

telecommunications, 185 

telephone system, 185-86 

Television Vietnam, 235-36 

Ten Circuit Army, 14 , 

Tet offensive, 70-72 

Thai-Cambodian border, 220 

Thailand, 183, 229, 230, 231; importance 
to Vietnam of, xlvii 

Thai Nguyen Province, 38, 49 

Thai people, 96, 98 

Thang Long (Hanoi), 16, 26 

Thanh Hoa, 183 

Thanh Hoa Province, 7 

Thanh Nien. See Viet Nam Thanh Nien 
Cach Menh Dong Chi Hoi (Revolu- 
tionary Youth League) 

Thanh Nien Tien Phong (Vanguard 
Youth), 49, 50 

Thieu. See Nguyen Van Thieu 

Tho Xuan, 281 

Three Cleans movement, 135 

Three Exterminations movement, 135 

Thuc, 8 

tin production, 146, 173 

titanium, 146 

To Huu, 331 

Tong Binh (Hanoi), 14 

Tonkin, 4, 31, 33, 35 

Tourane (Da Nang), 30 

tourism, 168 

trade, foreign (see also Comecon countries; 
economic planning; exports; imports), 
164, 166-67; decentralization for pur- 
poses of, 168-69; volume with Come- 
con and non-Comecon countries, 
169-70, 223 

trade boycott, 162, 167, 171 

trade deficit, 169-70, 177 

trade embargo (see also trade boycott), xl, 
227 

trading companies, 168-69 
trading corporations, state, 168-69 
Tran dynasty, 16 
Tran Hieu, 296 
Tran Hung Dao, 16 
Tran Kien, 332 



382 



Index 



Tran Nach Ban. See Tran Quoc Huong 

Tran Quoc Hoan, 293 

Tran Quoc Huong, 333 

Tran Quyet, 333 

transportation system, 181-85 

Tran Trong Kim, 48 

Tran Van Huong, 78 

Tran Van Tra, 190 

Tran Xuan Bach, 196, 328, 333 

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 

(1977) : with Laos, 217 

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 

(1978) : with Soviet Union, xxxix, 166, 
220, 222, 227 

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 

(1979) : with Phnom Penh government, 
217 

Treaty of Hue, 32 

Treaty of Protectorate with France (1883), 

32, 48 
Treaty of Saigon, 30-31 
Tri An, 161 
tribal groups, 86 
Trieu Au, 11 
Trieu Da, 8 
Trieu Quang Phuc, 12 
Trinh family, 21, 23-24 
Trotskyites, 45 
Trung Bo, 4, 43 
Trung sisters, 8-9, 240 
Truong Chinh, 50, 55, 260, 328 
Truong Nhu Tang, 199 
Tu Due, xxxvi, 30-31 
tungsten, 146 

Tuyen Quang Province, 49, 55, 191 
two-commander system, 268-69 

UN. See United Nations 
unemployment, 145-46 
Unified Bishops' Council of Vietnam, 126 
Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, 
122 

Unified Front for the Struggle of 
Oppressed Races (Front Unifie pour la 
Lutte des Races Opprimees: FULRO), 
99-100, 289, 295 

United Issarak Front, 214 

United Nations Economic and Social 
Council For Asia and the Pacific, 176 

United Nations Mekong Committee, 183, 
232 



United Nations (UN): Vietnam's rela- 
tions with, 214, 232 

United Nations (UN) General Assembly, 
xl, 214, 230 

United States: air strikes in North Viet- 
nam, 148; assistance to South Vietnam, 
149; attack on embassy of, 70; attempt 
to improve relations with, xlvi; expedi- 
tionary force in South Vietnam, 66-67, 
70; issue concerning aid to Vietnam, 
227-28; opposition to Second Indo- 
china War, 67; relations with China, 
227; role in Second Indochina War of, 
64; secret bombing in Cambodia by, 
72; support to France in Indochina war, 
225; war of support for South Vietnam 
by, xxxv, 65, 224 

United States Marines: in Vietnam, 66 

United States Military Assistance Com- 
mand, Vietnam (MACV), 61 

universities, 131 

University of Hanoi, 35 

urban society in South Vietnam, 108 

Vanguard Teenager Organization, 298 

Van Lang, 7, 8 

Vannier, Philippe, 29 

Van Tien Dung, 78, 330-31 

VCP. See Vietnamese Communist Party 

(VCP: Viet Nam Cong San Dang) 
Vegetexco, 169 

Versailles Peace Conference, 40 

Vessey, John W., 228 

Vichy government, 46 

Viet Bac, 45, 49, 56 

Viet Cong. See National Liberation Front 

(NLF) 
Viet (Kinh), 90 

Viet Minh, 106, 192, 250, 252, 330; 
establishment of, 47-50; National Con- 
gress meeting of, 50 

Viet Nam, 27 

Vietnam: partition of, 4-5 

Vietnam, North: as Democratic Repub- 
lic of Vietnam (DRV), 204; economic 
development in, 147-49; minority 
policy of, 99-101; relations with China 
of, 218; social system after partition in, 
105-7; wartime economy of, 67 

Vietnam, South: differentiated from North 
Vietnam, 201-2; economic development 
in, 147-49; minority policy of, 99-101; 



383 



Vietnam: A Country Study 



relations with ASEAN member coun- 
tries, 230; resistance to change after 
reunification, xxxvii; support by United 
States for, 65; wartime election in, 70 
Vietnam Buddhist Church, 122-23 
Viet Nam Cong Hien Hoi (Vietnam Pub- 
lic Offering Society), 36 
Vietnam Courier, 125 

Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP: 
Viet Nam Cong San Dang) {see also 
cadre system; Central Committee 
(VCP)); xxxvi, 83, 111, 143, 149, 153, 
189; control of government by, 189; 
control of People's Army of Vietnam, 
267-73; control of society by, 191, 
196-97; economic planning by, 149- 
54; founding of, 42-43; Linh role in, 
325-26; mechanism to control PAVN, 
272-73; role in population relocation 
planning, 304 

Vietnamese language, 7, 9, 12, 17, 24, 
93, 95; romanizing of, 23 

Vietnamese people, 93; as majority eth- 
nic group, 84 

Vietnamese-Siamese protectorate, 28 

Vietnam Fatherland Front, 191, 197, 263, 
328 

Vietnam Foreign Trade Corporation, 169 
Vietnam General Confederation of Trade 

Unions, 191, 197-98, 334 
Vietnam Institute of Nutrition, 145 
Vietnam Liberation Army (VLA) {see also 

People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN)), 

49, 52 

Vietnam News Agency (VNA), 235, 329 
Vietnam Ocean Shipping Agency, 169 
Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Dong Minh Hoi 
(League for the Restoration of Viet- 
nam), 50, 51 
Viet Nam Quang Phuc Hoi (Vietnam 

Restoration Society), 37, 50 
Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD: 
Vietnamese Nationalist Party), 41-42, 
51, 290 

Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Menh Dong 

Chi Hoi (Revolutionary Youth League), 

40, 41, 42 
Vietnam Trade Union Federation, 50 
Vietnam Women's Union, 116 
Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP: Dang 

Lao Dong Viet Nam), 55, 61 , 64, 106, 

192, 251 
Vietnam Youth Federation, 298 



Vietnam War. See Indochina War, 

Second 
Vietsovpetro, 169 
Viet (Yue) people, 8 
Vijaya, 15 

village society in South Vietnam, 108-9 
Vinh, 183 

Vinh Phu Province, 7 

VNQDD. See Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang 

(VNQDD: Vietnamese Nationalist 

Party) 
Vo Chi Cong, 326, 329 
Voice of Vietnam, 234 
volunteer services, 298-99 
Vo Nguyen Giap, 12, 49, 51, 56, 194, 

201, 249-50, 257, 266, 331 
Vo Nhan Tri, 149 

Vo Van Kiet, xli, 136, 137, 156-57, 325, 
327, 329 

Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone, xlviii, 
146 

Vu Oanh, 333 

VWP. See Vietnam Workers' Party 
(VWP: Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam) 

wage policy, 180-81 
Warsaw Pact members: Vietnam's rela- 
tions with, 224 
weather- related problems, 154 
Westmoreland, William C, 65-66, 67, 71 
White Tigers, 290 

women, 8-9, 11, 263; in labor force, 117; 
in military, 285-86; in Vietnamese 
society, 114, 116 

Workers' Liberation Association of Viet- 
nam (Hoi Lao Dong Giai Phong Mien 
Nam), 62 

World Bank, 232 



Yellow Crab Force, 290 
Yen Bai uprising, 42 
Yen The, 37, 

youth organizations, 298-99 
Yuan Shi-kai, 37 



Zao people, 96, 100, 101 
Zhou Enlai, 218 
zinc, 146 

Zone of Fabrication and Exportation, 
xlvii-xlviii 



384 



Published Country Studies 



(Area Handbook Series) 



550-65 


Afghanistan 


550-153 


Ghana 


550-98 


Albania 


550-87 


Greece 


550-44 


Algeria 


550-78 


Guatemala 


550-59 


Angola 


550-174 


Guinea 


550-73 


Argentina 


550-82 


Guyana 


550-169 


Australia 


550-151 


Honduras 


550-176 


Austria 


550-165 


Hungary 


550-175 


Bangladesh 


550-21 


India 


550-170 


Belgium 


550-154 


Indian Ocean 


550-66 


Bolivia 


550-39 


Indonesia 


550-20 


Brazil 


550-68 


Iran 


550-168 


Bulgaria 


550-31 


Iraq 


550-61 


XJ Ul 1 11 CI 


550-25 


Israel 


550-37 


Burundi/Rwanda 


550-182 


Italy 


550-50 


Cambodia 


550-30 


TaDan 


550-166 


Cameroon 


550-34 


Jordan 


550-159 


Chad 


550-56 


Kenya 


550-77 


Chile 


550-81 


Korea North 


550-60 


China 


550-41 


Korea South 


550-26 


Colombia 


550-58 


Laos 


550-33 


Commonwealth Caribbean, 


550-24 


Lebanon 




Islands of the 






550-91 


Congo 


550-38 


Liberia 


550-90 


Costa Rica 


550-85 


Libya 


550-69 


C6te d'lvoire (Ivory Coast) 


550-172 


Malawi 


550-152 


Cuba 


550-45 


Malaysia 


550-22 


Cyprus 


550-161 


Mauritania 


550-158 


Czechoslovakia 


550-79 


Mexico 


550-36 


Dominican Republic/Haiti 


550-76 


Mongolia 


550-52 


Ecuador 


550-49 


Morocco 


550-43 


Egypt 


550-64 


Mozambique 


550-150 


El Salvador 


550-88 


Nicaragua 


550-28 


Ethiopia 


550-157 


Nigeria 


550-167 


Finland 


550-94 


Oceania 


550-155 


Germany, East 


550-48 


Pakistan 


550-173 


Germany, Fed. Rep. of 


550-46 


Panama 



385 



550-156 


Paraguay 


550-89 


Tunisia 


550-185 


Persian Gulf States 


550-80 


Turkey 


550-42 


Peru 


550-74 


Uganda 


550-72 


Philippines 


550-97 


Uruguay 


550-162 


Poland 


550-71 


Venezuela 


550-181 


Portugal 


550-32 


Vietnam 


550-160 


Romania 


550-183 


Yemens, The 


550-51 


Saudi Arabia 


550-99 


Yugloslavia 


550-70 


Senegal 


550-67 


Zaire 


550-180 


Sierra Leone 


550-75 


Zambia 


550-184 


Singapore 


550-171 


Zimbabwe 


550-86 


Somalia 






550-93 


South Africa 






550-95 


Soviet Union 






550-179 


Spain 






500-96 


Sri Lanka 






550-27 


Sudan 






550-47 


Syria 






550-62 


Tanzania 






550-53 


Thailand 







<rU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1989 -0- 261-866 (00017) 



386 



PIN: 067205-000 



